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SUMMARY 
 
The work examines the problem of market manipulation in complex markets from an antitrust and 
capital market law perspective, using the example of the German wholesale market for electricity 
(European Energy Exchange, EEX) and applying the methodology of the economic analysis of law. 
It is shown that authorities applying the ban of market manipulations on potential infringements 
regularly face problems of proving a breach of the law which may result in a lack of enforcement of 
sanctions. Considerable gaps in enforcement result that may reduce the deterrent effect of the 
prohibition significantly. 
The central thesis of this work is therefore, that an evolution of the existing system of sanctions is 
required such that it exerts repercussions on market participants´ reasoning that make an offence 
unattractive already from the ex-ante perspective. 
In the first section, the market conditions as well as the existing legal framework are examined. As a 
result of this analysis, incentives for manipulation of the market by market participants and the lack 
of effective instruments for law enforcement are found. The sector inquiries of both, the European 
Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office confirm this finding. 
The second section of the work builds upon the positive analysis and proposes regulatory instruments 
to change the incentive scheme in the market. The focus is placed on measures that increase the 
probability of detection and punishment instead of the dogma of consistently increasing fines. The 
central proposal extends the existing leniency program for cartels on manipulation cases and 
combines it with a reward system for whistleblowers. This approach proposes an increased probability 
of detection of market manipulations and thereby boosts the deterrent effect of antitrust law. Also, 
the effective coordination of public and private antitrust enforcement efforts is a necessary 
accompanying measure to remedy deficiencies of law enforcement. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der Marktmanipulation in komplexen Märkten aus kartell- und 
kapitalmarktrechtlicher Perspektive am Beispiel des deutschen Großhandelsmarktes für Strom 
(European Energy Exchange, EEX) mittels einer ökonomischen und rechtlichen Analyse. 
Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Behörden bei der Anwendung des Manipulationstatbestandes auf 
mögliche Verstöße häufig vor Nachweisproblemen stehen, die im Ergebnis zu einer fehlenden 
Durchsetzung von Sanktionen trotz Tatbestandsmäßigkeit führen können. Dadurch kommt es zu 
Lücken in der Rechtsdurchsetzung, die den Abschreckungseffekt der Verbotstatbestände erheblich 
mindern. 
Zentrale These der Arbeit ist daher, dass das bestehende Sanktionensystem derart weiterentwickelt 
werden muss, dass es Rückwirkungen bereits auf die Tatbestandsebene entfaltet, die einen Verstoß 
gegen das Manipulationsverbot schon aus der ex-ante Perspektive unattraktiv machen. 
Im ersten Teil werden das Marktumfeld sowie der bestehende Rechtsrahmen untersucht und 
Manipulationsanreize für die Marktteilnehmer sowie das Fehlen effektiver Instrumente zur 
Rechtsdurchsetzung festgestellt. Die Sektoruntersuchungen der Europäischen Kommission sowie des 
Bundeskartellamtes bestätigen diesen Befund. 
Der zweite Teil setzt auf die positive Analyse auf und schlägt Regulierungsinstrumente zur Änderung 
des Anreizsystems vor. Dabei ist der Fokus anstelle stetig steigender Bußgelder auf Maßnahmen zur 
Steigerung der Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit zu legen. Es wird vorgeschlagen, das bestehende 
Kronzeugenprogramm auf Manipulationsfälle auszudehnen und mit einem Belohnungssystem für 
Whistleblower zu kombinieren, um vermehrt Verstöße aufzudecken und den Abschreckungseffekt der 
Manipulationstatbestände zu erhöhen. Begleitend ist eine effektive Koordinierung der Maßnahmen 
staatlicher und privater Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts geboten, um Durchsetzungsdefizite zu 
beseitigen. 
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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
- Juristische Fakultät - 
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FIRST CHAPTER: 
THE RESEARCH PROJECT AND ITS ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
A. Introduction 
“We who live in free market societies believe that growth, prosperity and ultimately 
human fulfillment, are created from bottom up, not the government down. Only when the 
human spirit is allowed to invent and create, only when individuals are given a personal 
stake in deciding economic policies and benefiting from their success – only then can 
societies remain economically alive, dynamic, progressive, and free. Trust the people. This 
is the one irrefutable lesson of the entire postwar period contradicting the notion that rigid 
government controls are essential to economic development.”1 
When the German energy market was opened in 1998, this event was connected with 
numerous expectations for a plurality of suppliers in the market, better supply of custom-
ers and, overall, lower prices for them.2 After decades of dominance of trusts and cartels 
                                                 
1 Ronald Regan, 40th President of the United States of America (1981-1989). September 29th, 1981. 
2 Peter Becker, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung des 
Energierechts (Bochum: Ponte Press, 2010), 78. 
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in the German energy market, almost not interrupted or even supported by government 
regulation, the directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity of 
the European Parliament from 19963 was expected to break the market power of the es-
tablished companies and introduce competition in the crucial markets for power genera-
tion, transmission and distribution. 
Yet, the years to follow the liberalization showed with huge clarity that the trusts were not 
willing to give up their dominant position in this profitable market without opposition. Their 
traditional and well-cultivated linkages with the political decision makers allowed them to 
influence legislation in their interest and keep their dominant position in the market.4 In 
particular, the creation of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in 2002 was an appreci-
ated opportunity for the trusts to control the development of power prices in their interest.5 
As a result, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) states in its 2011 sector inquiry on 
the power generation and power wholesale markets in Germany, that the competitive 
environment on the market for first-time sale of electricity is still dissatisfactory.6 The 
office was investigating price manipulations at the EEX through physical as well as financial 
capacity retentions by the four trusts in the German energy market: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall 
and EnBW. Several indications had been suggesting that the oligopoly firms were abusing 
their market power to charge prices above their marginal cost of production to the detri-
ment of the consumers.7 Yet, in spite of a huge data collection and evidence found for 
excessive prices at the stock exchange, the office was incapable to prove manipulations. 
Before, already the European Commission failed in proving manipulations in a 2007 ex-
amination – it ended with commitments of the huge suppliers instead of sanctions.8 
In similar cases concerning complex circumstances in capital markets, e.g. the German 
case Volkswagen/Porsche in 20089, the authorities did also face huge difficulties to prove 
manipulations. Apparently, there are cases in the field of the antitrust and capital market 
manipulation offenses that are most probably punishable – but where the actual enforce-
                                                 
3 European Parliament and European Council, Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, N° 96/92/EC from December 19th 1996. The directive was transposed into German law with the law 
on the energy industry [Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG)], from April 29th 1998, BGBl. I 730. 
4 Peter Becker, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung des 
Energierechts (Bochum: Ponte Press, 2010), 78. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 284. 
7 Becker, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung des 
Energierechts (Bochum: Ponte Press, 2010), 78. 
8 Commission of the European Communities, Commission staff working document, COM(2006) 851 final, 142 
Ref. 428. 
9 Möllers, “Die juristische Aufarbeitung der Übernahmeschlacht VW-Porsche – ein Überblick”, NZG Vol. 17, no. 
10 (2014), 363. 
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ment of a sanction fails in practice due to a lack of prove. Such shortcomings in enforce-
ment do, however, diminish the deterrent effect of any prohibition. This work will hence 
treat the question how the legal framework may be adapted in order to effectively deter 
infringements of the manipulation offenses. The central proposition that will be devel-
oped for this purpose in the following chapters is the following: 
The system of sanctions needs to be revised in a way that it creates repercus-
sions on the offense such that an infringement of the ban on manipulations be-
comes unattractive for market participants already from an ex ante perspective. 
This proposition will be developed using the allegations of market manipulations at the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) as an example. This prominent case is well suited for 
an exemplary treatment of the shortcomings in enforcement in complex manipulation 
cases due to the comprehensive data available. In a first step, it will be shown that the 
current design of the regulatory framework creates incentives for market participants to 
engage in market manipulations. This proposition is supported using data from the FCO´s 
and European Commission´s investigations as well as a model from industrial organiza-
tion. It will also be shown that in practice, authorities do lack effective instruments to 
prove manipulations in cases like this. On the basis of these findings, the work will con-
centrate on regulatory strategies that are suited to bring about positive behavioral effects 
impacting the market participants´ behavior pursuant to the regulator´s goals in a second 
step. The incentive system needs to be changed in such a way that manipulating the 
market is no longer an attractive option for actors, but are avoided due to the deterrent 
legal framework. The most promising approach recommended in this work is a reform of 
the system of sanctions and, subsequently, a change of paradigm in the FCO treatment of 
abuse of market power: 
▪ Instead of the sole focus on increasing government fines for infringements, a turn 
towards measures that increase the probability of detection of infringements, and 
▪ an efficient combination of available instruments of public and private market 
supervision are likely to result in a higher deterrent effect than the current legal 
framework. 
The main theses for the analysis will be presented in the next section B., followed by a 
description of the methodology used – the economic analysis of law – in section C. and an 
overview of the essential characteristics of the German energy market and the legal situ-
ation in Germany and the European Union (section D.). Section F. Summarizes the results 
of the first chapter. 
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The second chapter of the work introduces the economic and legal basics shaping the 
exemplary case of allegations of market manipulations at the EEX. The potential manipu-
lation strategies of the trusts at the EEX are discussed and subsumed under German and 
EU competition law. Subsequently, the obstacles to proving the suspicions of manipula-
tions for competition authorities will be demonstrated. In the case at hand, such short-
comings in enforcement did – in spite of a number of strong indications – result in no 
sanction for the allegations of manipulations. The fact that an infringement of the manip-
ulation offense was probable is shown using a model of industrial organization. The chapter 
closes with the finding that the current legal framework, in spite of its regulatory density, 
provides incentives for actors to manipulate the market. 
A behavioral impact on actors that makes manipulating the market unattractive to them 
may be reached with an efficient system of market surveillance both publicly and privately 
as it is introduced in the third and fourth chapters of this work. The third chapter starts 
with a comprehensive economic and legal analysis that shows that the authorities´ current 
focus on tremendous fines does not only lead to an ineffective deterrence of manipulations, 
but also infringes European and German constitutional law. The work does hence propose 
legal instruments that increase the probability of detection of market manipulations. It is 
only on this way that the necessary impact on the market participants´ behavior may be 
reached. 
The following fourth chapter does furthermore treat strategies of private market surveil-
lance that may increase deterrence of market manipulations if designed appropriately – 
namely damages claims of injured parties. 
As a result of the preceding analysis, the fifth chapter examines conflicts of objectives 
between the different regulatory approaches discussed and develops a new regulatory 
approach for the treatment of market manipulations: An integrated system of market sur-
veillance. This approach promises an impact on the market actors´ behavior that avoids 
manipulations and is hence superior to the currently practiced, fragmented regulatory 
system. 
The final sixth chapter summarizes the results. 
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B. Research theses 
This scientific work is going to prove the following theses concerning the market 
manipulations at the European Energy Exchange: 
(1) The data from the Federal Cartel Office sector inquiry 2011 as well as the market 
structure in the market for power generation suggest that market participants did 
have incentives to increase their profit through market manipulations during the 
period of examination. 
(2) The fight against market manipulations requires a regulatory impact on the mar-
ket actors´ behavior. For this purpose, the incentive system needs to be changed 
using a bundle of legislative measures, such that manipulations are no longer an 
attractive option for market participants. 
(3) The required impact on the actors´ behavior may be reached by a change of the 
system of sanctions that creates repercussions on the offense. The FCO is required 
de lege late to change the approach to public market surveillance by a shift from 
the current focus on tremendous fines towards an increased probability of pun-
ishment.  
(4) Furthermore, the legislator needs to create better incentives for injured parties to 
participate in market surveillance de lege ferenda. This way, the deterrent effect 
of public market surveillance may be increased and information carriers from the 
sphere of potential infringers be incentivized to disclose their information to the 
regulator. 
(5) Eventually, public and private instruments of market surveillance need to be co-
ordinated in an integrated system in order to achieve the highest possible level of 
deterrence at lowest cost and avoid potential conflicts between the instruments. 
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C. Methodology 
The following analysis will be conducted based on the fundamentals of the economic 
analysis of law. This interdisciplinary field of research brings together the subjects of law 
and economics to provide a better understanding of systems of legal rules and public 
policy.10 Economics, being at the most basic level a theory of rational behavior and decision 
making, offers essential tools to examine the law.11 
This methodology allows for an explanation of the effects of existing laws and regulations 
on people´s behavior (positive analysis), as well as an assessment of efficient rules to 
control harmful incentives (normative analysis).12 
 
I. Subject matters of the economic analysis of law 
Although the first thoughts on economic effects of legislation reach back to 18th cen-
tury classical economist Adam Smith13, modern economic analysis of law only developed 
in the 1960s14, mainly influenced by the publication of Ronald Coases groundbreaking 
article “The Problem of Social Cost”.15 In the early years, research focused on fields of law 
that were traditionally related to economics: Competition law and antitrust, industry reg-
ulation, tax and the determination of monetary damages in contract law and torts.16 Legal 
scholars and judges were employing economic tools to help them solve their cases. Yet, 
soon the economic analysis of law expanded into all fields of the legal science, including 
legal procedure and constitutional law.17 Today, the law and economics paradigm is influ-
encing the way we think about legal rules and institutions and – especially in the United 
States – the legal practice.18 Based on the concepts of neoclassical microeconomic theory, 
                                                 
10 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 11. For a de-
tailed description of the cooperation of law and economics, see: Christian Kirchner, “Ökonomische Analyse des 
Rechts. Interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit von Ökonomie und Rechtswissenschaft“, in Ökonomische Analyse 
des Rechts, ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Christian Kirchner, and Erich Schanze (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Sie-
beck), 1993), 62-78. 
11 David D. Friedman, Law´s Order: What Economics Has to Do With Law and Why it Matters (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 8. 
12 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 11. 
13 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
1776). 
14 Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 4. 
15 R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 3, no. 1 (1960). 
16 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 21. Robert Cooter 
and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 1. 
17 Ibid, 2. 
18 Economic analysis defined as the study of how societies meet their material needs even expands to a wider 
range of fields such as associations and bureaucracy, see Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic 
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it has emerged as a powerful scientific tool that did – especially in industry regulation and 
antitrust law – form “the intellectual force” behind revolutionary changes in paradigm.19 
By reason of the mentioned strengths of the economic analysis of law, this methodology 
is best suited to understand the market mechanisms in the primary market for electricity 
generation and identify the incentives for all market participants. Furthermore, the tools 
of economics allow for a normative analysis of the available regulatory instruments to 
reveal the most efficient measure against market distortions. 
The following section will highlight the basic assumptions of the law and economics anal-
ysis to sketch the framework of this work. 
 
II. Fundamental assumptions of the economic analysis of 
law 
As outlined above, the core of the economic analysis of law is the application of 
microeconomic theory to laws and institutions.20 To this end, the basic economic principle 
of efficiency is applied to legal rules.21 Consequentially, the legal system as an institution 
as well as jurisprudence are considered to aim at the maximization of social welfare 
through the creation of efficient rules and decisions22, opposed to basic legal theory that 
sees the primary end of legal rules and decision making in the achievement of justice.23 
The main task of the economic analysis of law is the transformation of legal rules into 
variables that can be used in analyses with the following subjects:24 
▪ Positive analyses of “the nature and origin of the existing legal system and its 
distribution of rights”, 
                                                 
Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 50 and Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 2. 
19 Economic analysis of law was one of the leading forces behind the deregulation movement in the United 
States in the 1970s and the U.S: antitrust revolution in the 1970s and 1980s. See Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 3. 
20 Christian Kirchner, “Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts. Interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit von Ökonomie und 
Rechtswissenschaft“, in Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts, ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Christian Kirchner, and 
Erich Schanze (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993), 70. 
21 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 3. 
22 Ibid, 3. 
23 Karl Larenz and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1995), 153. The economic approach to law is often criticized for the ignorance of justice. See Richard A. Pos-
ner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 27. 
24 The summary of analytical subject is taken from Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis 
of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 11. 
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▪ examinations on “the effect of the legal structure on allocative efficiency”, 
▪ research on “the necessary conditions for the development and emergence of effi-
cient legal structures”, and 
▪ normative analyses of the implementation of efficient legal structures. 
Both, the positive and the normative analysis, draw upon microeconomic principles.25 
Therefore, the fundamental assumptions of standard economic models apply.26 In the 
course of this work, it will be indicated if additional assumptions are made respectively 
one of the underlying assumptions is modified. However, the following most basic assump-
tions characterizing neoclassical microeconomics do have to be essentially met in the mod-
els presented in this work:27 
▪ Scarcity and 
▪ methodological individualism. 
 
1. Scarcity assumption 
The main problem of economic behavior and studies is to cope with limited resources 
as opposed to peoples´ unlimited wants.28 In a world of unlimited resources there is no 
need for rational choice. Therefore, economic thinking presumes that resources are limited 
– private consumers face an income restraint29, businesses and the governments are con-
fronted with a budget restriction.30 Therefore, the maxim of the economic science is effi-
cient resource allocation in the economy. 
 
                                                 
25 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 14. 
26 Assumptions in economic models serve the purpose of simplifying complex phenomena in reality to more 
easily study the effects of exogenous influences on the model world. Which assumptions are used in a model 
depends mainly on the question that shall be answered. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Ma-
son: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 23. 
27 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 50. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The income or budget restraint of private households is defined as “the limit on the consumption bundles 
that a consumer can afford”. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage 
Learning, 2008), 458. 
30 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 15. 
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2. Methodological individualism 
The second important assumption underlying economic theory is that people are 
rational decision makers in pursuit of the maximization of their individual utilities – homo 
oeconomicus.31 This abstract modeling of humans is also known as methodological indi-
vidualism in the social sciences and forms the basis for a wide range of analyses.32 The 
two main characteristics of the homo oeconomicus assumption, rationality and self-inter-
est, shall be introduced a little further. 
Rational behavior is most basically defined as purposeful choice.33 A rational decision 
maker tries to find the alternative that ranks the highest in reaching his ends. This process 
is called maximizing the actor´s utility.34 The premise of rationality does, however, not 
imply consciousness of a decision maker of his choice.35 Whichever goal an agent pursues 
and regardless of which reasons – the rationality assumption is satisfied if the means to 
achieve the goal are used with the least possible waste of resources.36 In order for this 
choice to be made, actors need a complete ordering of their preferences. In modern deci-
sion theory, three axioms of rationality allow for rational choices:37 
▪ Completeness of preference relations38, 
▪ reflexivity39, and 
▪ transitivity40. 
Besides this core of axioms, two more extensions have been added to the mentioned 
axioms in the literature: Independence41 and consistency42. Based on these hypotheses 
                                                 
31 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 3. 
32 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 51. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 16. 
35 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 3, 4. 
36 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 52. 
37 Ibid. 
38 A complete ranking of all alternatives is given by pair-wise comparisons of all alternatives.  
39 It is assumed that any bundle of goods is at least as good as itself. See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microe-
conomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 35. 
40 Transitivity means that if the bundle X is preferred to Y and Y is preferred to Z, then X must also be pre-
ferred to Z. See ibid. 
41 The independence axiom means that the preference of one bundle X over another bundle Y remains even if 
the agent receives a third alternative z instead. See Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis 
of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 53. 
42 The consistency axiom is satisfied if an agent preferring X over Y also prefers some chance of receiving X 
over the chance of receiving Y. See ibid. 
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about human behavior, predictions about the behavior of different actors in markets and 
other environments characterized by scarcity are possible. 
The notion of self-interest is not equal with selfishness:43 People may pursue selfish goals 
but may as well include other people´s happiness in their utility maximization.44 In other 
terms, an actor´s self-interest may more appropriately be called his “subjective prefer-
ences”.45 
As a result, it shows that in the concept of homo oeconomicus people respond to incen-
tives. That is, people´s behavior can be influenced by altering the institutional surround-
ings such that individual utility increases with altered decisions.46 This important insight 
stresses the value of an economic analysis of the market for electricity: Only by naming 
the incentives influencing the different actors on the market and testing the influence of 
altered surroundings, it will be possible to detect manipulations of the market and identify 
the optimal corrective. 
In order to compare the optimal market outcome with the actual market outcome and 
predictions about changes in the market triggered by different regulatory remedies, a 
benchmark has to be defined. In economics, this benchmark is social welfare. 
 
3. Social choice theory 
Assuming that the consequences of regulatory changes can be determined accu-
rately, social choice theory offers different concepts that allow for a comparison of different 
market outcomes with regard to the socially preferable one.47 Yet, there is not one unique 
concept that yields the social optimum of a decision problem. Depending on the definition 
of criteria the optimum shall fulfill, different value judgments are made in social choice 
theories.48 The most important ones will be introduced briefly in the following sections:49 
                                                 
43 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 4. 
44 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 52, 55. 
45 With reference to Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi: Ibid, 54. 
46 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 4. 
47 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 20. 
48 Ibid, 21. 
49 Besides these two important criteria, a lot of other decision rules have been developed in the social sci-
ences, e.g. the concept of utilitarianism going back to Jeremy Bentham. These alternative concepts, however, 
will not be discussed here because the following analysis is based on the widely accepted deckision rules pro-
posed by Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks. 
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▪ The Pareto criterion (Pareto efficiency), and 
▪ the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Social welfare). 
 
a) The Pareto criterion 
Vilfredo Pareto was one of the first economists to study the comparison of different 
market outcomes.50 He formulated what took later on his name as the Pareto principle51:  
“Consider two social states, x and y, each of which is a complete descrip-
tion of the society and the situation of each individual in it. Then if each 
member of society prefers x to y or is indifferent between x and y and at 
least one member prefers x to y, then x is socially preferable to y. Social 
choices that fulfill this condition are known as Pareto superior or Pareto 
improvements.”52 
The concept of Pareto allocative efficiency can be derived directly from this definition: A 
situation is Pareto efficient, if it is impossible to change the social status in order to make 
one person better off without making another individual in the society worse off.53 Hence, 
according to the definition of Pareto, only situations where no Pareto improvements are 
possible can be Pareto efficient.54 Yet, a Pareto efficient market outcome does not strin-
gently describe a socially just one.55 Notably, Pareto efficiency does not reflect the distri-
bution of welfare in society. Instead, an allocation of all goods and resources satisfies the 
conditions of the Pareto principle, even though this result is not considered a reasonable 
allocation.56 In the end, Pareto efficiency is a desirable end in social choice – yet, further 
criteria are needed to choose between different Pareto efficient allocations of one social 
state and ensure welfare distribution.57 
                                                 
50 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 15. 
51 This refers to the term “Pareto principle” used as synonym for Pareto efficiency and should not be confused 
with the statistical phenomenon known as the “80-20 rule”. 
52 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 22. 
53 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 17. 
54 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 15. 
55 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 23. 
56 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 613. 
57 Ibid. Also Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2004), 28-29. 
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Therefore, economists have been developing alternative concepts that allow for a distri-
bution of welfare across people, the most important one being the Kaldor-Hicks criterion58 
presented in the next subsection. 
 
b) The Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
In 1939, Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks proposed an alternative decision rule. The 
criterion later named after its originators is the following: 
“A social state x is distinguished from a social state y in that at least one 
member of the society prefers x to y and that at least one member prefers 
y to x. The social state x is superior to y if, and only if, those who prefer 
x can compensate those who prefer y so that they remain indifferent be-
tween x and y and those who prefer x are still better off in x than in y.”59 
In short, this decision rule prefers a social state over another if the benefitted group can 
virtually compensate the disadvantaged group and still have a net advantage.60 As the 
term “virtual” implies, the compensation does not actually have to be paid. The denomi-
nation of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as “potential Pareto superiority” illustrates this point 
precisely.61 Instead, the technique of cost-benefit-analysis can be applied:62 Adding the 
gains of all people in society and subtracting the accumulated losses from a change in 
social state yields a result that supports the change if it is positive, thus the benefits 
exceed the cost.63 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, therefore, allows for the maximization of wealth of the society 
as a whole.64 This approach is the basis of the field of welfare economics and will be used 
in this work to compare the different market outcomes from an economic point of view. 
The concept does not answer, however, questions of justice and ethical or social desira-
bility with regard to the different market outcomes.65 Anyhow, consensus for a social con-
tract under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion can be justified with the notion of general compen-
sation: Even if there is no compensation paid in individual cases, society benefits from the 
                                                 
58 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 47. 
59 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 30. 
60 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 47. 
61 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 14. 
62 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 47. 
63 Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 202. 
64 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 31. 
65 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 14. 
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application of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in the long run through a form of general com-
pensation stemming from a higher level of wealth in this society. A higher level of wealth, 
consequentially, benefits all members of a society. Ultimately, the Kaldor-Hicks decision 
rule results in every individual decision being Pareto-superior.66 
The analysis, therefore, does not pursue redistributive goals in the first place. Instead, the 
presented decision rules by Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks focus on efficient resource allocation 
in society in order to maximize the welfare of society as a whole. The restriction of the 
analysis to efficiency considerations is justified with the argument put forward by Cooter 
and Ulen (2008):67 
▪ Imprecise targeting of redistribution by private legal rights, 
▪ problems with the prediction of distributive effects of private law, 
▪ high transaction costs from the redistribution through private law, and 
▪ distortions of the economy from redistributions by private law. 
For these reasons, private law is no desirable basis for the redistribution of wealth.68 How-
ever, there are some limitations to this approach. The next section will highlight the weak-
nesses and criticism to the methodology of the economic analysis of law. 
 
III. Limitations of the economic analysis of law 
From the beginning of its development, the scientific methodology of law and eco-
nomics has been subject to criticism.69 In particular, the neoclassical fundament the eco-
nomic analysis of law is predominantly based on, provokes critique.70 The subsequent 
presentation of the main objections is split in a paragraph on 
▪ disagreement with the homo oeconomicus model, and 
▪ objections against the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. 
                                                 
66 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 32. 
67 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 10. 
68 Ibid, 11. 
69 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 25. 
70 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 34, 59. 
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1. Criticism of the homo oeconomicus model 
Most notably, the artificial model of the homo oeconomicus has aroused antago-
nism.71 Critics point out that the neoclassical model of decision-making does not accurately 
describe human decision-making. One of the main critiques is discussed under the key-
word “bounded rationality”: This literature demonstrates that people do neither have the 
necessary information, nor the mental capacity to act fully rational in making their deci-
sions.72 Further critique is treated under the headline of “behavioral anomalies”: People 
tend to deviate from rationality under certain circumstances which can be summarized as 
follows: Framing, scenario thinking, overconfidence bias, opportunity cost anomaly, hind-
sight bias, anchoring, prospect theory, sunk costs, and probabilities.73 
Yet, as Hayek (1955) pointed out, the power of the “generic figure” homo oeconomicus 
lies in its ability to explain the general nature of real world phenomena “and not in the 
accuracy of any particular instance”.74 Hence, the economic science does not draw on the 
perfect precision of the assumptions in every single case but infers predictions from as-
sumptions “that can be considered to be broadly true”.75 Deviations from the homo oeco-
nomicus model can therefore not broadly be interpreted as falsifications of the assump-
tion.76 
Anyhow, there have been efforts to specify the homo oeconomicus model in order to meet 
the criticism in recent years. The most noted approach in this field is behavioral economics, 
and for a short time, neuroeconomics.77 Behavioral economics studies consumer´s choices 
using the insights of psychology.78 The above-named behavioral anomalies are results of 
this field of study that shall help to improve our understanding of human choice behavior. 
Yet, the paradigm of behavioral economics has not yet succeeded in offering a workable 
model of consumer choice that is as simple and elegant as the neoclassical homo oeco-
nomicus.79 
                                                 
71 Ibid, 34, 56. 
72 Ibid, 59. 
73 For a detailed description of the behavioral anomalies see ibid, 60-62. 
74 Ibid, 57. With reference to F. A. v Hayek, "Scientism and the Study of Society. Part I," Economica Vol. 9, no. 
35 (1942), 267-291. 
75 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1957). 
76 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 57. 
77 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 494. 
78 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 549. 
79 Ibid, 548. 
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Hence, despite of its weaknesses in accuracy for individual cases, the homo oeconomicus 
model of rational choice remains the core of economic analysis. This conclusion can be 
well defended based on Hayek´s and Popper´s insights on its practical benefits in making 
general predictions. It will therefore be employer in this work. 
 
2. Criticism of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion 
Another criticism mainly put forward by Eidenmüller (1995) refers to the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion.80 Eidenmüller attacks the ability of the efficient social state under the Kal-
dor-Hicks criterion to be consensual. The assumption that the disadvantaged group would 
be satisfied with waiting for a long-term compensation in the shape of a higher level of 
welfare is rejected by him as unrealistic.81 
Although there is some justification for the Eidenmüller argument, there is empirical sub-
stance for the general compensation principle. It can be shown that rich industrialized 
nations having “instituted policies of wealth maximization” are generally better off than 
those nations without wealth maximizing institutions.82 Furthermore, the philosophical de-
bate about hypothetical consensus with regard to a certain social state should not hide the 
fact that the use of economic tools in legal analysis helps to clarify value conflicts as well 
as reach “given social ends by the most efficient path”.83 
In conclusion, the weaknesses highlighted above should not lead to a rejection of the 
methodology of the economic approach to law as a whole.84 Some of the assumptions 
made in neoclassical economics prove to be pretty sound for general predictions. Moreo-
ver, there are many constellations that allow for a relaxation of the strict neoclassical 
framework and still yield convincing results. An effort will be made in this work to highlight 
the boundaries of the interpretation of results found on the basis of economic models to 
obtain a sound argumentation. 
 
                                                 
80 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing Limited, 2004), 34. With reference to Horst Eidenmüller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip (Tübingen: Mohr Sie-
beck, 1995). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 25. 
84Ibid. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The preceding paragraphs provided a brief overview of the economic approach to 
law including its tools, underlying assumptions and potential weaknesses. In conclusion, 
the adequacy of economic reasoning with regard to the examination of the incentives that 
govern the behavior of market participants and also having regard to the comparison of 
different market outcomes under various regulatory arrangements has been demonstrated 
comprehensively. It will hence be applied in both the positive and normative analysis of 
the incentive structure at the EEX. 
In a next step, the following section will provide an overview of the German energy market 
that is examined in the course of this work as an example. The special characteristics of 
the traded goods, demand and supply, market structure, and trading conditions at the 
energy exchange will be highlighted. Thereafter, section E. introduces the legal framework 
the actors are operating in. 
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D. Economic Foundations of the German 
Electricity Market 
Energy markets in general and the German market in particular have some specific 
characteristics that discern them from the standard model of economic markets. This 
chapter is designed as an introduction to the economic theory of markets and a summary 
of the fundamental particularities in the German energy market. Thereby, the fundamental 
understanding of incentives for manipulations and their deterrence is carved out. 
The first part treats the essentials of markets in economic theory including some remarks 
on welfare differences between competitive and concentrated markets. Part two examines 
more closely the demand and supply side in the German energy market and classifies the 
real conditions in the economic model. The final third part concludes. 
 
I. Fundamentals of economic markets 
Goods and services, including electricity, are traded in markets. An economic market 
is defined as a mechanism for the determination of goods and services prices and their 
exchange.85 Market organization ranges from non-organized to highly organized structures 
like stock exchanges.86 The basic concepts of demand, supply and market equilibrium 
introduced in the following subsections apply to all markets independently of their organ-
izational form. 
 
1. The market forces of demand and supply 
In each market, there are two main groups of actors: Buyers wanting to acquire 
particular goods and services, as opposed to sellers aiming at the sale of their products. 
These two aggregated groups of people are termed the demand and the supply side of the 
market. 
 
                                                 
85 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 26. 
86 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 66. 
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a) The demand side of the market 
Demand is defined as “the amount of the good that buyers are willing and able to 
purchase”87. The individual demand function of a customer (xi) therefore depends on three 
variables: 
▪ The price of the good (pj), 
▪ the prices of other goods (pk), and 
▪ the individual income of the customer (mi).88 
This relationship can be written more formally as 
xi (pj, pk, mi). 
Market demand for the product j (Xj) is derived from individual consumer choice by adding 
up the individual quantities of the number of consumers in the market n: 
Xj (p
j
, p
k
, m1, …, mn)  = ∑xi(pj, pk, mi)
n
i=1
. 89 
All other things equal90, the entire quantity demanded in the market is determined by the 
price of the good. For normal goods, the quantity demanded is negatively correlated with 
the price charged, other things equal.91 In other words: People buy more units of a normal 
good if the price is lower. This correlation is best represented graphically in the demand 
curve D(p): 
                                                 
87 Ibid, 67. 
88 Other influences on demand, like the individual and social tastes, are left out in this analysis. For a detailed 
discussion of these special influences see Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: 
McGraw-Hill, 2005), 48. 
89 For the formal derivation see Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, 2006), 266. 
90 Ceteris paribus assumption, in this example, the price of other goods pk and the income mi are held con-
stant. 
91 So-called law of demand. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage 
Learning, 2008), 67. 
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Figure 1: Downward-sloping demand curve and the price elasticity of demand 
The demand curve is downward sloping92, for reasons of simplification, a linear progression 
has been assumed in the figure above. The exact slope of the curve depends on the price 
elasticity of demand. This parameter measures the change in quantity demanded of a 
good when its price changes.93 Economists discern elastic demand, where the quantity 
demanded changes substantially with price increases and inelastic demand, if only slight 
changes in quantity are observed in reaction to price increases.94 In the graphical repre-
sentation, perfectly inelastic demand results in a straight vertical line, whereas perfectly 
elastic demand yields a horizontal line that parallels the quantity axis.95 The interpretation 
of the price elasticity of demand is straightforward: In case of inelastic demand, customers 
buy the same quantity of the good irrespective of the price. By contrast, in case of elastic 
demand, customers stop buying the product already in the event of slight price increases. 
The determinants of the price elasticity are manifold, however, some general influences 
can be spotted: The availability of close substitutes favors elastic demand, as well as a 
longer time horizon does. In contrast, necessities usually go along with inelastic demand. 
Eventually, the price elasticity depends on the boundaries of the market: Narrowly defined 
markets have more elastic demand than broadly defined ones.96 
Apart from changes in price, the quantity demanded in a market can be influenced by 
external factors, such as the income available to buyers, changes in the prices of related 
goods, changes in trends, tastes, and expectations within the population or the number of 
                                                 
92 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 47. 
93 Ibid, 66. 
94 See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 90. Fur-
thermore, some textbooks also discuss unit-elastic demand if the percentage change in quantity equals the 
percentage change in price. See. For example Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singa-
pore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 67. 
95 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 68. 
96 For details of the determinants of price elasticity see N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: 
South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 90-91. 
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buyers in the market.97 These influences lead to shifts of the demand curve to the left 
(characterizing a decrease in demand) or to the right (increase in demand). 
 
b) The supply side of the market 
Inversely to the demand side of the market, the group of suppliers forms the supply 
side. The quantity supplied is defined as the amount of a commodity that producers are 
willing to produce and sell, ceteris paribus.98 The quantity supplied depends on the market 
price of the commodity concerned and is positively related to it.99 Hence, a higher market 
price for a good causes the supply to increase. Equally as for the demand side, the market 
supply can be derived from the addition of the individual supply curves of all producers in 
the market.100 
The slope of the supply curve depends on the price elasticity of supply. This measure 
states how much the quantity supplied of a given commodity changes in response to a 
change of the price of that good.101 Similar to the price elasticity of demand, there are two 
cases: Elastic and inelastic supply. If the quantity supplied changes heavily with a change 
in price, supply is said to be elastic. If, on the contrary, the quantity offered in the market 
does only slightly respond to changes in price, supply is inelastic.102 The graphical repre-
sentation of the supply curve and the extreme cases of perfectly elastic and perfectly 
inelastic supply summarizes these relationships clearly.103 
                                                 
97 Ibid, 70-71. 
98 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 51. 
99 So-called law of supply. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage 
Learning, 2008), 73. 
100 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 289. 
101 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 99. 
102 Ibid, 99. 
103 See for similar illustrations: Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, 2006), 291. Also: N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learn-
ing, 2008), 101. 
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Figure 2: Upward-sloping supply curve and the price elasticity of supply 
In the economic interpretation, the price elasticity of supply indicates the ability of pro-
ducers to change the amount of the commodity they produce flexibly. Goods that are 
naturally or technologically limited in supply are relatively inelastic compared to manufac-
tured goods with theoretically unlimited production.104 Furthermore, the time horizon con-
sidered influences the elasticity of supply: In the short run, firms are relatively inflexible 
in changing their production capacity. Over a longer time period, however, they can adapt 
their production facilities and technique to the situation on the market, which results in an 
increasing elasticity of supply.105 
Eventually, external factors other than the price of the good influence the quantity supplied 
and shift the supply curve to the right (increase in supply) or to the left (decrease in 
supply).106 The most important of the influences to lead to an increase in supply are falling 
market prices for inputs and advances in production technology. On the contrary, a de-
crease in supply can be due to negative expectations of sellers for the future or a falling 
number of suppliers in the market.107 
Now that both sides of the market have been introduced, the next subsection will present 
the concept of equilibrium in competitive markets. 
 
                                                 
104 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 99. 
105 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 73. 
106 Ibid, 53. 
107 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 75-76. 
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2. Equilibrium in competitive markets 
Demand and supply combined determine the price and the quantity of a commodity 
sold in the market.108 The price at which the quantity demanded equals the quantity sup-
plied marks the market equilibrium: 
D(p) = S(p).109 
In the graphical representation, this point is found at the intersection of both curves: 
 
Figure 3: Market equilibrium 
In this situation, “the quantity of the good that buyers are willing and able to buy exactly 
balances the quantity that sellers are willing and able to sell”.110 Any quantity traded below 
or above the equilibrium quantity would result in a shortage (excess demand) or a surplus 
(excess supply). In reaction to this situation, the price would have to change; a new equi-
librium results.111 Therefore, markets have an inherent tendency to equilibrium.112 Put 
differently in the words of Adam Smith: The joint action of consumers and producers di-
rected by market prices leads them to a welfare-maximizing equilibrium, as if an invisible 
hand was guiding them.113 
Yet, the above insights about the self-regulating nature of the marketplace only hold for 
competitive markets. Markets are characterized as perfectly competitive, if they fulfill the 
following conditions: 
▪ An infinite number of buyers and sellers is trading in the market, 
                                                 
108 Ibid, 77. 
109 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 289. 
110 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 77. 
111 So-called law of supply and demand. See ibid, 77-78. 
112 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 290. 
113 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A. Millar, 1790), Part IV, Chapter I Paragraph 10. 
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▪ a homogenous product is traded, 
▪ there are no barriers to entry and exit, 
▪ perfect information is assumed, and 
▪ buyers and sellers face zero transaction costs.114 
The above assumptions for competitive markets need a little further explanation. Most 
importantly, in competitive markets both, buyers and sellers, act as “price takers”, thus 
no single buyer or seller has any influence on the market price.115 Goods traded are ho-
mogenous, therefore, customers can substitute the products across suppliers. The as-
sumption of lacking entry and exit barriers, e.g. legal hurdles or a high investment to start 
the business, assures that new suppliers can enter the market at all times, which acts as 
a deterrent for the existing suppliers in the market to raise prices by collusive agreements. 
Perfect information describes a situation where prices and the quality of the products are 
known to all customers and producers. This does not mean, however, that every market 
participant possesses all information. It is sufficient, if market participants possess the 
information relevant to their optimization problems. Eventually, the zero transaction costs 
assumption ensures that all beneficial transactions take place. 
Most real-world markets, however, do not satisfy these assumptions. Harold Demsetz is 
touching on that issue in his 1969 paper on a “nirvana approach” in the economic science. 
He points out that there would rather have to be a choice between “alternative real insti-
tution arrangements” instead of the actual focus on comparisons of the reals world with a 
non-existent ideal of a textbook perfectly competitive market (“nirvana”).116 Neither in 
theoretical analysis, nor in practical policy may following an unreachable end be a guiding 
principle. Therefore, in this paper, the model of a perfectly competitive market is used 
solely as a benchmark. The deviations of all market situations and corrective regulatory 
approaches from the “nirvana market” are compared with each other to reveal the closest 
approximation to the theoretical model of an optimal market. In this sense, this work is 
following the comparative institution approach proposed by Demsetz. 
The question why the model of perfectly competitive markets is considered to be the ideal 
standard still has to be answered. Using the concept of allocative efficiency introduced in 
                                                 
114 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 148. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Harold Demsetz, „Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint“, Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 12, 
no. 1 (1969), 1. 
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the precedent section117, the superiority of competitive markets from the welfare stand-
point can be demonstrated convincingly. 
The rational decision maker model and the assumption of methodological individualism 
predict that buyers would only purchase goods whose utility – u(x) – exceeds or at least 
equals the price they pay (px): 
u(x) ≥ px. 
Though, the utility u(x) that a particular good has to a customer differs between the num-
ber of units consumed and among individuals, whereas the price paid is the same for each 
unit and each customer.118 Consequently, the above equation can be rewritten as 
u(x) = px + sc(x), 
where sc(x) is the utility that exceeds the price paid for the individual customer. Rearrang-
ing terms gives 
sc(x) = u(x) – px119 
for the individual consumer surplus. In other words: The consumer pays less for a partic-
ular good than his maximal willingness to pay would allow.120 Thereby, he retains money 
back for other uses.121 Aggregation of the individual consumer´s surplus for the whole of 
market demand yields the consumers´ surplus from trade in a particular product mar-
ket122, with i denominating the individual customer and n the number of all customers in 
the market: 
Sc(x)= ∑ sci(x)
n
i=1
 
                                                 
117 See paragraph C.II.3.b) of this chapter. 
118 So-called law of diminishing utility. See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singa-
pore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 96. 
119 See for an analog formal derivation of consumer surplus Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 248-250. 
120 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 139. 
121 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 249. 
122 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 140. 
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The context becomes even clearer in the graphical representation: 
 
Figure 4: Consumer surplus and producer surplus 
The geometrical interpretation is straightforward: For the market as a whole, the area 
between demand curve and price depicts the consumer surplus.123 Also, it can be seen 
that an increase of consumer surplus is the result of a drop in price.124 
As figure 4 already indicates, there is a similar surplus for the group of producers, the so-
called producer surplus. The axioms of rational choice theory and the assumption that 
producers try to maximize profit, and do not act for reasons of benevolence in the mar-
ket125 suggest, that a product is sold in the market if, and only if the price equals or 
exceeds the cost of production c(x): 
px ≥ c(x). 
Since producers face different costs of production, some of them are paid more for the 
sale of their commodity than their reservation price. This gain is called producer surplus.126 
Producer surplus (sp(x)) results from any amount the seller is paid for his good that ex-
ceeds the cost of provision of the good.127 Formally, this can be written as 
px = c(x) + sp(x). 
After rearranging, the producer surplus is defined as: 
sp(x) = px – c(x). 
                                                 
123 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 250. 
124 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 140-141. 
125 This important insight was already introduced by Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1776), Book I, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2. He shaped the 
famous sentence that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”. 
126 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 260. 
127 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 143. 
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By analogy to the consumer surplus, the aggregation of all individual gains yields the 
producers´ surplus in the market:128 
Sp(x)= ∑ spi(x)
n
i=1
 
As depicted in figure 4, the area between the equilibrium price line and the supply curve 
measures the producer surplus in a market.129 Similarly to the above analysis, this surplus 
can be increased by raising the price of the good.130 
Both, consumers´ and producers´ surplus add up to economic surplus.131 In the formal 
description, this can be written as 
Se(x) = Sc(x) + Sp(x). 
With the substitution for the variables Sc(x) and Sp(x) we obtain 
Se(x) = [u(x) – px] + [px – c(x)], 
and after summing up and rearranging terms 
Se(x) = u(x) – c(x)132 
for the economic surplus. Thus, the economic surplus is the difference between the value 
of the good to the buyer and the cost of production the seller faces. This property makes 
the economic surplus a measure for the welfare in the economy. Under the condition of a 
perfectly competitive market, welfare is maximized. As shown in figure 4, there is no 
alternative allocation of resources that would increase consumers´ or producers´ surplus 
without lowering the other group´s surplus or the total quantity traded in the market.133 
More precisely, free markets allocate resources in such a way that 
▪ the supply of goods is directed towards the buyers who have the highest valuation 
for them, based on their willingness to pay, 
▪ the demand for goods is directed to the sellers who can produce goods at cheapest 
cost, and 
                                                 
128 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 159. 
129 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 159. 
130 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 145. 
131 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 159. 
132 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 147. 
133 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 159. 
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▪ the quantity of goods produced maximizes economic surplus.134 
One last question that remains to be answered in this general economic introduction is the 
rationale for profit-maximizing companies in setting the sale price of their product. Since 
the equilibrium price is found by the forces of demand and supply, how would a rational 
producer price its product to maximize profit? 
In studying the profit-maximization problem of a firm in a competitive environment, we 
assume that this firm faces fixed prices for the factors of production.135 Furthermore it is 
assumed, that it acts for the purpose of realizing as much profit as possible, where profit 
(∏) is defined as total revenue (R) from sale of the products minus total cost of production 
(C): 
∏ = R – C.136 
Continuing, revenue is defined as the amount a firm is paid for the sale of its products: 
R = p . x137, 
and cost relates to the market value of the inputs used in production: 
C = cf + cv(x), 
in which we distinguish fixed cost (cf) that occur independently of the quantity produced 
and variable cost (cv(x)) that depends on the number of units manufactured.138 Summing 
up, the profit function of the firm can be written as 
∏ = p . x – [cf + cv(x)].139 
Since it has been assumed above that the firm maximizes profit, the maximum of this 
equation needs to be determined. Mathematically, a maximization problem is solved by 
calculating the first derivative of the profit function and setting it equal to zero140: 
                                                 
134 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 149. 
135 And, by assumption in the model of a perfectly competitive market, the firm does also face fixed prices for 
ist output since it acts as a price taker. See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Nor-
ton & Company, 2006), 334. 
136 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 268. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. For the distinction between fixed and variable costs see Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 339. 
139 Similar Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 335. 
140 For the mathematical background of this reasoning see for example Carl P. Simon, Mathematics for Econo-
mists (New York: Norton & Company, 1994), 62-64. 
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dπ
dx
 = p - 
dc
dx
 = 0 
After rearranging terms, one obtains the necessary condition for maximum profit in com-
petitive markets: 
p = 
dc
dx
 .141 
The important insight from this analysis can be summarized as follows: For a profit-max-
imizing firm in a competitive market, the best choice is to set its price equal to the marginal 
cost of production (
dc
dx
 in the term above), which is the cost of the production of an addi-
tional unit of the good.142 A more intuitive explanation of the profit-maximizing condition 
is offered by the following easily interpreted graphic image: 
 
Figure 5: Profit-maximization for firms in competitive markets 
For any price p above the marginal cost of production, the firm can increase its profit by 
expanding its production. Likewise, any price below the marginal cost of production re-
duces the firm´s profit.143 Consequently, the firm will expand its production until the point 
where the marginal cost curve (blue) intersects with the price curve (red) and thereby 
maximize profit. 
With this central understanding of profit-maximizing reasoning, this section concludes. 
The next subsection will introduce the structure and market participants´ reasoning in 
imperfectly competitive markets to complete the economic introduction and achieve an 
understanding for the imperfectly competitive energy market. 
                                                 
141 A less formal derivation can be found in Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singa-
pore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 155. 
142 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 276, 294. 
143 Note that the market price equals marginal revenue since the first derivative of the revenue function with 
respect to x yields dR/dx = p. 
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3. Economics of concentration 
Perfectly competitive markets are rare in the world outside economic textbooks. 
Therefore, economic theory did early on develop models of markets that fail to produce 
the socially optimal output. The contents of this subsection is limited to the case of market 
power, which is the only market failure relevant to the analysis of price manipulation at 
the energy market. First, the extreme case of only one supplier in the market (monop-
oly)144 is introduced to provide a basis for the understanding of the related case of oligop-
oly. 
 
a) Pricing behavior and social welfare in monopolized markets 
Other than in competitive markets, a monopoly firm does not have to act like a price 
taker. On the contrary, its decisions on output have influence on the price for the good. 
The reason is that customers have no chance to substitute the product of the monopolist 
for a cheaper one offered by an alternative producer since by definition there are no other 
producers in the monopolized market.145 Of course, the monopolist´s power to choose the 
price is not unlimited, but constrained by the demand behavior of the customers.146 How-
ever, the following analysis will reveal that the profit-maximizing monopolist chooses a 
price that differs from the one observed in competitive markets. 
The monopolist faces, other than firms in a competitive environment, the complete market 
demand curve.147 This is best expressed by an inverse demand function p(x), where the 
price (p) depends on the quantity of output (x). Furthermore, the monopolist incurs some 
cost of production also depending on the quantity x: c(x). The resulting revenue function 
takes therefore the shape 
R(x) = p(x) . x, 
expressing that the revenue results from the quantity of units sold (x) times the price per 
unit (p(x)). 
                                                 
144 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 423. 
145 Ibid, 444. 
146 Ibid, 423. 
147 Competitive firms face a demand curve in the shape of a horizontal line because they can sell an unlimited 
quantity of the product at the given market price. For this case and the different one of monopoly firms see: N. 
Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 315. 
First Chapter: The Research Project 
D. Economic Foundations 
30 
 
Consequently, the maximization problem refers to the corresponding profit function, where 
profit results from the subtraction of cost of production from the revenue from the sale of 
the product: 
∏(x) = R(x) – c(x). 
Insertion of the above defined variables for R(x) results in 
∏(x) = p(x) . x – c(x). 
As introduced above, the first-order condition for a profit maximum is found by deriving 
∏ with regard to x and equating the term to zero: 
dπ
dx
 = 
dp
dx
 ∙ x + p(x) - 
dc
dx
 = 0 
Rearranging terms yields the profit-maximizing condition for monopoly output: 
dp
dx
x + p(x) =  
dc
dx
 .148 
This term shows that the monopolist maximizes profit by choosing an output level where 
marginal revenue from the sale of an additional unit equals marginal cost of the production 
of this unit.149 Having said this, the conclusion for the price level under monopoly is 
straightforward: While price equals marginal cost in competitive markets, price exceeds 
marginal cost in a monopoly market.150 The magnitude of the price difference depends 
most notably on the elasticity of demand: The price-cost margin increases with a lower 
elasticity of demand and vice versa.151 
This finding has considerable consequences for social welfare. In detail, there are three 
main inefficiencies stemming from monopoly pricing: 
▪ Allocative inefficiencies, 
▪ productive inefficiencies, and 
▪ dynamic inefficiencies. 
                                                 
148 A similar derivation of the monopoly pricing rationale can be found in: Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microe-
conomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 424. 
149 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 155. 
150 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 320. 
151 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
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Allocative inefficiency can be derived by a comparison of social welfare produced in the 
benchmark model of perfectly competitive markets with the social welfare under monop-
oly. From the law of demand we know that an increase of the market price causes the 
quantity demanded to decrease.152 In other words: Customers with a willingness to pay 
for the product higher than the cost of production are not served in the monopoly case, 
whereas they would be in a competitive market environment; economic surplus de-
creases.153 This loss of social welfare is best illustrated in the following graphic, where the 
loss of economic surplus from both losses of consumers´ surplus and producers´ surplus 
is depicted. 
 
Figure 6: Welfare loss from monopoly 
From figure 6 it is well to be seen that the monopolist´s pricing rationale increases the 
price, such that output decreases simultaneously. As a result, consumer surplus shrinks 
in favor of a gain of producer surplus. This event constitutes a pure transfer of wealth from 
the consumers to the producers.154 Yet, beyond this transfer, there is a true welfare loss 
from the inefficiently low quantity of output. This decrease of value from the lower output 
level due to monopoly pricing is called “deadweight loss”.155 
A second aspect of allocative inefficiency with regard to monopoly has first been discussed 
in Gordon Tullocks 1967 article on the cost of monopolies156: He suggested, that the fo-
cusing of the economic science on the deadweight loss was completely ignoring a much 
bigger allocative problem of monopoly, which is what was later named the “rent seeking 
                                                 
152 See paragraph D.I.1.a) of this chapter. 
153 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 323. 
154 Ibid, 325. 
155 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 433. 
156 Gordon Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft”, Western Economic Journal Vol. 5, no. 
3 (1967), 224-232. 
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activities” of monopoly firms.157 This is, firms start spending money to gain political influ-
ence and lobby in order to keep or increase their monopoly power158 - instead of investing 
the money in more productive uses. This waste of resources enlarges the cost associated 
with monopoly.159 
The second drawback monopolized markets cause is productive inefficiencies. This term 
describes the monopolies´ tendency to face higher cost of production than firms operating 
in competitive markets.160 The additional welfare loss from the utilization of inefficient 
production technology is mainly due to the lack of competitive pressure, which would force 
the firm to use the best available technologies in order to keep the costs at a competitive 
level.161 Apart from that, productive inefficiency stems from managerial shirking. Monopoly 
power is said to bring about managerial inefficiency because of lacking incentives for the 
managers to exhaust the whole of the firm´s scope in view of safe monopoly profits.162 
Eventually, dynamic inefficiencies contribute to welfare losses from monopoly. Economic 
models of competition and innovation show that monopoly firms have less incentives to 
invest in research and development (R&D).163 Innovation is materially triggered by the 
expectation to recover the investments made in R&D. The expectation of market power, 
therefore, exhibits a strong incentive to innovate. By contrast, monopoly firms already 
exercising market power have weaker inducement to invest considerable amounts of 
money in research projects with uncertain returns.164 
All aspects considered there is serious evidence that monopolized industries harm social 
welfare and, as a result, are subject to various government regulation efforts. Oligopolized 
markets like the German energy industry treated in this work face similar regulatory prob-
lems. The next subsection therefore presents the case in between the two extremes of 
perfectly competitive markets and monopoly: Market structures named oligopoly with a 
limited number of suppliers bigger than one, but small enough to leave individual firms 
some room to exert influence on the market price.165 
                                                 
157 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
44. 
158 Gordon Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft”, Western Economic Journal Vol. 5, no. 
3 (1967), 228. 
159 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
44. 
160 Ibid, 45. 
161 This is somehow a Darwinian selection argument, since in the presence of competition, only efficient firms 
survive. For a more in-depth analysis and empirical evidence see ibid, 46. 
162 This argument is best understood in the context of corporate governance theory and the so-called princi-
pal-agent models that highlight the conflict between manager and shareholder interests. See ibid, 47. 
163 Ibid, 58. 
164 Ibid, 55. 
165 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 480. 
First Chapter: The Research Project 
D. Economic Foundations 
33 
 
b) Pricing behavior and social welfare in oligopoly markets 
Also in oligopoly markets, prices tend to exceed the costs of production, resulting in 
welfare losses for the economy.166 Whether and how much prices deviate from the com-
petitive benchmark depends not only on the elasticity of demand as discussed for the 
monopoly case167, but also on how successful firms are in maintaining a collusive pricing 
strategy.168 This is due to the fact that in an oligopoly, the market price and as a conse-
quence the firm´s profit does not only depend on the production decision of a single firm, 
but also of the other firms in the market.169 This constellation requires strategic interac-
tions between the firms in the market.170 
From a profit maximizing point of view, the oligopoly firms would prefer to act the same 
way a monopolist does and produce the monopoly output in order to share it between the 
colluding companies.171 Yet, oligopoly firms face some obstacles in trying to achieve a 
collusive agreement to act like a monopoly, the most important of which are 
▪ the cost of detection, since collusion is illegal in most legislations, and 
▪ the incentive to cheat on the agreement among oligopolists in order to make an 
extra profit by undercutting the oligopoly price.172 
Without going into the details, some of the factors favoring collusion shall be named here. 
Those ones being of further importance to the manipulations in the energy market will be 
discussed in-depth in the chapters devoted to the analysis of the industrial organization of 
the German electricity market and the considerations on antitrust regulation opportuni-
ties.173 For the purpose of a first overview, important structural factors facilitating collusive 
agreements are as follows:174 
▪ Highly concentrated markets175, 
                                                 
166 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
138. 
167 See section D.I.3.a) of this chapter. 
168 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 188. 
169 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), 366. 
170 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 480. 
171 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 187. 
172 Ibid, 188. 
173 Issues of industrial organization in the electricity market are discussed in the second chapter in section D. 
For the regulatory measures, please refer to the fourth chapter of this work. 
174 The structural factors are based on the enumeration in Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and 
Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 142-149. 
175 A common measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. In competition analysis, 
values exceeding 1,800 indicate highly concentrated markets. See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. 
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▪ high barriers of entry, 
▪ cross-ownership and other links among competitors, 
▪ regularity and frequency of orders, 
▪ the lack of buyer power on the demand side, 
▪ a sudden massive increase of demand, 
▪ product homogeneity, 
▪ symmetry between firms, 
▪ firms meeting in more than one market (multi-market contracts), and 
▪ inventories and excess capacities. 
In conclusion, oligopoly may mean as much of a threat to social welfare as monopoly does. 
However, firms face significantly more obstacles in achieving and maintaining collusive 
prices than a monopolist does. Yet, market structures with oligopolistic characteristics are 
much more common in real markets and in consequence much more relevant for industry 
analyses176. As the next section will show, this is also true for the German electricity mar-
ket. 
 
II. The German electricity market 
The following paragraphs are supposed to give a short introduction on the features 
and structure of the primary market for power generation and the common channels of 
trade and distribution. The understanding of these basic market characteristics is key to 
the following treatment of manipulation strategies and their deterrence. In classifying the 
market for power generation in economic terms, I will revert to the basic economic models 
of competition developed in the preceding section. The first subparagraph starts off with 
a short historical survey of the development of the German electricity market. Thereafter, 
subsection two treats the specific features of electricity as a product. Subsequently, the 
existing power plants and the process of power generation are examined from an economic 
point of view in the third subsection, including an introduction to electricity trading both 
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at stock exchanges and Over-the-Counter (OTC). Subsection four treats the process of 
formation of prices in the energy market.177 
 
1. The historical development of the German electricity 
market 
Until the liberalization in 1998, the German electricity market was organized as a 
natural monopoly178.179 The underlying assumption was that companies in the power busi-
ness – due to high capital investments especially in grids – could only ensure reliable and 
cheap power supply if they were not facing competitive pressure.180 As a result, power 
was purchased from a small number of suppliers based on long-term contracts and retailed 
to the customers in the particular supply areas.181 The territorial monopolies were pro-
tected with two contractual agreements: The concession contract between the municipality 
and the energy supplier to guarantee the exclusive right to build grids in the area and 
reciprocal demarcation contracts with other energy suppliers which were guaranteeing 
them territorial monopolies for energy supply.182 
In 1998, regulatory policy had come to the conclusion that a competitive market structure 
was possible for the fields of power generation, power trading and distribution.183 Only on-
grid transportation of electricity was further considered a natural monopoly.184 The end of 
the deregulation efforts was evident: A competitive structure of the energy market was 
intended in order to increase efficiency in power generation and distribution with the final 
aim of driving the price down.185 Long-term supply contracts were negotiated anew, net-
work access for third-party suppliers was introduced, and a huge number of competitors 
                                                 
177 This structure is based on the treatment of the German electricity market in the FCO sector inquiry on 
power generation. See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-
9/09, 2. 
178 A natural monopoly is a market situation where the production of the market output is only efficient when 
carried out by a single firm. This situation is due to economies of scale, which is the existence of huge fixed 
costs and small marginal cost, resulting in marginal cost pricing resulting in losses. See Paul A. Samuelson and 
William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 171-172. 
179 Peter Becker, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung des 
Energierechts (Bochum: Ponte Press, 2010), 78. 
180 Wolfgang Gerke, Marc Hennies, and Daniel Schäffner, Der Stromhandel. Grundlagen, Profile, Perspektiven 
(Frankfurt am Main: F.A.Z.-Institut, 2000), 15. 
181 Georg Erdmann, “War die Strommarkt-Liberalisierung in Deutschland bisher ein Flop?”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 3 
(2008), 197. 
182 Jörg Fried, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 
2010), 162-163. 
183 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 40. 
184 See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 37. 
185 See ibid. 
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entered the market of energy production, trade and distribution.186 Yet, liberalization ef-
forts did not yield the expected effects, instead, prices for energy climbed to higher levels 
steadily.187 Part of this price increase was due to higher taxes and government charges.188 
However, there is justified concern that the increasing prices had other causes besides 
public charges. 
The following overview of the German electricity market after the liberalization will give a 
first impression why the introduction of competition is facing so many problems and there 
is persistent danger of market manipulations. 
 
2. Specific features of the good “electricity” 
To begin with, the good “electricity” possesses some features that differ from other 
commodities traded in markets, which might influence the market outcome. The charac-
teristics that will be discussed subsequently can be summarized as follows: 
▪ There is no noteworthy and common technology to store electric current after its 
production.189 
▪ Variation of quality in electricity grids is not possible (homogenous product).190 
▪ Electricity is a grid-bound product.191 
First, the lacking property of storability deprives energy suppliers of the option to produce 
ahead. In addition, electric grids require a stable voltage at all times, therefore, feeding 
into the power grid and extractions from the grid do always have to match. In economic 
terms this implies, that demand and supply do have to be in exact equilibrium at all 
times192. Yet, demand for power is subject to huge intraday and seasonal fluctuations. 
With lacking options to produce ahead, load control of the grids is only possible through 
                                                 
186 Georg Erdmann, “War die Strommarkt-Liberalisierung in Deutschland bisher ein Flop?”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 3 
(2008), 197. 
187 Axel Metzger, “Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und Vertrags-
recht”, ZHR Vol. 172 (2008), 548. Also Georg Erdmann, “War die Strommarkt-Liberalisierung in Deutschland 
bisher ein Flop?”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 3 (2008), 198. Federal Network Agency, Monitoringbericht 2010, 35. 
188 See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 37. 
189 Ibid, 38. With regard to recent developments in this field refer to e.g. Hans Heller, "Optimierung der 
energierechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen durch den Einsatz moderner Stromspeichertechnologie," EWeRK Vol. 
13, no. 4 (2013), 177 et sqq. 
190 Georg Erdmann and Peter Zweifel, Energieökonomik: Theorie und Anwendungen (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
2008), 295. 
191 Wolfgang Gerke, Marc Hennies, and Daniel Schäffner, Der Stromhandel. Grundlagen, Profile, Perspektiven 
(Frankfurt am Main: F.A.Z.-Institut, 2000), 13. 
192 Ingo Hensing, Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, and Wolfgang Ströbele, Energiewirtschaft: Einführung in Theorie 
und Politik (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1998), 112. 
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management of demand and supply. In absence of observable quality features of electric-
ity, management of demand for this homogenous good is possible only with regard to the 
price.193 Based on the economic principles presented in the previous section, one would 
expect a rise in prices in times of high demand and a price drop at low demand periods, 
e.g. in summer. Yet, this demand-driven price signal would require metering not only of 
the aggregate consumption of a customer, but of the time-related electricity extraction.194 
Although there has been some effort to introduce smart metering recently, this technology 
is not yet common for households.195 As a consequence, load management in the German 
electricity market is mainly supply-based. Short-term matching of demand and supply is, 
metaphorically speaking, regulated by turning on and off power plants.196 As a conse-
quence, the decision about the quantity produced (hence the supply side of the market) 
determines the price for electricity. 
Second, electricity being a grid-bound product brings about deviations from other product 
markets. The German distribution network is, depending on the voltage level, divided in 
four categories reaching from grids for long-distance transport to dispersion grids.197 The 
direction of the electricity flow in the network is determined by the laws of physics. There-
fore, neither producer nor consumer can decide about the way the current takes once 
supplied with. Also, suppliers cannot direct current produced in their plant to a particular 
customer. Instead, the delivery of electricity corresponds to the simultaneous feeding and 
extraction of current by several suppliers and customers.198 For this reason, electricity is, 
other than ordinary commodities, traded in the shape of purchase warrants that entitle 
the buyer to a specified extraction from the network.199 
Having shown the features of electricity, the analysis now turns to a brief description of 
the process of energy generation. 
 
                                                 
193 Georg Erdmann and Peter Zweifel, Energieökonomik: Theorie und Anwendungen (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
2008), 295. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Peter Heuell, “In kleinen Schritten zum Smart Grid”, et Vol. 61, no. 9 (2011), 44. Also Oliver D. Doleski, 
“Handlungsbedarf versus Abwartetaktik: Quo vadis, Smart Grid?”, et Vol. 61, no. 9 (2011), 47. 
196 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2011), 121. 
197 Georg Erdmann and Peter Zweifel, Energieökonomik: Theorie und Anwendungen (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
2008), 295. 
198 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft", ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), 122. 
199 Ibid. 
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3. Fundamentals of power generation and distribution 
The structure of the energy market is best described with the three-stage theory of 
the power industry. In this view, the market for power consists of three vertically con-
nected stages: Power generation, power distribution, and end consumer stage.200 
This structure is best illustrated with the following figure:201 
 
Figure 7: Structure of the German power market 
 
a) The market for power generation 
In the process of power generation, primary energy (e.g. fossil fuels, uranium, or 
renewable energies) is transformed into secondary energy (electricity) in a specified tech-
nical process.202 The power generation stage, therefore, comprises all energy suppliers 
that possess their own production facilities.203 In Germany, the lion´s share of power gen-
eration is in the hands of the four huge vertically integrated suppliers E.ON, RWE, EnBW, 
and Vattenfall.204 Together, these companies possessed 84 percent of the power genera-
tion facilities in Germany in 2008.205 Today, they still control 62 percent of the production 
                                                 
200 Thomas Niedrig, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann and Michael Cieslarczyk 
(Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 4. 
201 Based on Ingo Hensing, Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, and Wolfgang Ströbele, Energiewirtschaft: Einführung in 
Theorie und Politik (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1998), 112. 
202 Ibid, 111. 
203 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), 122. Refer 
also to Sandro Gleave, "Marktabgrenzung und Marktbeherrschung auf Elektrizitätsmärkten," ZfE Vol. 34, no. 2 
(2010), 102. 
204 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), 122. 
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capacity.206 Apart from the “big four”, there are a huge number of municipal energy sup-
pliers and independent power plant operators in the market.207 Despite their predominance 
in numbers, this group of producers has only a relatively small share in covering the daily 
demand for electricity. Finally, there is some import and export of electricity to and from 
Germany. The net import of the quantities exchanged with the neighboring countries con-
tributes to the supply of the quantity needed on the German market.208 
The above-described transformation process from primary to secondary energy is realized 
with a variety of different types of plants using different inputs, and, as a consequence, 
facing different costs of production. Hence, although electricity appears to be a homoge-
nous good from the point of view of the demand side, it is, in fact, quite divers. Most 
roughly, the existing types of power plants are differentiated based on their economic and 
technical characteristics: 
▪ Base load power generation plants, 
▪ intermediate power generation plants, and 
▪ peak load power generation plants.209 
From an economic point of view, the plant types differ with regard to fixed and variable 
costs of production. Fixed cost mainly consists of capital cost, maintenance cost and labor 
costs. By contrast, short-term variable cost is predominantly determined by the prices of 
inputs, thus the primary energies each plant type uses.210 On a competitive market for 
power generation, the amount of variable cost a plant requires for the production of one 
megawatt hour of electricity therefore decides whether it is turned on to satisfy the actual 
demand for electricity.211 
Base load power generation plants are generally well suited to produce electricity steadily 
at a relatively low variable cost. Therefore, this plant type is used for the constant feed of 
the network and only turned off for the purpose of technical revisions. A flexible operation 
                                                 
sold, but the named companies are still the most important producers of electric energy for the German mar-
ket. 
206 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die 
Energiewende, 2015, 34-36 Ref. 55. 
207 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), 122. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Georg Erdmann and Peter Zweifel, Energieökonomik: Theorie und Anwendungen (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
2008), 302. 
210 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 54 – Strom und Gas 2009: Energiemärkte im Spannungsfeld von 
Politik und Wettbewerb, 47. Besides the cost of primary sources of energy, plant operation faces variable costs 
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is only possible to a limited extent. Typical base load power generation plants in the Ger-
man generation system are plants using brown coal or uranium as primary source of en-
ergy.212 
Intermediate power generation plants are mainly used to cover long-term fluctuations of 
demand because of their better suitability for the flexible operation mode. The production 
of a megawatt hour of electricity induces a higher variable cost compared to base load 
plants, though. Most typically, intermediate power plants are based on fossil fuel inputs 
like coal and gas, but also combined-cycle plants.213 
Peak load power generation plants are only turned on in times of extremely high demand. 
Their advantage is the high flexibility in the operation mode, which is however accompa-
nied by a high amount of variable cost. Typical exponents of this plant type are gas turbine 
power stations and reservoir power stations.214 
With regard to the different types of producers, a variance of power plant mixes is ob-
served in the market. Whereas the huge four companies possess a well-diversified mix of 
plants suited for the production of both, base and peak load electricity, the group of mu-
nicipal energy suppliers and independent power plant operators does typically only have 
particular plants suited for either base or peak load production.215 As will be shown later, 
this disproportionate distribution of power production capacity influences the behavior of 
the suppliers and thereby the market outcome. 
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2008), 301. 
215 Sandro Gleave, “Die Marktabgrenzung in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft”, ZfE Vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), 122. 
First Chapter: The Research Project 
D. Economic Foundations 
41 
 
The following graphic image illustrates the different variable costs and the corresponding 
use of the different types of plants:216 
 
Figure 8: Variable cost for different types of power plants 
 
b) Trade and distribution of electricity 
The second stage in the power market is distribution. All companies trading, selling, 
or buying electricity not intended for their own belong at this stage.217 In Germany, this is 
regional energy supply companies, municipal energy suppliers, and of course the four 
vertically integrated producers. Furthermore, there are banks and specialized energy trad-
ers involved in the futures market at the energy exchange. Firms on this stage maximize 
their profit through trade with electricity; the end use of the product is of no relevance to 
them.218 
After the cancelation of the long-term power supply contracts with the liberalization 1998, 
two different types of wholesale markets for power trading emerged.219 On the one hand, 
parties were contracting bilaterally via brokers or electronic trading platforms – a market 
segment which is known as over-the-counter trading (OTC).220 Besides the OTC trading, 
energy exchanges emerged beginning in 2000 with the foundation of the Leipzig Power 
                                                 
216 The illustration was created based on Georg Erdmann and Peter Zweifel, Energieökonomik: Theorie und 
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Exchange (LPX) and the European Energy Exchange (EEX).221 Since the focus of this work 
is on energy exchanges, OTC trade will not be further examined at this point, even though 
traded volumes in the OTC market do by far exceed the volumes traded at exchanges.222 
However, prices found in the EEX auctions usually serve as reference prices for OTC con-
tracts223, which justifies the limitation of the inquiry on auction pricing224. 
In contrast to OTC, trade at the energy exchanges is highly regulated and well organized. 
This structure saves transaction costs for the participants through standardization and the 
assumption of the credit risk by the exchange ensures high liquidity of the market, and 
contributes to the formation of a transparent price for current.225 The EEX, after a merger 
with the LPX in 2001226, offers two market segments for trade in energy products227: 
▪ The spot market (now part of the European Power Exchange (EPEX))228, and 
▪ the futures market. 
The following chart gives an overview of the different products that are traded in the two 
market segments: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
221 Thomas Pilgram, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2010), 345-355. 
222 See Commission staff working document accompanying the communication from the European Commis-
sion. Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors 
(Final Report), COM(2006) 851 final, 127. 
223 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 88. See also Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der 
European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 90-91. 
224 Axel Ockenfels, Veronika Grimm and Gregor Zoettl. “Strommarktdesign: Preisbildungsmechanismus im 
Auktionsverfahren für Stromstundenkontrakte an der EEX”. Expertise for the European Energy Exchange. 
2008, 4, 15. 
225 Scott Besley and Eugene F. Brigham, Principles of Finance, 2nd ed. (South-Western Thomson Learning, 
2003), 63-64 and 91-93; Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 
2nd ed. (Köln: RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 165-166 Ref. 3.34. 
226 Thomas Pilgram, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2010), 346. 
227 Spot and futures market do also offer trade in products other than current. This analysis will, however, only 
discuss trade in electricity products. 
228 After a cooperation with the French exchange Powernext in 2009, trades in the spot market are conducted 
by the EPEX Spot SE. See Thomas Pilgram, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski 
(Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2010), 346-347. 
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MARKET 
SEGMENT 
TRADED PROD-
UCTS 
PERFORMANCE SUPPLY 
Spot market 
(Germany, 
Austria, 
France, and 
Switzerland) 
Day-ahead auctions 
for base and peak 
load (single hours 
or block contracts) 
Intraday trade 
Continuous trade 
(only France) 
 
Physical 
 
 
 
Physical 
 
Physical 
Max. two trading days 
after contracting 
 
 
 
Same day 
Futures mar-
ket 
Phelix-Futures 
French-/German-
Power-Futures 
Phelix options 
Financial or physical 
 
Financial or physical 
 
 
Financial or physical 
Months, quarters, years 
 
 
 
 
Months, quarters, years 
OTC market Electricity products   
 
Table 1: Products traded at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) 
The spot market offers day-ahead auctions229 for Germany, Austria, France and Switzer-
land. Furthermore, intraday trade is possible for Germany and France, as well as continu-
ous trade for France. In contrast to the futures market, performance on the spot market 
is always physical, thus, current is actually delivered from the seller to the buyer. Energy 
traders and producers use this market to fulfill their delivery commitments in the short 
term.230 
All contracts with performance later than two trading days after closing are offered at the 
futures market.231 The periods for supply reach from weeks to years; quantity, quality, 
and point of delivery are standardized.232 Performance in the futures market may either 
be physical or financial. This market segment mirrors the expectations of producers and 
                                                 
229 Michael Ritzau and Lukas Schuffelen, in Energiehandel in Europa: Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, ed. 
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230 Jörg Borchert, Ralf Schemm, and Swen Korth, Stromhandel. Institutionen, Marktmodelle, Pricing und Risi-
komanagement (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 2006), 9. See also Marcel Malcher and Matthias Puffe, in 
Preise und Preisgestaltung in der Energiewirtschaft, ed. Ines Zenke, Stefan Wollschläger, and Jost Eder(Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 2015), 22 Ref. 35. 
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consumers in the middle and long run.233 On this account, participants may use these 
trades to guard against price fluctuations, realize arbitrage transactions, or speculation on 
future prices.234 At this stage of the power market, trade with electricity does not only 
happen vertically between companies from different trade levels, but also horizontally.235 
Predominantly, the exchange price is found in auctions. Exchange participants transfer 
excel sheets with bids containing quantity and price236 for all 24 hours of the next day in 
spot auctions.237 The energy exchange collects all bids until a certain point in time (for 
day-ahead auctions in Germany, 12:00 p.m.) and generates aggregated demand and sup-
ply curves from the bids of each hour.238 The market-clearing price is found at the inter-
section of both curves.239 The price is subject to various influences. Notably, the size of 
the market, the market structure, price volatility, distribution of risks, and the competitive 
situation on the electricity market may increase or decrease the price.240 After completion 
of the auction, the EEX does in addition take care of clearing and settlement of the con-
tracts.241 
On the futures market, the price is not found in an auction, but through matching of bid 
and identically priced ask orders.242 The relevant indices for the futures market are com-
puted by the exchange as the arithmetic mean of the spot auction prices for 24 hours 
(Phelix base) and the 12 hours of the day (9 a.m. to 20 p.m., Phelix peak).243 
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c) The end customer stage 
This stage describes the demand side of the power market. Households and industrial 
customers buy electricity from the companies on the distribution stage.244 Due to the ho-
mogeneity of electricity, the price of a kilowatt hour (kWh) is the relevant variable for the 
customers´ decision-making. 
 
4. Formation of electricity prices on the wholesale 
market 
As the pricing mechanism on the distribution stage has already revealed, the market-
clearing price at the exchange depends on demand and supply for current at any time of 
the day and in the future. An analysis of the exchange price, therefore, requires an exam-
ination of the structure of demand and supply for current. 
 
a) The demand side of the market 
The demand for electricity on the wholesale market is mainly spread over the fol-
lowing groups: traders, intermediaries and sales companies, huge industrial customers, 
and re-distributors.245 This variegated group of consumers with their diverse needs and 
hourly fluctuating demand for current may exert influence on the market price. Yet, their 
demand is most of the time inelastic, their ability to react to increasing prices with smaller 
quantities demanded therefore limited.246 The main driver of the market price, therefore, 
is the supply side. 
 
b) The supply side of the market 
Supply in the German wholesale market for electricity is heavily influenced by the 
competitive situation on the market for electricity production.247 Therefore, production and 
wholesale market are examined together by consensus.248 The production market was 
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248 See for example Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 59 – Energie 2011: Wettbewerbsentwicklung mit 
Licht und Schatten, 166. For the legal perspective on the definition of the relevant market, see the second 
chapter of this work. 
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highly concentrated during the period of examination in the years 2006 to 2009. The Her-
findahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) displayed values exceeding 1,800 on the basis of capaci-
ties and quantities.249 Four huge suppliers provided the lion´s share of the quantity de-
manded.250 In 2007 and 2008, most of the production capacity and notably the biggest 
plants were still owned by RWE AG, E.ON AG, EnBW AG, and Vattenfall Europe AG – 
85 percent (2007) respectively 84 percent (2008).251 In 2014, the number still fluctuated 
around 62 percent.252 These numbers include shares on municipal energy suppliers owned 
by the four companies, and long-term buying options for production capacities in the mar-
ket.253 
In addition, the Federal Cartel Office used the Residual Supply Index (RSI)254 to prove the 
market power individually for each of the four oligopoly firms. This concept is based on 
the proof of the demand side´s dependence from a certain supplier. Consequently, market 
power is to be affirmed if a single supplier is indispensable to satisfy the market demand 
as a whole (“pivotal supplier”).255 The authority concluded in its sector inquiry, that each 
of the four huge suppliers possessed individual market power in 2007 and probably also 
in 2008.256 Recent numbers suggest that the situation is slightly changing. However, this 
development might not be permanent due to the ongoing closures of plant capacity in the 
generation market.257 
From an economic point of view, therefore, a competitive pricing strategy is not profit-
maximizing for the oligopoly firms.258 Each of the four huge suppliers has a considerable 
influence on the wholesale price of current that might be exerted to impose a price above 
marginal cost.259 This fact will have to be taken into account when discussing the equilib-
rium price in the next subsection. 
 
                                                 
249 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 90. 
250 In 2007, 86 percent of the electricity feeding into the general power grid was realized by the oligopoly sup-
pliers, in 2008 it was still 85 percent. See ibid. 
251 Ibid, 45. 
252 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die 
Energiewende, 2015, 34-36 Ref. 55. 
253 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 45, 90. 
254 For a detailed discussion of the RSI based market power analysis, please refer to the second chapter, sec-
tion B.II.1. of this work. 
255 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 45, 97-114. 
256 Ibid, 114. 
257 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die 
Energiewende, 2015, 50 Ref. 91. 
258 See section I. 3. a of this chapter for the economic derivation. 
259 Melanie Etten-Rüppel and Christoph Riechmann, Stromwirtschaft. Ein Praxishandbuch, 2nd ed., ed. Michael 
Bartsch, Andreas Röhling, Peter Salje, Ulrich Scholz (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag GmbH, 2008), 45. 
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c) The equilibrium price in the wholesale market 
When analyzing price formation in the wholesale market for electricity, one has to 
take into account that only 26 percent of the price is influenced by competitive pricing in 
the sectors of production and sales. The main part of the end customer price consists of 
taxes, government charges, and regulated fees.260 In a nutshell, the end customer price 
for electricity consists of the elements pictured in the following illustration:261 
 
Figure 9: Elements of the end customer price for electricity 
 
The 26 percent share of the price being subject to competitive pricing is found based on 
the short-run marginal costs of the suppliers in the merit order. This term describes the 
power plant operation in ascending order of their marginal cost.262 In the short term, this 
marginal cost equals the variable cost of plant operation.263 Based on the marginal cost of 
production (mainly fuel) on the supply side and (inelastic) demand for current, the graph-
ical illustration shows distinctly, how the price in the merit order is found for each hour of 
the day.264 
                                                 
260 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 37-38. 
261 Taken from Federal Network Agency, Monitoringbericht 2015, 2015, 210. 
262 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 83. 
263 For the description of the factors influencing variable cost, please refer to subsection II.3.c) earlier in this 
chapter. 
264 Based on Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 21. 
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Figure 10: Exemplary merit order in the German power plant mix 
From figure 10 it can be deducted that the last plant necessary to satisfy the demand for 
power in each hour of the day is, with regard to the inelastic demand producers are facing, 
determining the price of power in the market.265 All plants producing at a marginal cost 
lower than the market price earn a surplus on their capacity that can be used to cover the 
fixed cost of the plant.266 In a competitive market environment, therefore, offering its 
capacity at marginal cost in the market would be a dominant strategy for each supplier.267 
Since the market structure found in the German energy market is rather close to an oli-
gopoly than a competitive environment, different pricing strategies are to be expected.268 
The following chapter 2 will develop an approximation to the expected equilibrium. 
 
III. Conclusion 
The economic analysis of the German electricity market has revealed a complex 
structure still being in flux from a formerly monopolized industry to a competitive envi-
ronment. The following description of the legal framework will further illuminate the reg-
ulatory efforts and problems in connection with this change. 
                                                 
265 Ingo Hensing, Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, and Wolfgang Ströbele, Energiewirtschaft: Einführung in Theorie 
und Politik (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1998), 120. 
266 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 83. 
267 Melanie Etten-Rüppel and Christoph Riechmann, Stromwirtschaft. Ein Praxishandbuch, 2nd ed., ed. Michael 
Bartsch, Andreas Röhling, Peter Salje, Ulrich Scholz (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag GmbH, 2008), 38. 
268 Refer to section D.3.b) of this first chapter. 
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E. Legal Foundations in German and European 
Union Law 
The legal framework for companies in the fields of energy production, transport, and 
trade, affects various areas of public and private law on both the European and national 
level. The following section will give a brief overview of the relevant rules and regulations 
in the fields of: 
▪ Energy law, 
▪ competition law, 
▪ commercial and capital market law. 
In absence of specific rules in the legislation on the above-named topics, the German 
general civil law and general public law apply. 
 
I. Energy Law 
The field of energy law cannot be located in one single national German code, but is 
rather spread over a number of laws and statutory orders. It combines elements of both, 
private and public law, since most of the rules refer to (private) contracts, that are, how-
ever, partly subject to regulatory interventions by the Federal Network Agency (FNA).269 
In a narrow sense, energy law “can be understood as the sum of all legal norms with 
validity exclusively for the power and gas industry”.270 
The basic rules for the energy sector are codified in the German Law on the Energy Indus-
try (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG)271, which is mainly treating questions of network 
access (Sec. 20(1), (1a) EnWG), access fees (Sec. 21 EnWG), and basic supply for cus-
tomers (Sec. 36 EnWG). Sec. 1 EnWG defines the central objectives of German energy 
law: First and most importantly, supply of the general public with electricity shall be reli-
able, reasonably priced, consumer-friendly, efficient, and ecological.272 Second, effective 
and undistorted competition in energy supply, as well as guaranteed long-term powerful 
                                                 
269 Ulrich Büdenbender, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Peter Rosin, Energierecht I. Recht der Energieanla-
gen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 7. 
270 Ibid, 6. Translation by the author. 
271 Heino Mengers, Energierecht. Handbuch, 2nd ed., ed. Christoph Germer and Helmut Loibl (Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag, 2007), 22. 
272 Ibid, 32. 
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and reliable operation of power grids shall be ensured.273 Third, the European requirements 
in the field of energy law shall be enforced.274 
In order to meet these standards, the act contains comprehensive regulatory require-
ments, further concretized in statutory orders based on Sec. 21, 21a, 24 EnWG with regard 
to network access (German Statutory Order on Network Access for Electricity, Stromnetz-
zugangsverordnung – StromNZV) and access fees (German Statutory Order on Access 
Fees for Electricity, Stromnetzentgeltverordnung - StromNEV). 
Besides the EnWG, the German Renewable Energy Act (Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneu-
erbarer Energie, EEG) contains provisions on connection requirements for renewables, 
preferential feed-in of this current, and the guaranteed feed-in tariffs.275 Notably, the re-
newable energy act establishes a claim for a 20-year fixed remuneration of energy stem-
ming from renewable sources (Sec. 16ff. EEG) and obligates network operators to buy this 
electricity with priority (Sec. 8 EEG).276 In 2010, the renewed Statutory Order on the EEG 
Clearing Mechanism (Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung, AusglMechV) came into effect, 
forcing transmission system operators to sell current from EEG installations in the spot 
market (Sec. 2(2) AusglMechV).277 These rules exert huge influence on the price formation 
at the energy exchange through the so-called merit-order effect278, which will be discussed 
later in this work.279 
Eventually, the rules on emissions trading relevant to industrial power plants (German Act 
on Emissions Trading, Treibhausgasemissionshandelsgesetz – TEHG – and related laws), 
and numerous regulations, particularly from the Federal Network Agency (FNA), shape the 
legal framework energy producers, distributors, and traders operate in.280 
                                                 
273 Ibid, 120-121. 
274 The liberalization of the German energy market was driven by the European directive N° 96/92 on the sin-
gle European power market from December 12, 1996, EU Official Journal from January 30, 1997 L 27, 20, that 
was forcing member states to open their power industry for competition. 
275 Jens-Peter Schneider, Recht der Energiewirtschaft. Praxishandbuch, 3rd ed., ed. Jens-Peter Schneider and 
Christian Theobald (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 1204-1205. 
276 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, No. B10-9/09, 65. Also Peter 
Salje, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz. Kommentar, 5th ed. (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 343ff., 493ff. 
277 Jens-Peter Schneider, Recht der Energiewirtschaft. Praxishandbuch, 3rd ed., ed. Jens-Peter Schneider and 
Christian Theobald (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 1233ff. 
278 This term describes the decrease of the power price at the EEX in the event of an installation with lower 
variable cost entering the market. Particularly wind power and photovoltaic (PV) are typical examples of instal-
lations that regularly squeeze more expensive plants out of the merit order. For an analysis of the volume of 
this effect, see the simulation by Frank Sensfuß, Mario Ragwitz, and Massimo Genoese, “The merit-order ef-
fect: A detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in Ger-
many”, Energy Policy, Vol. 36, no. 8 (2008), 3086-3094. 
279 Refer to the third chapter, section D.I.1. of this work. 
280 For a comprehensive overview of the rules and regulations for the power sector that would go far beyond 
the scope of this work, please refer to e.g. Jens-Peter Schneider and Christian Theobald (ed.), Recht der Ener-
giewirtschaft. Praxishandbuch, 3rd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2011). 
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In August 2011, as a consequence of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, the German 
energy law experienced an abrupt turnaround. Within a few weeks, the German parliament 
decided to quit energy production from nuclear sources until 2022 and switch to renewable 
sources of energy.281 The existing laws, most importantly the Atomic Energy Act (Atomge-
setz – AtG)282, the EnWG283, and the EEG284 were amended to permit the change in para-
digm in German energy policy.285 Main changes in the EnWG refer to the unbundling on 
the electricity and gas markets, accelerated network expansion, and simplified rules for 
the change of suppliers for end customers.286 With regard to the promotion of renewable 
energy sources – the Federal Government plans to increase the share of renewables in the 
energy production to 35 percent until 2020 and 80 percent until the year 2050287 – the 
EEG was amended in order to avoid severe price increases. In particular, a market pre-
mium is supposed to incentivize producers to sell their electricity individually at the ex-
changes as an alternative to the legally guaranteed payment (Sec. 33a to 33i EEG).288 
Further amendments aim at the relief of the energy intensive industry from the EEG 
cost.289 
The amendments resulting from the energy turnaround290 will affect the above-described 
supply side of the market in the future, notably the appearance of the merit order. Since 
this regulatory change happened after the exemplary period of examination treated in this 
work, it did not influence the market equilibrium during the years 2006 to 2009 and is 
therefore without relevance for the more general research question on regulatory impacts 
on manipulation incentives. 
 
                                                 
281 Birgit Ortlieb, “Das Gesetzespaket zur Energiewende – Zusammenfassender Überblick über die wesentli-
chen Inhalte der acht am 8. Juli 2011 endgültig verabschiedeten, mittlerweile im Bundesgesetzblatt veröffent-
lichten (und zum größten Teil auch bereits in Kraft getretenen) Gesetze”, EWeRK, Vol. 11, no. 4 (2011), 151. 
282 Amendment of the AtG: BGBl. I 2011, p. 1704-1705, effective from August 5th, 2011. 
283 Amendment of the EnWG: BGBl. I 2011, p. 1634-1678, effective from August 47h, 2011; partly also serv-
ing as transformation of the Third Single Energy Market Package of the European Union. 
284 Amendment of the EEG: BGBl. I 2011, p. 1634-1678, effective from January 1st, 2012. 
285 For an overview of the main changes, see Birgit Ortlieb, “Das Gesetzespaket zur Energiewende – Zusam-
menfassender Überblick über die wesentlichen Inhalte der acht am 8. Juli 2011 endgültig verabschiedeten, 
mittlerweile im Bundesgesetzblatt veröffentlichten (und zum größten Teil auch bereits in Kraft getretenen) Ge-
setze”, EWeRK, Vol. 11, no. 4 (2011), 151. 
286 Ibid, 153-154. 
287 German Federal Government, “Energiekonzept für eine umweltschonende, zuverlässige und bezahlbare 
Energieversorgung.”, 2010. 
288 Florian Valentin, “Das neue System der Direktvermarktung von EEG-Strom im Überblick”, ree, Vol. 2, no. 1 
(2012), 11. 
289 Christian Buchmüller and Jörn Schnutenhaus, “Die Entlastung stromintensiver Unternehmen durch das 
Energiepaket des Bundestages“, EWeRK Vol. 11, no. 4 (2011), 132-134. 
290 The word describes the historic German project to change its energy supply to green, nonnuclear and re-
newable sources. In the meantime, it is also known in English-speaking countries in its original German term 
“The Energiewende”. See Paul Hockenos, “The Energiewende”, Die Zeit Vol. 67, no. 47 from November 15, 
2012. Available online at http://www.zeit.de/2012/47/Energiewende-Deutsche-Begriffe-Englisch.  
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II. Competition Law 
With regard to the formerly monopolized structure of the power sector, competition 
law has always played a key role in this industry. With the liberalization of the power 
market, the exceptions for the power sector from the German Act Against Restraints of 
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) became ineffective.291 
Since then, the whole sector is subject to the competition laws of the European Union and 
Germany. 
Competition law on both the European and the German national level can be broken up 
into the following three domains:292 
 
Figure 11: Three domains of European and German competition law 
With regard to the enforcement of market manipulations, mainly the control of abusive 
practices is of further interest. Therefore, the relevant rules shall be introduced subse-
quently with their scope and preconditions, furthermore, the relation of European and 
German national rules will be presented. 
 
                                                 
291 Until the 1998 amendment of the GWB, Sec. 103b GWB had stated an exception of the power supply indus-
try from the cartel ban with regard to contracts between companies and between companies and municipali-
ties. See Christian Theobald, Recht der Energiewirtschaft. Praxishandbuch, 3rd ed., ed. Jens-Peter Schneider 
and Christian Theobald (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 10. 
292 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
30-38. Also Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 15-19. The denotations of 
the laws and numbers of the articles have been adapted to the effective rules by the author. 
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1. Abuse of a dominant position in European law: 
Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 82 TEC) 
The relevant rule for the definition of abusive behavior in European Union law is 
Art. 102 TFEU, formerly Art. 82 TEC. It reads as follows: 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other un-
fair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
The wording of Art. 102 TFEU names two requirements for market behavior to qualify as 
abusive: A dominant position of the market participant and abusive behavior; the list 
of abusive practices in the article is not exhaustive, however, and just supposed to give 
rule examples.293 The two elements shall be examined subsequently. 
 
a) The dominant position 
The European Court of Justice, since its famous decision in Hoffmann-La Roche 
(1979), defines market dominance as follows:294 
“The dominant position … relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed 
by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ulti-
mately of the consumers. Such a position does not preclude some competition, 
which it does where there is a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the 
                                                 
293 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
34. 
294 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission. Case 85/76. European Court reports 1979, 461 (1979), Ref. 38-39. 
Similar Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 179. 
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undertaking, which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an appre-
ciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will develop, 
and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does 
not operate to its detriment.” 
In economic terms, this definition implies an appreciable influence on the market price, 
exerted by the dominant firm.295 The identification of a dominant position requires the 
definition of the relevant market with regard to the product traded, place, and (where 
applicable) time as a first step. In its 1997 notice296, the European Commission established 
the relevant market concept, specifying the 
▪ relevant product market as comprising “all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the 
products´ characteristics, their prices and their intended use”; and the 
▪ relevant geographical market as comprising “the area in which the firms concerned 
are involved in the supply of products or services and in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogenous”. 
In practice, the European Commission employs the so-called SSNIP test to identify the 
relevant market and detect market dominance.297 The long form of the abbreviation – 
“Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price”298 – clearly reveals the con-
ceptual approach: Substitute products are identified in “a speculative experiment, postu-
lating a hypothetical small, lasting change in relative prices and evaluating the likely re-
actions of customers to that increase.” By including additional products and areas to the 
market at issue, it can be concluded “whether competition from these other products and 
areas affect or restrain sufficiently the pricing of the parties´ products in the short 
term.”299 In economic terms, price elasticity of demand is assessed, depending on con-
sumers´ ability to buy from an alternative supplier.300 
                                                 
295 For its pricing decision, a company having a dominant position will only take into account the best re-
sponses of its competitors to each quantity or price offered in the market and not solely its marginal cost of 
production. See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 35 and Ref. 88. 
296 European Commission, Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competi-
tion law. Official Journal from December 9, 1997. N°. C 372. 
297 Ibid, no. 15-19. 
298 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
102. The small but significant price increase ranges between 5 to 10 percent relative to competitive prices. 
299 European Commission, Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competi-
tion law. Official Journal from December 9, 1997. N°. C 372/7 no. 15. 
300 With regard to the meaning and implications of the concept of price elasticity of demand, please refer to 
section D.I.1.a of this work. 
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However, the SSNIP test has some weaknesses, especially in cases where firms have al-
ready charged prices above the competitive level. A further increase of the market price 
might not be profitable for the firm, resulting in a wide market definition and only small 
market shares of a powerful firm on the basis of the SNIPP test.301 The European Com-
mission tries to answer the question of market dominance therefore using additional cri-
teria, e.g. analyses of the recent past, specific econometric and statistic studies, market 
views of customers and competitors302, consumer preferences, barriers and costs associ-
ated with switching of demand, and customer and price discrimination.303 
Once the relevant market has been defined both product-wise and geographically, the firm 
being suspect of abusive practices has to be identified as dominant in the market. With 
regard to market dominance, European law refers to a paramount position in the Common 
European Market.304 In the past cases, jurisprudence has established a market share of 
about 40 to 50 percent as a relevant threshold for dominance.305 In praxis, however, eco-
nomic analysis is used to judge the market power of firms. Factors like barriers to entry, 
and vertical integration of firms may intensify the presumption of dominance, whereas 
e.g. a dominant position on the supply side tends to weaken market power.306 
 
b) Abuse of a dominant position 
If the analysis comes to the conclusion that market dominance has to be approved, 
abuse of the dominant position has to be proved. The pure creation of a dominant position 
through internal growth of firms is not punished in European competition law.307 Therefore, 
the subsumption of market behavior under Art. 102 TFEU requires a clear definition of 
                                                 
301 This situation is denoted as “Cellophane Fallacy”. See Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker and Heike Schweitzer, 
Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2004), 395. Also Massimo Motta, Competition 
Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 105. 
302 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 69. 
303 European Commission, Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competi-
tion law. Official Journal from December 9, 1997. N°. C 372/10-11, no. 36-43. 
304 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 903-904 Ref. 14, 15. Firms with dominance only on minor parts of the Common Market are not 
subject to the European abuse provisions. 
305 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission. Case 27/76. European Court 
reports 1978, 207 (1978), Ref. 108. Hilti AG v. Commission. Case T-30/89. European Court Reports 1994, I-
00667, Ref. 92f. Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission. Case C-62/86. European Court Reports 1991, I-03359, Ref. 
60. See also Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 35. Further Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 907 Ref. 19. 
306 Please refer to section D.I.3.b for an overview of structural factors that benefit concentration. See also 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker and Heike Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2004), 404-405. 
307 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
35. 
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abuse. Again, the 1979 case Hoffmann-La Roche (1979), delivers important indications 
for abusive behavior:308 
“which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition nor-
mal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the de-
gree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competi-
tion.” 
Art. 102 TFEU names a number of examples for abusive practices, that are, however, not 
exhaustive. For the case of price manipulations discussed here, Art. 102 lit. a TFEU is the 
relevant paragraph. This rule has two prerequisites: Prices must be extorted and inap-
propriate. For the element of extortion to be satisfied, any use of the market power a 
firm has is sufficient, a special exercise of pressure on the consumers is not required.309 
The decisive element of the abuse provision, therefore, is the inappropriateness of the 
price charged.310 The main criterion for the judgment of prices as inappropriate is a missing 
relation between price and economic value of the good or service.311 Based on the profit 
margin, thus the difference between production cost and price, the Commission eval-
uates prices with regard to their appropriateness.312  
Several different concepts have been applied to determine inappropriate prices.313 Com-
parisons may be drawn with other (competitive) markets or prices for comparable goods 
and services.314 However, it remains difficult to prove abuse of market power through 
excessive prices convincingly based on these approaches.315 This core thesis of the present 
work will be developed in depth in the following chapter 2, analyzing the past efforts of 
competition authorities in detail. 
 
                                                 
308 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission. Case 85/76. European Court reports 1979, 461 (1979), Ref. 38-39. 
309 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 149. 
310 Ibid. 
311 General Motors Continental NV v. Commission. Case 26/75. European Court Reports 1975, 1367. See also 
Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 919 Ref. 38. 
312 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker and Heike Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2004), 410. 
313 For an overview of the most famous approaches, please refer to Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des 
Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 928-933. 
314 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 150. 
315 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
69-70. 
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c) Sanctions 
Upon existence of abusive practices, Art. 7(1) of the European regulation 
N° 1/2003316 authorizes the European Commission to take all relevant actions necessary 
to end the abuse.317 Furthermore, fines can be determined, Art. 23 REG 1/2003.318 Abu-
sive agreements between companies may be void by law if the violation is centered in a 
disturbance of the economic liberty of action, Sec. 134 BGB.319 In less severe cases, an 
adaption of the contract provisions (e.g. a reduction of the price) takes precedence over 
the legal consequence of nullity.320 Beyond that, damages claims of aggrieved parties 
on the basis of Sec. 33 GWB are a legal tool to punish infringements of competition law.321 
The current system of sanctions for antitrust infringements will be presented in chapters 
3 (governmental sanctions) and 4 (private sanctions) in a comprehensive manner and be 
subjected to an economic evaluation as part of the positive analysis of incentives for mar-
ket participants. 
 
2. Abuse of a dominant position in German law: 
Sections 19, 20, 29 GWB 
In the German code, Sec. 19, 20, and 29 GWB treat abusive practices. Market ma-
nipulations of any form might only be subsumed under Sec. 19 GWB, which reads: 
“(1) The abuse of a dominant position by one or several undertakings is pro-
hibited. 
(2) An abuse exists in particular if a dominant undertaking as a supplier or 
purchaser of a certain type of goods or commercial services 
1. directly or indirectly impedes another undertaking in an unfair man-
ner or directly or indirectly treats another undertaking differently 
from other undertakings without any objective justification; 
2. demands payment or other business terms which differ from those 
which would very likely arise if effective competition existed; in this 
context, particularly the conduct of undertakings in comparable 
markets where effective competition exists shall be taken into ac-
count; 
3. demands less favourable payment or other business terms than the 
                                                 
316 European Regulation N° 1/2003. EU Official Journal from May 1, 2004, 2003 N° L 1, 1. 
317 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 173. 
318 Holger Dieckmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1588 Ref. 1. 
319 Ibid, 1509 Ref. 17. 
320 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 174. 
321 Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan. Case C-453/99. European Court Reports 2001, I-6297. Also Manfredi v. 
Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA. Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04.European Court Reports 2006, I-06619. 
See also Holger Dieckmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 1510 Ref. 20. 
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dominant undertaking itself demands from similar purchasers in 
comparable markets, unless there is an objective justification for 
such differentiation; 
4. refuses to allow another undertaking access to its own networks or 
other infrastructure facilities against adequate consideration, pro-
vided that without such joint use the other undertaking is unable 
for legal or factual reasons to operate as a competitor of the domi-
nant undertaking on the upstream or downstream market; this shall 
not apply if the dominant undertaking demonstrates that for oper-
ational or other reasons such joint use is impossible or cannot rea-
sonably be expected; 
5. uses its market position to invite or cause other undertakings to 
grant it advantages without any objective justification. 
(3) Paragraph 1 in conjunction with paragraph 2 nos 1 and 5 also applies to 
associations of competing undertakings within the meaning of §§ 2, 3, 
and 28(1), § 30(2a) and § 31(1) nos 1, 2 and 4. Paragraph 1 in conjunc-
tion with paragraph 2 no. 1 shall also apply to undertakings which set 
resale prices pursuant to § 28(2) or § 30(1) sentence 1 or § 31(1) no. 3.” 
 
Sec. 19 GWB aims, in parallelism to the European rules, at the protection of third parties´ 
liberty of action in case of exposure to dominant firms.322 Like the European code, 
Sec. 19(1) GWB has two elements: The dominant position and abusive behavior, the def-
inition of which will be introduced subsequently. 
 
a) The dominant position 
With regard to the identification of dominance, the German law parallels the Euro-
pean concept for the definition of the relevant product and geographic market (Sec. 18 
GWB).323 Dominance is assumed if a monopoly exists or no substantial competition is 
observed in a market (Sec. 18(1) N° 1 GWB), a firm has a paramount market position 
(Sec. 18(1) N° 3 GWB), or has no substantial competition (Sec. 18(1) N° 2 GWB).324 In 
legal practice, courts judge market power by way of an overall view of the relevant factors, 
mainly examining a firm´s ability to influence the market price.325  
                                                 
322 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 339. 
323 Ibid, 341.Please refer to the preceding subsection for details. In depth Anne Godde, Marktabgrenzung im 
Stromsektor (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 92. 
324 See Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 983-991. 
325 Sachs v. GKN, KVR 4/77, BGHZ 71, 102 (1978). Also Klöckner v. Becorit, KVR 1/80, BGHZ 79, 62 (1980). 
And Springer v. MZV, KVR 2/80, BGHZ 82, 1 (1982). 
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b) Abuse of a dominant position 
Besides the sweeping clause in Sec. 19(1) GWB, there are a variety of rule examples 
for abusive practices in Sec. 19(2) GWB. Excessive pricing is listed in Sec. 19(2) N° 2. The 
rule defines the “hypothetical competitive price” as a benchmark for price controls.326 This 
price is found by comparison with prices paid in similar markets (so-called analogue mar-
ket conception - Vergleichsmarktkonzept).327 Yet, this approach, as other indirect concepts 
to approach the competitive price328, has not proved to be a successful instrument in 
competition policy.329 
As a consequence of their weaknesses, price controls may only be a corrective in cases 
where all other measures of competition law fail.330 An in-depth analysis of the drawbacks 
of this instrument in its current form will be conducted in chapters 2 and 3 of this work, 
combined with possible alternative regulatory concepts presented likewise in chapter 3. 
 
c) Sanctions 
Infringements of the abuse provisions are punished both in German public and civil 
law. The German public law empowers antitrust authorities to issue injunctive relieves 
against firms engaging in abusive pricing, Sec. 32 GWB331, and contains provisions on 
fines, Sec. 83 GWB et sqq. with reference to the German code on administrative offences 
(Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz – OWiG).332 
For damages claims, Sec. 33 GWB is the legal basis.333 With reference to the German Civil 
Code, aggrieved parties may sue dominant firms for unlawful, culpable abusive actions 
that caused them damages.334 The value of this instrument in competition law and prob-
lems of this approach will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 of this work. 
                                                 
326 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1003 Ref. 51. 
327 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 368-369. 
328 E.g., approaches observing profits and profit margins based on a comparison of production cost and reve-
nue have been developed, but failed to deliver convincing results due to missing data on actual production 
costs. See ibid, 371. 
329 See also the references in the preceding section on European competition law. 
330 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 369, 371. 
331 Tobias Klose, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 
1775 Ref. 1. 
332 Martin Klusmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1900 et sqq. 
333 Julia Topel, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 
1753 et sqq. 
334 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 533. 
First Chapter: The Research Project 
E. Legal Foundations 
60 
 
3. The relation of European and German national law 
Since there are two regulatory regimes for cases of abusive practices, the question 
comes up which rules shall be applied. The relation of European and German national 
competition law is regulated in the European regulation N° 1/2003.335 As a general rule, 
European and national competition law are applicable parallel in cases where trade be-
tween Member States is affected (Art. 3(1) REG 1/2003 and Sec. 22(1) GWB). The Ger-
man national courts and agencies are free to decide whether they want to apply the Ger-
man code in addition to European law (Sec. 22(2), (3)); in doing so, however, they have 
to respect the primacy of community law.336 
An exception from this general rule has been made with regard to Art. 102 TFEU: Member 
States may adapt rules stricter than community law to prevent or punish unilateral acts 
of firms (Art. 3(2), second sentence REG 1/2003, Sec. 22(3), third sentence GWB).337 
As a consequence of this parallelism, both European and German competition law will be 
examined with regard to their ability to prevent manipulations in the following analysis. 
 
4. Summary and outlook 
The description of both European and German competition law produces two results: 
Firstly, the existing competition law does apparently cover abusive practices by dominant 
firms in an extensive manner. Yet, secondly, the introduced concepts for the assessment 
of market power already point to the practical problems with regard to the need for robust 
evidence for antitrust violations. 
This problem will be further analyzed in Chapter 2 of this work by looking at past efforts 
to prove manipulations both by European and German cartel offices. Eventually, chapters 
3 and 4 will focus on suitable alternative approaches to prove abusive behavior. 
 
III. Exchange and capital market law 
As a third important complex, the following subsection will give an overview of the 
rules and regulations governing the conduct of exchange participants. Just as for the other 
                                                 
335 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 115 Ref. 2. 
336 Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 11th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 42-43. 
337 Ibid, 44. 
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fields of law, both European and German national laws define standards for admission and 
trade. 
 
1. European laws and regulations on capital markets 
On the European level, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)338 and 
the revised directive MiFID II (applicable from January 2, 2018)339, out of it particularly 
the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)340 and Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)341, and recently 
drafted regulations on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT)342, and on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR)343, are the main legal 
framework for trades at exchanges. 
Since the MiFID and the MAD have been implemented in German law by way of the act 
implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Um-
setzungsgesetz, FRUG)344, thereby mainly changing the provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act (Börsengesetz, BörsG) and the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhan-
delsgesetz, WpHG), European and German national law are widely synchronous.345 The 
MAR is applicable directly and has hence not been transposed into German law.346 There-
fore, the introduction to these provisions will be given in the subsection on German capital 
market law. 
REMIT and EMIR entered into force on December 28, 2011.347 The most significant changes 
for actors on financial markets intended by the two regulations are pictured in the following 
figure: 
                                                 
338 Directive 2004/39/EC from April 21, 2004. Official Journal L 145, p. 1-44.  
339 Diretive 2014/65/EU from May 15, 2014. Official Journal L 173, p. 349-496. With regard to the changes to 
be expected in 2017 refer to Ines Zenke, "Was die Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde BaFin "mit Energie" umtreibt," 
IR Vol. 12, no. 12 (2015), 266-267. 
340 Directive 2003/6/EC from January 28, 2003. Official Journal L 96, p. 16-25. Renewed by directive 
2014/57/EU from April 16, 2014. Official Journal L 173, p. 179-189. 
341 Regulation N° 596/2014/EU from April 16, 2014. Official Journal L 173, p. 1-61. 
342 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy 
market integrity and transparency, COM(2010) 726 final from December 12, 2010. Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0726:FIN:EN:PDF. 
343 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC de-
rivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2010) 484 final from September 15, 2010. Availa-
ble online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0484:FIN:EN:PDF. 
344 Act implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, 
FRUG), version promulgated on July 16, 2007, Federal Law Gazette I, 1330. 
345 Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS 
Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 25 Ref. 1.91. 
346 BaFin, “Market Manipulation” (2017). Available online on https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/Bo-
ersenMaerkte/Marktmanipulation/marktmanipulation_node_en.html (last accessed October 23, 2017). 
347 Regulation on wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) N° 1227/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Version promulgated on October 25, 2011 (Official Journal L 326, p. 1-16). 
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Figure 12: Main provisions of REMIT and EMIR 
Taken as a whole, the intended changes are supposed to close existing gaps in legislation 
and create more effective instruments for market surveillance – notably on the OTC mar-
ket.348 
 
2. German laws and regulations on capital markets 
In German national law, three main laws regulate access to and behavior at exchanges: 
The Securities Exchange Act (Börsengesetz, BörsG), the Securities Trading Act (Wertpa-
pierhandelsgesetz, WpHG) and the follow-up regulation in the MAR, as well as the German 
Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG). Especially with regard to the Securities Exchange 
and the Securities Trading Act (BörsG and WpHG), the influence of European legislation 
has to be respected. Any interpretation of these rules has to be done in the light of the 
European directive.349 
The scope of each of the statutes is pictured in the following chart: 
 
                                                 
348 Janine Riewe, “Verordnungsentwurf zur Transparenz und Marktintegrität im Energiegroßhandel vom 08. 
Dezember 2010”, EWeRK Vol. 11 no. 1 (2011), 9-10. 
349 Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS 
Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 28-29 Ref. 1.102. 
Main provisions of REMIT and EMIR 
REMIT 
 
▪ Applicable for both, exchange and 
OTC trading 
 
▪ Bans on market abuse and insider 
dealing 
 
▪ Reporting commitments for mar-
ket participants 
 
▪ Duty to disclosure for fundamental 
data 
 
▪ Europe-wide sanctions for viola-
tions 
EMIR 
 
▪ Uniform provisions for derivatives 
trading (particularly compulsory 
clearing and notification require-
ments) 
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Figure 13: The scope of the three German banking and exchange acts 
The following subsections will shortly introduce the relevant provisions with regard to the 
topic of exchange manipulations. 
 
a) Important terms and definitions in German capital market law 
The term exchange is defined legally in Sec. 2(1)-(3) BörsG350, whereupon a differ-
entiation is made between securities exchanges (Sec. 2(2) BörsG) and commodity ex-
changes (Sec. 2(3) BörsG).351 Gas and electricity products are unquestionably classified 
as commodities.352 Therefore, the rules for commodities exchanges apply to the EEX. 
                                                 
350 The legal norm defines exchanges as public-law institutions with some legal capacity that organize and 
monitor multilateral systems matching buyers and sellers of economic goods according to the BörsG. See also 
Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS Ver-
lag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 152 Ref. 3.3. 
351 Ibid, 160 Ref. 3.23. 
352 Michael Cieslarczyk and Thomas Pilgram, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann 
and Michael Cieslarczyk (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 637. 
German Securities Exchange Laws 
Securities 
Exchange Act 
(BörsG) 
 
Permission of ex-
changes, organs, and 
basic exchange or-
ganization 
(Sec. 1-22 BörsG) 
 
Admission of securi-
ties and participants 
to trading 
(Sec. 32-48, 19 
BörsG) 
 
Fixing of the market 
price, trade suspen-
sion 
(Sec. 24, 25 BörsG) 
 
Administrative fines 
and penal provisions 
(Sec. 49-50 BörsG) 
Securities 
Trading Act 
(WpHG) 
 
Scope and definitions 
of financial instru-
ments 
(Sec. 1-2a WpHG) 
 
Bans on insider trad-
ing and surveillance 
(Sec. 12-20 WpHG) 
 
Ban on exchange 
price and market ma-
nipulation 
(Sec. 20a-20b WpHG) 
 
Rules of conduct, or-
ganization and trans-
parency 
(Sec. 31-37a WpHG) 
 
Administrative fines 
and penal provisions 
(Sec. 38-40a WpHG) 
Banking Act 
(KWG) 
 
 
Rules on permission 
and continuous sol-
vency of banks and fi-
nancial service pro-
viders 
(Sec. 32-38 KWG) 
 
Supervision by the 
Federal Agency for Fi-
nancial Market Super-
vision (Bundesanstalt 
für Fi-
nanzdienstleistung-
saufsicht, BaFin) 
(Sec. 6-9 KWG) 
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According to the definition in Sec. 2(3) BörsG, commodities exchanges are open to trade 
in commodities as defined in Sec. 2(2c) WpHG353, futures contracts with reference to com-
modities, and futures contracts as defined in Sec. 2(2) N° 2 WpHG. The enumeration in 
this provision refers to the central term with regard to the scope of German capital market 
law: financial instruments. A legal definition of this term can be found in Sec. 2(2b) 
WpHG. This provision includes: 
▪ Securities as defined in Sec. 2(1) WpHG, 
▪ financial market instruments (Sec. 2(1a))354, 
▪ derivatives (Sec. 2(2) WpHG), and 
▪ rights to subscription of securities. 
Since the products traded at commodities exchanges, namely day-ahead contracts on the 
spot market and Phelix futures or options on the futures market355, are not securities and 
financial market instruments, as well as subscription rights, they can only be classified as 
derivatives. The law names several requirements for contracts to be treated as derivatives 
in the meaning of the WpHG: 
▪ Futures contracts with reference to (e.g.) commodities, 
▪ performance is realized by way of cash clearing, 
▪ the contracts are concluded in an organized market or in a multilateral trading 
system, 
▪ they are no spot transactions. 
                                                 
353 Sec. 2(2c) WpHG defines commodities as fungible assets that can be delivered, including amongst other 
things energies like electricity. 
354 According to the legal definition, financial market instruments are classes of claims not comprised by 
Sec. 2(1), but typically traded in the financial market. Cash Bills and Treasury Bills in the governmental sector 
are an example, but already comprised by Sec. 2(1) in their nature as bonds. See Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz. Kommentar, 5th ed., ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schneider (Köln: Verlag 
Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2009), 145-146 Ref. 37. 
355 For details please refer back to section D.II.3.b. 
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As a consequence of this definition, EEX spot products, particularly day-ahead trading, are 
not subject to the WpHG and KWG rules governing access to and conduct in the ex-
changes.356 The futures contracts, however, are comprised by the definition and as a con-
sequence subject to the rules presented subsequently.357 
 
b) Structure, surveillance, and conditions of trade: The Securities 
Exchange Act (BörsG) and connected rules 
The Securities Exchange Act (BörsG) contains legal foundations for all exchanges 
operating in Germany. However, this statute is completed by several other rules – mainly 
on-site by the EEX.358 The most important ones are:359 
▪ The exchange regulations of the EEX (Börsenordnung, BörsO)360, 
▪ the EEX Code of Conduct361, 
▪ the EEX trading conditions362 and the EEX contract specifications363, 
▪ the admission rules of the EEX364, and 
▪ the EEX OTC-clearing regulations. 
Legal provisions for the operation of exchanges are codified in the Securities Exchange 
Act (BörsG). The operation of an exchange requires a public permit in the first place, 
Sec. 4(1) BörsG. The EEX and its preceding organizations did pass the approval process 
                                                 
356 Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS 
Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 1235 Ref. 13.50. Likewise Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit 
marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2011), 110, 172-173. 
357 Michael Cieslarczyk and Thomas Pilgram, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann 
and Michael Cieslarczyk (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 637. 
358 In their nature as a public body, the exchanges are authorized to legislate. See Markus Lenenbach, Kapital-
marktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum 
GmbH, 2010), 152 Ref. 3.3. 
359 See for a complete list Philipp Härle, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Ber-
lin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2010), 401-402. For access to the documents, please refer to 
www.eex.com/en/Download/Documentation/Rules_and_Regulations. 
360 This code is a public-law by-laws according to Sec. 12(2)  N° 1 and Sec. 16 BörsG. The latest version from 
September 25, 2011 is published on www.eex.com/en/document/97629/20110925_EEX_Ex-
change_Rules_0019a_e_final_clean.pdf. 
361 EEX Code of Conduct from June 24, 2010. Availabe at www.eex.com/en/docu-
ment/76054/EEX_code_of_conduct_en.pdf. 
362 This regime describes explicitly the kinds of possible orders, including the submission, price fixing, and con-
clusion of contracts. Details will not be discussed in this work. 
363 The contract specifications as a part of the trading conditions define standards for the spot and futures 
market products. For details see Philipp Härle, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski 
(Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2010), 410 et sqq. 
364 These rules refer to the admission requirements and process of exchange traders. The topic will not be 
dealt with in detail here. 
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and were permitted as commodity exchanges.365 During their operation, exchanges are 
subject to public oversight by the Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision (Bun-
desanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin).366 However, the merger of the EEX 
Power Spot GmbH with the French EPEX Spot SE with its registered office in Paris resulted 
in a supervision vacuum: The French authority, the Commission de Régulation de l` En-
ergie (CRE) is only reliable for French energy trade and cross-border transactions. The 
EEX spot market for the German market area is therefore not covered by any CRE com-
petence, nor is there a responsibility of the German BaFin for companies with registered 
offices outside the territory of Germany. As a consequence, the EEX spot market does 
currently operate without supervision of governmental authorities, the BörsG provisions 
don´t apply.367 
The internal structure of the EEX can be described – in a simplified illustration – as a split 
of power between the Exchange Executive Board, the Exchange Council, and the Market 
Surveillance.368 The Exchange Council is the highest body in the exchange organization; 
its elected members are representatives of the companies admitted for trade at the ex-
change. Its main functions are promulgation of the exchange rules, the appointment and 
surveillance of board members and the director of the Market Surveillance (Sec. 12(2), 14 
BörsG).369 The Executive Board is reliable for the daily business, particularly the execution 
of trade (Sec. 15 BörsG). Eventually, Sec. 7 BörsG requires the installation of a Market 
Surveillance, which is supposed to collect and analyze data in order to detect breaches of 
rules and manipulations.370 
An important document with regard to market manipulations is – since 2008371 – the EEX 
Code of Conduct. This public-law by-law contains behavioral rules for trading at the ex-
change, information requirements, and sanctions. It applies to the exchange itself, all 
exchange participants and traders (Sec. 1(1) Code of Conduct).372 Therefore, also spot 
market transactions are included in the scope of the code, other than under the Securities 
Exchange and Securities Trading Act (BörsG and WpHG).373 Sec. 3 et sqq. Code of Conduct 
                                                 
365 Michael Cieslarczyk and Thomas Pilgram, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann 
and Michael Cieslarczyk (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 638. 
366 Heiko Beck, Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Eberhard Schwark and Daniel Zimmer (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2010), Sec. 3 BörsG Ref. 1. 
367 Kevin Canty and Volker Lüdemann, “Strompreisbildung ohne Aufsicht”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
from November 23, 2010. 
368 Michael Cieslarczyk and Thomas Pilgram, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann 
and Michael Cieslarczyk (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 644 Ref. 41. 
369 Ibid, 644-645 Ref. 42, 45. 
370 Ibid, 639 Ref. 24. 
371 The first Code of Conduct was promulgated on June 13, 2008. 
372 Philipp Härle, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 403 Ref. 739a. 
373 One of the intentions for the Code of conduct was to close legal gaps in the Securities Trading Act. See ibid, 
454 Ref. 967. 
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prohibits all forms of manipulations of stock exchange dealing, particularly fictitious or 
misleading orders (Sec. 4 and 5 Code of Conduct), agreements or collusive behavior 
(Sec. 6 Code of Conduct), and manipulation of the settlement price such that it deviates 
from the fair market price (Sec. 7 Code of Conduct). Furthermore, the code obliges ex-
change participants to support market transparency and refrain from insider dealing 
(Sec. 8, 9 Code of Conduct). In the event of violations, Sec. 19 Code of Conduct provides 
sanctions, most importantly the exclusion of the participant concerned from exchange 
trading for a certain market respectively product or altogether.374 Sec. 19(2) Code of Con-
duct clarifies that sanctions based on the code do not preclude sanctions on the basis of 
other laws. This notice mainly points to the (higher-ranking) federal Securities Trading Act 
and its provisions on manipulations and insider dealing introduced in the following subsec-
tion. 
 
c) Rules of good conduct for exchanges: The Securities Trading 
Act (WpHG) and Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) 
The Securities Trading Act contained rules on capital market surveillance, insider 
trading, ad hoc disclosures, market manipulations, and general and special rules of con-
duct for security service providers towards their customers375 until its replacement by the 
MAR in 2016.376 For the purpose of this work, notably the ban on market manipulations 
and insider trading will be examined closer. 
Since during the period of examination, Sec. 20a WpHG was still in place, the focus will 
be on this rule. The follow-up regulation in Art. 12, 15 MAR, that is widely identical with 
the former Sec. 20a WpHG,377  will however be introduced since it applies to future capital 
market manipulation cases. 
As already indicated above, the rules do only apply to financial instruments consistent with 
the definition in Sec. 2(2b), 2(2) N° 2 WpHG and as a consequence do not cover EEX spot 
market transactions.378 
                                                 
374 Ibid, 454 Ref. 968. 
375 Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS 
Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 1219 Ref. 13.1. 
376 BaFin, „Market Manipulation“ (2017). Available online on https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/Bo-
ersenMaerkte/Marktmanipulation/marktmanipulation_node_en.html (last accessed October 23, 2017). 
377 Krause, “Kapitalmarktrechtliche Compliance: neue Pflichten und drastisch verschärfte Sanktionen nach der 
EU-Marktmissbrauchsverordnung”, CCZ Vol. 7, no. 6 (2014), 258. 
378 Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy 
Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 117. 
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As a first important instrument to ensure fair market behavior, the ban on insider trad-
ing was codified in Sec. 12 et sqq. WpHG. It prohibited the utilization of special or secret 
knowledge with relevance to the market price of assets in an unfair manner.379 Today, the 
ban on insider trading is codified in Art. 7 et sqq. MAR. 
The second – and more relevant – important instrument for market integrity in the Secu-
rities Trading Act is the ban on market manipulations, formerly Sec. 20a WpHG, now 
codified in Art. 12, 15 MAR. Just as for the ban on insider dealings, the rule addresses 
everybody, aiming at the protection of reliable exchanges and exchange prices.380 It does 
not protect any individual interest of traders, but the functionality of securities markets as 
a whole.381 
Forbidden behavior under the former Sec. 20a(1) WpHG and also Art. 12, 15 MAR is cat-
egorized as follows:382 
▪ Incorrect or misleading statements about circumstances with relevance for the 
evaluation of a certain financial instrument if the information is capable to influence 
the market price (formerly N° 1), 
▪ Transactions or orders that are capable to yield wrong or misleading price signals 
for financial instruments, as well as the establishment of an artificial price level 
(formerly N° 2), and 
▪ Other frauds with potential to influence the market price for financial instruments 
(formerly N° 3). 
Any behavior being classified as allowed custom in the market was excluded from the 
prohibition, former Sec. 20a(2) WpHG. The exclusion required approval by the BaFin.383 
With regard to the focal point of this work, particularly the former Sec. 20a(1) N°2 
WpHG, now Art. 12, 15 MAR, is relevant. The rule referred to transactions with financial 
instruments and orders with the capacity to send misleading signals for the price. It is 
important to notice that the pure capacity to cause irritations through wrong price signals 
                                                 
379 Christian Siller, Kapitalmarktrecht (München: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH, 2006), 7. 
380 Sebastian Mock, Andreas Stoll, and Thomas Eufinger, Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG, ed. Heribert Hirte 
and Thomas M.J. Möllers (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007), 674 Ref. 114. 
381 As a consequence, individual traders may not claim damages in the event of violations of Sec. 20a WpHG 
based on Sec. 823(2) BGB. For details and the recent developments in this discussion, see Joachim Vogel, 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 5th ed., ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schneider (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto 
Schmidt, 2009), 842-843 Ref. 31. 
382 For a short overview of prohibited behavior, see Christian Siller, Kapitalmarktrecht (München: Verlag Franz 
Vahlen GmbH, 2006), 38-41. 
383 Markus Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht und kapitalmarktrelevantes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: RWS 
Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2010), 1386-1387 Ref. 13.483-13.484. 
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or artificial price levels sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the manipulation provi-
sion.384 The benchmark for a price signal to be misleading was the true economic condi-
tions on the market in question. These conditions, however, are based on the many price 
signals from all bid and ask bids in the market385 which makes the demarcation between 
(forbidden) wrong price signals and allowed price signals practically almost impossible.386 
Moreover, the law did not contain a critical threshold for neither the price signal nor the 
price level to be qualified as wrong respectively artificial.387 
Violations of the ban on market manipulations may be punished with fines up to five million 
Euro (for individuals) respectively 15 percent of the yearly turnover for legal entities, 
Sec. 39(3d) N° 2, (4a) WpHG in case of abstract exposure to wrong price signals and 
artificial price levels. Is the abstract exposure realized and the manipulation successful, 
Sec. 38(1) N° 2 in connection with Sec. 39(3d) N° 2 WpHG even allow for imprison-
ment.388 
 
d) Banking permit for energy traders: Provisions of the Banking 
Act (KWG) 
The German Banking Act requires all companies engaging commercially in the bank-
ing business or offering financial services to obtain a banking permit from the BaFin, 
Sec. 32(1) KWG. The provision covers in the energy business inter alia:389 
▪ Investment brokerage (Sec. 1(1a) N° 1 KWG), 
▪ Contract brokerage (Sec. 1(1a) N° 2 KWG), 
▪ Portfolio management (Sec. 1(1a) N° 3 KWG), and 
▪ trading in one´s own name and for one´s own account (Sec. 1(1a) N° 4 KWG). 
At present, however, most energy traders are exempted from the authorization on the 
basis of Sec. 2 KWG. First, the intra-enterprise doctrine exempting all financial services 
                                                 
384 Joachim Vogel, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 5th ed., ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schneider (Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2009), 890 Ref. 150. 
385 See section D. on the economic foundations for details. 
386 See e.g. the justified criticism in Joachim Vogel, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 5th ed., ed. Heinz-Dieter Ass-
mann and Uwe H. Schneider (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2009), 890 Ref. 150. 
387 Sebastian Mock, Andreas Stoll, and Thomas Eufinger, Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG, ed. Heribert Hirte 
and Thomas M.J. Möllers (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007), 708 Ref. 194. 
388 Christian Siller, Kapitalmarktrecht (München: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH, 2006), 41. 
389 Michael Cieslarczyk, Energiehandel. Ein Praxishandbuch, ed. Karl-Peter Horstmann and Michael Cieslarczyk 
(Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2006), 132 Ref. 43. 
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carried out between group members from the authorization requirement, relieves the huge 
groups of enterprises from the application for the BaFin permit, Sec. 2(1)  N° 7 KWG.390 
Second, the futures exchange privilege codified in Sec. 2(1) N° 8 KWG excludes all traders 
from the KWG surveillance if they only act on derivatives markets (so-called Locals).391 
Energy traders at the EEX can claim this exemption – even if they are active on both the 
futures and the spot market, because trading in the spot market is not subject to BaFin 
authorization according to the KWG as it is not a securities exchange.392 
As a consequence, most energy traders are currently not subject to the surveillance and 
financial requirements codified in the Banking Act. 
 
3. Summary and outlook 
In conclusion, the examination of the existing capital market laws has shown that, 
although many abusive practices are covered, there is no comprehensive ban on all harm-
ful practices and for all market segments. Most notably, the lacking coverage of the OTC 
market and the inapplicability of the provisions of the Securities Trading Act on the spot 
market constituted considerable legal gaps.393 In the meantime, this gap has been closed 
by the REMIT rules, the effectiveness of which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
On the other hand, it has been carved out that the existing EEX Code of Conduct covers 
both, the products not in the scope of the WpHG and the OTC market segment at the EEX. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The analysis of the European and German legal foundations for the electricity market 
has revealed a complex system of rules, yet also pointed to several serious gaps. Subse-
quently, this work conducts hence a positive analysis of the existing legal system 
and its behavioral implications on market participants in chapters 2 (enforcement) and 3 
(sanctions), followed by a normative analysis in chapter 3 that shows how the reform 
                                                 
390 Ibid, 138 Ref. 66. 
391 Béatrice Freiwald, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2010), 670 Ref. 1336. 
392 BaFin, Merkblatt – Hinweise zur Erlaubnispflicht von Geschäften im Zusammenhang mit Stromhandelsakti-
vitäten, dating from June 24, 2011. Available at www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Ser-
vice/Merkblaetter/mb_110622_stromhandel.html. 
393 Kevin Canty and Volker Lüdemann, “Strompreisbildung ohne Aufsicht”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
from November 23, 2010. 
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of the system of sanctions may affect the practical enforcement of the rules by a change 
of the incentive scheme. 
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F. Summary of the First Chapter 
This first chapter started with a short outline of the research question, followed by 
the main theses guiding the research. The central questions to be answered are 
(1) which were the incentives for firms to manipulate prices in the wholesale market for 
electricity during the period of examination in the years 2006 to 2009 (positive anal-
ysis), and 
(2) how regulation may change the incentives in a way that impacts the market partici-
pants´ behavior and results in the ex-ante prevention of market manipulations. 
Subsequently, the research methodology was introduced. This work follows the law and 
economics approach, an interdisciplinary subject using the tools of economics to examine 
legal frameworks positively and analyze different legal correctives normatively. Section C. 
of this chapter offered a detailed introduction to the law and economics paradigm and its 
suitability to produce evidence for the research theses. 
The following subsection D. of this chapter presented a brief introduction to the German 
energy market from an economic point of view. Starting from a quick overview of the 
basics of competitive economic markets compared to concentrated markets and their eco-
nomic losses, the analysis turned to the special case of energy markets. In the light of the 
historical development of this market from a monopolized structure to a regulated industry 
as well as the specific features of the good electricity, the market structures in power 
generation, distribution, and trade during the period of examination were introduced. It 
was shown that the market was highly concentrated with the four established energy pro-
ducers E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW controlling up to 85 percent of the production 
facilities. Based on this analysis, the formation of electricity prices according to the merit 
order mechanism was subject to a detailed description. In summary, the marginal cost of 
a kWh of electricity produced by the last power plant needed to satisfy market demand 
determined the market price of all kWhs of electricity. 
Subsection E. switched the focus from the economic examination to the legal facts relevant 
to the energy industry. The three main fields of law shaping the energy sector, namely 
▪ energy law, 
▪ competition law, and 
▪ capital market law 
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were introduced and presented with their main features. Thereafter, critical points and 
legal gaps were pointed out and a first approach to their closing was indicated. Notably, 
practical problems in the proof of antitrust violations in the field of competition law, as 
well as lacking supervision of the EEX spot market and the inapplicability of provisions 
against market manipulation codified in the Securities Trading Act in the field of capital 
market law were identified to hinder the efficient execution of the existing legal framework 
to the benefit of the market. This creates incentives for market participants to engage in 
manipulations of the market to their firms´ benefit. 
On the basis of these fundamental findings, the following chapter 2 will examine possible 
manipulation strategies and identify the authorities´ practical problems with regard to the 
enforcement of sanctions for offences against the legal bans in a positive analysis. The 
following chapters 3 to 5 build on the findings regarding distorted incentives and propose 
corrections of the law to achieve an impact on the market participants´ behavior in line 
with the regulator´s goals. 
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SECOND CHAPTER: 
STRATEGIES OF MARKET MANIPULATION AT THE 
EEX – ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
A. Introduction 
“The `free market´ is the product of laws and rules continuously emanating from 
legislatures, executive departments, and courts.”394 
Based on the preceding analysis of structure and pricing in the German energy market, 
this chapter will examine pricing strategies that favor the energy suppliers, but drive the 
market towards an equilibrium that deviates from the competitive welfare-maximizing 
level. With regard to energy trading at the EEX, physical and financial capacity reten-
tion are two harmful strategies to influence the market price. Both will be examined in 
depth in the following sections. 
The chapter starts with an economic description and a legal classification of the two ma-
nipulation strategies named above (section B). Subsequently, the incentives of market 
participants to actually engage in the manipulation strategies introduced before are ex-
amined in section C. of this chapter. This work´s approach uses the tools of industrial 
organization395 and game theory396 to analyze the market participants´ incentives and 
optimal pricing strategies under the existing oligopoly situation. With the help of this anal-
ysis, it will be shown that pricing above the competitive level is – from an economic point 
of view – an optimal choice for firms in this market during the period of examination. It 
was hence likely that an oligopoly firm chose a manipulation strategy if the law did not 
actually prevent such behavior. 
Past regulatory efforts to reach efficient deterrence of market manipulations by way of 
detection, proof and punishment of both the European Commission and the German FCO 
                                                 
394 Robert Bernhard Reich, University of California, Berkeley. 
395 The field of industrial organization examines interactions between markets and firms. In its traditional 
branch, industrial organization acts on the assumption that market structure influences the behavior of partici-
pants in the market, which results in a (then predictable) market outcome (so-called Structure-Conduct-Perfor-
mance Paradigm), see for example Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer, 
2004), 1-3. 
396 Game theory treats strategic interaction of agents and is therefore widely used for the economic analysis of 
firm behavior in oligopolistic markets, see Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Nor-
ton & Company, 2006), 504. 
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will be presented in section D. It will be shown, that despite reasonable suspicion by mar-
ket participants and competition authorities, manipulations could not be proved until now. 
Section E of this chapter summarizes and concludes. 
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B. The Nature of Physical and Financial Ca-
pacity Retention 
This section introduces the two types of capacity retention, starting with an economic 
description of each of the strategies. The following legal classification is based on the 
economic behavior innate to the strategies and investigates whether the prerequisites of 
Art. 102 TFEU and Sec. 19 GWB are fulfilled. 
 
I. Economic classification of capacity retention 
With regard to competitive markets, economic theory as treated in the first chap-
ter397 teaches that all profit-maximizing firms should offer any capacity that can be sold 
for a price (p*) at or above short-term marginal cost (cv) in the market in order to earn a 
contribution to profit (∏):398 
Sell, if: p* ≥ cv 
and earn ∏ = p* - cv. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, firms possessing market power maximize their 
profits by reducing the quantity offered, expecting the prize to go up and increase the 
profits earned on the amount sold.399 In the case of power, plant operators may retain 
capacity physically in order to increase the market price for their product. 
With regard to the EEX pricing mechanism, the merit order, plant operators forgo the 
supply of plant capacity with low marginal cost (cvlow). As a result, the marginal plant 
needed to cover market demand becomes a more expansive one with regard to its mar-
ginal cost of production (cvhigh).400 Therefore, any capacity is sold at this higher marginal 
cost in this point of time, the market equilibrium price (p**) increases: 
cvhigh = p** > p*. 
                                                 
397 See the first chapter, part D.II.4.c) of this work. 
398 Christian Jungbluth and Jörg Borchert, “Möglichkeiten der Strompreisbeeinflussung im oligopolistischen 
Markt”, ZNER, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 316. 
399 Matthias Jahn, “Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der Strombörse EEX in Leipzig”, ZNER, 
Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 300. 
400 Christian Jungbluth and Jörg Borchert, “Möglichkeiten der Strompreisbeeinflussung im oligopolistischen 
Markt”, ZNER, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 317. Likewise Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen 
Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 103. 
Second Chapter: Strategies of Market Manipulation 
B. The Nature of Physical and Financial Capacity Retention 
77 
 
Plant operators with low cost facilities earn a higher profit on any MWh of power sold. This 
strategy is therefore profitable for operators possessing a highly diversified portfolio of 
plant types, thus a mixture of base load power generation plants (e.g. nuclear power) and 
intermediate and peak load power generation plants (e.g. based on fuel fossils or gas).401 
By retaining low cost plants from the market, they forgo the profit made with these plants 
(∏low) in anticipation of higher profits earned on the (low-cost) plants still offered in the 
market (∏high)402: 
∏low ≤ ∏high 
∑ (p* - cvlow) ≤ ∑ (p** - cvlow). 
The following figure illustrates this context again: 
 
 
Figure 14: Physical capacity retention and the merit order 
                                                 
401 The huge power plant operators like E.ON possess such a diversified portfolio, see Matthias Jahn, “Zur 
Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der Strombörse EEX in Leipzig”, ZNER, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 
299. 
402 See for example Christian Jungbluth and Jörg Borchert, “Möglichkeiten der Strompreisbeeinflussung im oli-
gopolistischen Markt”, ZNER, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 317. Also Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmiss-
bräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 
104. With reference to Frank Dohmen and Klaus-Peter Kerbusk, "Kartell der Abkassierer," Der Spiegel Vol. 60, 
no. 45 (2007), 106. 
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The upper part of the illustration shows the situation without capacity retention as pictured 
in figure 10 on page 42. The price for current in this exemplary hour is dependent on the 
production cost of the marginal plant necessary to satisfy demand, which is gas. Therefore, 
the equilibrium price is at 105. In contrast, the lower part of the illustration shows a situ-
ation where all brown coal, hard goal and gas capacity is taken out of the market, but 
more EEG/must run capacity and nuclear power is offered. The satisfaction of market 
demand requires, however, more expansive power stations to be turned on, which drives 
the market price for electricity up to 125. In the example, plant operators running nuclear 
power stations earn a profit in the amount of the difference between the market price 
(125) and their marginal production cost (9) per MWh. 
In conclusion, it shows that it can be a profitable strategy to forego profits from the sale 
of low production cost installations´ capacity (in the example brown coal, hard coal and 
gas) in order to drive the market price up and generate higher profits from an increased 
margin between market price and production cost for any plant running.403 
Physical capacity retention is disguised in diverse manners: Technical restrictions, exces-
sive provision of balancing energy, repurchase of energy already sold in long-term con-
tracts and other.404 In many cases, external observers are unable to decide whether a 
market participant´s behavior serves legitimate or manipulative purposes405, which makes 
the proof of manipulations a challenging task to the regulator. 
The closely related strategy of financial capacity retention pursues the same objective, 
however using a slightly different approach. The above-described shift in the merit order 
is achieved through markups (m), which are added upon the marginal cost of production 
(cv). These markups are designed in a way such that the power station x in question will 
not be in demand in the market equilibrium:406 
cvx + m = cvxm and 
cvxm > p*. 
Instead, the installation (x) concerned is replaced by a seemingly cheaper one (y) accord-
ing to the merit order mechanism. The market price for power increases: 
                                                 
403 Harald Schumann, “E.on soll Strombörse manipuliert haben”, Die Zeit Vol. 64, no. 11 (2009). 
404 Matthias Jahn, “Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der Strombörse EEX in Leipzig”, ZNER, 
Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 300. 
405 However, in some cases energy traders revealed their preferred strategies, see for example Harald Schu-
mann, “E.on soll Strombörse manipuliert haben”, Die Zeit Vol. 64, no. 11 (2009). 
406 See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 117. 
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cvx < cvy, but 
cvx + m > cvy, therefore 
cvy = p** > p*. 
Just as for the case of physical capacity retention, this strategy is attractive to plant op-
erators with a diversified portfolio of plant types. The operator foregoes profits from com-
parably cheap installations for the sake of higher profits earned on all of his remaining 
installations running. The graphic analysis illustrates the case again: 
 
 
Figure 15: Financial capacity retention and the merit order 
In the graphical example, there is a margin of 55 on the price of hard coal. As a result, 
hard coal appears to be costlier than gas and is replaced by gas in the merit order. The 
market equilibrium price increases from 70 to 105, operators earn a considerable profit on 
any MWh sold of all cheaper plants running and being offered in the market. 
Financial capacity retention is also possible in slightly altered scenarios, e.g. raising the 
price of the marginal power station for a certain hour of trading. In this case, the merit 
order does not change, yet the market equilibrium price and the profits earned on all 
plants running do.407 
Both strategies, physical and financial capacity retention, have in common that marketable 
capacity is taken out of the market – either by retaining it or artificially raising its price.408 
Sellers possessing market power earn a profit on any MWh sold at the increased market 
                                                 
407 Christian Jungbluth and Jörg Borchert, “Möglichkeiten der Strompreisbeeinflussung im oligopolistischen 
Markt”, ZNER, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 318. 
408 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 59 – Energie 2011: Wettbewerbsentwicklung mit Licht und Schat-
ten, 6 Ref. 12. See also Commission of the European Communities, Commission staff working document ac-
companying the Communication frethe Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report), SEC(2006) 1724, 133 Ref. 403. 
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price, whereas buyers suffer from the excessive prices.409 The next sections will subsume 
this abusive behavior under the existing laws in the fields of antitrust (II.) and capital 
market law (III.) and examine their qualification to prevent manipulations of the market 
prices. 
 
II. Legal classification of capacity retention: Antitrust 
The legal classification of the various forms of capacity retention focuses on the field 
of antitrust violations according to Art. 102 TFEU and Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB. Based on the 
foundations of European and German antitrust laws presented in Chapter 1410, the criterion 
of market power has to be proved as a precondition for the abuse provisions to apply. For 
the example of EEX manipulations chosen in this work this means: Only if a dominant 
position in the primary market for power generation can be proved, manipulations accord-
ing to Art. 102 TFEU respectively Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB may be considered in a second 
step. 
 
1. Market power in the primary market for power 
a) The relevant product market 
The identification of market power requires the definition of the relevant market 
according to the criteria pointed out in Chapter 1.411 With regard to the definition of the 
relevant product traded, the German antitrust authorities discriminate between the pri-
mary market for power (power producers) and the secondary market (sale to end custom-
ers).412 The relevant primary market comprises the first-time sale of the electricity suppli-
ers´ own production, as well as net imports of electricity.413 Wholesale traders are ex-
cluded from this definition, since it focuses on the physical supply of power, which is 
exclusively determined, by the production and imports.414 Pure commercial transactions 
                                                 
409 Axel Ockenfels, "Strombörse und Marktmacht," et Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 48. 
410 See Chapter 1 E. II. of this work for details. 
411 See Chapter 1 E.II.1.a) and 2.a). 
412 This distinction is made since the 2006 decision of the FCO in the merger prohibition case E.ON/Eschwege 
and has been confirmed by both the Higher Regional Court (OLG) Düsseldorf and the Federal Court of Justice. 
See FCO decision from September 12, 2003. B 8 – Fa – 21/03. Also OLG Düsseldorf, decision from June 6, 
2007. VI-2 Kart 7/04 (V) “E.ON/Eschwege”. German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 
2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”. 
413 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”, Ref. 15 
et sqq. 
414 German Federal Court of Justice in “E.ON/Eschwege”, Ref. 18. With reference its decision from October 5th, 
2004. KVR 14/03 “Staubsaugerbeutelmarkt”. 
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of power stay without influence on the quantity offered in the market. Also, pure transac-
tions are unable to exert influence on the competitive situation in the primary market, 
since wholesale traders need to buy power from the producers respectively importers be-
fore they can offer power in the market. Therefore, this group of traders cannot be exam-
ined on the same trade level with the producers.415 As a result, the relevant product mar-
ket for the first-time sale of power includes the following commodities: 
▪ Actual physical production of power (as opposed to the capacity theoretically avail-
able with regard to the existing power stations), and 
▪ net total imports of power to Germany.416 
On the European level, the German product market definition has been approved in 2006 
by the European Commission in its sector inquiry.417 
In its 2011 sector inquiry, the FCO further defines the German primary electricity market, 
making two important restrictions: Balancing energy and the production from renewable 
sources (EEG) are excluded from the market. With regard to balancing energy, the FCO 
argues that this product aims at capacity provision, whereas the wholesale market is tar-
geted on the delivery of power. Furthermore, the demand situation differs from the one 
found on the wholesale market: Balancing energy is demanded only by the four transmis-
sion network operators in Germany, who cover their demand in separate auctions accord-
ing to the applicable law.418 As a result, there is no substitutability for balancing energy 
products with power from the wholesale market. The European Commission follows the 
same logic in its decisions.419 
Furthermore, the FCO excludes the production and marketing of power from renewable 
sources from the primary market for power.420 The Renewable Energy Act (EEG) pre-
scribes a necessity for network operators to connect plant operators to the grid and buy 
                                                 
415 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”, Ref. 19. 
416 Summarizing the definition of the market: Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stro-
merzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 69-70. 
417 European Commission, DG Competition, Report on the Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC (2006) 1724, 397 et 
sqq. 
418 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 71 et sqq. The 
auction requirement is codified in Sec. 22 et sqq. EnWG and Sec. 6 et sqq. StromNZV. 
419 European Commission, decisions from November 26, 2008. COMP/39.388 “Deutscher Stromgroßhandels-
markt“ and COMP/39.389 “Deutscher Regelenergiemarkt“. 
420 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 73. 
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their power production at legally fixed rates with priority.421 Also the sale of power stem-
ming from EEG installations is subject to legal rules in the AusglMechV.422 Therefore, pro-
duction of power from renewable sources is independent from demand and the situation 
on the wholesale market.423 Indeed does the quantity of EEG power influence the equilib-
rium price in the market, since conventional power stations are replaced by cheap EEG 
power (so-called merit order effect).424 However, the transmission network operators mar-
keting the EEG power do not act as competitors in the market, since the system leaves 
them no room for decisions on quantity and price.425 The EEG amendments from August 
2011, in particular the possibility for EEG installation operators to sell their power individ-
ually at the exchanges instead of earning the legally guaranteed payment (Sec. 33a to 33i 
EEG), might change this situation in the future.426 However, the incentives for operators 
to build energy storages and manage their power feed into the grids in order to optimally 
market their power at the exchanges are low.427 
This argument, however, is not undisputed. Säcker criticizes that competitive effects of 
the EEG must be considered.428 In the short term, the price-dampening effect of EEG 
power feed-in (merit-order effect) influences the market participants´ behavior. In the 
long term, investment decisions depend on the legal framework for EEG power production 
and feed-in. Säcker points out that even the FCO has admitted an influence of EEG power 
on the market.429 However, the FCO convincingly demonstrates the lacking liberty of action 
for network operators in determining price and quantity of EEG power feed-in.430 The mere 
existence of a competitor, who is, however, not equipped with the very basic liberty to 
choose quantity and price offered in the market, is not sufficient to justify the claim that 
EEG power would exert remarkable influence on the competitive situation in the power 
market. 
To date, therefore, the exclusion of power stemming from EEG installations from the rel-
evant product market as practiced by the FCO is convincing. Summarizing, the relevant 
                                                 
421 See the explanation in Chapter 1 E.I. for details. 
422 Jens-Peter Schneider, Recht der Energiewirtschaft. Praxishandbuch, 3rd ed., ed. Jens-Peter Schneider and 
Christian Theobald (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 1233ff. 
423 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 73-74. 
424 Ben Schlemmermeier, Carsten Diermann, Eyk Bösche, and Tobias Haberland, “Stromgroßhandelsmarkt aus 
zwei Perspektiven betrachtet: Erzeuger und Vertriebe”, Explorer Markttrends no. 12 (2010), 7. 
425 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 73. 
426 Florian Valentin, “Das neue System der Direktvermarktung von EEG-Strom im Überblick”, ree Vol. 2, no. 1 
(2012), 11. 
427 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 59 – Energie 2011: Wettbewerbsentwicklung mit Licht und Schat-
ten, 10 Ref. 22. 
428 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 75. 
429 Ibid. With reference to Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° 
B10-9/09, 249 et sqq. and 73. 
430 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 73. 
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product market for power in European and German competition law includes the following 
products: 
▪ Actual physical production of power, and 
▪ net total imports of power to Germany. 
Excluded from the primary market are: 
▪ Balancing energy, and 
▪ power stemming from renewable resources (EEG). 
 
b) The relevant geographical market 
The relevant geographical market for the first-time sale of power includes the Ger-
man territory. Both, German courts431 and the European Commission432 have confirmed 
this established practice of the FCO.433 The main reason for the geographical limitation to 
Germany is the lack of sufficient cross-border transmission capacity.434 Competition from 
foreign power producers is therefore limited physically, since no noteworthy quantity can 
be imported to Germany.435 
The FCO makes an exception with regard to Austria. In the years from 2007 to 2009, all 
cross-border transactions could be carried out, congestions were not observed.436 With 
regard to power trade, the FCO points out that the EEX has become the leading exchange 
for Austria, furthermore, there is just one EPEX day-ahead price for both countries.437 The 
German Monopoly Commission supports the FCO opinion438. However, a recent analysis of 
                                                 
431 OLG Düsseldorf, decision from June 6, 2007. VI-2 Kart 7/04 (V) “E.ON/Eschwege”. German Federal Court 
of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”. 
432 European Commission, decisions from November 26, 2008. COMP/39.388 “Deutscher Stromgroßhandels-
markt“ and COMP/39.389 „Deutscher Regelenergiemarkt“. See also Commission of the European Communities, 
Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final 
Report), SEC(2006) 1724, 5. 
433 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 74. 
434 For a comprehensive analysis of the current situation, see Nina Vrana, Interkonnektoren im Europäischen 
Binnenmarkt (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2012). See also Commission of the European Com-
munities, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity 
sectors (Final Report), SEC(2006) 1724, 6. 
435 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”, Ref. 22. 
436 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 54 – Strom und Gas 2009: Energiemärkte im Spannungsfeld zwi-
schen Politik und Wettbewerb, 25 Ref. 48. 
437 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 78. 
438 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 59 – Energie 2011: Wettbewerbsentwicklung mit Licht und Schat-
ten, 6 Ref. 10. 
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the electricity wholesale sector suggests that in particular with regard to the coupled mar-
kets with the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, Germany is sufficiently interconnected.439 
Yet, the study has been conducted as an ex-post analysis and using a static system with 
restrictive assumptions that are frequently disproved by practical observations.440 The 
findings of the ESMT study can therefore not serve as proof of an European integrated 
wholesale market, as the FCO correctly claims. In conclusion, the relevant geographical 
market for first time power sale includes Germany and Austria.441 
 
c) Dominance of the power market 
The definition of the relevant product and geographic market conducted in the pre-
ceding chapter is the relevant point of reference for the examination of market dominance 
in the wholesale market. In the German power market, two forms of market power have 
to be discussed: 
▪ The existence of a dominant oligopoly by the four established producers E.ON, RWE, 
EnBW, and Vattenfall or a subset of this group, and 
▪ a possible dominance by each of the four firms solitarily. 
As already outlined in the first chapter, dominance in the light of European and German 
antitrust laws refers to a position that enables firms to behave independently of their 
competitors and exert perceptible influence on the market output level and price.442 The 
following subsections will elaborate the indicators for the two cases of collective and indi-
vidual dominance and judge whether the oligopoly firms and/or the individual firms needed 
to be considered as dominant in the wholesale market during the time horizon of this 
examination (2004 to 2009). 
 
aa) Collective market dominance – the oligopoly case (Sec. 19(2) GWB) 
Sec. 18(5) GWB stipulates that two or more firms may be collectively dominant on 
a market if 
                                                 
439 ESMT, The Electricity Wholesale Sector: Market Integration and Competition. Study from January 13, 2010, 
21. Available at www.esmt.org/en/271646. 
440 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 85-86. 
441 This finding has recently been confirmed: Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein 
wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die Energiewende, 2015, 30 Ref. 48. 
442 For the European Court of Justice definition of market dominance, please refer back to Chapter 1 E.II.1.a). 
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(1) no substantial competition exists between them with respect to certain kinds of 
goods or commercial services, and 
(2) they comply in their entirety with the requirements of paragraph 1, which states 
that firms are without competitors or in a paramount market position.443 
Sec. 18(6) N° 1 GWB contains a presumption for market dominance if three or less un-
dertakings reach a combined market share of at least 50 percent. For five or fewer under-
takings, the threshold for the presumption of dominance is at two-thirds, Sec. 18(6) N° 6 
GWB. 
Concerning the German power market, European444 and German445 court decisions have 
already come to the conclusion that at least a duopoly consisting of E.ON and RWE domi-
nated the wholesale market. In 2008, the European Commission even suggested that 
three companies, namely E.ON, RWE, and Vattenfall, formed an oligopoly in the German 
wholesale market for power.446 Indicators for lacking competition between the two com-
panies were vertical integration on both sides, the behavior observed on the power mar-
kets, corporate integration between RWE and E.ON on the one hand, but also between 
RWE/E.ON and EnWB on the other hand, high market shares at power production capacity 
as well as net power production, a considerable distance to competitors in the market and 
the homogeneity of power as a product, combined with transparency of prices at the power 
exchange.447 At large, this strong evidence made the Federal Court of Justice assume a 
paramount market position of the duopoly E.ON/RWE.448 
The further question whether the duopoly consisting of E.ON and RWE would rather have 
to be qualified as an oligopoly, also including EnBW and Vattenfall, is not answered by the 
tribunal. The FCO, however, in its sector inquiry, identified several indicators that suggest 
the existence of an oligopoly in the wholesale market for power in the relevant period449: 
                                                 
443 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 988 Ref. 26. 
444 European Commission, decisions from November 26, 2008. COMP/39.388 “Deutscher Stromgroßhandels-
markt“ and COMP/39.389 “Deutscher Regelenergiemarkt”. 
445 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”. 
446 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et, Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 76. 
447 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 89. With refer-
ence to German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”, 18 
et sqq. For the relevance of the indicators named see Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd 
ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 989 Ref. 27. 
448 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from November 11, 2008. KVR 60/07 “E.ON/Eschwege”, 25. 
449 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 95. 
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▪ The development of market shares with regard to installed capacity and feed into 
the grids since 2007, and 
▪ the degree of concentration measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index 
(HHI). 
The underlying data with regard to market shares yields by far the highest installed 
capacity and net power production by E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW in the years since 
2007.450 The following chart presents a summary of the data, a market volume of 100 per-
cent has served as a reference. The values are rounded.451 
 
SUPPLIER 
2007 
CAPACITY 
 
FEED-IN 
2008 
CAPACITY 
 
FEED-IN 
2009 
CAPACITY 
 
FEED-IN 
EnBW 12 % 12 % 12 % 11 % 14 % 14 % 
E.ON 23 % 23 % 23 % 22 % 19 % 21 % 
RWE 34 % 35 % 33 % 36 % 31 % 31 % 
Vattenfall 17 % 17 % 16 % 15 % 16 % 16 % 
Sum 85 % 86 % 84 % 84 % 80 % 82 % 
 
Table 2: Installed capacity and feed-in by the established energy suppliers in percent 
The summed numbers presented in table 2 exceed a combined market share of two thirds 
for the four companies listed. The assumption of collective dominance in Sec. 18(6) N° 2 
GWB is therefore confirmed for the years 2007 to 2009.452 However, the dominance as-
sumption can be disproved by way of evidence for existing competition between the dom-
inant firms and a notable competitive position of the residual firms, Sec. 18(7) GWB.453 In 
its sector inquiry, the FCO examined the competitive environment of the oligopoly firms, 
                                                 
450 The inquiry included power plants owned by the companies, shares in joint plants and contractual long-
term buying options for plant capacity. See ibid, 90. 
451 For the exact values, especially reports of the MW of capacity installed and the TWh feed-in see ibid, 90, 
94. 
452 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 990 Ref. 29. 
453 Ibid, 989 Ref. 28. 
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coming to the conclusion that various structural similarities suggest an alignment of inter-
ests and ultimately restraints of competition.454 The FCO considers the preconditions es-
tablished by the European Court of First Instance in its decision Airtours v Commission455 
for oligopolized markets to be met.456 Due to the oligopolistic interdependence of the four 
firms, permanent uniform behavior of the oligopoly is expected.457 
Säcker contradicts the FCO claims, pointing out that the market position namely of E.ON 
and RWE changed considerably lately through the abandonment of several minority stakes 
in municipal suppliers, headmost in the case Thüga458.459 Moreover, Säcker stresses the 
influence of the European unbundling specifications on the market structure. Eventually, 
his paper suggests that under these changing conditions, not even the duopoly argument 
can be maintained.460 This claim is based on a study by Frontier Economics from 2010 that 
sees an erosion of market shares for both E.ON and RWE.461 This study – a commissioned 
work for the E.ON group – does however treat possible future scenarios for the market 
development. By contrast, the FCO data for the situation in 2007 to 2009 does not leave 
room for an interpretation that sees any erosion in the market shares of E.ON and RWE. 
Quite the contrary is true: Table 2 shows, that market shares kept stable at high levels 
exceeding 80 percent for both installed capacity and production. 
With regard to the HHI concentration measure, the FCO identified values easily ex-
ceeding the threshold of 1.800 that account for highly concentrated markets.462 Both, with 
regard to installed capacity and quantity produced, the power market´s HHI values sug-
gest high concentration of the industry.463 
Based on this robust evidence and in line with German and European jurisprudence, the 
German antitrust authority dismisses its former duopoly assumption for the power market 
                                                 
454 These are namely vertical integration of the firms, corporate integration, the homogeneity of power as a 
commodity, and the huge distance with regard to market shares to the remaining competitors in the market. 
See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 95. Also Franz 
Lamprecht, “Sektoruntersuchung Strom: Kein Marktmachtmissbrauch, aber Wettbewerbshemmnisse”, et, Vol. 
61, no. 1/2 (2011), 48. 
455 Airtours v Commission. Case T-342/99. European Court Reports 2002, II-2585 (2002). 
456 The criteria do largely comply with the indicators for lacking competition listed on the last page. The pre-
dominant idea is to make a prediction on the probability of coordinated actions by market participants. 
457 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et, Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 79. 
458 Federal Cartel Office, Decision from November 30, 2009. N° B8-107/09. 
459 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et, Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 81. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Frontier Economics, Marktkonzentration im deutschen Stromerzeugungsmarkt, 2010. Available online at 
http://www.eon.com/content/dam/eon-com/download/dwn-news/9949_431/RPT_Frontier_EON-Konzentration-
sanalyse_Final_20102010__stc.pdf. 
462 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 185. 
463 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 91. 
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in favor of the claim, that the wholesale market for power is dominated by an oligopoly 
formed by E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW in the period of examination.464 
Only in 2015, when the Monopoly Commission presented an updated calculation of the 
concentration measures in its expert opinion, things slightly changed. For the year 2014 
that the data refers to, the Monopoly Commission came to the conclusion that there was 
no collective dominance of the former oligopoly with regard to the RSI method.465 How-
ever, it considered the market still to be highly concentrated – especially with regard to a 
market share of 62 percent of the former oligopoly firms466 – and expected new market 
power problems in the near future due to closures of plant capacity.467 The numbers con-
cerning the market shares are confirmed by the Federal Network Agency data for the year 
2014: The combined market share with regard to production capacity for E.ON, RWE and 
Vattenfall reached 51 percent468 and hence still fulfilled the requirements of the dominance 
presumption in Sec. 18(6) N° 1 GWB. Having regard to the actual production quantity, 
even the oligopoly presumption for all four huge suppliers (Sec. 18(6) N° 2 GWB) was still 
fulfilled: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW reached a combined market share of 67 percent 
in 2013 and 2014.469 The following analysis will therefore operate on the basis of the 
oligopoly presumption for the examination period. 
 
bb) Individual market dominance by E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW 
In addition to collective market dominance, European and German antitrust laws 
also know the concept of individual market dominance by one or more firms, Art. 102 
TFEU, respectively Sec. 18(1) GWB.470 According to the German Federal Court of Justice, 
even several companies in the same market may be dominant individually if any of them 
has a market position allowing for noticeable influence on market price and quantity.471 
The European Court of Justice decides equally.472 
                                                 
464 Peter Becker, “Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamts: Ausge-
zeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen”, ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 116. 
465 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die 
Energiewende, 2015, 43-44 Ref. 77. 
466 Ibid, 33-36 Ref. 55. 
467 Ibid, 50 Ref. 91. 
468 Federal Network Agency, Monitoringbericht 2015, 2015, 38. 
469 Ibid, 36. 
470 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 901 Ref. 10 et sqq. 
471 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from March 3, 2009. KZR 82/07 “Reisestellenkarte”, 13. 
472 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP). Cases C-241/91 and C-
242/91. European Court reports 1995, 743 (1995). 
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As for the case of collective market dominance, the German code contains a dominance 
presumption for companies whose share in the relevant market reaches 40 percent, 
Sec. 18(4) GWB. In its guidance paper on the enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 
ECT (now Art. 102 TFEU), also the European Commission states a market share of 40 per-
cent as a threshold for dominance.473 Neither data from 2009 nor recent numbers from 
2014 do identify any of the companies considered in this work as presumably dominant.474 
Anyhow, both the German and European authorities recognize that in specific cases below 
the threshold a powerful market position may develop and require official attention.475 
In the here relevant case of exploitative abuses, dominance below the threshold may be 
assumed if dependence of the consumers on the market concerned can be proved – the 
powerful company operates as unavoidable trading partner.476 The FCO employs the so-
called Residual Supply Index (RSI) concept that has been developed specifically for 
power markets477 as a tool to demonstrate the nature of E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW 
as pivotal suppliers.478 This indicator measures the importance of a supplier for the satis-
faction of market demand. It is defined as follows: 
RSIi = 
Aggregate capacity - Capacity
i
Aggregate demand per unit of time
 
Hence, the index measures whether the aggregate capacity offered in the market after 
subtraction of the capacity fed in by supplier i is sufficient to satisfy demand at a certain 
point in time.479 Values smaller than 1 indicate that company i is indispensable for the 
satisfaction of aggregate market demand. Market power, in contrast, is already presumed 
in cases where the RSI yields values smaller than 1.1 in more than five percent of the 
                                                 
473 European Commission, Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. EU Official Journal from February 24, 2009 C 45, 9 
Ref. 14. 
474 See table 2 of this work. Also refer to Federal Network Agency, Monitoringbericht 2015, 2015, 36 et sqq. 
for recent data. 
475 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 96. European 
Commission, Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclu-
sionary conduct by dominant undertakings. EU Official Journal from February 24, 2009 C 45, 9 Ref. 14. 
476 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 96. With refe-
rence to Thomas W. Wesseley, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 3rd Vol. Art. 82 EG, ed. Wolfgang Jae-
ger, Petra Pohlmann, and Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG, 2011), 42 Ref. 87. 
477 The index measures market power in power markets in view of the special conditions on these markets like 
the impossibility of storage, short-term inelastic demand etc. For details please refer back to the first chapter, 
section D.II.2. of this work. For the advantages of the RSI concept as compared to the traditional HHI see Da-
vid Newbery, “Predicting Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets”, EUI Working Paper, no. RSCAS 
2009/03. 
478 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 97. 
479 Anjali Sheffrin, “Critical Actions Necessary for Effective Market Monitoring” Draft Comments Department of 
Market Analysis, California ISO, FERC RTO Workshop, October 19, 2001, 8. 
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hours observed. The market dominance presumption in the RSI concept is fulfilled if values 
smaller than 1.0 are being observed.480 
In the 2011 sector inquiry, the FCO calculated RSI values for the four huge suppliers 
hourly. Values smaller than 1.1 could be observed in far more than five percent of the 
hours in the period of examination; furthermore, values smaller than the 1.0 threshold 
were found in a considerable amount of hours. The following chart pictures the relevant 
findings of the FCO for the years 2007 and 2008.481 
 
SUPPLIER 
RSI < 1.1 
2007 
 
2008 
RSI < 1.0 
2007 
 
2008 
EnBW 49.1 % 25.7 % 14.2 % 1.6 % 
E.ON 71.8 % 50.5 % 50.5 % 27.8 % 
RWE 93.6 % 73.8 % 77.8 % 55.9 % 
Vattenfall 55.1 % 30.6 % 27.7 % 7.2 % 
 
Table 3: Hours with RSI values smaller than 1.1 and 1.0 in 2007 and 2008 in percent 
Hence, except from EnBW in 2008, all four established suppliers needed to be considered 
pivotal, headmost RWE.482 As for any other presumption of dominance, the FCO acknowl-
edges a possible disprove of dominance through actual competitive conditions on the mar-
ket. E.g., the authority recalculates values for the integration of the Austrian capacity in 
the market483, and examines changes in the results with regard to the development in the 
years following 2009.484 Still, the authority affirms individual market power for at least 
three of the four established suppliers: E.ON, RWE, and Vattenfall. Regarding EnBW, a 
final decision is not made.485 This conclusion was reinforced through the circumstance that 
only the four companies named owned capacity covering the whole of the merit order, 
thereof a considerable number of nuclear power plants.486 
                                                 
480 David Newbery, “Predicting Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets”, EUI Working Paper no. RSCAS 
2009/03, 4. Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 98-
99. Refer also to Annette Loske, "Funktionieren die Großhandelsmärkte für Strom?," et Vol. 57, no. 9 (2007), 
8. 
481 For the definition of the RSI variables please refer to Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stro-
merzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 99-103. 
482 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 104-105. 
483 Ibid, 110-112. 
484 Ibid, 112-113. 
485 Ibid, 113-114. 
486 In fact, in Germany only the four established power suppliers E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW own nuclear 
power plants. See Anita Blasberg, Matthias Geis, Tina Hildebrandt, Anna Kemper, Roland Kirbach, Henning 
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Criticism is put forward by Säcker – he makes three major points of critique:487 
▪ The FCO did not subtract capacity that is bound through agreed power provision, 
long-term contracts, and futures contracts. This deviation from the original RSI 
concept put forward by the CAISO488 results in too high market shares computed 
for the companies. 
▪ The disregard of EEG capacity and feed-in from installations performing with less 
than 25 MW entails the risk of considerable divergences from the situation in the 
real market. 
▪ The FCO bases its legal judgment of the market situation solely on the RSI results. 
This monocausal analysis is in contrary to the German Federal Court of Justice 
exercise in the cases Phonak489 and Texaco-Zerssen490. A simple conclusion from 
market structure to market performance491 is not a sufficient proof for lacking com-
petition, instead, all other circumstances on the market have to be considered. 
Yet, the criticism Säcker puts forward is not capable to disprove the FCO analysis. First, it 
cannot be convincingly shown that the inclusion of capacity from long-term liabilities would 
yield fundamental changes in the RSI results. A London Economics study from 2007492 
also quoted by Säcker calculates RSI values for three different scenarios: One scenario 
with reserves and long-term contracts included, one accounting for reserves only, but 
excluding long-term contractual obligations, and one scenario excluding reserves from the 
calculation.493 The following table shows the results in an overview: 
 
 
                                                 
Sussebach, Wolfgang Uchatius, and Stefan Willeke, “Der Poker um 17 Atommeiler”, Die Zeit Vol. 66, no. 13 
(2011), 19. 
487 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et Vol. 61 no. 4 (2011), 78-79. 
488 Anjali Sheffrin, “Predicting Market Power Using the Residual Supply Index” Presented to FERC Market Moni-
toring Workshop December 3-4, 2002. 
489 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from April 20, 2010. Case N° KVR 1/09 “Phonak/GN Store”, Ref. 
64. 
490 German Federal Court of Justice, decision from October 4, 1983. Case N° KVR 3/82 “Texaco Zerrsen”. 
491 Early approach in industrial organization: The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm, see for example 
Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer, 2004), 1-3. 
492 London Economics, “Structure and Performance of Six European Wholesale Electricity Markets in 2003, 
2004 and 2005”. 
493 For detailed results on the thress scenarios, please refer to ibid, 292 (Standard scenario) and 298 and 299 
(alternative scenarios). 
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SUPPLIER Standard 
scenario 
Alternative Scenario 1: 
Excluding long-term 
contracts 
Alternative Scenario 2: 
Excluding reserves 
0436-S-DE 47.7 % 58.7 % 57.8 % 
0569-S-DE 4.6 % 4.1 % 9.1 % 
1338-S-DE 77.1 % 55.6 % 85.8 % 
1681-S-DE 3.8 % 15.1 % 7.0 % 
 
Table 4: RSI results < 1.1 in percent of time calculated for three different scenarios 
by London Economics (average of 2003-2005) 
In the standard scenario with both, long-term contracts and reserves included, only two 
of the four huge companies exceed the threshold (5 percent) indicating lacking competi-
tion.494 In the alternative scenarios excluding either long-term obligations or reserves from 
the calculation, the values change slightly, however indicating market power for three 
(alternative scenario 1) or even four (alternative scenario 2) firms.495 Although the data 
used by London Economics is older than the FCO data, one important conclusion can be 
drawn: The subtraction of reserves and long-term contractual obligations does not con-
tradict RSI results found in the standard scenario also applied in the FCO study. Therefore, 
this argument cannot be used to prove the FCO approach wrong. 
Second, also the exception of EEG power and small installations might entail a risk of 
slightly diverging values. Still, the FCO study covers 87 percent of the installations in the 
German market, which is considered sufficient to draw a sufficiently detailed picture of the 
competitive conditions in the German wholesale market.496 
Finally, other than Säcker argues, the FCO does conduct a fairly detailed analysis of the 
market besides the RSI considerations.497 In line with the Phonak and Texaco Zerssen 
jurisprudence, the authority verifies whether the presumption of dominance can be refuted 
by the actual competitive situation.498 Becker points out that especially the in-depth anal-
ysis of the production conditions suggests a powerful position of the four companies indi-
vidually for many hours of the day.499 After all, the FCO showed that 80 percent of the 
                                                 
494 Ibid, 292. 
495 Ibid, 298-299. 
496 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 43. 
497 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 78-79. 
498 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 96-97 and 106 
et sqq. 
499 Peter Becker, “Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamts: Ausge-
zeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen”, ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 116. 
Second Chapter: Strategies of Market Manipulation 
B. The Nature of Physical and Financial Capacity Retention 
93 
 
production capacity was owned by the established companies in 2008.500 Furthermore, 
both the FCO and Becker stress the fact that only the four huge electricity suppliers have 
capacity covering the whole of the merit order at their disposal.501 Even Säcker acknowl-
edges this structural difference between municipal suppliers and the four huge firms.502 
The Monopoly Commission supports the application of the RSI concept for the identification 
of market power in the German wholesale market for power.503 A more recent RSI analysis 
carried out by the Monopoly Commission in 2013 suggest that the market power of the 
oligopoly decreases.504 In the latest 2015 Monopoly Commission analysis, RSI values do 
no more suggest a pivotal character of the former oligopoly suppliers.505 Still, the Com-
mission is aware that the situation in the wholesale market for power is about to change 
in the event of the expected closures of plant capacity.506 
After all, the critical discussion of the FCO analysis revealed that the RSI approach, in 
connection with an examination of the actual competitive situation in the market, is an 
adequate basis for the judgment of the competitive situation in the power market. In line 
with the prevailing opinion507, this work therefore acts on the assumption that in 2007 and 
2008 E.ON, RWE, and Vattenfall possessed market power both individually and combined. 
For EnBW, the case was slightly different, however, for the purposes of this work, it can 
be left open whether the company did have a powerful market position only in a collective 
with the remaining three companies or also individually. 
With regard to the 2014 RSI data, individual dominance must be denied. However, the 
market remains concentrated more than 15 years after the liberalization. Moreover, in the 
future the problem of pivotal suppliers exercising market power may even shift towards 
small producers in the event of scarce capacity due to the changes currently observed in 
the power market.508 
                                                 
500 See the explanation earlier in this work and Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stro-
merzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 90. 
501 Peter Becker, “Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamts: Ausge-
zeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen”, ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 117. 
502 Franz Jürgen Säcker, “Marktabgrenzung, Marktbeherrschung und Markttransparenz auf dem Stromgroß-
handelsmarkt”, et Vol. 61, no. 4 (2011), 79. 
503 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 54 – Strom und Gas 2009: Energiemärkte im Spannungsfeld von 
Politik und Wettbewerb, 15, 65. 
504 Marc Bataille and Susanne Thorwarth, "Die Messung von Marktmacht bei der konventionellen 
Stromerzeugung," et Vol. 63, no. 11 (2013), 66, 68. 
505 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 71 - Energie 2015: Ein wettbewerbliches Marktdesign für die 
Energiewende, 2015, 43-44 Ref. 77. 
506 Ibid, 50 Ref. 91. 
507 For the European Commission´s position, please refer to Commission of the European Communities, In-
quiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final 
Report), SEC(2006) 1724. 
508 Axel Ockenfels, "Strombörse und Marktmacht," et Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 53. 
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As a result of the above analysis, this work will operate on the assumption that the oli-
gopoly collectively dominated the power market during the period of examination. The 
GWB abuse provisions may hence be applied. 
 
2. Abuse of market power 
In a second step, the GWB and TFEU provisions require an abuse of market power. 
For the case of capacity retention, Art. 102 lit. a and b TFEU and Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB 
prohibiting the limitation of production and excessive pricing are the relevant provisions. 
As already outlined in the first chapter509, inappropriateness of the price charged to the 
consumers has to be proved. The benchmark for a fair market price is the price observed 
in a competitive market environment.510 
As the economic introduction showed, sellers in a competitive market would offer any 
marketable capacity that can be sold at or above short-term marginal cost in the market 
to maximize their profit.511 Conversely, abuse is assumed if a powerful supplier retains 
capacity that could be sold above short-term marginal cost, thereby expecting the spot 
market price to increase in order to earn higher profits on its power plant portfolio.512 Also 
mark-ups on capacity whose marginal cost of production lies below the market price qual-
ify as abuse.513 Hence, the law follows the economic rationale presented in the first section 
of this chapter514: Profit-maximizing strategies by firms possessing market power that 
increase the spot market price to the detriment of the consumers fulfill – if actually prac-
ticed by market participants – the criteria of Art. 102 (2) lit. A and b TFEU and Sec. 19(2) 
N° 2 GWB.515 
 
3. Conclusion 
Despite this straightforward legal classification of capacity retention, the antitrust 
authorities face problems to find sound evidence for the various forms of manipulative 
                                                 
509 See Chapter 1 section E.II.1.b). 
510 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 928-933. 
511 See Chapter 1 section D.I.2. The FCO comes to the same conclusion: Federal Cartel Office, Sektorunter-
suchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 115. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid, 117. 
514 See Chapter 2 section B.I. 
515 Coming to the same conclusion Selmar Konar, Wettbewerbskonforme Stromgroßhandelspreise: Eine 
Untersuchung über die Integrität und Transparenz des Energiegroßhandelsmarkts (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 
39. 
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behavior. This is, however, a necessary requirement for penalties, since the burden of 
proof lies with the authorities. Subsection D. will therefore present two previous ap-
proaches to find evidence standing up in court. Beforehand, the following section III. will 
focus on the field of capital market law and its suitability to cover the manipulative behav-
ior at the energy exchange. 
 
III. Legal classification of capacity retention: Capital 
market law 
Besides the field of antitrust, European and German energy and capital market law 
contain sanctions for infringements of legal duties and rules of conduct in market environ-
ments. This section will examine the application of the European MiFID, MAD and MAR, 
REMIT, and EMIR rules on the EEX spot market516 (subsection 1), as well as the German 
set of rules laid down in BörsG, KWG and WpHG517  (subsection 2). It will be shown that 
capital market law offers further means of intervention to deter manipulations of the power 
market. 
 
1. European energy and capital market law 
European capital market law is spread among a number of directives and regulations, 
the most important of which are MiFID II and MiFIR, EMIR and MAD respectively MAR.518 
In the field of energy law discussed in this work as an example, REMIT contains the core 
provisions. EMIR regulates OTC trades and clearing requirements between energy trad-
ers519. It may therefore not apply to manipulations of the EPEX spot and will not be dis-
cussed further in this work. MiFID II520, even if focused on exchange trading of financial 
                                                 
516 See Chapter 1, section E.III.1. of this work. 
517 See Chapter 1, section E.III.2. of this work. 
518 For the recent changes refer to Alexander Kox, "REMIT, MiFID, EMIR und Co. verschärfen die 
Anforderungen zur Teilnahme am Energiehandel," et Vol. 63, no. 8 (2013). With regard to the delineation be-
tween the codes, refer to Chapter 1, section E.III.1. of this work. 
519 Ibid. Also Jörg Spicker, "Der OTC-Handel (Over-The-Counter-Handel)," in Handbuch Energiehandel, ed. 
Hans-Peter Schwintowski, 3nd ed. (Berlin: Schmidt, 2013), 140 Ref. 292. 
520 The directive has been published in the EU Official Journal on June 12, 2014. It will enter into force in Janu-
ary 2017. See the EC Press release from June 12, 2014 accessible at http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-
12-06-2014.htm?locale=en (Last accessed October 17, 2014).  
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instruments and energy trading, does concentrate on transparency and liquidity of trad-
ing521 and is therefore also not suited to legally capture and sanction EPEX spot manipu-
lations. 
MAD and MAR are applicable to financial instruments exclusively (Art. 1(2) MAD) and ex-
clude spot commodity contracts that are wholesale energy products (Art. 1(4)(a) MAD, 
Art. 2(2)(a) MAR). The following section a) will therefore concentrate on the REMIT provi-
sions in order to show that capacity retention strategies as introduced in section I. are 
covered by these norms. For comparably complex manipulation cases in the context of 
capital markets that are not wholesale energy products, MAD and MAR apply. They will be 
discussed later in section 2. on German capital market law and in the more general con-
siderations on manipulation deterrence in the third chapter of this work, section B.II.1.b). 
 
a) The Regulation on wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency 
REMIT has entered into force on December 28, 2011.522 It contains a ban of insider 
trading and market manipulation applicable also on EPEX spot.523 The European Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) supervises the compliance of traders with 
the REMIT provisions.524 
Art. 5 REMIT contains the prohibition of market manipulation. The term is defined in 
Art. 2(2) lit. a REMIT (action based manipulations): Any transaction entered into or 
any order issued in wholesale energy products, which 
▪ gives false or misleading signals with regard to supply, demand or price of whole-
sale energy products (i), 
▪ secures the price of a wholesale energy product on an artificial level (ii), or 
                                                 
521 Kox, "REMIT, MiFID, EMIR und Co. verschärfen die Anforderungen zur Teilnahme am Energiehandel," et 
Vol. 63, no. 8 (2013), 42-43. 
522 Regulation on wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) N° 1227/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Version promulgated on October 25, 2011 (Official Journal L 326, p. 1-16). 
523 Kox, "REMIT, MiFID, EMIR und Co. verschärfen die Anforderungen zur Teilnahme am Energiehandel," et 
Vol. 63, no. 8 (2013), 44. See also Spicker, "Der OTC-Handel (Over-The-Counter-Handel)," in Handbuch 
Energiehandel, ed. Schwintowski, 3nd ed. (Berlin: Schmidt, 2013), 135 Ref. 283.  
524 Patric Bachert, "Befugnisse der Bundesnetzagentur zur Durchsetzung der REMIT-Verordnung," RdE Vol. 24, 
no. 9 (2014), 361; Spicker, "Der OTC-Handel (Over-The-Counter-Handel)," in Handbuch Energiehandel, ed. 
Schwintowski, 3nd ed. (Berlin: Schmidt, 2013).. Refer also to Selma Konar, "Energieregulierung auf 
Unionsebene - Die Rolle der Europäischen Kommission und der ACER nach der REMIT-VO," ZNER Vol. 19, no. 1 
(2015), 9-10. 
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▪ employs a fictious device or any other form of deception to give false or misleading 
signals with regard to supply, demand or price of wholesale energy products (iii). 
Also, information-based manipulations are banned according to Art. 2(2) lit. b REMIT: 
Disseminating information through the media, which 
▪ gives false or misleading signals with regard to supply, demand or price of whole-
sale energy products, or 
▪ rumors where the disseminating person knew or ought to have known that the 
information was false or misleading, or 
▪ the information is disseminated for the purposes of journalism and the disseminator 
derives an advantage or profits from the dissemination (i) or intends to mislead 
the market (ii). 
Both kinds of manipulative actions have been transposed into German national law and 
are now codified in Sec. 95 EnWG: Sec. 95 (1b) EnWG refers to action based manipula-
tions and Sec. 95(1c) N° 6 EnWG to information based manipulations.525 The law makes 
a reference to the requirements of REMIT without defining the manipulative actions itself. 
With regard to capacity retention at EPEX spot, ACER has specified the meaning of the 
REMIT rules in its 2013 guidance on the application of REMIT with examples of market 
manipulation involving price positioning:526 
“Actions undertaken by persons that artificially cause prices to be at a level not 
justified by market forces of supply and demand, including actual availability 
of production, storage or transportation capacity, and demand (“physical with-
holding”): This is for example the practice where a market participant decides 
not to offer on the market all available production […] without justification and 
with the intention to shift the market price to higher levels, e.g. not offering on 
the market, without justification, a power plant whose marginal cost is lower 
than the spot prices, […] that would result in abnormal high prices.” 
Also, REMIT itself gives examples of market manipulations in its recitals N° 13 and 14 that 
include “making it appear that the availability of electricity generation capacity […] is other 
                                                 
525 Christian Theobald and Antje Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Wolfgang Danner and Christian 
Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 95 EnWG Ref 1 et sqq. 
526 ACER, Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, 2013, 37. 
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than the capacity which is actually technically available where such information affects or 
is likely to affect the price of wholesale energy products.”527 
Hence, physical capacity retention strategies may be classified as an infringement of the 
REMIT ban of market manipulation. 
 
b) Legal consequences 
An infringement of the REMIT provisions on market manipulation may result in a 
punishment according to the rules of administrative offenses, Sec. 95(1b) EnWG. In case 
of intentional behavior and an actual influence on the price caused, even criminal sanctions 
may apply, Sec. 95a(1) EnWG. A detailed discussion of sanctions for manipulations ac-
cording to energy capital market law will be undertaken in the third chapter of this work. 
It deals with the current and optimal level of fines in order to establish an effective regime 
of public market surveillance to deter manipulations of the EEX. 
 
c) Conclusion 
The REMIT provisions cover capacity retention at EPEX spot. The following section 
will present an in-depth analysis of capital market rules applicable to EPEX spot market 
manipulations in German law. Thereafter, the work turns from the classification of the 
manipulations to the deterrent effect of the rules de lege lata in order to identify short-
comings that weaken the system. 
 
2. German capital market law 
As the introductive section E.III. in chapter 1 of this work has shown528, German 
capital market law is spread between three codes – the Securities Exchange Act (BörsG), 
the Securities Trading Act (WpHG) and the German Banking Act (KWG). All of these codes 
contain sanctions for infringements of their provisions. While KWG sanctions do not cover 
abusive behavior in electricity trading, the provisions in the BörsG focus on allowances of 
exchanges and organizational duties rather than the process of trading itself.529 
                                                 
527 Ibid, 35. 
528 Please refer to chapter 1, section E.III.2. of this work. 
529 Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy 
Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 109-110. 
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With regard to manipulations on the EEX spot market, however, only the WpHG was of 
some relevance. With the introduction of the MAR provisions in July 2016, Sec. 20a WpHG 
was cancelled and replaced by the immediately applicable European rules in Art. 12, 15 
MAR.530 Since these rules are largely identical in context with the former Sec. 20a WpHG531 
that was in place during the period of examination of this work and the commentary liter-
ature has not yet covered the MAR rules, this work will refer to both, the former Sec. 20a 
WpHG and Sec. 15 MAR in the following section. 
However, one necessary differentiation has to be made: While it will be argued that 
Sec. 20a WpHG was directly applicable on manipulations on markets for wholesale energy 
products, the new rules in Sec. 12, 15 MAR are explicitly not, Art. 2(2)(a) MAR. Therefore, 
Sec. 20a WpHG will be presented in depth due to its applicability during the period of 
examination and reference to Art. 12, 15 MAR will be made to illustrate the legal situation 
in comparably complex capital market manipulation cases. 
 
a) The prohibition against market manipulation in Art. 12, 15 
MAR (formerly Sec. 20a WpHG) 
The capital market law provisions of greatest relevance for this work are Art. 12, 15 
MAR (formerly Sec. 20a WpHG): Art. 15 MAR states the prohibition of market manipula-
tion, concretized by definitions and exemplary manipulation scenarios in Art. 12 MAR. 
Art. 12, 15 WpHG are accompanied by penalty rules for their infringement: Sec. 39 WpHG, 
which is designed as an administrative offense, and Sec. 38 WpHG containing a criminal 
sanction.532 Hence, capital market law seems to offer sanctions for manipulative behavior 
independently of the requirements of antitrust. The next sections will discuss whether a 
legal classification of capacity retention according to the requirements of the former 
Sec. 20a WpHG, as well as the new Art. 12, 15 MAR, are feasible and suited to deter future 
manipulations. 
 
 
                                                 
530 The rules were transposed into German law by way of the First Act Amending Financial Marekts Regulations 
(Erstes Finanzmarktnovellierungsgesetz, 1. FiMaNoG) from June 30, 2016. Refer to the information on the 
homepage of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), available online at 
https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/BoersenMaerkte/Marktmanipulation/marktmanipulation_node_en.html (last 
accessed October 23, 2017).  
531 Krause, “Kapitalmarktrechtliche Compliance: neue Pflichten und drastisch verschärfte Sanktionen nach der 
EU-Marktmissbrauchsverordnung”, CCZ Vol. 7, no. 6 (2014), 258. 
532 Ibid, 121. 
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aa) Scope of application of the former Sec. 20a WpHG 
First and most importantly, the scope of application of Sec. 20a WpHG needed to 
cover the trade with electricity products at the EPEX spot market both materially and 
geographically. The material scope of application of Sec. 20a WpHG covered financial 
instruments according to the definition in Sec. 2(2b) WpHG533, hence excluding the prod-
ucts traded at the EEX spot market.534 This opinion was supported by the considerations 
of the German Monopoly Commission in its 2007 special report, stating that the Securities 
Exchange Act was not applicable to spot market transactions and manipulative behavior 
could only be pursued with the help of antitrust rules.535 Also the new Art. 12, 15 MAR 
explicitly exclude wholesale energy spot market transactions, Art. 2(2)(a) MAR. 
For the former Sec. 20a WpHG, this view overlooks the impact of Sec. 20a(4) WpHG. This 
paragraph extended the scope of application of Sec. 20a WpHG explicitly on commodities 
if traded in an organized market.536 With regard to electricity traded over EPEX spot, 
Sec. 20a WpHG hence applied: The EEX is an organized market537 and the power products 
traded fall under the definition of commodities.538 In particular, the norm did comprise 
cases where the auction price for power was influenced by withholding capacity from low-
cost plants in favor of more expansive facilities.539 
In conclusion, the material scope of application of Sec. 20a WpHG therefore included ca-
pacity retention on the spot market for electricity during the period of examination.540 
                                                 
533 Please refer to chapter 1 of this work, section E.III.2.a) of this work. 
534 Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy 
Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 125 Also refer to Markus Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in 
Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur 
Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 98. 
535 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 49 - Strom und Gas 2007: Wettbewerbsdefizite und zögerliche 
Regulierung, 2007, 61 Ref. 194. Also Matthias Jahn, "Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der 
Strombörse EEX in Leipzig," ZNER Vol. 11, no. 4 (2008), 306. 
536 Oliver Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy 
Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 126. Also Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: 
Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der 
Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 133; ibid. Detailed 
Alexander T. Retsch, Marktmissbrauchsrechtliche Regelungen des WpHG und der REMIT-VO im 
Stromspothandel (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 96 et sqq. 
537 Michael Cieslarczyk et al., "Verbesserung der Transparenz auf dem Stromgroßhandelsmarkt aus 
ökonomischer sowie energie- und kapitalmarktrechtlicher Sicht,"(Düsseldorf/Berlin/London2006), 126, 128. 
538 In depth Matthias Jahn, "Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der Strombörse EEX in 
Leipzig," ZNER Vol. 11, no. 4 (2008), 306 et sqq. See also Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die 
Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der 
Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 202. Also Michael 
Cieslarczyk and Karl-Peter Horstmann, "Marktmissbrauch im Energiehandel?: Die Empfehlung von ERGEG und 
CESR zur Entwicklung eines spezifischen Regelwerks gegen Marktmissbrauch auf den Energiemärkten," emw 
Vol. 6, no. 8 (2008), 27. 
539 Joachim Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schneider, 
6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 2012), § 20a Ref. 43a. 
540 Also Eberhard Schwark, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Eberhard Schwark and Daniel Zimmer, 4th 
ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2010), § 20a WpHG Ref. 99-100. Likewise Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit 
marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
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Further questions arise with regard to the geographical scope of application of the 
former Sec. 20a WpHG. Effective from April 1, 2009, the EEX spot market merged with 
Powernext, a Paris-based spot market for energy, to form the EPEX Spot SE.541 EPEX Spot 
has its domicile in Paris, France, which gave rise to the question of geographical applica-
bility of the norm, as well as the criminal sanction in Sec. 38(2) WpHG.542 Since the of-
fenses in Sec. 20a, 38, 39 WpHG were all designed as abstract strict liability torts, requir-
ing intent or negligence, but no need to actually succeed, the reference for the scope of 
application of Sec. 20a WpHG could only be the place of action rather than the place 
where the harm arose. Sec. 1(2) WpHG concretized this action-based approach, stating 
that the rules of the third and fourth section of the WpHG were also applicable to actions 
and omissions taken abroad if they referred to financial instruments traded at a domestic 
exchange. Hence, the norm did not require the manipulation to be carried out at a domes-
tic exchange.543 However, it required a reference to financial instruments also traded do-
mestically, and therefore excluded commodities like power from the scope of application. 
Since an influence of the spot price in Germany had become practically impossible after 
the shutdown of spot trading at EEX Leipzig, this did not constitute a regulatory gap. The 
actual opportunity to influence the price of futures traded at EEX in Leipzig through 
spot market transactions was covered by Sec. 1(2) WpHG, since those could be subsumed 
under the definition of financial instruments. In summary, any action or omission at EPEX 
spot in Paris that fulfilled the requirements of Sec. 20a WpHG and referred to financial 
instruments traded at the EEX futures market in Leipzig was covered by the geographical 
scope of application of Sec. 20a WpHG.544 However, the applicability of Sec. 20a WpHG 
did not yet contain the applicability of the sanctioning provisions in Sec. 39, 38 WpHG. 
Since Sec. 38 WpHG contains criminal sanctions, its geographical scope of application de-
pends upon the rules of international criminal law, Sec. 3 to 7 and 9 StGB, respectively 
administrative rules codified in Sec. 5, 7 OWiG. According to these norms, the applicability 
is clear in cases of manipulations that have effects in the domestic financial market. Thus, 
manipulations of the EPEX spot market in Paris that have effects on the prices in the EEX 
futures market located in Leipzig are covered.545 
                                                 
Lang, 2011), 127. Also Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische 
Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 200. 
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In conclusion, the geographical scope of application of Sec. 20a, 38, and 39 WpHG covered 
capacity retention at EPEX spot that had effects in the EEX Leipzig futures market and the 
financial instruments traded at this exchange. The following section will now turn to the 
examination of the manipulation offenses codified in the former Sec. 20a WpHG in order 
to prove the legal classification of capacity retention as capital market law offense by the 
time of the examination. For future cases of capital market manipulations, reference will 
be made to the new MAR rules. 
 
bb) Requirements of the former Sec. 20a WpHG 
Sec. 20a(1) first sentence WpHG contained three alternative manipulation offenses: 
▪ Information based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 1 WpHG, now 
Art. 12(1)(c) MAR), 
▪ Trade based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG, now 
Art. 12(1)(a)(i) MAR), and 
▪ Action based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 WpHG, now 
Art. 12(1)(b) MAR). 
Capacity retention at EPEX spot could be subsumed under all three alternatives of Sec. 20a 
WpHG during the period of examination: information based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) 
first sentence N° 1 WpHG) and trade based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 
2 WpHG), as well as other manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 WpHG).546 All 
cases named will be examined subsequently. Under the MAR, commodity spot trades in 
wholesale energy products are excluded from the regulation and only the REMIT rules 
apply. In manipulation cases that do not address the wholesale energy market, however, 
the new MAR provisions named here may apply. 
 
(1) Information based manipulations, Art. 12(1)(c) MAR (formerly Sec. 20a(1) 
first sentence N° 1 WpHG) 
Information based manipulations according to the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence 
N° 1 WpHG could be committed by action (Alt. 1) or omission (Alt. 2). The norm required 
false or misleading information relevant to investors and qualified to influence the auction 
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price. At EPEX spot, publication of false information on the EEX webpage with regard to 
the available quantity of power may be considered an infringement of this provision.547 
Brunke proposes that the purposeful manipulation of production capacity aiming at an 
influence of the merit order does necessarily deceive the market about the whole of the 
available production capacity. He bases his argument on the fact that producers publish 
their available capacity on the EEX webpage daily as part of the transparency initiative. 
Any visitor summing up the values to determine overall capacity would therefore not be 
able to calculate actual available capacity, but a lower value. The information on the EEX 
webpage would hence be false.548 Furthermore, Brunke considers the information to be 
misleading because the omission of capacity produces a false image of overall capac-
ity.549 
Yet, any publication on the EEX webpage happens on a voluntary basis.550 However, the 
existence of a duty to disclose is of no relevance to the goods protected by Sec. 20a(1) 
first sentence N° 1 WpHG. Also, publications on a voluntary basis need to be correct and 
complete.551 
As a final criterion, Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 1 WpHG required the false information 
to be of relevance to investors in the process of evaluating the product, e.g. power 
supply.552 This relatively imprecise term was defined further in Sec. 2 Statutory Order 
Concretizing the Ban of Market Manipulations (Verordnung zur Kontretisierung des Verbo-
tes zur Marktmanipulation, MaKonV)553, including a legal definition and presumptive ex-
amples.554  Accordingly, the law addressed any such circumstances that a rational investor 
would consider when deciding about the investment.555 With regard to EEX spot trades, 
the information about the available production capacity was of relevance to investors mak-
ing their buy and sell decisions. In case of capacity retention, investors would face price 
deviations to their disadvantage when spot prices rise above the average variable cost of 
                                                 
547 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
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production. Having known the actual availability of supply, investors would probably have 
refrained from investing the way they did. Hence, the disclosure of available production 
capacity might be considered of relevance to investors.556 
However, the modalities of publication on the EEX webpage cast some doubt on this line 
of argument. Frist, as Brunke points out, only about two thirds of total installed capacity 
publish information on the EEX webpage.557 Small installations with less than 20 MW pro-
duction capacity are not covered by the agreement of EEX and plant operators.558 Hence, 
investors would not find information on the availability of about one third of total installed 
capacity. 
According to the amendments resulting from the implementation of the REMIT, energy 
producers trading in the wholesale market are obliged to publicly disclose inside infor-
mation they possess including information relevant to the capacity and use of facilities for 
production of electricity and planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities, 
Art. 4(1) REMIT and Art. 2(1)(b), 2(7) REMIT.559 
Yet, the data is displayed rather undifferentiated. Investors may access installed, available 
and actually generated power. There is however neither a differentiation between the in-
dividual plants, nor between the hours of the day that are auctioned off at the spot mar-
ket.560 Rather, production is cumulated for each day and only differentiated with regard to 
the energy source.561 Hence, it appears highly questionable to deduct a relevance to in-
vestors with regard to objectively fragmentary data. To a rational investor, the data must 
appear rather unqualified to base an investment decision upon it.562 
Therefore, manipulations of prices at the EEX spot market did not violate Sec. 20a(1) first 
sentence N° 1 WpHG during the examination period, independently of the suitability of 
false information disclosure to influence the market price.563 Subsequently, the two other 
                                                 
556 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
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561 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
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563 Assuming a comprehensive duty to disclose for all producers and as a result affirming the relevance to in-
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alternatives of Sec. 20a(1) – trade based and other manipulations – will be considered to 
analyze whether these cover spot market manipulations. 
 
(2) Trade based manipulations, Art. 12(1)(a)(i) MAR (formerly Sec. 20a(1) 
first sentence N° 2 WpHG) 
Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG addressed trade based manipulations, thus 
trades that were suited to send false or misleading signals with regard to supply, demand, 
or stock market price of financial instruments or to effect an artificial price level.564 With 
regard to the EEX spot market, all trade based manipulation techniques could be addressed 
by the norm if they produced false signals or artificial price levels without being considered 
an accepted market practice or justified by legitimate reasons.565 
As a first criterion, trade based manipulations required the exercise of a transaction 
(e.g. purchase or sale of power products) or the issue of a purchase or sale order.566 
The law did explicitly not refer to an execution of the order. Rather, any order that was 
received by the addressee – thus entered into the electronic trading system Xetra used at 
the EPEX spot – irrespective of a time limit or a limit with regard to the amount bid was 
considered an order. Even a later withdrawal of the order did not hinder the compliance 
with the criterion.567 Hence, any issue of a purchase or sale order at EPEX spot was in 
principle covered by Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG. 
In order to qualify as trade based manipulation, it did further need to be suited to send 
false or misleading signals with regard to supply, demand or the stock price of power 
or establish an artificial price level.568 Hence, Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG 
established strict liability that did not require other market participants to be deceived. 
This wide range of the norm did require a closer definition of infringing behavior with 
regard to the constitutional principle of legal certainty. The necessary level of legal cer-
tainty was met with the help of the complementary provisions in Sec. 3 MaKonV.569 
                                                 
564 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), Vor § 20a Ref. 35. 
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(a) Former Sec. 3(1) N° 1e MaKonV 
According to Sec. 3(1) N° 1e MaKonV, orders taken at or around a specific time 
when reference prices are calculated that lead to price changes which have an effect on 
such prices indicated manipulative behavior.570 With regard to the EEX, the following con-
stellation might be addressed by the rule: Derivatives traded at the EEX futures market 
(and hence financial instruments) are based upon underlyings from EPEX spot, e.g. power 
contracts. Through purchases and sales of those underlyings, prices of call or put options 
may be influenced significantly.571 Also, capacity retention aiming at a change of the merit 
order and – correspondingly – the price level in the reference market EPEX spot – is well 
suited to influence prices for call (increase) and put options (decrease) disproportionately 
high. Accordingly, the manipulation of exchange prices for power using capacity retention 
was covered by Sec. 3(1) N° 1e MaKonV, which was a strong indicator for market manip-
ulation.572 
However, this view was not uncontested. Schröder points out that the process of price 
formation is not disturbed by the retention of capacity. Rather, the price is determined 
correctly with regard to (seemingly) scarce supply. It would only be different if more ca-
pacity were included in the process of price formation.573 This view is convincing: Capital 
market law addresses the functionality of capital markets, and in particular the process of 
price formation at exchanges to protect the investors´ confidence.574 Other interventions 
in the market process without specific link to the integrity of capital markets are left to 
the rules and regulations of antitrust and unfair competition.575 This is especially true for 
influence exerted on the market price, abusing a position of market power without target-
ing the mechanism of price formation. Shortening supply in order to raise prices and in-
crease profits is a well-known rationale for firms possessing market power.576 It is, how-
ever, irrespective of the process of price formation. A view that considers the shortening 
of supply as an intervention in the process of price formation misjudges the distinction 
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between capital market law and the field of antitrust. In conclusion, Sec. 3(1) N° 1e Ma-
KonV did therefore not cover capacity retention aiming at EPEX spot. 
 
(b) Former Sec. 3(1) N° 3 MaKonV 
According to Sec. 3(1) N° 3 MaKonV, trades that did not result in a change of the 
economic owner of the good, could be suspicious of manipulation. Trades without economic 
relevance could be targeted at feigning an active market with huge liquidity that did not 
reflect the actual market situation.577 The impression of increased trade may result in 
higher demand and a price increase in the market. At the EEX, power producers may as 
well act as buyers in the market, especially the vertically integrated companies.578 Several 
companies trading for the E.ON group do economically belong to the group themselves. 
Hence, at EPEX spot is a danger of manipulation through trades without change of the 
economic owner. This conclusion is compounded by the fact that trading at EPEX spot is 
anonymous579, such that the identity of buyers and sellers is not visible to traders. In case 
of suspicions, such behavior may be detected using the full documentation of trading and 
the competence of the EEX Trade Supervisory Office.580 
The application of Sec. 3(1) N° 3 MaKonV with regard to the re-sale of power already sold 
at the exchange (so-called wash sale) was excluded: This trading strategy is common in 
all futures markets and consistent with the purposes of futures trading.581 Other than with 
manipulative behavior, those trades possess economic relevance, as they shall balance 
long-term futures trades with regard to short-term price trends, which are often not fore-
seeable in the long run.582 
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(c) Former Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV 
Sec. 3(2) MaKonV contained coercive examples of behavior that implied the satis-
faction of the conditions of Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG.583 With regard to spot 
market manipulations at EEX, Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV might have applied. The norm 
had a close relationship to Sec. 3(1) N° 1e MaKonV treated above. Other than Sec. 3(1) 
N° 1e MaKonV, Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV required an element of deception.584 Accordingly, 
the impression of economically sound purchase or sale orders needed to be created, while 
in fact only the closing price was manipulated.585 As has been said with regard to Sec. 3(1) 
N° 1e MaKonV, at EPEX spot, capacity retention aiming at a change of the merit order and 
– correspondingly – the price level in the reference market EPEX spot – is well suited to 
influence prices for call (increase) and put options (decrease) disproportionately high. The 
same behavior could therefore have been covered by Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV, if a decep-
tion of other market participants was to be expected. 
Other than Sec. 3(1) N° 1e MaKonV, Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV did not require any direct 
influence on the closing price of power.586 Therefore, the norm covered capacity reten-
tion at the EPEX spot as manipulative behavior that was suited to deceive market par-
ticipants about the actual supply of power production. 
 
(d) Further requirements of the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG 
In summary, capacity retention aiming at a change in supply in order to influence 
the merit order shortly before the finding of the closing price and deceiving other market 
participants about the actual supply situation was covered by Sec. 20a(1) first sentence 
N° 2 WpHG in conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV applicable during the period of 
examination. 
According to the former Sec. 20a(2) WpHG, any action 
▪ compatible with legitimate practice on the markets concerned or 
▪ based upon legitimate reasons 
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was excluded from the provision.587 Actions could only be considered a legitimate practice 
on the market if they were to be expected according to reasonable judgment and had been 
approved by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin).588 Sec. 7 to 10 MaKonV concretized the requirements 
for approval of the BaFin. Criteria included transparency for other market participants 
(Sec. 8(1) N° 1 MaKonV), the opportunity for other traders to react in due time (Sec. 8(1) 
N° 4 MaKonV) or whether the practice endangered the integrity of other markets on which 
the financial instrument was traded (Sec. 8(1) N° 6 MaKonV). In summary, a core criterion 
for the approval of market behavior was the transparency practiced by market partici-
pants.589 With regard to capacity retention at EPEX spot, there was, however, no trans-
parency involved. The practice had not been approved by the BaFin and has no prospect 
of being approved ex post (former Sec. 20a(2) third sentence WpHG)590 in the future.591 
Also, the practice needed to be justified because of legitimate reasons. Such legitimate 
reasons required recognition in capital market law and should not have contradicted ac-
cepted principles, structures, mechanisms, conditions for functioning and integrity of the 
market.592 Plant shutdowns due to revision or maintenance are clearly legitimate reasons 
according to this definition. For reasons of clarification, however, the official approval of 
the BaFin would be desirable.593 By contrast, it appears highly questionable to subsume 
capacity retention strategies under this definition of legitimacy of reasons. Yet, the delim-
itation of manipulative shutdowns and legitimate plant revisions is difficult in practice, 
which will be discussed with regard to the proof of manipulations later in this chapter. 
In conclusion, capacity retention strategies at EPEX spot could be subsumed under 
Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG in conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV during 
the period of examination. 
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(3) Other manipulations, Art. 12(1)(b) MAR (formerly Sec. 20a(1) first sen-
tence N° 3 WpHG) 
Furthermore, withholding capacity might also have met the criteria of other manip-
ulative actions according to Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 WpHG during the period of 
examination.594 The norm served as an omnibus offense targeting any other deceptive 
action qualified to influence the market price of commodities traded at exchanges.595 De-
ceptive actions could be seen in any behavior that was objectively misleading and influ-
enced the perception of other market participants. Sec. 4(1) MaKonV concretized: The 
action needed to be qualified to deceive a reasonable investor about the economic condi-
tions, especially supply and demand of the commodity, and to influence the market price 
to move either upwards or downwards. An individual deception was not required, only the 
general qualification to deceive.596 
With regard to capacity retention at EPEX spot, especially the former Sec. 4(3) N° 1 Ma-
KonV deserves a closer look.597 It banned the protection of a dominant market position 
using the supply or demand for financial instruments, if it resulted in a change of prices 
or the creation of trading conditions not reflecting the market.598 This strategy, also known 
as cornering, could as well have covered purchases at EEX from companies dominating 
the power market.599 Especially, since this strategy was promising in illiquid markets, 
which may happen at times of scarce supply and fixed-date delivery obligations in com-
modity markets.600 However, at EPEX spot capacity is being kept out of the market rather 
than purchased by the oligopoly firms. The wording of Sec. 4(3) N° 1 MaKonV did not refer 
to the withholding of financial instruments. Jahn argues that withholding a product in a 
market environment may only be profitable to its producer if this behavior is connected 
with an economic incentive, which might be seen in the manipulation of the EEX price 
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600 Fleischer and Bueren, "Cornering zwischen Kapitalmarkt- und Kartellrecht," ZIP Vol. 33, no. 27 (2013), 
1256. 
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mechanism. He concludes, that Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 covered capacity retention 
of dominant firms at EEX.601 
Yet, this reasoning is not convincing due to the requirement of legal certainty in criminal 
law: Both, Sec. 20a(1) WpHG and the concretizing MaKonV contained a number of unde-
fined legal concepts requiring interpretation.602 With regard to the threat of criminal pun-
ishment (Sec. 38 WpHG) for infringements of Sec. 20a(1) WpHG, this interpretation 
needed to be restrictive and could not cover extensions of the wording of the norm.603 
Therefore, the qualification of capacity retention at EEX as cornering according to 
Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 WpHG in conjunction with Sec. 4(3) N° 1 MaKonV was not 
possible.604 
 
cc) Conclusion 
In summary, the legal classification of capacity retention as an infringement of cap-
ital market law, namely the ban on market manipulations codified in the former Sec. 20a 
WpHG, revealed a second approach in the fight against EPEX spot manipulations. 
The retention of plant capacity aiming at a change of supply in order to influence the merit 
order shortly before the finding of the closing price and deceiving other market participants 
about the actual supply situation could be subsumed under Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 
WpHG in conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV during the period of examination. 
For future capital market manipulations, however excluding manipulations of wholesale 
energy commodity spot markets, the respective manipulation rules in Art. 12, 15 MAR 
apply and qualify as capital market law offences.605 
The following section will shortly discuss the legal consequences for infringements of this 
paragraph. 
                                                 
601 Jahn, "Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der Strombörse EEX in Leipzig," ZNER Vol. 11, 
no. 4 (2008), 311. Similar Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der 
European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 167. 
602 Fleischer and Bueren, "Cornering zwischen Kapitalmarkt- und Kartellrecht," ZIP Vol. 33, no. 27 (2013), 
1256. 
603 Similar Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy 
Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 163, 184. Also Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 
Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 2012), § 20a Ref. 231. 
604 Leaving the question open Schröder, Handbuch Kapitalmarktstrafrecht, 3rd ed. (Köln: Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 2015), 171 Ref. 891. 
605 Krause, “Kapitalmarktrechtliche Compliance: neue Pflichten und drastisch verschärfte Sanktionen nach der 
EU-Marktmissbrauchsverordnung”, CCZ Vol. 7, no. 6 (2014), 258. 
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b) Legal consequences 
An infringement of the WpHG ban of market manipulations may result in a punish-
ment as an administrative offense according to Sec. 39 WpHG or even result in a criminal 
sanction according to Sec. 38 WpHG. The differentiation between administrative offense 
and criminal sanction shall depend upon the actual influence on the stock price: Actions 
that are qualified to influence the stock price but do not result in an actual change of the 
price are treated as administrative offenses. A criminal sanction may only be imposed in 
cases where the manipulation had an actual effect on the stock price.606 A detailed discus-
sion of the sanctions named and their deterrent effect will be presented in the third chapter 
of this work.607 
 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the legal classification of capacity retention at EPEX spot as an in-
fringement of capital market law (the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG in 
conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV) offers a second approach to the problem, as well 
as additional legal tools to fight the offenses. However, the practical problems with the 
capital market law approach are twofold: First, authorities face similar difficulties as in 
antitrust to present sound evidence for manipulative behavior.608 The mere fact that in 
spite of the heated public discussion, the competent authority – BaFin – has never opened 
a case against one of the companies concerned underlines this problem.609 Second, the 
lack of precise rules fulfilling the requirements of legal certainty – especially with regard 
to the criminal sanctions in Sec. 38 WpHG – increases the difficulty for authorities and 
legal practitioners to identify the allowed practices. 
Hence, the regulatory problem at EEX – also in capital market law – is not a lack of rules 
covering manipulative practices. Rather, it is a lack of efficient market monitoring and 
enforcement of the rules.610 Subsection C. will therefore treat the practical problem of 
                                                 
606 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 172. 
607 Please refer to the third chapter, section B.II.1.b). 
608 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 175. See also Jahn, "Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels 
an der Strombörse EEX in Leipzig," ZNER Vol. 11, no. 4 (2008), 314. 
609 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 134, 198. 
610 Ibid, 201, 212. 
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proving manipulations, before the following chapters three and four focus on approaches 
that reduce the enforcement deficit both in antitrust and capital market law. 
 
IV. Legal classification: The relationship between antitrust 
and capital market law 
Having proved an offense against both the rules of antitrust and capital market law, 
the question concerning the relationship of the two regimes arises. In principle, both laws 
applied in parallel during the period of examination.611 In case of a divergence of results, 
the more extensive regime prevails in order to avoid regulatory gaps.612 In the following 
chapters, this work will examine the deterrent effect of both regulatory regimes – antitrust 
and capital market law – in their complex interaction.613 It will be shown where the weak-
nesses of the two systems lie and how an efficient system of law enforcement needs to 
focus on both antitrust and capital market law to successfully deter the manipulation of 
capital markets, illustrated on the example of the EEX power market.614 
 
                                                 
611 Christian Dessau and Joachim du Buisson, "Die Rolle Europas im Energiehandel," in Energiehandel in 
Europa: Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, ed. Ines Zenke and Ralf Schäfer, 3rd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 
2012), Sec. 28 Ref. 124 et sqq. After the introduction of the MAR, there is no parallel application of the WpHG 
and GWB rules any more, but rather of REMIT and the GWB/AEUV rules. 
612 Fleischer and Bueren, "Cornering zwischen Kapitalmarkt- und Kartellrecht," ZIP Vol. 33, no. 27 (2013), 
1263. 
613 Refer to the third and fourth chapter of this work. 
614 For the integrated solution refer to the fifth chapter of this work. 
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C. Economic Analysis of the German Energy 
Market 
Based on the fundamentals of structure and pricing in the German energy market 
introduced in the first chapter615 and potential manipulation strategies discussed in the 
preceding section, the following section will examine incentives for market participants to 
engage in manipulative behavior. An economic analysis will examine pricing strategies to 
find the optimal choice of price and quantity for any operator and show that the retention 
of capacity may be an attractive option if the law does not deter it. The analysis acts on 
the assumption that the four established power generators formed an oligopoly during the 
period of examination616 and did therefore not pursue a competitive pricing strategy to 
maximize their profits. 
 
I. Fundamental assumptions of the model 
The economic branch of industrial organization consulted for the purpose of this in-
quiry permits the analysis of markets that do not comply with one of the two extreme 
cases, the monopoly respectively the competitive market, but are dominated by a number 
of influential participants. Starting from the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, 
whereby the market structure determines the market actors´ conduct and this the market 
performance617, industrial organization offers a variety of tools for the examination of stra-
tegic behavior in non-competitive market environments.618 Therefore, it is especially 
suited for a general behavior-based analysis of the market to identify incentives for ma-
nipulations. This model does hence not assume that the actual exercise of market power 
causes high power prices in the first place, but starts with an incentive-based analysis for 
the main players.619 
The following analysis will model pricing in the energy market as a non-cooperative game 
in the case of two firms.620 This application of game theory enables the examination of the 
market equilibrium, given that any participant acts according to his self-interest. The basic 
                                                 
615 See chapter 1 section II. 
616 This fact has been established earlier in this chapter, see section II.1.c). 
617 Erich Kaufer, Industrieökonomik (München: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH, 1980), 8. 
618 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 1. 
619 So the criticism of former analyses by Axel Ockenfels, "Strombörse und Marktmacht," et Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 49, 54. 
620 For reasons of simplification, the analysis is restricted to the duopoly case, it could, however, be expanded 
to the case of n firms without changes in the results. See Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 448. 
Second Chapter: Strategies of Market Manipulation 
C. Economic Analysis of the German Energy Market 
115 
 
solution to strategic games is the so-called Nash-equilibrium: A combination of strate-
gies such that a firm cannot increase her profit by a change of strategy, given the strategic 
choices of the other firms considered.621 The final target is therefore to find the equilibrium 
solution, such that the following condition for the profit ∏i of firm i holds: 
πi(ai
*, aj
*) ≥ πi(ai , aj
*), 
with firm i (i = 1, 2) and the profit function ∏i(ai, aj), depending on the action ai of firm i 
and the action aj of its competitor. 
The model assumes price competition according to the Bertrand competition model. The 
strategic variable for the players´ decisions is therefore the price.622 This model fits the 
case of the power market well, since power as a good is perceived as fully homogenous 
by consumers, who therefore base their purchase decision solely on the lowest price of-
fered in the market.623 Furthermore, cost structure, efficiency of production and the char-
acteristics of the good power are assumed to be the same for both firms and remain 
unchanged.624 
 
II. The analysis of the energy market 
Market demand is D(pi) and is distributed between the two firms active in the market 
according to the specific demand functions which can be established as follows: 
D(p
1
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621 Ibid, 448. 
622 Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004), 95-96. 
623 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 456. 
624 Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004), 96. 
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The distribution of market demand between the two oligopoly firms active in the market 
therefore depends solely on the price set by each firm: Any price p higher than the com-
petitor´s price will result in the more expansive firm being driven out of the market (first 
row).625 By contrast, the firm setting its price lower than the competing firm will satisfy 
the whole of market demand (last row). If both firms price equally at p = p1 = p2, they 
will share the market each serving half of the customers due to the similarity assump-
tion.626 
 
1. The basic case of oligopolistic Bertrand competition 
In this basic case of oligopolistic competition, each firm needs to define its best 
response to the competitor´s action: If the profit ∏ of one firm ∏1(p1, p2) depends on the 
price p2 that has to be treated as given by firm 1, this firm has to choose its own price p1 
such that profit is maximized for any given p2.627 This best response function R1 there-
fore contains all profit-maximizing prices p1 for any given value of p2: 
p
1
*= R1 (p2) 
The same is, of course, true for the strategic choice of price of firm 2: 
p
2
*= R2 (p1) 
The intersection of the two best response functions reveals the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 
for the strategic game.628 Under the symmetry assumption and without production re-
strictions, the best response for both firms is to price equally: 
p = p1 = p2 
at their identical cost c, resulting in 
p = c.629 
                                                 
625 Ibid. 
626 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 456. 
627 Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004), 108. 
628 Ibid, 109. 
629 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 457-458. 
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This paradox result is due to the fact that any marginal price increase would drive the 
more expansive firm out of the market. Therefore, the best response functions intersect 
where c1 = c2 = p. In equilibrium, no incentive for excessive pricing would be identified.630 
 
2. A more realistic assumption: Capacity limits in production 
(The Bertrand-Edgeworth model) 
However, as the FCO established in its sector inquiry, a more realistic assumption 
for the German power market would be capacity limits in production for the firms in-
volved.631 This means that none of the firms individually can satisfy the whole of market 
demand at any time. In industrial organization, this situation is treated in the Bertrand-
Edgeworth model632: With Y1 being the production capacity of firm 1, this firm can only 
produce a quantity of power which satisfies the following condition: 
y1 ≤ Y1.633 
If market demand exceeds the production capacity of firm 1, a second supplier is needed 
to cover the remaining demand: 
D(p1) > Y1 and 
D(p2) = D(p1) – Y1. 
The individual demand functions of the two firms change as follows: 
D(p
1
) = {
D(p
2
) - Y2                     for p2 < p1
D(p)- y
2
                    for p
2
= p
1
= p
D(p
1
) = Y1                     for p1 < p2
 
D(p
2
) = {
D(p
1
) - Y1                     for p1 < p2
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                   for p
2
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1
= p
D(p
2
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In this situation, the firms have incentives to raise prices above the competitive level, 
because there is no danger of being driven out of the market as a result of marginal price 
                                                 
630 So-called Bertrand paradox, stating that a duopoly is sufficient to guarantee competitive pricing in a mar-
ket. See ibid, 458. 
631 The FCO presents data on the net production capacity, revealing that none of the four huge producers is 
able to satisfy the whole market demand. See Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeu-
gung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 90. 
632 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 459. 
633 Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004), 100. 
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increases any more.634 A certain share of the unsatisfied demand for power offered by the 
cheapest supplier will always be left to be satisfied by more expansive producers. As a 
result, p = p1 = p2 = c is no longer an equilibrium in this strategic game.635 Instead, firm 
2 may increase its profits by setting 
p2 > p1 = c, resulting in 
∏2 = (p2 – c) y2 > 0. 
The best response function of firm 2 therefore changes to 
R2(p1 = c) > p1. 
Since firm 1 anticipates the reasoning of firm 2, it will also set a price p1 deviating from 
its cost of production636: 
R1(p2 > c) ≤/≥ p2. 
Whether firm 1 will set its price equal to or marginally higher or lower than p2 cannot be 
decided without further assumptions on cost of production and market demand. Yet, it 
shows that with the existence of limited production capacity as can be observed in the 
German power market, profit-maximizing firms have an incentive to raise prices above 
their cost of production. 
 
3. Further improvements of the model through the assump-
tion of decreasing economies of scale 
A further constraint of pricing close to the marginal cost as found in the Bertrand 
competition model comes from increasing marginal cost of production: Decreasing econ-
omies of scale.637 Other than in the initial case, we assume the cost of production Ci(yi) to 
be increasing and convex: 
dCi
dy
i
>0  and 
d
2
Ci
dy
i
2
 ≥0.638 
                                                 
634 Ibid. 
635 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 459. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Ibid, 462. 
638 Ibid. 
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The assumption of increasing marginal cost of production is sensible in the case of elec-
tricity production, since it has been shown earlier in this work how increasing market 
demand influences the production technology used, requiring more expansive plants to be 
turned on at peak hours.639 This situation constitutes the more general case of capacity 
limits treated in the previous section: Offering a quantity Si(p) whose unit cost exceeds 
the price p charged in the market is not profitable for the supplier:640 
Si(p)= ỹ  with  p = 
dCi
dỹ
 . 
Therefore, the fact that economies of scale are decreasing comes across as a capacity 
limit, where marginal cost of production grows to infinity.641 As a result, firms face the 
same incentive to raise prices above marginal cost as described for capacity limits, since 
consumers all wanting to buy from the cheapest producer face a rationing of the good at 
the moment when the quantity demanded exceeds the profitable output level of the pro-
ducer: 
D(p) > Si(p).642 
Again, the residual demand will have to be satisfied by the operation of more expansive 
production technology respectively other suppliers, which is exactly the ratio of the merit 
order mechanism. In anticipation of these economic facts, producers have an incentive to 
price their production higher than at marginal cost to earn a profit from the price-cost 
difference: 
∏i = (pi – c) yi > 0. 
With the two restrictive assumptions discussed in this subsection and the preceding sub-
section 2, strong incentives for divergences from the competitive pricing level in the elec-
tricity market have been pointed out. The following subsection will shortly discuss factors 
that might, as opposed to the results of the model, still lead to competitive pricing. 
 
4. Conflicting incentives for producers 
In the light of the above model, one might ask why firms do not invest in an upgrade 
of their installed capacity either with regard to an expansion or an improved, more efficient 
                                                 
639 See first chapter, section D.II.3.a). 
640 Helmut Bester, Theorie der Industrieökonomik, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004), 99 Ref. 19. 
641 Jean Tirole, Industrieökonomik, 2nd ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 462. 
642 Ibid. 
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production technology. If, for example, one electricity producer was able to improve his 
installations such that they could serve a higher share of the customers at marginal cost 
of production, he could increase his market share to the detriment of his competitor. In 
the short run, however, none of the firms involved has an incentive to invest in their 
capacity in order to serve a higher share of the customers respectively improve their pro-
duction technology, because the investment is not covered by the profits earned.643 These 
are too low with regard to the tremendous investments necessary for the construction of 
new plants in the short run. But also in the medium term the incentive to increase pro-
duction capacity is rather weak: Firms anticipate that capacity enabling them to serve the 
whole market would result in a ruinous competition as outlined for the basic case of Ber-
trand price competition. Profits would be zero for all firms and firms would hence not earn 
a contribution margin to cover the fixed cost of the installation of new capacity.644 
Another factor possibly leading to divergences from the results found in the above Ber-
trand model variations of the power market might be seen in the antitrust legislation re-
stricting the free choice of prices by firms possessing market power. As outlined in the 
introductory chapter of this work, German and European competition law interdict exces-
sive pricing by dominant market participants.645 At this stage of the work, there shall be 
no detailed discussion of the deterrent effect of antitrust law on firm behavior, this analysis 
is the subject matter of the third and fourth chapter on legal corrections of the manipula-
tion incentives.646 Yet, this analysis is not necessary for the treatment of the incentive for 
excessive pricing, since firms do not have to declare their pricing strategy in public and 
thereby reveal their objectives towards the competition authorities. Instead, they find 
ways to cover behavior interdicted by law – e.g. by which is the very core of the example 
used in this work: retention of production capacity. 
The above analysis came to the conclusion that a price equaling the marginal cost of pro-
duction is not an equilibrium solution for the firms in the oligopolized German electricity 
market. Instead, prices exceeding the competitive level will probably be observed. The 
next section examines in more detail the scope of the price increases. 
 
                                                 
643 Ibid, 459. 
644 Ibid, 460. 
645 Please refer to the first chapter, section E.II.1. and 2. 
646 Refer to the third and fourth chapters of this work. 
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5. The withholding equilibrium 
This section will show a possible N-player Nash equilibrium with each power gener-
ator withholding capacity in order to increase individual profits. The analysis is based on 
a paper by Lave and Perekhodtsev looking at power generation in the California ISO area 
from 2001.647 
 
a) Assumptions of the Lave and Perekhodtsev model 
The analyzed N-player Nash equilibrium is found based on a continuous linear sym-
metric model. This model works with some simplifying assumptions as compared to real 
electricity markets:648 
▪ Completely inelastic industry demand is assumed, as well as 
▪ complete information of all market participants.649 
▪ Furthermore, for the generating firms continuous marginal cost of production is 
assumed instead of stepwise functions. This assumption permits the use of func-
tions in the model instead of multiple units. The simplification is justified in the 
case of power supply, since the average size of the units offered by a generator is 
negligible in comparison to its total supply.650 
▪ Finally, symmetry of the generating firms is assumed which helps to determine 
the Nash equilibrium and avoids accounts for capacity constraints of generators.651 
In order for the industry marginal cost to resemble the real one shown in the first chapter 
(merit order mechanism)652, increasing concave marginal cost functions for each generator 
are used, such that the marginal cost of a single generator will be 
p = 
dc
dx
 and 
with N being the total number of generators in the market, industry marginal cost will be 
                                                 
647 Lester B. Lave and Dmitri Perekhodtsev, “Capacity withholding equilibrium in wholesale electricity mar-
kets”, CEIC working paper CEIC-01-01. 
648 Ibid, 5-6. 
649 Ibid, 1. 
650 Ibid, 6. 
651 Ibid, 7. 
652 See the first chapter, section D.II.4.b) of this work. 
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dC
dX
 = 
dc
dx
N
. 
Accordingly, with D being the industry demand, the market-clearing price will be 
p  = 
dc
dD
N
. 
Therefore, each of the generators faces an equal demand share d of 
d = 
D
N
. 
 
b) Withholding Nash equilibrium 
The effect of withholding some inframarginal amount of capacity x by one of the 
generators, assuming that all the other generators´ behavior remains unchanged, results 
in a gap in supply: 
X – x < D. 
The residual demand has to be made up for by a shift of the vertical demand line to the 
right by the amount x, resulting in a higher market-clearing price.653 The individual de-
mand lines for each generator shift to the right by an amount x/N. Therefore, total demand 
for the generator who withheld capacity will change to 
dnew = dold - x + 
x
N
. 
The choice of the inframarginal unit of capacity to withhold depends on the marginal cost: 
It is most profitable for the generator to withdraw the most expansive inframarginal ca-
pacity, Δx. However, since the generator foresees the right shift of the demand line by 
Δx/N as a consequence of him withdrawing capacity, he would prefer to withdraw the 
formerly ultra marginal capacity Δx, which is, after the shift of the demand line, the most 
expansive inframarginal unit. Therefore, the generator withholds both: 
Δx and Δx(N – 1)/N.654 
                                                 
653 This is the ratio of the characteristic of physical capacity retention treated extensively at the beginning of 
this chapter. See section B.I. for details and a graphical analysis of the case. With regard to the model applied 
here, see Lester B. Lave and Dmitri Perekhodtsev, “Capacity withholding equilibrium in wholesale electricity 
markets”, CEIC working paper CEIC-01-01, 7. 
654 Ibid. 
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Assuming the generator reasoning this way, market price will increase by Δx/N. The extra 
profit (∏extra) earned from withholding the inframarginal capacity is 
πextra (∆x) = 
D - ∆x (N – 1)
N
 
∆x
N
, 
as opposed to a sacrificed profit (∏sac) of 
πsac (∆x) = 
∆x2 (N – 1)
2
2N2
. 
The total change in profit Δ∏ is therefore 
∆π = D 
∆x
N2
 - ∆x2
N - 1
N2
 - 
1
2
 ∆x2 
(N - 1)
2
N2
. 
This quadratic function has its maximum at 
∆x = 
D
N2- 1
.655 
This amount is hence being retended by producers. Having derived the optimal behavior 
for a single producer, we can now turn to the examination of a market equilibrium Δx* 
with all the agents withholding capacity Δx* and nobody wanting to deviate from this 
choice. It is assumed that N – 1 market participants already withheld the capacity Δx* in 
the way described above. The question becomes therefore, what would be the optimal 
capacity for the nth agent to withhold. 
Lave and Perekhodtsev show, that due to N – 1 agents each already having withhold Δx*, 
the industry demand line changed to 
D´ = D + Δx*(N – 1). 
Thus, the optimal amount to withdraw from the market for the nth agent is 
∆x = 
D + Δx*(N – 1)
N2- 1
.656 
                                                 
655 For the derivation of the profit functions, please refer to ibid, 8. The maximum of the quadratic profit func-
tion is found by calculating the first derivative of this function with regard to Δx, which is, after combining and 
rearranging terms, 
d∆π
d∆x
 = 
D + ∆x - ∆xN2
N2
, and equalizing it to zero. 
656 For the derivation of the profit functions, please refer to ibid, 9. 
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In order to find the withholding equilibrium for the market, Δx has to equal Δx*. The 
solution to the resulting equation in terms of Δx* delivers the amount of capacity being 
withhold by each generator in equilibrium: 
∆x* = 
D
N (N – 1)
.657 
Total withholding in the market is therefore 
∆X* = 
D
N - 1
.658 
As a result of the above analysis, Lave and Perekhodtsev find that for any demand D faced 
by the industry, the total withholding is D/(N – 1). Hence, the industry inverse supply 
function changes to 
p = 
X
N - 1
.659 
As compared to the competitive case where supply equals marginal cost (p = X/N), this 
means that “whatever the demand is, the resulting price will always be by N/(N – 1) higher 
in the case of linear marginal cost” if capacity is held back.660 
 
III. Insights from the Lave and Perekhodtsev study 
Lave and Perekhodtsev take the analysis even farther by departing from the conti-
nuity assumption and extending it to several case variations to the point of the asymmetric 
nonlinear marginal costs case.661 For the purpose of this work, however, the findings from 
the basic model are sufficient to prove the attractivity of capacity withholding in the energy 
wholesale market: 
(1) A withholding equilibrium to the benefit of producers in wholesale electricity markets 
is possible. 
                                                 
657 This solution is found by equalling Δx* to the above calculated Δx: ∆x* = 
D + ∆x* (N – 1)
N2- 1
. Summarizing and 
rearranging terms yields the equilibrium withholding for each generator. 
658 For the derivation of the profit functions, please refer to Lester B. Lave and Dmitri Perekhodtsev, “Capacity 
withholding equilibrium in wholesale electricity markets”, CEIC working paper CEIC-01-01, 9. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid, 10-14. 
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(2) The withholding equilibrium results in a price increase by N/(N – 1) to the detriment 
of consumers. 
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D. Previous efforts to prove manipulations 
The preceding section C. showed that – from an economic point of view – the reten-
tion of capacity was an attractive option for market participants during the time of the 
examination. This incentive scheme should however be changed by the legal system that 
deters manipulative behavior in the market by the threat of fines. This section will examine 
whether the threat of fines is credible in the current legal framework, assuming that only 
a sufficiently high sanction, combined with an adequate probability to actually be sanc-
tioned, may change the incentive scheme of market participants. For this purpose, past 
efforts of the European and German authorities to prosecute manipulations will be dis-
cussed. 
With regard to the suspicions of manipulations at the European Energy Exchange used as 
an example in this work, two approaches by once the European Commission in its sector 
inquiry from 2007 and the FCO in its 2011 sector inquiry have become known for their 
efforts to find substantial evidence for manipulative behavior by power sellers violating 
the antitrust laws. The following section I. will shortly introduce the central ideas of the 
two methods, but also point out the shortcomings. Thereafter, section II. will demonstrate 
past approaches to prove capital market law infringements at EPEX spot. As a result, it 
will be shown that none of the past strategies actually led to a proof of manipulations 
standing up in court (section III.). The current legal system does hence suffer from short-
comings in enforcement of the law. 
 
I. Previous approaches to prove antitrust manipulations 
1. The European Commission sector inquiry (2007) 
Based on the former Art. 82 TEC (now Art. 102 TFEU), the European Commission 
conducted a sector inquiry into the European gas and electricity sectors with a focus on 
the years 2002 to 2006.662 This inquiry came to the result that there was a substantial 
scope for excessive pricing at the EEX.663 
The European Commission bases its findings on several different analyses: 
                                                 
662 Commission of the European Communities, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report), SEC(2006) 1724. Accompanied by Commission of 
the European Communities, Commission staff working document, COM(2006) 851 final. 
663 Commission of the European Communities, Commission staff working document, COM(2006) 851 final, 146 
Ref. 436 and p. 150. 
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(1) The analysis of concentration in generation, mainly looking at ownership of pro-
duction assets, and the subsequent analysis of concentration in trade both in spot 
and forward trading serve the purpose of proving market power of the main 
sellers.664 
(2) Subsequent, the Commission analyses the scope for excessive pricing in the Eu-
ropean power markets. As a piece of evidence, the frequency of bids being the 
market clearing price in a certain hour is examined, as well as the frequency of 
bids in the close periphery of the market clearing price. 
(3) Eventually, the possibilities to withdraw capacity are assessed using a calculation 
of plant load factors and observations of plant retirements in the period of exam-
ination. 
The relevant approaches in proving capacity retentions named in (2) and (3) shall be 
examined further to see whether they are qualified to prove manipulations convincingly. 
The Commission acted on the assumption that the residual demand in the power market 
is supplied by a few or even just one operator.665 Accordingly, the examination of the 
operators´ price setting frequency was supposed to reveal all hours in which the “selling 
bid was equal to the clearing price”, resulting in a scope for excessive pricing.666 The data 
collected for the case of the EEX did reveal a large number of operators who were alter-
natively setting the clearing price with their bids. In fact, there were eight operators setting 
the clearing price in more than 5 percent of the hours examined.667 On the basis of this 
data, therefore, the Commission could not conclude that a single operator was influencing 
the spot market price at the EEX. 
In a second step, the European Commission examined which operators placed bids in a 
+/- 10 percent interval around the clearing quantity to identify “whether any operator 
offered more than 50 percent of the quantity in that interval.668 This analysis came to the 
result that at the EEX, concentration of bids around the clearing price increased rapidly in 
2005. The monthly average of “peak hours when the largest price setter controlled more 
than 50 percent of the offers of electricity offered at a price around the clearing price” 
                                                 
664 Ibid, 132 et sqq. The Commission does come to the conclusion that the market concentration allows for the 
exercise of market power, see e.g. Petra Linsmeier and Christian Hamman, “Die Ergebnisse der Sektorunter-
suchung Energie und die neue Energiepolitik in Europa: Konsequenzen für die Entflechtung”, et Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 93. 
665 Commission of the European Communities, Commission staff working document, COM(2006) 851 final, 142 
Ref. 428. 
666 Ibid, 143 Ref. 429. The period of examination covered each month of the year 2004 and the first eight 
months of the year 2005. 
667 Ibid, 144 Ref. 432. For the detailled data also in comparison with other European power exchanges, please 
refer to Table 20 on p. 144. 
668 Ibid, 145 Ref. 434. 
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jumped from 11 percent in 2004 to 25 percent in the first eight months of 2005. The same 
observation was made with regard to the monthly maximum, which increased from 25 per-
cent of the hours in 2004 to 52 percent in 2005.669 Therefore, the Commission suggested 
that the EEX might have become a platform for the optimization of peak plants. 
This analysis did however not permit inferences on actual capacity retention by power 
sellers. As the Commission pointed out itself in the report, this data only allowed for an 
assessment of the scope for manipulations, but not for conclusions whether the scope had 
actually been used.670 To verify possibilities to withdraw capacity, the Commission exam-
ined the level of utilization of power plants.671 For this purpose, so-called load factors of 
power plants owned by the main generators have been calculated. The load factor is de-
fined as follows:672 
Load Factor = 
Effective production of plant x
Maximal possible production of plant x
 
Throughout the period of investigation covering the years 2000, 2004 and the first tri-
mester of 2005, the Commission found an increase in the correlation between marginal 
costs of production and load factor of the plants. This observation was especially made for 
the load factors of low marginal cost plants in Germany.673 In addition, the Commission 
found a decrease of total generation capacity for the four main German operators between 
2000 and early 2005 despite slowly increasing demand.674 Based on these findings, the 
inquiry came to the result that a tighter supply/demand balance developed on the market, 
and especially plants with low marginal costs did not operate at their maximum at all 
times.675 However, also these results did not allow for definite conclusions on manipula-
tions. With respect to variations of the load factors of certain plants, the Commission 
acknowledged that e.g. cogeneration plants might have been run according to the need to 
                                                 
669 Ibid, 146 Ref. 436. For the detailled data on Europe´s exchanges please refer to table 21 in the EC report. 
670 Ibid,142 Ref. 428. 
671 Ibid, 146 Ref. 438. 
672 The following formula assumes that all other market terms remain equal and refers to the numbers of 
hours that the plant has been generating electricity during one production period. For the definition see ibid, 
147 Ref. 440. 
673 Ibid, 147 Ref. 442. 
674 Ibid, 149 Ref. 445. 
675 Ibid, 150 Ref. 448. Similar for exemplary weeks in the year 2006 Alfred Richmann and Annette Loske, 
"Gibt es strategisches Verhalten auf dem Strom-Spotmarkt?," et Vol. 57, no. 4 (2007), 9 et sqq. 
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produce heat instead of focusing in the power production.676 Furthermore, technical con-
straints, maintenance obligations, etc. might have falsified the results.677 Similarly, plant 
retirements might be explained by the age of the plant concerned.678 
Therefore, the European Commission sector inquiry did not succeed in providing substan-
tial evidence for actual manipulations by one of the established power sellers that could 
stand up in court. 
 
2. The FCO sector inquiry (2011) 
In its 2011 sector inquiry, the FCO chose a similar approach as the Commission to 
prove manipulations through capacity retention by the established firms. The authority 
collected data on marginal cost and operation of power plants for the sample period. Using 
an ad hoc designed algorithm qualified to identify the optimal operation mode for any 
generation unit from the data, a comparison with the actual operation mode of the gener-
ation units was rendered possible.679 Since the optimization was conducted from an ex 
post perspective without uncertainty, a certain tolerance with regard to deviations was 
taken account of, such that only “considerable reductions in plant operation in substantial 
time periods can be considered as valid indicators for abusive retention of power plant 
capacity”.680 
The FCO found 9.9 TWh of unused capacity during the sample period, whereupon in almost 
any hour examined at least 100 MWh of plant capacity were withdrawn, mainly from hard 
and brown coal plants (68 percent of all capacity not used).681 The authority therefore 
concluded that with the help of the optimization algorithm, some indications for the non-
operation of power plants on the part of the huge power generators could be found. The 
firms´ information with regard to technical restrictions and maintenance of plants, reveal-
ing an average outage of about a quarter of the time in the sample period, arouses further 
suspicion with regard to fair market behavior, since fringe suppliers did have considerable 
less outages.682 However, the evidence did not lead to the conclusion of actual abusive 
                                                 
676 Ibid, 147 Ref. 443. 
677 Ibid, 311 Ref. 998. 
678 Ibid, 149 Ref. 445. 
679 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 134. 
680 Ibid, 148. 
681 Ibid, 157. See also Peter Becker, “Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundes-
kartellamts: Ausgezeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen”, ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 118. 
682 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 210. 
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behavior in the market, since tolerable deviations in operation due to the ex post optimi-
zation model, as well as trade activities on the intraday market might disprove the find-
ings.683 
An appropriate proof for manipulative behavior that would result in the initiation of legal 
proceedings was therefore not part of the sector inquiry.684 The authority referred to a 
lack of data and resources to conduct even more complex analyses of market behavior.685 
 
3. Conclusion 
The above survey of former efforts to prove manipulations of the energy market has 
revealed serious impediments. In both cases, manipulations could not be proved in spite 
of serious suspicious facts.686 An expertise for the German Bundestag from 2011 came to 
the conclusion that calculations of optimal plant operation could not serve as reliable indi-
cators for manipulations due to lacking or non-verifiable data and the obligatory ex post 
perspective.687 The proof of manipulations would rather require detailed behavior-based 
analyses of the market, followed by a normative evaluation of the facts for which the data 
collected may only serve as an indicator.688 
The following section II. will show that also in the field of capital market law, efforts to 
prove manipulations were not successful. Thereafter, the findings are summarized and a 
brief outlook on the solution to the shortcomings in enforcement proposed in this work is 
given. 
 
                                                 
683 Ibid, 157-158. 
684 Fouquet, Dörte, Angela Seidenspinner, and Thomas Füller, “Kurzgutachten Wettbewerbs- und energiepoliti-
sche Lücken der Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung, Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes vom Januar 
2011”, 6. 
685 Peter Becker, “Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamts: Ausge-
zeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen”, ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 118. Federal Cartel Office, Sek-
toruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, N° B10-9/09, 160. 
686 Similar Konar, Wettbewerbskonforme Stromgroßhandelspreise: Eine Untersuchung über die Integrität und 
Transparenz des Energiegroßhandelsmarkts (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 61. 
687 Fouquet, Dörte, Angela Seidenspinner, and Thomas Füller, “Kurzgutachten Wettbewerbs- und energiepoliti-
sche Lücken der Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung, Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes vom Januar 
2011”, 11. 
688 Fouquet, Dörte, Angela Seidenspinner, and Thomas Füller, “Kurzgutachten Wettbewerbs- und energiepoliti-
sche Lücken der Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung, Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes vom Januar 
2011”, 11. 
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II. Previous approaches to prove capital market law 
infringements 
In the field of capital market law, much less effort has been made in the past years 
to pursue infringements of the WpHG or the European REMIT rules. In particular the BaFin 
did not pursue a single case referring to manipulations of the German power market.689 
This fact might be due to the view prevailing among German authorities that capital mar-
ket law was not applicable to manipulations at EPEX spot.690 However, there has been one 
exception to this view: The Public Prosecutor Leipzig has started criminal proceedings 
against E.ON in 2009.691 Yet, the proceedings were terminated due to a lack of sufficient 
grounds for suspicion.692 
Except from this initiative, there has been no further attempt to pursue manipulations of 
the energy exchange on the grounds of capital market law. 
 
III. Summary of previous approaches to prove 
manipulations 
While there has been quite a lot of effort and money spent for the prosecution of 
antitrust infringements related to the manipulation of the energy exchange, few attempts 
have been made in the field of capital market law. Yet, despite the efforts made in antitrust 
prosecution, the above analysis has shown that very little has been achieved so far. In 
spite of repeated strong suspicions during the period of examination and beyond, the 
prosecution of infringements of the antitrust and capital market laws at the EEX was not 
successful. It is hence likely, that the law suffers from shortcomings in enforcement – 
which might in consequence lead to a decline in deterrence and increase the market par-
ticipants´ incentives to engage in manipulations. 
                                                 
689 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 198. 
690 Inter alia Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 49 - Strom und Gas 2007: Wettbewerbsdefizite und 
zögerliche Regulierung, 2007, 61 Ref. 194. Also Jahn, "Zur Strafbarkeit von Manipulationen des Handels an der 
Strombörse EEX in Leipzig," ZNER Vol. 11, no. 4 (2008), 306. 
691 Michael Grassmann, "Angriff auf Stromkonzerne: Bundeskartellamt untersucht Preispolitik," Financial Times 
Deutschland Vol. (2009). 
692 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 198. 
Second Chapter: Strategies of Market Manipulation 
E. Summary 
132 
 
E. Summary of the Second Chapter 
The second chapter introduced the key conditions and data of the example used to 
illustrate the enforcement deficit in complex manipulation cases. Namely, the manipulation 
strategies observed at the energy exchange were examined from both an economic and a 
legal perspective. This interdisciplinary approach enabled a detailed analysis of the causes 
and effects of manipulative behavior. 
In section B. it was shown which economic preconditions must be fulfilled for manipulative 
behavior to be profitable for firms. In a second step, the legal relevance of the strategies 
described, especially in the field of antitrust legislation, was pointed out. The two elements 
of the antitrust offense were examined in depth: Based on data from the European Com-
mission sector inquiry dating back to 2007 and the more recent FCO sector inquiry from 
2011, market dominance of the power market during the period of examination reaching 
from 2002 to 2009 could be proved for the four huge German energy suppliers. With 
regard to the abuse element of the offense, however, this work came to the conclusion 
that former inquiries did not succeed in providing sufficient evidence for actual manipula-
tions that would have resulted in penalties. 
In order to examine whether market participants have incentives to manipulate, section 
C. conducted an in-depth economic analysis of the German power market, using the tools 
of industrial organization and game theory. This incentive-based approach revealed that 
a competitive outcome with market prices equaling marginal cost of production did not 
constitute an equilibrium in the oligopolized German power market during the examination 
period. Instead, prices above the competitive level were likely. The Lave and Perekhodtsev 
model on withholding equilibrium was introduced to show the scope of price increases. 
The incentives to manipulate may however be diminished or even be reduced to zero if 
market participants face a credible threat of punishments for infringements of the law. 
Antitrust and capital market laws are hence crucial legal instruments to take deterrent 
effect against manipulations. Section D. of this chapter therefore surveyed previous ap-
proaches chosen by European and German antitrust authorities to prosecute suspicious 
behavior and deliver convincing proof of manipulations. As a result, this work found none 
of the authorities’ efforts to have been successful in the prosecution of manipulations. 
In the light of manipulations being attractive to market participants in the absence of 
effective regulatory deterrence (section C.), one must hence conclude that the energy 
market during the period of examination did provide huge incentives for infringements of 
the law. As the analysis, namely in section B. of this chapter, has shown, the regulatory 
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weaknesses do not originate from a lack of rules that interdict market manipulations. Both, 
antitrust and capital market laws contain a number of prohibitions that cover the manip-
ulation strategies examined. However, there is a serious lack of enforcement due to the 
complex structure of the power industry and the exchange environment: For authorities, 
it is often not possible to distinguish between legal optimization of the power plant parc of 
an operator and illegal manipulation of the market. These insecurities led to an expected 
sanction for manipulators close to zero during the period of examination. There was hence 
almost no deterrent effect of the law that would have had any behavioral impact on market 
participants. 
The following chapters will therefore discuss regulatory measures that are suited to elim-
inate the shortcomings in enforcement in manipulation cases. Namely, a deterrence ap-
proach that has a preventive behavioral effect on market participants will be introduced 
to close the enforcement gap. 
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THIRD CHAPTER: 
IMPROVED PUBLIC MARKET SURVEILLANCE 
 
A. Introduction 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either 
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law 
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to 
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”693 
Based on the findings from the preceding chapters, that revealed severe shortcomings in 
enforcement of infringements of antitrust and capital market manipulation bans, this sec-
tion will focus on a positive analysis of the current sanctioning system with regard to fines 
(section I) and the probability of punishment (section II). This analysis will reveal an in-
sufficient level of deterrence that is not suited to fill the enforcement gap. 
Subsequently, a normative analysis is conducted, aiming at the introduction of a system 
of public market surveillance that combines fines and the probability of fining in an 
optimal way to reach a preventive behavioral effect on market participants and success-
fully deter market manipulations. The measures being discussed in this work are: 
▪ A change of paradigm in the public market surveillance that turns from excessive 
fines to an increased probability of prosecution of infringements, combined with 
non-monetary sanctions for infringements of the law (this chapter). 
▪ Tightened public surveillance might be accompanied by incentives for private ac-
tors, e.g. the aggrieved parties or competitors, to claim damages from the in-
fringer (next chapter). 
This chapter will examine the public market surveillance measures named for their suita-
bility to solve the problem with regard to economic, legal and political criteria. It will be 
shown that there is a necessity for a coordination of capital market law and antitrust en-
forcement on the one hand and public and private activities on the other hand. This results 
                                                 
693 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen & Co., 
Ltd., 1776). 
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in the claim for an integrated legal system of public and private enforcement intro-
duced in the fifth chapter. 
The following section B. begins with an introduction on the economic theory of optimal 
sanctions. Thereafter, the positive and normative analysis of the EU and German system 
are conducted for capital market law and antitrust enforcement. 
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B. Public Market Surveillance 
Governments traditionally deter infringements of the law by the threat of sanc-
tions.694 In the case of exchange manipulations, both capital market and antitrust 
laws contain sanctions for manipulations of the market outcome.695 In antitrust, ap-
proaches focusing on the economic rationale of legal rules to increase social welfare have 
long been discussed under the header of the more-economic approach.696 Accordingly, 
sanctions – also in capital market law – are subject to efficiency considerations. 
Gary Becker and William Landes proposed an internalization approach aiming at a fine 
equaling the damage done to third parties by the infringer, such that costs and benefits 
from the offense are borne by the firm.697 This approach does however overlook the very 
purpose of antitrust law to deter violations from happening and not just make them costly 
to the infringer.698 Furthermore, the practical application is very difficult in the case of 
internalization: The harm done to third parties has to be quantified in complex procedures, 
including both the transfer and the deadweight loss.699 The deterrence approach avoids 
the quantification of the harm done to the parties and solely focuses on the expected gain 
of the infringer. For fines to be efficient under this approach, they need to equal the ex-
pected gain from the manipulative practice from the point of view of a firm having to 
decide whether to engage in manipulative practices or not.700 As a result, the firm shall 
become indifferent between obeying the law and manipulating, because the expected 
value of the illegal behavior equals zero.701 
The expected gain is easily identified as the change in profits due to the adaptation of a 
manipulation strategy (). With regard to the expected damage for the firm, we have to 
distinguish two factors: 
                                                 
694 First examined from an economic viewpoint by Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76 no. 2 (1968). 
695 See the second chapter in section B.II. for the legal classification of capacity retention. 
696 Basic thoughts on the methodology of the more economic approach in antitrust may be found in Rainer P. 
Lademann, “Zur Methodologie des more economic approach im Kartellrecht”, in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbew-
erb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias 
Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 381. 
697 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 169. Also William M. Landes, “Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations”, The University of Chi-
cago Law Review Vol. 50, no. 2 (1983), 652. 
698 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
13. 
699 Ibid, 14. 
700 Ibid, 12. Also refer to Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und 
Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and 
Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 436. 
701 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 5, 7. 
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(1) The cost to the firm from the detection (CD) – this is namely administrative fines 
determined by the FCO, 
(2) and the probability of punishment (pP(e)), composed of the probability of detection 
of a crime and the enforcement of the existing laws, both dependent on the efforts 
(e) of the prosecutors. 
Interest should also be included in the considerations to compensate for the delay between 
the point in time when the gain from the manipulation is realized and the point in time at 
which the fine is due.702 For reasons of clarity of thought, however, this aspect is disre-
garded here. This constraint does certainly not falsify the result of the analysis of manip-
ulation deterrents pursued in this work.  
Based on the preceding considerations, we get for the expected damage (DE)703: 
DE = pP(e) . CD. 
To comply with the initially introduced equality condition, we write: 
 = DE or 
 = pP(e) . CD, 
meaning that the change in profit equals the expected damage. It is important to note, 
that the optimal fine would have to refer to the subjective estimates the infringer is holding 
when contemplating a violation of the law.704 This subjective perspective on the gain and 
the expected damage from the antitrust violation is due to lacking information and the 
overconfidence bias of decision makers. People tend to overestimate the probability and 
amount of positive events, as well as underestimate it for bad things happening.705 The 
reference of fines to objectively calculated values for the expected gain and expected 
damage would therefore lead to underdeterrence of manipulations. Since, however, only 
objective values for the probability and the cost may be observed, this work will refer to 
those and recommend the implementation of slightly higher values for the variables in 
practice to cope with the biases named. 
                                                 
702 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
12. 
703 For the case of antitrust violations with a probability of apprehension and conviction smaller than 1 and 
positive enforcement costs see the seminal work of William M. Landes, “Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Viola-
tions”, The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 50, no. 2 (1983), 657. See also ibid, 12. 
704 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
15. 
705 Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, “Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assump-
tion from Law and Economics”, California Law Review Vol. 88, no. 4 (2000), 1085-1090. 
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The two parameters to be optimized by government policy with regard to the above con-
siderations can be deducted directly from the equation: 
▪ The cost in the event of detection CD can be varied, and 
▪ the probability of punishment depending on prosecution efforts pP(e) may be 
adapted to meet the intended level of deterrence.706 
Which of the parameters is varied depends predominantly on the cost C any adjustment 
induces. Any measure adopted is affiliated with a cost C(e) depending on the efforts the 
regulatory change induces, which has to be subtracted from the welfare gain effective 
deterrence of manipulations creates.707 Hence, 100 percent prevention of manipulations is 
unlikely to be the social optimum.708 For reason of welfare maximization, the parameter 
affiliated with the lowest cost should be varied preferably. However, there are limits to the 
maximum punishment for firms CD as well as to the efficiency of measures increasing the 
probability of punishment pP(e). The following analysis will therefore examine variations 
of both parameters, using the example of the German power market under economic (II. 
and III.) and legal (IV.) aspects. Beforehand, the necessary level of deterrence is defined. 
 
I. Determining the necessary level of deterrence 
Since the optimal values deduced for pP or CD depend on the level of deterrence  
that is needed, this variable has to be defined in a first step. Thereafter, optimal values 
for CD and pP are derived. This analysis is however limited to an objective determination 
of the variables, with the weakness pointed out in the preceding section. It is still consid-
ered useful to serve as a general guidance for fixing fines in practice.709 
In the introductory chapter, profit has been defined as the difference between a com-
pany´s revenue and cost of production.710 The level of deterrence  can therefore be 
understood as the change in revenue R and cost C due to a change in output: 
                                                 
706Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold, and Joseph G. Sidak, "The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 89, no. 3 (1981), 431, 433-434. More generally Gary S. Becker, “Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, no. 2 (1968), 204. 
707 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 174. For the case of antitrust sanctions see Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory 
and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 17. 
708 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 9. 
709 Ibid, 31. 
710 Please refer to the first chapter, section D.I.2 for the detailled derivation. 
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 = R - C.711 
This work does not aim at the exact numbering of extra profits possibly gained through 
manipulative tactics. With the exemplary data at hand, any attempt to condense the var-
ious influences to a precise statement of the profit increases would be doomed to failure. 
This is due to the numerous simplifying assumptions made in the model with regard to 
symmetry of the operating firms and linearity of costs on the one hand.712 On the other 
hand, oligopolists might not have been able to reach the optimal level of retention because 
of already existing threats of punishment.713 Any deviation from this optimum, however, 
would also have influenced the change in profits from manipulations . Eventually, the 
mere fact that not 100 percent of the market were controlled by the oligopoly714 and other 
influences like a changing market demand influenced the results deducted from the model. 
Notwithstanding, an example value will be computed on the basis of market demand for 
the year 2015. This number will serve as an approximation to the necessary level of de-
terrence  for the example of the power exchange. It does not claim accuracy and only 
serves the purpose of illustration of the theoretical scope for manipulations. 
We know from the analysis of a possible withholding equilibrium in the second chapter715 
of this work that there exists a Nash equilibrium that maximizes individual profits of power 
generators operating in an oligopolized market environment. The optimal withholding for 
a single firm amounts to 
∆x* = 
D
N (N - 1)
,716 
or for the case at hand with four oligopoly firms (N = 4), 
∆x* = 
D
12
. 
The last unknown variable left to be determined is therefore market demand D. Data on 
market demand is publicly available from the German Federal Association of the Energy 
and Water Industry (Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft, BDEW). For 
                                                 
711 Lester B. Lave and Dmitri Perekhodtsev, “Capacity withholding equilibrium in wholesale electricity mar-
kets”, CEIC working paper CEIC-01-01, 10. 
712 Ibid, 1, 6. 
713 Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold and Joseph G. Sidak, “The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement”, 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 89, no. 3 (1981), 429 et sqq. 
714 The available data for the years 2007 to 2009 suggests a combined market share of the oligopoly of about 
80 percent in the production market, see the second chapter, section B.II.1.c) of this work. 
715 See B.II.5.b) of this work. 
716 Lester B. Lave and Dmitri Perekhodtsev, “Capacity withholding equilibrium in wholesale electricity mar-
kets”, CEIC working paper CEIC-01-01, 9. 
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2015, the association calculated a gross total demand for power of 548 million MWh per 
year.717 Since the market share of the oligopoly only amounted to 62 percent of this sum, 
for the following exemplary calculation a value of 340 million MWh corresponding to this 
market share will be assumed. 
The optimal withholding for the four oligopoly firms then amounts to 
Δx* ≈ 28 million MWh. 
The estimations based on the Lave and Perekhodtsev model hence reveal a huge quantity 
of power potentially subject to withholding. The following analysis will therefore establish 
a corresponding level of deterrence. 
 
II. The optimal value for government fines CD 
In determining the optimal value for CD and successfully deter manipulations at the 
energy exchange, the government has two main parameters to set: 
▪ The amount of criminal and civil sanctions by the government (DG),718 and 
▪ the framework that determines the scope for damages claimed by injured parties 
(DP). 
The sum of both values adds up to the cost of detection CD:  
CD = DG + DP. 
The increase of criminal and civil sanctions does not entail huge financial efforts for the 
government as compared to any measure connected with the increase of the probability 
of punishment pP(e):719 
C (eCD) < C (epP). 
                                                 
717 BDEW-Schnellstatistikerhebung from August 15, 2016, available online on https://www.bdew.de/inter-
net.nsf/id/FD436AB109EDA397C1257F65003175A0/$file/Stromverbrauch%20Ver-
gleich%202015_2016%20online_o_quartalsweise_Ki_15082016.pdf. 
718 Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold and Joseph G. Sidak, “The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement”, 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 89, no. 3 (1981), 430-431. 
719 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 180. 
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For the case of public fines, the social cost is even close to zero, since it is a simple transfer 
payment from the offenders to the government.720 An increase of the probability of pun-
ishment does however entail a significant administrative cost including cost borne by the 
competition authorities and courts, but also costs of lawyers and experts borne by the 
companies concerned.721 From an efficiency perspective, the variable CD should therefore 
be maximized in order to deter manipulative behavior at minimum cost.722 
In the following considerations, the focus lies on criminal and civil sanctions imposed by 
public institutions DG. The damages claimed by injured parties DP will be treated separately 
in the following chapter 4.723 Therefore, DP is held constant in the following analysis: 
DP = D̅P. 
The examination starts with the definition of the relevant baseline scenario under the ex-
isting legal rules in both the EU and Germany and then turns to a critical review of the 
success of the existing legal framework. 
 
1. The baseline scenario: The current level of public fines in 
European and German law 
It is important to note that, other than for the most part of economic models focusing 
on one singular field of law,724 DG is assumed to be the total damages an infringing firm 
faces with fines and damages having their basis in both capital market (DM) and antitrust 
law (DA).725 Both fines add up to 
DG = DM + DA. 
In the following sections, the respective levels of fines are elaborated for antitrust (a) and 
capital market law (b). 
 
                                                 
720 The cost of collection of fines does of course have to be added. See ibid, 180. 
721 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
17. 
722 For the case of cartel deterrence see Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, 
Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 4. Also ibid, 17. 
723 See the third Chapter section D of this work. 
724 See e.g. Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 
(2006), 4. The author explicitly limits its analysis to corporate fines, which excludes fines on individuals, im-
prisonment and also private damages. 
725 Refer to the first chapter of this work, sections II.1.c), II.2.c) and III. 2.c). 
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a) Fines for antitrust infringements DA 
Both, the European Commission and the German FCO have published guidelines on 
the method of setting fines in cases of antitrust infringements in 2006. From these docu-
ments, the current level of public fines DA will be deducted as a baseline scenario in order 
to draw conclusions on the appropriate amounts of these fines in the following analysis. 
Other sanctions, especially nonmonetary punishments for infringements of the law (e.g. 
prison sentences or occupational bans for offenders), are not part of the European rules.726 
 
aa) The European Commission guidelines on fines for antitrust 
infringements 
As already pointed out above, the European Union may impose fines to sanction 
manipulations of powerful undertakings, Article 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003.727 The 
guidelines of the European Commission on fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) 
of Regulation N° 1/2003 were first published in 1998 and further refined in 2006.728 The 
explicit target is sufficient deterrence in specific cases to sanction undertakings concerned 
with infringements and general deterrence in order to keep other undertakings from en-
gaging in behavior contrary to the EC Treaty.729 The fine is imposed on the undertaking, 
individual fines for the acting management are not part of the EU guidelines.730 
The relevant basis for setting fines comprises three variables: 
▪ “The value of the sales of goods or services to which the infringement relates” (N° 
5), 
▪ the duration of the infringement in years as “a proxy to reflect the economic im-
portance of the infringement as well as the relative weight of each undertaking in 
the infringement” (N° 6), and 
▪ “A specific amount irrespective of the duration of the infringement, in order to 
deter companies from even entering into illegal practices” (N° 7). 
                                                 
726 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 23. 
727 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 898 Ref. 5. 
728 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal from September 1, 2006. N° C 210, 2-5. 
729 Ibid, 2 N° 4. 
730 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 23. See also Martin Klusmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 1917 Ref. 31. 
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For each infringement, a basic amount of the fine is determined in a first step.731 Basically, 
the value of sales of an undertaking is calculated using the best available figures (N° 
15) during the last full business year of the undertaking´s participation in the infringement 
(N° 13) before value added tax (VAT) and other taxes directly related to sales (N° 17).732 
To calculate the basic amount of the fine, a proportion of the value of sales will be set 
depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement and multiplied by the number of 
years of the infringement (N° 19).733 Finally, the so-called “entry fee”, a sum of between 
15 percent and 25 percent of the value of sales will be added to the basic amount in order 
to deter undertakings from entering in infringing practices (N° 25). Clearly laid out, the 
European Commission calculates this basic fine according to the following formula: 
DA = α . dy [(p . x) – T]    +    β . [(p . x) – T], 
 
         Specific deterrence       General deterrence 
     (Sanction)  
where T is the amount of taxes subtracted from the value of sales, dy the duration of the 
infringement in years, α the relevant multiplier defining the gravity of the individual in-
fringement and β the multiplier for the general deterrence element. The domain for the 
gravity multiplier in the equation ranges from 0 to 0,3 (N° 21). Hence, depending on the 
circumstances of the case gravity (α) may be assessed up to a level of 30 percent of the 
value of sales734 and general deterrence (β) has a domain from 0 to 0,25735. 
In a second step, potential adjustments to the basic amount are assessed, taking account 
of all the relevant circumstances in each individual case that might either increase (N° 28) 
or decrease (N° 29) the basic amount determined before.736 
Finally, N° 32 of the Commission´s guidelines sets a legal maximum amount for the total 
fine that shall not exceed 10 percent of the total turnover in the preceding business year 
                                                 
731 Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 472. 
732 Ibid, 474. 
733 For details on the graivity factor see ibid, 473-474. 
734 The European Commission names a number of factors that influence the assessement of gravity such as 
the nature of the infringement, the combined market share of all the undertakings concerned, the geographic 
scope of the infringement and whether or not the infringement has been implemented. See European Commis-
sion, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
Official Journal from September 1, 2006. N° C 210, 3 N° 22. 
735 In case of hardcore cartels, markups of 15 percent to 25 percent are mandatory in the guidelines, however, 
for the case of other infringements, the Commission has a margin of discretion including also the choice of a 
zero markup. See ibid, 3 N° 25. 
736 Ibid, 3 N° 27. See also Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, 
WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 472. 
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of the undertaking.737 Furthermore, N° 35 contains a provision for cases where the fine 
imposed on an undertaking exceeds the ability of this firm to pay from an objective point 
of view.738 
All things considered, the European guidelines for the determination of the amount of the 
public punishment DG do therefore not satisfy the above-defined condition for the optimal 
level of deterrence.739 First, the guidelines are ignorant of the subjective view decision 
makers in a firm have on the expected gain, fines and the probability of punishment. This 
imprecision leads to inaccurate calculations of fines for violations. Furthermore, the influ-
ence of the probability of punishment pP(e) on the level of deterrence is not part of the 
calculation method in the guidelines. Therefore, DG might be set too high or too low as 
compared to the above-described optimality condition. Third, the Commission´s consider-
ations solely discuss DG, where the total cost from detection CD to the infringer is the sum 
of public and private damages DP.740 Yet, the ignorance of the cost to be expected from 
private damage claims741 does reinforce the presumption that the EC values for DG might 
exceed the efficient level and therefore cause unnecessary cost to society.742 The exami-
nation of past experience with the EC guidelines (subsection (2)) following the discussion 
of the FCO standards will reinforce this observation. 
 
bb) The German FCO guidelines on fines for antitrust infringements 
Also in Germany, the general rule for public fines in Sec. 81(4) GWB743 has been 
concretized with the help of administrative principles.744 These German FCO guidelines 
on the determination of fines, imposed pursuant to Sec. 81(7) GWB745 date also to 2013 
                                                 
737 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 4. 
738 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1239. 
739 See section C.III. of this chapter of this work. 
740 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 9.  
741 Also for the purpose of this analysis, DP has been held constant, yet will be considered in section D. of this 
chapter as part of the total damages to be paid by an undertaking CD being held liable for manipulative behav-
ior. 
742 Already before the introduction of the 2006 guidelines, sanctions in the EU ranked among the highest in 
the world and were supposed to further rise with the introduction of the 2006 guidelines. See e.g. Felix Engel-
sing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 470, 482. 
743 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1032 Ref. 83. 
744 Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift 
zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 430. 
745 Federal Cartel Office, Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren, 2013. 
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and resemble the EC guidelines in methods and contents.746 In Germany, other than under 
the EU guidelines, fines for individual actors according to Sec. 9 OWiG are possible for 
authorized representatives of an undertaking.747 The circle of offenders is further extended 
to individuals with supervision obligations, Sec. 130 OWiG.748  
The individualized fine is dependent on the type of antitrust infringement. The maximum 
fine is only exhausted for hardcore cartels and not in manipulation cases.749 The calculation 
is based on two steps. First, a basic amount of the fine depending on gravity and duration 
as well as the potential damage done with the infringement is determined.750 A multipli-
cator applies to take account of the individual firm´s size (N° 13). The second step is, in 
line with the EC guidelines, optional adjustments to the basic amount. These may be in-
creasing factors like the 100 percent markup for the purpose of deterrence or aggravating 
circumstances (N° 16), but also factors that decrease the fine.751 
Also according to the German guidelines, the calculated fine is fixed upwards at 10 percent 
of the total turnover in the preceding business year (N° 8). In case of a fine exceeding the 
financial capacity of a firm also in the long term, the FCO may reduce the amount. 
A synopsis of the German guidelines comes to the same conclusions as for the EC provi-
sions above: A pinpoint determination of the optimal value for DG cannot be achieved. 
Also, the resulting fines tend to be unduly high with an upward trend.752 The following 
subsection (2) will present empirical evidence on the practical experience with the EC and 
FCO method of setting antitrust fines. 
 
cc) Experience with the baseline scenario for DA 
In the past decades, fines for antitrust infringements have risen dramatically in the 
European Union.753 Data for the years 1990-2009 shows how the EU total of corporate 
                                                 
746 With regard to the predecessor from 2006 Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommis-
sion von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 470, 471. See also Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des Bun-
deskartellamtes”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 458, 469. 
747 Martin Klusmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1916-1917 Ref. 31-32. See also Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des Bundeskartellamtes”, WuW 
Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 466. 
748 Martin Klusmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1917 Ref. 33 et sqq. 
749 Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des Bundeskartellamtes”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 460. 
750 Federal Cartel Office, Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren, 2013, 
Ref. 2, 9. 
751 A detailled description of the adjustment factors may be found in Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des 
Bundeskartellamtes”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 462 et sqq. 
752 Ibid, 461. 
753 Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift 
zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-
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fines collected in a five-year period rose from 344 Million Euro between 1990 and 1994 to 
almost 10 Billion Euro between 2005 and 2009, which is almost 27 times the amount 
collected in the base period.754 The following figure illustrates this trend: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: EU Total Corporate Fines 1990-2009 
Also, the highest individual fines imposed by the European Commission have risen consid-
erably, especially since the introduction of the guidelines in 1998.755 In the case of the 
vitamine cartel756 from 2001, a fine of altogether 855,23 Million Euro has been imposed. 
In the same year, a 313,69 Million Euro fine was imposed in the case “Carbonless Paper”757 
and another 218,8 Million Euro fine in the case “Graphit electrodes”.758 
In Germany, the total amount of corporate fines collected increased by about four times 
the baseline level in the 2005 to 2009 period.759 Also, fines for individual companies have 
reached tremendous amounts, as is tellingly illustrated by the case of Microsoft760. 
                                                 
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 431. See also Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, 
Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 4. Also Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang 
Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals 
for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 8-12. 
754 An almost as big increase can be shown for the EU average corporate fines in the same time period. See  
Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 
(2010), 11. 
755 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 203. See 
also Thomas Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 
2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 219, 228, 232. 
756 European Commission, decision from November 21, 2001. COMP/37.512 “Vitamin cartels”. 
757 European Commission, decision from December 20, 2001. COMP/36.212 “Carbonless Paper”. 
758 European Commission, decision from July 18, 2001. EU Official Journal 2002 L 100, 1. “Graphit electrodes”. 
759 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1236. 
760 Microsoft v Commission. Case T-201/04. European Court of First Instance 2007. 
344 271
3,174
9,755
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1990-04 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
Fi
n
e
s 
in
 €
 M
ill
io
n
EU Total Corporate Fines 1990-2009
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
147 
 
With regard to the above criticism in the EC and FCO approach to the determination of the 
optimal public fine DG, however, it can be doubted whether the ever-increasing fines on 
the national and European level establish an efficient level of deterrence.761 The mere fact 
that violations continue to be detected should not serve as an argument to raise the level 
of fines endlessly. With regard to the social optimum of deterrence being smaller than 1, 
a certain number of manipulations will constantly be observed.762 
The amount of fines CD is after all limited by the profits () and the assets (A) of the 
individual firm. For any firm i, the following liability condition does therefore have to be 
fulfilled: 
CD ≤ πi(p) + Ai. 
Penalties causing the infringing firm´s bankruptcy do not have a deterrent effect for the 
parties involved beyond this barrier.763 Furthermore, the bankruptcy of a firm entails high 
social costs for employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and tax authorities.764 Even if 
bankruptcy is avoided through an ex post reduction of the fine, the ex-ante threat of high 
fines leads to excessive expenditures in the fields of corporate monitoring and compliance, 
which will be passed on to end-customers and cause inefficiencies.765 
As a consequence, legislators have to link sanctions to the firms´ assets and cannot in-
crease the fines endlessly. Eventually, empirical evidence suggests that ever-increasing 
fines do not even have a deterrent effect on antitrust infringements: According to 
the statistics introduced above, both the EU and Germany have been increasing corporate 
fines since the 1990s, yet contrary to the expectations the number of cartel cases did not 
                                                 
761 A divergent view is hold by Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und 
Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and 
Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 432. 
762 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
16. 
763 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1238. See also Bernd Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus 
deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für 
Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Bernd Schünemann and Carlos Suarez Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 
290. The EC and FCO guidelines take account of this fact through the ability to pay provisions introduced 
above. 
764 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
19. 
765 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 5. 
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decrease.766 Especially high values of recidivism imply that deterrence based on increasing 
sanctions is not fit to curtail manipulative practices in the market.767 
The opposite is true: Undertakings are being overcharged with the financial burden from 
public fines768, not yet including private damage claims and fines in other jurisdictions.769 
High transaction costs arise from the complicated system of rules to set fines with their 
many exemptions and proceedings taking an average of more than four years to be con-
cluded.770 In summary, the available data suggests that the current strategy to constantly 
increase antitrust fines does fail to work effectively and meet the target to deter infringe-
ments of the law.771 As well, it falls short of working efficiently since it causes unnecessary 
cost to society through the increase of transaction costs for firms and authorities. 
In conclusion, for the public fines from antitrust infringements DA the following relation 
already mentioned above must be noted: 
DA = α . dy [(p . x) – T]    +    β . [(p . x) – T], where 
DA ≤ 0,1 . (p . x), 
hence a maximum damage to the firm from publicly imposed antitrust fines of 10 percent 
of the total turnover in the preceding business year.772 
Therefore results 
α . dy [(p . x) – T] + β . [(p . x) – T]  ≤  0,1 . (p . x). 
DA hence depends on a number of variables but does not refer to the economic optimum 
derived above:  = R - C. 
                                                 
766 Ibid, 10-12. 
767 John M. Connor and C. Gustav Helmers, “Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005”, 
American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01, 38. Earlier studies do also find prove for repeated of-
fense, see for example Richard A. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of Law and 
Economics Vol. 13, no. 2 (1970), 394-395.  
768 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1239. 
769 Meinrad Dreher, "Kartellrechtscompliance. Voraussetzungen und Rechtsfolgen unternehmens- oder 
verbandsinterner Maßnahmen zur Einhaltung des Kartellrechts," ZWeR Vol. 2, no. 1 (2004), 76. Refer also to 
Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1238. 
770 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, WuW 
Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1238. 
771 Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in Bausteine 
des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 289. The author points out the necessity to install efficient 
control mechanisms. 
772 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, "Antitrust Sanctions," Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 4. 
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The next subsection b) will describe the baseline situation with regard to fines in capital 
market law both in Europe and Germany, before section c) concludes on the current level 
of government fines. 
 
b) Fines for market manipulation DM 
Since section B.III. of the second chapter has shown that market manipulation at 
EPEX spot may also be subsumed under German capital market law (during the period of 
examination the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG in conjunction with 
Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV) and European energy capital market law (Art. 5, 2(2) REMIT and 
Sec. 95 EnWG),773 firms engaging in such illegal practices might also be charged a (public) 
fine on the grounds of capital market law. This section will elaborate the scope of these 
fines and their relationship to the antitrust fines presented above in order to obtain the 
overall amount of public fines charged for market manipulations DG. 
In German capital market law, Sec. 39 WpHG contains the legal consequences for 
WpHG infringements. Sec. 39(1) N° 1 WpHG qualified infringements of Sec. 20a(1) first 
sentence N° 2 WpHG in conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV as administrative of-
fenses.774 Also information based manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 1 WpHG) 
and other manipulations (Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 WpHG) were classified as ad-
ministrative offenses during the period of examination, Sec. 39(2) N° 11 WpHG and 
Sec. 39(1) N° 2 WpHG.775 Today, Sec. 39(3d) N° 2 WpHG contains the qualification of 
MAR infringements as administrative offences. Sec. 39(4a) first sentence WpHG imposes 
a penalty of up to 5 million Euro for any of these manipulations for individuals and a 
maximum of 15 million Euro respectively 15 percent of the yearly turnover for legal enti-
ties. The actual fine depends on several factors including the profession of the offender, 
the timing of the manipulation with regard to price formation, and the monitoring mecha-
nisms that have been deceived by the offender, Sec. 17(3) OWiG.776 This fine may be 
addressed not only to individuals,777 but also to legal entities according to Sec. 30 OWiG.778 
                                                 
773 See second chapter, section B.III.1. on European law and 2. on German law for a detailed discussion. 
774 Ulrich Sorgenfrei, in Kapitalmarktstrafrecht: Handkommentar, ed. Tido Park, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2008), 371 Ref. 231. 
775 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), § 39 Ref. 6. 
776 Sorgenfrei, in Kapitalmarktstrafrecht: Handkommentar, ed. Park, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 
375 Ref. 243. 
777 The influence of individual fines on the deterrent effect of the law will be discussed in section B.IV.1. b) aa) 
of the fourth chapter and will therefore not be deepened here. See chapter four, section B.IV.1.b) aa) of this 
work. 
778 Daniel Zimmer and Matthias Cloppenburg, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Eberhard Schwark and 
Daniel Zimmer, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2010), § 39 Ref. 3. 
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In conclusion, the damage from the detection of market manipulations to the firm in 
German capital market law is therefore: 
DM ≤ 0,15 . (p . x), if 
0,15 . (p . x) > 15 Mio. €. 
In European capital market law, legal consequences for infringements of the REMIT 
provisions are laid down in the German EnWG code: Sec. 95(1b) and (1c) N° 6 EnWG 
qualify infringements of Art. 5, 2(2) REMIT as administrative offenses. The fine for all 
manipulation alternatives reaches up to 1 million Euro plus three times the additional sur-
plus earned through the manipulative practice, Sec. 95(2) first sentence EnWG.779 This 
fine is, other than in German capital market law, addressed to firms rather than individu-
als. Hence, the value for DM changes to the following amount if European REMIT provisions 
are included in the accounts: 
DM = 0,15 . (p . x) + 1 mio. + δ . [(p** . x) - (p . x)], 
where δ is the factor for the levy of additional revenues reaching from 0 to 3 and the term 
[(p** . x) - (p . x)] the additional revenue, which may be estimated by the regulator, 
Sec. 95(2) second sentence EnWG. 
 
c) Conclusion on the current level for public fines DG 
In conclusion, therefore, the total amount of public fines DG for firms engaging in 
capacity retention needs to be summed up from antitrust fines DA and capital market fines 
DM:780 
DG = DA + DM. 
Plugging in the values derived from the above analysis de lege lata, DG adds up to a 
maximum penalty of: 
DG = 0,1 . (p . x) + 0,15 . (p . x) + 1 mio. + δ . [(p** . x) - (p . x)] 
                       Antitrust fines                       Capital market fines 
                                                 
779 Bachert, "Befugnisse der Bundesnetzagentur zur Durchsetzung der REMIT-Verordnung," RdE Vol. 24, no. 9 
(2014), 365. 
780 For the parallel applicability please refer to the fifth chapter in section B.III. of this work. 
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Altogether, firms face a threat of fines reaching from one million if only a mild sentence in 
capital market law is imposed to up to 15 percent of their yearly turnover plus a share of 
the additional revenue from the manipulation. With reference to the above display of the 
tremendous amounts reached in practice today, it may well be doubted whether the initial 
condition for effective fines, 
CD ≤ πi(p) + Ai, 
is still met. This is especially true if one also considers the amounts paid to private dam-
ages claimants treated in the following chapter 4 on private market surveillance.781 The 
consequences of these huge sanctions and necessary changes in the legal framework will 
be discussed in the following subsections 2. and IV. 
 
2. Required changes in the legal framework 
Hence, from an economic point of view, the establishment of an effective level of 
deterrence under the existing legal system in both EU and Germany requires several 
changes in the legal framework782 that will be further elaborated in the following sections: 
▪ A departure from the dogma of prohibitive government fines, 
▪ an additional, nonmonetary damage variable that increases CD without further di-
minishing the financial basis of undertakings, 
▪ a shift towards measures that influence the probability of punishment pP, as well 
as 
▪ an integrated system of public and private prosecution. 
The following subsection will elaborate an optimal value for pP and thereby further empha-
size the urgent need for tightened rules in that respect. Concrete suggestions on changes 
in the existing law will be presented for both drivers of deterrence, CD and pP, commonly 
in section IV. The idea of an integrated system of public and private prosecution will only 
be presented in the fifth chapter after the discussion of tools of private prosecution (section 
D.). 
                                                 
781 Marc-Philippe Weller, "Die Anrechnung pönaler Schadensersatzleistungen gemäß § 33 GWB auf 
Kartellbußen," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 2 (2008), 171. See also Christian Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten 
Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ibid, no. 3, 269. 
782 Similar Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 
2015, 44 Ref. 179 et sqq. 
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III. The optimal value for the probability of 
punishment pP 
The preceding examination of optimal values for DG has revealed that the current 
legal framework does operate on the basis of too high public damages. As a consequence, 
the adaptation of the probability of punishment pP is a crucial complement to successfully 
deter manipulations in the energy market.783 pP in this model is assumed to depend on the 
efforts (e) of public (eG) and private (eP) prosecution of manipulative behavior784: 
pP (e) with e = e (eG, eP) and e ∈ [0, e̅] and 
dp
P
deG
 > 0 and 
dp
P
deP
 > 0 for any eG, eP >0. 
Private efforts will be discussed in the following section IV. and are therefore not part of 
the subsequent considerations, eP is hence treated as a constant: 
eP = e̅P. 
With regard to public efforts eG, this model does again consider the effort of both exchange 
supervisory authorities (eE) and the FCO (eF), which add up to eG: 
eG = eE + eF. 
This combined public effort eG is mainly influenced by the authorities´ financial and staff 
resources and the legal framework for the prosecution that does indirectly determine the 
success of prosecution efforts. It is assumed that any one of these measures is affiliated 
with a cost C(eG)785: 
C (eG) = γ . eG 
with γ being an exogenous cost parameter and 
                                                 
783 For the general idea of the probability of punishment being a necessary complement to the amount of fines 
see Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift 
zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 436. Also refer to Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier and Renaud Legal, 
“Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union”, Working paper (2008), 2. For the case of 
antitrust see Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in 
Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 289. 
784 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 180. For the case of antitrust see Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, 
World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 12. 
785 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 174. 
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dC (e
G
)
dγ
 > 0. 
This cost has to be subtracted from the welfare gains from effective deterrence and should 
therefore be minimized.786 In this respect, the choice of maximum efforts e̅ is no welfare 
optimum.787 It can easily be seen that in this model an increase of the financial equipment 
and/or authority staff would facilitate the discovery and punishment of antitrust infringe-
ments.788 These decisions would at the same time increase the cost of the prosecution of 
manipulations. Hence, the value of the exogenous parameter γ with regard to staff and 
resources is a simple question of public choice to be made by politicians, it won´t be 
discussed any further in this work.789 Rather, the focus lies on the design of the legal 
framework prosecutors operate in. 
The following examination will start with the definition of a baseline scenario to identify 
the current probability of punishment pP under the value for eG in force de lege lata. Sub-
sequent subsections will then discuss drawbacks under the existing regime and propose 
changes in the legal framework to optimize pP in order to establish a level of deterrence 
effectively suited to prohibit manipulations of the energy exchange. 
 
1. The baseline scenario: The current probability of punish-
ment pP under the existing legal framework 
The probability of punishment pP (e) depends on several factors. Most importantly, 
these are: 
▪ The detection rate of manipulations (rD), and 
▪ the rate of conviction (rC).790 
Since the detection of manipulative practices is a necessary first step to a potential later 
conviction, both elements are linked by multiplication: 
                                                 
786 Ibid, 181. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid, 174. 
789 In recent years, certain organizational changes took place to expand the capacity and competence of the 
FCO in detecting infringements of the GWB. See e.g. Andreas Mundt, “Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, 
in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan 
Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 430. 
790 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, 
no. 2 (1968), 174. 
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pP (eG, e̅P) = rD 
. rC, 
where rD, rC (eG, e̅P). 
For the detection rate, no comprehensive data is available. This deficiency is due to the 
fact that the detection rate of manipulative practices is smaller than one; hence not all 
manipulations taking place in practice are detected. As a consequence, the global proba-
bility of detection is unknown to the authorities.791 Numbers for manipulations might only 
be observed for the “probability of detection conditional on being detected”.792 To date, 
there are no inquiries quantifying the number of and damage done by manipulative market 
behavior.793 
Yet, there are some estimates on the detection rate for collusive agreements, which might 
serve as an indication for the case of manipulations. These values, since they suffer from 
the same weaknesses described above for the case of manipulations, may only indicate 
the upper bound of the instantaneous global probability of detection. Furthermore, the 
values for the observed probability of detection are positively related to the global proba-
bility of detection.794 
Current estimations in this field suggest an annual value of 0,13 to 0,17 for collusive 
agreements; hence 13 to 17 percent of the actual number of cartels is being detected per 
year.795 More recent data from the EU suggests a similarly low rate of detection of about 
13 percent.796 For international cartels, the American Antitrust Institute found out that 
discovery rates have been increasing “from four to six per year in the early 1990s to about 
35 per year in 2003-2005”.797 
Overall, the values presented here suggest a low probability of detection for cartel agree-
ments. All the more, the connected rate of conviction bears the burden to further decrease 
                                                 
791 Maier-Rigaud, Frank and Ulrich Schwalbe, “Quantification of Antitrust Damages”, in: Competition Damages 
Actions in the EU: Law and Practice, ed. David Ashton and David Henry (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013), 3. See also Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy Inter-
national Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 7. 
792 Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier and Renaud Legal, “Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the 
European Union”, Working paper (2008), 3. See also Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen 
Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 474. 
793 Maier-Rigaud, Frank and Ulrich Schwalbe, “Quantification of Antitrust Damages”, in: Competition Damages 
Actions in the EU: Law and Practice, ed. David Ashton and David Henry (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013), 3. 
794 Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier and Renaud Legal, “Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the 
European Union”, Working paper (2008), 3. 
795 Peter G. Bryant and E. Woodrow Eckard, “Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics Vol. 73, no. 3 (1991), 531. 
796 Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier and Renaud Legal, “Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the 
European Union”, Working paper (2008). 
797 John M. Connor and C. Gustav Helmers, “Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005”, 
American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01, 38. 
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the probability of punishment. For this reason and since this work has identified the proof 
of manipulative practices to be the more urgent problem in establishing an effective level 
of deterrence798, no further examination will be made of the factors that influence the rate 
of detection.799 Rather, the focus lies on legal parameters with major influence on the rate 
of conviction. This points to the practical problems of producing adequate evidence. The 
following sections differentiate between the powers to intervention available to the FCO 
(probability of punishment for antitrust offenses pF, section a) and intervention powers 
granted in capital market law (probability of punishment at the EEX pE, section b). 
 
a) The probability of punishment for antitrust offenses pF 
The probability of punishment for antitrust offenses pF depends on the legal tools for 
investigation and prosecution that are at the Commission´s and FCO´s disposal.800 This 
section will present the current legal framework for antitrust investigations both in the EU 
and in Germany with a special focus on the effect any individual instrument has on the 
rate of conviction. 
 
aa) The European Commission approach to the proof of market manipula-
tions 
Under Art. 102 lit. a TFEU, the European Commission has to prove the extortion of 
an inappropriate price from the consumers.801 To this end, the inappropriateness of a price 
(1) as well as the procedural tools available to build a case (2) have to be defined. 
 
 
 
                                                 
798 Moreover, it has been shown earlier in this work (see Second Chapter, section C.) that problems in fighting 
manipulations do occur on the level of proof standing up in court and not so much with regard to the detection 
of manipulative practices. 
799 An important driver for an increased rate of detection have been so-called leniency programs in recent 
years that create incentives for firms to cooperate with the antitrust authorities. See e.g. Andreas Mundt, “Kar-
tellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von 
Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 
2011), 437.  
800 As already outlined above, the financial and staff equipment of the authority which of course also influence 
the probability of punishment are being excluded from this analysis. 
801 For details on the abuse provision please refer back to the first chapter, section E. II.1.b) of this work. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
156 
 
(1) The identification of an inappropriate price under EU law 
The identification of an inappropriate price under EU law is based on a comparison 
of the price charged with the objective value of the contractual performance.802 Abuse is 
being assumed if there is an objective and significant disparity between objective and 
contractual value; in practice, the price must exceed the objective value by more than 10 
percent.803 Hence, any proof of manipulative behavior is dependent on a convincing de-
termination of the objective value of the good or performance. 
In European competition law, different approaches are used to prove the inappropriate-
ness of a price. First, the profit margin serves as an indicator for manipulative market 
behavior. Under this approach, a comparison of the sales price with the production cost 
has to reveal an excessive profit margin that suggests abusive behavior.804 However, both 
the cost analysis and the control of the profit margin are subject to large uncertainty. As 
a consequence, this concept does not allow for a conclusion that satisfies the needs of 
substantial proof in court.805 
More convincing is the second established approach to the proof of inappropriate prices, 
the so-called comparable market concept. The question whether prices in a market are 
excessive is answered using a comparison with prices charged otherwise.806 Generally, the 
comparison has to be conducted in the same product market; different geographical807 
and temporal markets are possible.808 The indicative effect from objective differences in 
prices has to be explained by the companies concerned.809 However, also under this ap-
proach does the competition authority have to make several assessments with regard to 
the comparative price level or the relevance of the difference to the competitive price.810 
As a consequence, the proof of manipulative behavior is in many cases not successful.811 
 
                                                 
802 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 929 Ref. 51. 
803 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission. Case 27/76. European Court 
reports 1978, 207 (1978), Ref. 261/266. 
804 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 929 Ref. 51. 
805 Ibid, 930 Ref. 52. 
806 Ibid, 930 Ref. 53. 
807 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission. Case 27/76. European Court 
reports 1978, 207 (1978), Ref. 261/266. 
808 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2008), 930 Ref. 53. 
809 Ibid, 931 Ref. 53. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Ibid. 
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(2) Procedural rights of the EC under EU law 
From a procedural perspective, the EC has a number of powers of intervention. Most 
notably, these are the request for information (Art. 18 regulation N° 1/2003) and the 
investigation (Art. 20 regulation N° 1/2003), both concretizing Art. 337 TFEU.812 The re-
quest for information aims at the discovery of proof in cases where the Commission has 
sufficient evidence that circumstances are of relevance from an antitrust point of view.813 
Its power includes the request for a written answer to any question that might be essential 
to clarify the facts.814 Also the remittance of documents may be required.815 Companies 
have an obligation to cooperate, which is only limited by the privilege against self-incrim-
ination.816 
Investigations shall support the collection of proof by empowering the Commission to enter 
the offices of a firm under suspicion of antitrust infringements, see business documents, 
make copies and ask for explanations. With judicial approval, also private rooms may be 
the objects of an investigation.817 In case of formal investigations, the firm has to tolerate 
the Commission measures, but may consult legal assistance.818 The national antitrust au-
thorities do have to be informed and consulted819 and are obliged to provide administrative 
assistance.820 
Both investigation powers do not include a right to hear witnesses or confiscate docu-
ments.821 
 
bb) The FCO approach to the proof of market manipulations 
Also, the German FCO needs to provide evidence for offenses against Sec. 19(2) 
N° 2 GWB referring to a definition of the excessive price (1) and its procedural powers of 
intervention (2). 
                                                 
812 Holger Dieckmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1542 Ref. 1. 
813 Ibid, 1542 Ref. 4. 
814 Ibid, 1546 Ref. 18. 
815 Ibid, 1547 Ref. 19. With reference to Orkem v. Commission. Case 374/87. European Court reports 1989, 
3283 and Lombardclub v. Commission. Cases T-259/02 to 264/02 and T-271/01. Reports of Cases 2006 II-
05169. 
816 Holger Dieckmann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1547 Ref. 21. 
817 Ibid, 1549 Ref. 24. 
818 Ibid, 1551 Ref. 31. 
819 Ibid, 1550 Ref. 28. 
820 Ibid, 1551 Ref. 32. 
821 Ibid, 1542, 1552 Ref. 1, 34. 
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(1) The comparable market approach (“Vergleichsmarktkonzept”) and the 
profit margin approach (“Gewinnbegrenzungskonzept”) 
Abusive pricing is being proved based on the so-called comparable market approach 
(“Als-ob-Wettbewerb”), Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB, where the market outcome in the concen-
trated market is being compared to the prices that would result from effective competi-
tion.822 This concept is highly similar to the EC approach introduced before: It requires a 
price higher than in a competitive market and a significant deviation of the abusive price 
from the competitive level.823 The main occurrence of this method in practice is the geo-
graphical comparable market approach where the price of the relevant enterprise is com-
pared to the prices of other suppliers in the same product market, but in a different geo-
graphical market, which is competitive.824 Any differences in the markets of regional, legal 
or factual nature are taken account of through corrective surcharges.825 However, this 
concept fails to yield sustainable proof in cases where the necessary corrections become 
too numerous.826 
Alternative concepts to prove manipulations of the market have been discussed and are 
allowed in Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB. Most notably, the profit margin approach referring to 
an extreme difference between the firm´s cost of production and its revenue has been 
proposed.827 However, it has never been of any practical relevance for the proof of price 
manipulations.828 
Finally, the FCO has approached the challenge of proving abusive market behavior through 
cost controls.829 According to the jurisdiction, reproaches based on excessive cost do 
have to refer to the total price and may not be based on single cost factors or the calcu-
lation of the enterprise.830 This approach gained in importance through the introduction of 
                                                 
822 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1003 Ref. 51. Refer also to Peter Becker, "Kartellrechtliche Kontrolle von Strompreisen," ZNER Vol. 12, 
no. 4 (2008), 292. 
823 For the affirmation of abuse, a price difference of 5 to 15 percent is required. Gerhard Wiedemann, Hand-
buch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 1006, Ref. 55. Refer-
ring to Higher Regional Court (OLG) Düsseldorf, decision from February 11, 2004. VI-Kart 4/03 (V) “TEAG”. 
824 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1004-1005 Ref. 53. 
825 Ibid, 1005 Ref. 53. 
826 This is the case where more than 50 percent of the notional price analogous to the competitive price is 
based on corrective assessements. See German Federal Court of Justice, decision from December 2, 1980. KVR 
3/79 “Valium II”. 
827 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1003 Ref. 51. The concept is the German equivalent to the profit margin approach used by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in the case United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission. 
Case 27/76. European Court reports 1978, 207 (1978). Refer also to Becker, "Kartellrechtliche Kontrolle von 
Strompreisen," ZNER Vol. 12, no. 4 (2008), 292 et sqq. 
828 Gerhard Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 
2008), 1003 Ref. 51. 
829 Ibid. 
830 Higher Regional Court (OLG) Düsseldorf, decision from February 11, 2004. VI-Kart 4/03 (V) “TEAG”. 
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Sec. 29 first sentence N° 2 GWB which does explicitly refer to prices that inappropriately 
exceed the cost of production.831 However, in many cases the cost control concept suffers 
from lacking information of the competition authorities on the exact cost of production.832 
In practice, the FCO does therefore not succeed to convincingly prove manipulations in 
court. 
 
(2) Procedural rights of the FCO 
The FCO is entitled to collect all evidence and conduct any investigation necessary 
to identify the existence of antitrust infringements, Sec. 57(1) GWB. This includes the 
request for information, Sec. 59 GWB. Sec. 59(1) GWB postulates a right to information, 
Sec. 59(2) GWB a right to inspection and verification, and Sec. 59(4) GWB codifies the 
right to conduct a search upon order of a judge.833 Furthermore, proof is possible through 
the hearing of witnesses and experts (Sec. 57(2) GWB) and the confiscation of documents 
(Sec. 80 GWB).834 In fine proceedings, the investigation powers are based upon the Ger-
man Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), due to Sec. 46 OWiG.835 
The request for information and the investigation do, with regard to their design, both 
resemble the Commission powers described above.836  
 
cc) Experience with the baseline scenario for pF 
The considerations above show that the probability of punishment is – even if hard 
to measure – substantially low.837 In many cases, the European Commission and the FCO 
lack the legal tools to collect adequate evidence in manipulation cases. The latest 
                                                 
831 Raliza Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2013), 358. 
832 Different ibid, 375. 
833 Tobias Klose, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 
1792 Ref. 1. 
834 Ibid, 1842-1843 Ref. 106, 112. 
835 Tobias Klose, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed., ed. Gerhard Wiedemann (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 
1793 Ref. 6. 
836 Refer to Sec. B.III.1.a)aa)(2) of this chapter. 
837 Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in Bausteine 
des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 290. 
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display of this problem may be seen in the FCO sector inquiry, which fails to deliver evi-
dence for the initiation of proceedings against the firms under suspicion of market manip-
ulations.838 Many other cases end with settlements due to a lack of evidence.839 
Hence, the current legal framework does not provide sufficient rights of intervention for 
the antitrust authorities to successfully prosecute potential manipulators in the energy 
market. The consequences and necessary changes in the legal framework will be discussed 
in the following subsections 2. and IV. Previously, the baseline situation for the probability 
of punishment at the EEX under capital market law will be displayed. 
 
b) The probability of punishment in capital market law 
This chapter will examine the question whether the probability of punishment with 
regard to market manipulations is bigger in capital market law than in antitrust. A look 
towards both, the European and the German approach to the proof of manipulations and 
the tools for investigation and prosecution available to the competent authorities is re-
quired. 
 
aa) The European tools to prove energy capital market law infringements 
At the European level, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
together with the National Regulatory Authorities is the competent authorities to prosecute 
infringements of the REMIT provisions. ACER has published a (non-binding) guidance on 
the application of REMIT that is supposed to help the National Regulatory Authorities (in 
Germany the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) and the FCO) monitor the REMIT compli-
ance of market participants according to Sec. 35, 95(5) and 54 EnWG and Sec. 48(3) 
GWB. 
With regard to market manipulation cases as treated exemplary in this work, the guidance 
defines diverse types of market abuse and concretizes the application of the prohibition of 
market manipulation.840 It names precisely possible signals of market manipulation that 
might indicate an infringement of the REMIT prohibition in section 8.3.2. Especially the 
signal h) is interesting: It considers trades “that on a stand-alone basis would be uneco-
nomic and counterintuitive” suspicious of triggering a manipulation e .g. by increasing the 
                                                 
838 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 160. 
839 Refer e.g. to the EU Commission sector inquiry. See the second chapter of this work, section C.I.1. 
840 ACER, Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, 2013. 
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market price and thereby enabling a market participant to profit to a high degree from 
separate trading activity.841 The wording seems to point towards manipulations through 
capacity retention at energy exchanges. 
With regard to the detection of manipulations, the guidance relies on reporting of suspi-
cious transactions by persons professionally arranging transactions in wholesale energy 
products.842 Also, ACER itself may examine the data reported to them by market partici-
pants and the National Regulatory Agencies according to Art. 8 REMIT in order to find 
suspicious trades. 
Having regard to the powers of investigation and intervention, the Federal Network 
Agency may demand information and documents from natural and legal persons if neces-
sary for the monitoring of the compliance with the REMIT prohibitions of insider dealing 
and market manipulation, Sec. 69(11) EnWG. The right to confiscate documents or objects 
is however not covered by the provision.843 Furthermore, the Agency is empowered to use 
the rights defined in Art. 13(2) REMIT, Sec. 56 second sentence EnWG. These include the 
power to demand the termination of particular practices and their replacement through 
concrete measures named by the BNetzA, Sec. 56 second sentence in conjunction with 
Art. 13(2) second sentence lit. e) REMIT with reference to Sec. 65(1) and (2) EnWG.844 
Besides the EnWG enabling provisions, the German legislator has introduced a Market 
Transparency Unit at BNetzA and FCO in order to comply with the REMIT requirements.845 
This unit is supposed to continuously monitor the energy wholesale market in order to find 
irregularities in pricing that might be based on the abuse of market power, insider infor-
mation or market manipulation, Sec. 47b(1) GWB. Furthermore, this unit is the competent 
body for the monitoring and collection of data and information required by the REMIT 
regulation, Sec. 47b(2), (3), (6) GWB. 
The unit is equipped with powers according to Sec. 59 GWB, which refer to requests for 
information (Sec. 47d(1) GWB). Furthermore, it may exert powers according to Art. 7(2) 
and (3), Art. 4(2) second sentence, Art. 8(5) first sentence and Art. 16 REMIT 
(Sec. 47d(2) GWB). With regard to EPEX spot manipulations, foremost the Sec. 59 GWB 
powers are of interest. Those are the same powers described above with reference to the 
                                                 
841 Ibid, 53. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Bachert, "Befugnisse der Bundesnetzagentur zur Durchsetzung der REMIT-Verordnung," RdE Vol. 24, no. 9 
(2014), 363-364. 
844 Ibid, 363. 
845 Act on the Establishment of a Market Transparency Unit for Wholesale Trade in Electricity and Gas 
(Markttransparenzstellengesetz), Federal Law Gazette 2012 I-2403, published on December 11, 2012. 
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field of antitrust (e.g. right to information, inspection, verification and conducting 
searches).846 
 
bb) The German tools to prove energy capital market law infringements 
In fulfilling the EU requirements, Germany relies on the collection of comprehensive 
data on transactions in energy wholesale products in order to uncover manipulations of 
the market. The data is continuously checked for inconsistencies by the Market Transpar-
ency Unit, which yields suspicious cases to the competent authority (Sec. 47a(1), 47b(1), 
47b(7) GWB). 
Furthermore, the compliance of market participants with the German WpHG rules is mon-
itored by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin), Sec. 4(1) WpHG. It may demand information and 
documents from anybody who is suspicious of the infringement of a WpHG prohibition, 
Sec. 4(3) WpHG. Furthermore, the authority is empowered to enter the business facilities 
of persons obliged to provide information during business hours and – in case of imminent 
danger – also beyond this time, Sec. 4(4) WpHG. Facts that give rise to the suspicion of a 
crime according to Sec. 38 WpHG need to be reported to the competent Public Prosecution 
Service, Sec. 4(5) WpHG. 
In 2010, 1.31 billion transactions were reported to the BaFin, 1197 of which were analyzed 
with regard to a potential abuse of the market. Only 30 of these transactions were recom-
mended for a further examination with regard to market manipulations. This number is 
considerably low, which points to a huge estimated number of unreported cases. Even if 
criminal proceedings are started, convictions are the exemption (only 7 in 2010 for market 
manipulations)847. This low probability of detection and prosecution might be due to 
the complexity of the field of capital market law and problems to prove the subjective 
elements of the crime (e.g. intent) on the one hand, but also to restrictions of resources 
at the BaFin and the Public Prosecutors in this field. However, these facts may not serve 
as a satisfactory explanation of the enormous discrepancy between the anecdotic and 
journalistic hints and the actual number of examinations.848 
 
                                                 
846 Tobias Klose, in Handbuch des Kartellrechts, ed. Gerhard Wiedemann, 2nd ed. (München: Beck, 2008), 
1792 Ref. 1. 
847 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), 2055 Ref. 14. 
848 Ibid, 2055-2056 Ref. 14. 
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cc) Experience with the baseline scenario for pE 
Even though the above outline of instruments for intervention has shown a wide 
range of powers for authorities to prosecute suspicious transactions, the probability of 
detection and subsequent punishment is still very low. In practice, authorities either don´t 
recognize their responsibility – the German Monopoly Commission´s belief that Sec. 20a 
WpHG was not applicable on commodities exchanges demonstrates this misjudgment in 
an exemplary manner849 – or they lack adequate instruments and capacity to collect proof 
that may support a case.850 
Furthermore, the competence of an authority is not always clear and unique: Especially in 
the case of market manipulation at an exchange, several authorities might be con-
cerned: At the national level, these are FCO, BNetzA and BaFin. And there are more 
(e.g. European Commission, ACER) at the European level. A strong, comprehensive mon-
itoring of market manipulations is hardly possible in the light of this administrative equiv-
ocality.851 
In conclusion, the probability of punishment in the field of energy capital market law ap-
pears to be even smaller than in antitrust. The low number of cases pursued by the au-
thorities in the past years reinforces this finding.852 
 
2. Required changes in the legal framework 
The above analysis has shown that also with regard to the probability of punishment, 
an effective level of deterrence is not achieved under the existing legal system in both EU 
and Germany. Several changes in the legal framework are necessary to deter manipula-
tions successfully. The following sections will further discuss the following possible adap-
tations of the legal framework in antitrust: 
▪ An alternative approach to prove manipulations based on the firms’ profits, 
▪ the shift of the burden of proof from the authorities to the suspected firms, 
                                                 
849 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 125. With reference to Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 49 - 
Strom und Gas 2007: Wettbewerbsdefizite und zögerliche Regulierung, 2007, 61 Ref. 194. 
850 Cieslarczyk and Horstmann, "Marktmissbrauch im Energiehandel?: Die Empfehlung von ERGEG und CESR 
zur Entwicklung eines spezifischen Regelwerks gegen Marktmissbrauch auf den Energiemärkten," emw Vol. 6, 
no. 8 (2008), 28. 
851 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 223. 
852 Ibid, 198. 
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▪ the introduction of leniency programs for the case of market manipulations. 
Also in capital market law, changes of the legal framework have to be considered, mainly 
with regard to the cooperation of the market monitoring authorities involved. 
 
IV. Legal tools to meet the level of deterrence 
The above economic analysis has revealed that the existing legal framework for the 
public prosecution of manipulative behavior has several weaknesses both with regard to 
the cost to a detected firm DG and the probability of punishment pP. As a consequence, 
deterrence based on the current fining system is ineffective and does not help to 
decrease the number of antitrust infringements.853 Legal measures to adapt the current 
systems to the necessary level of deterrence have been named at the end of each sub-
section. This paragraph will introduce the legal changes suggested and show how they 
change the incentive scheme for manipulations at the energy exchange. 
 
1. Changes with regard to the damage from government 
fines DG 
Since section II. of this chapter has identified too high and misdirected government 
fines DG as one reason for the deviation from the optimal level of deterrence, this section 
will treat different approaches that are suited to set fines to the right level. It will also be 
discussed which of the changes is most effective and most efficient in fighting the manip-
ulation incentive. 
The following approaches will be discussed: 
▪ A departure from the dogma of prohibitive government fines (a), 
▪ the shift of liability from firms to individuals including the discussion of criminal 
sanctions (b)(aa) and (bb)), and 
▪ an additional, nonmonetary damage variable that increases CD without further di-
minishing the financial basis of undertakings: debarment from the employment 
market (b)(cc). 
                                                 
853 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 2015, 42-43 
Ref. 175 et sqq. 
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a) A new reference for the calculation of public fines de lege lata 
First and most importantly, the reference for the calculation of government fines 
needs to be adapted to the efficient level. To date, both the EC and German guidelines on 
fines for antitrust infringements refer to the turnover achieved from the infringement.854 
In many cases, this policy violates the liability condition for firms:  
CD ≤ πi(p) + Ai.
855 
As a consequence, firms being subject to a fine in antitrust cases face the danger to be-
come insolvent.856 The economic analysis has shown that this result is neither an effec-
tive deterrent for potential manipulators, nor an efficient tool to fight manipulations from 
the point of view of society.857 With regard to profits, both EU and German law contain a 
cap. Accordingly, fines may not be higher than 10 percent of last year´s sales.858 Both 
guidances do furthermore contain provisions for the case of inability to pay of a firm.859 
Yet, the ex post reduction of fines corresponding to the firms´ ability to pay lowers the 
deterrent effect below the level required to meet the optimum.860 
Therefore, the calculation of fines both under EU and German law has to be subjected to 
a revision that takes account of the probability of punishment pP and other damages that 
an infringer faces in the event of antitrust violations, e.g. private damages claims and 
fines from other fields of law.861 
From a legal point of view, the EC and FCO approaches in their guidelines do also meet 
with criticism. The following legal analysis will treat concerns with regard to violations of 
higher-ranking European and German law through excessive fines. It will be shown that 
under EU law, the current level of fines violates Art. 23(5) Regulation N° 1/2003 if fines 
                                                 
854 See e.g. Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43 (2010), 
2378. 
855 For the derivation of this correlation, please refer back to section II.1.a) cc) in this chapter. 
856 A recent case was the fire-fighting vehicles case. FCO decision from February 10, 2011. B12-11/09. As a 
consequence of the 8 Million Euro fine, the firm filed bankruptcy. See Südwest Presse from August 17, 2011. 
http://www.swp.de/unternehmen/news/Insolvenz-Kartellstrafe-Geschaeftsbetrieb-Insolvenzverwalter-Ein-
schraenkung-Jakarta-Kroatien-Zagreb-Winschoten-Rendsburg-Muenchen-Giengen-an-der-Brenz-Indonesien-
Niederlande-Muehlau-Heidenheim-Giengen-Aalen;art1168007,1079386. 
857 Similar Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 
2015, 41 Ref. 171. 
858 For EU law, see Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 
57, no. 5 (2007), 471. Refer to Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des Bundeskartellamtes”, WuW Vol. 57, 
no. 5 (2007), 458, 465 with regard to German law. 
859 See Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 481 for the case of the EU. See also Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, 
World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 22. For the practical experience with the provisions refer to Andreas 
Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, "Europäisches Kartellrecht 2010," EuZW Vol. 22, no. 11 (2011), 420. 
860 Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 
19. 
861 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 9. 
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have the quality of criminal sanctions.862 Consequently, DG needs to be reduced below this 
threshold de lege lata (section aa)). Under German law, the current level of antitrust fines 
conflicts with the constitutional guarantee of legal certainty codified in Art. 103(2) GG 
(section bb)). Hence, just as for the case of EU law, fines may not exceed the threshold 
to criminal sanctions. De lege ferenda, the legislators both in the EU and Germany need 
to define precise criteria for the calculation of fines and reorganize the administrative pro-
cedures for the fining (section cc)). 
 
aa) Violations of higher-ranking European Law 
The legal predecessor of the current guidelines from 1998 has been subject to judi-
cial litigation at the European Court of Justice in 2005.863 The court came to the conclusion 
that the guidelines do not violate primary Community law.864 Concerns with regard to a 
violation of the protection of legitimate expectations (Ref. 171-173, 187-188 and 228) and 
the prohibition on retroactivity (Ref. 202, 216-219, 222-224, 227-231) were negated in 
the judgment.865 The court emphasized the predictability of changes in fining and the wide 
discretion of the Commission in defining both the method of calculation and the scope of 
fines.866 
Concerns with regard to the requirement of legal certainty, the principles of proportionality 
and equal treatment and the prohibition of arbitrary procedures were not treated in the 
decision.867 These objections continue to be raised against the revised guidelines effective 
since 2006.868 In order to determine whether the EC guidelines violate higher-ranking 
European law, the legal character of the guidelines has to be defined in a first step. 
Art. 103(1) TFEU empowers the European Council to adopt directives and regulations that 
aim at the realization of the EU competition rules set forth in Art. 101 and 102 TFEU. With 
                                                 
862 Ibid, 82. 
863 Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 471. 
864 Dansk Rørindustri v Commission. Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-208/02 P, C-213/02 P. 
European Court Reports 2005, I-5425. 
865 Ibid. 
866 Ibid, Ref. 252, 254, 258, 260-261, 267. 
867 For an overview of the objections against the 1998 guidelines please refer to Hans-Joachim Hellmann, 
“Vereinbarkeit der Leitlinien der Kommission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit höherrangigem Gemein-
schaftsrecht”, WuW Vol. 52, no. 10 (2002), 944 et sqq. With regard to the requirement of legal certainty also 
refer to Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot. Die 
Kartellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 202 et 
sqq. 
868 See e.g. Jürgen Schwarze, “Rechtsstaatliche Defizite des europäischen Kartellbußgeldverfahrens”, WuW 
Vol. 59, no. 1 (2009), 6 et sqq. 
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regard to fines, Art. 103(2) lit. a) TFEU emphasizes the role of public fines in the enforce-
ment of the abuse prohibition. Hence, primary Community law basically refers to fines as 
part of the sanctioning system.869 
Art. 23 regulation N° 1/2003 contains details on the scope of public fines. Since it is itself 
secondary Community law, it does however have to fulfill the requirements of higher-
ranking EU law.870 These are: 
▪ The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU871, 
▪ the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),872 and 
▪ common constitutional principles and traditions of the member states according to 
Art. 6(3) and Art. 2 TEU.873 
Violations of these statutes may not be justified by Art. 23 (5) of Regulation N° 1/2003 
which is itself secondary to higher-ranking Community law.874 Therefore, the European 
method of levying fines has to be in accordance with the above-listed sources of primary 
Community law.875 
The following sections will show that: 
1. De lege lata, only fines below the threshold of criminal law are in accordance with 
primary EU law (2)-(5), and 
2. criteria allowed for setting fines are only the gravity and the duration of the in-
fringement; where gravity is interpreted as a reference to the gain firms realize 
through cartelization (6). 
 
  
                                                 
869 Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43 (2010), 2378. 
870 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 13. 
871 According to recital 37 of the preamble to Regulation N° 1/2003, the fundamental rights particularily recog-
nized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU are respected by the Regulation. See Koen Lenaerts, 
“Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 175. 
872 Kurt Stockmann, "Stellungnahme zum Zwischenbericht des Bundeskartellamtes zum Expertenkreis 
Kartellsanktionsrecht," ZWeR Vol. 13, no. 3 (2015), 191. 
873 Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43 (2010), 2378. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Koen Lenaerts, “Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 175. 
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(1) The guiding principles of EU law  
The European Union law needs to comply with general constitutional principles, in 
particular the guarantee of the rule of law, Art. 2 TEU. This includes from a formal view-
point the principle of the division of powers, priority and reservation of the law and the 
principle of a regulated procedure. From a material viewpoint, the rule of law guarantees 
the protection of fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.876 By the case 
law of the European Court of Justice, concrete legal principles resulting from the rule of 
law have been formulated: The protection of legitimate expectations877, the prohibition on 
retroactivity878, the principle of legal certainty879 and procedural guarantees880. The com-
pliance of Art. 23 Regulation N° 1/2003 and the European Commission guidelines on fining 
with these basic legal principles will be examined in subsections (2) to (5). 
Furthermore, the European Union acceded to the ECHR, Art. 6(2) TEU. This convention 
contains requirements for the right to a fair trial and the principle of “no punishment with-
out law”, which also apply to sanctions that are not of strictly criminal nature, but compa-
rable to administrative offences.881 Hence, fine proceedings under competition law have 
to satisfy these requirements of the ECHR.882 
According to its preamble, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is part of the 
European treaties and has full legal effect since the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. 
According to a verdict of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from 2006, it has relevance 
for the interpretation of European competition law.883 Regulation N° 1/2003 is to be inter-
preted and applied in accordance with the rights and principles from the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights.884 The charter contains fundamental rights with relevance for undertak-
ings, such as the freedom to choose an occupation (Art. 15), the freedom to conduct a 
business (Art. 16), the right to property (Art. 17), the principle of equality before the law 
(Art. 20), and the guarantees of fair administrative proceedings and a fair trial (Art. 41 
and 47). The imposition of fines according to Art. 23 Regulation N° 1/2003 might affect 
                                                 
876 Christian Calliess, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 2 EUV 25. 
877 De Compte v Parlament. Case C-90/95. European Court Reports 1997, I-1999 Ref. 35 et sqq. 
878 Racke. Case 98/78. European Court Reports 1979, 69 Ref. 20. 
879 Gondrand Freres. Case 169/80. European Court Reports 1981, 1931 Ref. 17. 
880 Unectef v Heylens. Case 222/86. European Court Reports 1987, 4097 Ref. 15. 
881 Öztürk v Germany. Case 58544/79. ECtHR NJW 1985, 1273 Ref. 56. 
882 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 24-25. 
883 European Parliament v Council of the European Union. Case C-540/03. European Court Reports 2006, I-
5769 Ref. 38. 
884 See recital 37 of Regulation N° 1/2003. Koen Lenaerts, “Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, 
no. 5 (2013), 175. 
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these legal guarantees. As a consequence, Art. 52(1) first sentence of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights states the necessity of the legislator himself having to regulate all mate-
rial issues with regard to any limitation on the exercise of rights and freedoms recognized 
by the Charter.885 
 
(2) Fines above the threshold of criminal law violate the principle of legal cer-
tainty 
In its current form, Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 violates the principle of legal 
certainty. This section will start with a short illustration of the contents of the requirement 
of legal certainty (a) in general and for the case of criminal law in particular. The applica-
bility of the certainty standards (b) and the necessary level of certainty for the case of 
Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 (c) will be deduced. It will be shown that the current 
Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 does not satisfy the standards identified before (d). A 
justification for the lack of legal certainty may not be found (e). As a result, the norm 
needs to be interpreted restrictively (f). 
 
(a) The rule of law and the principle of legal certainty 
The requirement of legal certainty under EU law results from the rule of law.886 Also 
legal entities may rely on this principle.887 The European Court of Justice interprets the 
requirement of legal certainty as a fundamental principle of EU law that demands clear 
and foreseeable Community legislation.888 These requirements of clearness and fore-
seeability are of particular importance in cases with potential financial consequences. The 
                                                 
885 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 22. 
886 Christian Calliess, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 2 EUV Ref. 25. 
887 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 204. 
888 See e.g. Criminal proceedings against X. Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95. European Court Reports 1996, I-
6609 Ref. 25. See also Gerda Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer. Case 70/83. European Court Reports 1984, 1075 
Ref. 11 and Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi and others. Joined 
Cases 212-217/80. European Court Reports 1981, 2735 Ref. 10. 
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Court of Justice of the European Communities consistently established that parties con-
cerned by Community law need to be able to assess the scope of their liabilities.889 There-
fore, any act of secondary Community law must be in accordance with the primary re-
quirement of legal certainty.890 
Besides the general requirement of legal certainty, the European Court of Justice recog-
nizes a more far-reaching requirement of legal certainty for criminal proceedings891, which 
finds its dogmatic basis in the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege).892 This principle 
of legality is also rooted in the above-introduced Art. 7(1) ECHR and Art. 49(1) Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, which are both binding law according to Art. 6(1), (2) TEU. 
Furthermore, it is part of the common constitutional traditions shared by the EU Member 
States, e.g. Art. 103(2) of the German Constitution.893 The principle of nulla poena sine 
lege entails two specifications: The ban for the jurisdiction to punish without legal basis 
and the demand to the legislator to define criminal sanctions clearly (nulla poena sine lege 
certa).894 The requirement of clarity means for the part of the elements of an offense that 
the precise consequences and the scope of application need to be deductible from the 
wording or through interpretation of the text of the criminal provision.895 
 
(b) The standards of clarity applicable to Art. 23 of REG N° 1/2003 
The requirement of certainty is therefore applicable to the provisions of Regulation 
N° 1/2003. This result is independent of the legal classification of the sentencing provision 
in Art. 23 of regulation N° 1/2003 as criminal sanction or as pure administrative offense.896 
                                                 
889 Commission v French Republic. Case C-30/89. European Court Reports 1990, I-691 Ref. 23; Ireland v 
Commission. Case 325/85. European Court Reports 1987, 5041 Ref. 18; Kingdom of the Netherlands v Com-
mission. Case 326/85. European Court Reports 1987, 5091 Ref. 24; Belgian State v Banque Indosuez. Case C-
177/96. European Court Reports 1997, I-5659 Ref. 27; The Queen v National Farmers´ Union and others. Case 
C-354/95. European Court Reports 1997, I-4559 Ref. 57; Administration des douanes v Société anonyme 
Gondrand Frères and Société anonyme Garancini. Case 169/80. European Court Reports 1981, 1931 Ref. 17 et 
sqq., Commission v French Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Joined Cases 
92/87 and 93/87. European Court Reports 1989, 405 Ref. 22. 
890 CNTA v Commission Case 74/74. European Court Reports 1975, 533 Ref. 44. 
891 Criminal proceedings against X. Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95. European Court Reports 1996, I-6609 
Ref. 25. 
892 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 204. 
893 Ibid, 205. With reference to the constitutions of other Member States in reference 36. See also Criminal 
proceedings against X. Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95. European Court Reports 1996, I-6609 Ref. 25. 
894 K.-H.W. v Germany. Case 37201/97. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-II Ref. 45; Streletz, Kessler 
and Krenz v Germany. Cases 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-II 
Ref. 50; S.W. v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case 20166/92. A335-B Ref. 35; Tol-
stoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case 18139/91. A316-B Ref. 37. 
895 Voet van Vormizeele, EU-Kommentar, 3rd ed., ed. Jürgen Schwarze (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2012), 
2735 Ref. 7. 
896 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 205. 
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The European Court of Justice has repeatedly decided that sanctions may only be imposed 
where they are based on clear and unambiguous provisions.897 Since the level of fines is 
in dispute with regard to legal clarity, this requirement must also be applicable to the legal 
consequences of the sentencing provisions. 
Since the requirement of legal certainty intends to enable the addressee of a sentencing 
provision to foresee the impending sanction, this legal principle does necessarily include 
the clarity of the legal consequences, thus the scope of the fine.898 The European 
Court of Justice refers to this requirement in its fundamental decision of 1996 as the “prin-
ciple of legal certainty of criminal offenses and sanctions”.899 The jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) established basic criteria for the necessary quality 
of a law in this regard: It needs to be formulated with sufficient precision, such that the 
persons concerned may foresee the consequences which a given action entails to a degree 
reasonable in the circumstances. A discretion does not per se preclude foreseeability if its 
scope and manner are indicated with sufficient clarity that provides protection against 
arbitrary interference.900 
Eventually, the tightened standards of clarity for criminal provisions apply to 
Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003. Art. 23(5) of Regulation N° 1/2003, stipulating that 
sanctions according to sections 1 and 2 of this article have no criminal character, is not 
qualified to preclude this judgment of the rules. The classification of a provision as criminal 
does not depend on its denomination, but solely on its actual legal character, Art. 263(4) 
TFEU.901 The European Court of Justice decided in the case Alusuisse Italia SpA v Council 
and Commission of the European Communities with regard to the identical predecessor of 
Art. 263(4) TFEU, Art. 173(2) TEEC:902 
“The second paragraph of Article 173 of the treaty makes the admissibility of 
proceedings […] dependent on fulfillment of the condition that the contested 
measure, although in the form of a regulation, in fact constitutes a decision 
                                                 
897 Könecke v BALM. Case 117/83. European Court Reports 1984, 3291 Ref. 11; Maizena v BALM. Case 
137/85. European Court Reports 1987, 4603 Ref. 15. 
898 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, N° 7 (2003), 205. 
899 Criminal proceedings against X. Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95. European Court Reports 1996, I-6609 
Ref. 25. 
900 Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden. Case 12963/87. A 226-A Ref. 75; Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case 18139/91. A316-B Ref. 37. 
901 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 22. 
902 Alusuisse Italia SpA v Council and Commission oft he European Communities. Case 307/81. European 
Court Reports 1982, 3463 Ref. 7. See also Engel and others v The Netherlands. Cases 5100/71, 5101/71, 
5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72). A 22 Ref. 81 with regard to the conditions, especially the ECHR, under which the 
Member States are free to establish a distinction between criminal and disciplinatory law. 
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which is of direct and individual concern to them. The objective of that provi-
sion is in particular to prevent the Community institutions, merely by choosing 
the form of a regulation, from being able to exclude an application by an 
individual against a decision of direct and individual concern to him and thus 
make clear that the choice of form may not alter the nature of a measure.”  
Hence, if the legal character of the fines provision is of criminal nature, the tightened 
standards for criminal provisions apply. In the Engel case903, the ECtHR established criteria 
to decide whether a public sanction has a criminal character in the meaning of Art. 6(1) 
ECHR.904 This jurisdiction has been confirmed by the ECJ in the judgment Bonda.905 In a 
first step, it needs to be determined whether the law containing the sanctioning provision 
is considered as criminal law by the legislating state.906 With regard to Art. 23(2) of Reg-
ulation N° 1/2003, the legislator has clearly stated in the above described Art. 23(5) of 
Regulation N° 1/2003 that he considers the fines provisions as non-criminal law. 
In case of denial of the first criterion, the classification of legal acts is conducted on the 
basis of the scope907 and purpose of the sanction.908 The scope of fines, according to 
Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 a maximum of 10 percent of last year´s total reve-
nues909, does already have an indicative effect.910 For huge enterprises, fines may reach 
three-digit million amounts.911 The extent of antitrust fines differs considerably from the 
level of fines common in cases of administrative offenses.912 Rather, the European Com-
mission is empowered to structural interventions in markets through the use of excessive 
                                                 
903 Engel and others v The Netherlands. Cases 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72). A 22 Ref. 82. 
904 The Engel judgment has been confirmed recently: Dubus S.A. v France. Case 5242/04 Ref. 36. Also 
Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy. Case 43509 Ref. 38. 
905 Bonda. Case C-489/10 Ref. 37. 
906 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, “Die Rechtmäßigkeit der neueren Geldbußenpraxis der EU-Kommission wegen Ver-
stoß gegen Verfahrenspflichten nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Verordnung Nr. 1/2003”, WuW Vol. 62, no. 12 (2012), 
1165. 
907 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. See 
also ibid. 
908 Jussila v Finland. Case 73053/01 Ref. 38. 
909 The decisive criterion for the distinction between criminal law and administrative sanctions is not the 
amount in an individual case, but the legal maximum. See Dubus S.A. v France. Case 5242/04 Ref. 37. 
910 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. 
911 Please refer to the illustration of past antitrust fines in section B.II.1.a) cc) of this chapter. 
912 See Wernhard Möschel, “Kartellbußen und Artikel 92 Grundgesetz”, WuW Vol. 60, no. 9 (2010), 870 who 
refers to administrative offenses as minor offenses with mass character. Similar Stockmann, "Stellungnahme 
zum Zwischenbericht des Bundeskartellamtes zum Expertenkreis Kartellsanktionsrecht," ZWeR Vol. 13, no. 3 
(2015), 197. Also Gerald Brei, "Due Process in EU antitrust proceedings - causa finita after Menarini?," ibid, no. 
1, 39. 
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fines.913 This huge scope and influence of fines for market manipulations suggests a clas-
sification as criminal law914. In the case Menarini, the ECtHR classified a – comparably low 
– 6 Million Euro fine as criminal law.915 Hence, European Commission fines proceedings 
according to Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 are criminal charges in the meaning of 
Art. 6(1) ECHR.916  
Also, the purpose and requirements of the fines provisions suggest their classification as 
criminal law. Legal provisions that do not aim at the compensation of a concrete damage, 
but rather pursue a deterrent and punishing purpose, belong to the field of criminal law.917 
The European Commission has repeatedly emphasized the meaning of antitrust fines for 
deterrence.918 Recital 4 of the guidelines on fining reads: 919 
“[…] Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only in order to 
sanction the undertakings concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order 
to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behavior that is 
contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (general deterrence).” 
Since 1970, also the European jurisdiction has recognized the repressive function of fines 
according to Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 and its preceding provisions.920 Even 
though the ECJ has never confirmed the criminal nature of fines in competition cases so 
far, it ensures the respect of procedural guarantees applying to criminal proceedings, in 
particular Articles 47 to 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.921 
                                                 
913 Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43 (2010), 2377. 
See also with specific reference to Germany Wernhard Möschel, “Kartellbußen und Artikel 92 Grundgesetz”, 
WuW Vol. 60, no. 9 (2010), 870. 
914 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, “Die Rechtmäßigkeit der neueren Geldbußenpraxis der EU-Kommission wegen Ver-
stoß gegen Verfahrenspflichten nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Verordnung Nr. 1/2003”, WuW Vol. 62, no. 12 (2012), 
1165. See also Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," 
in Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann 
and Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 281. 
915 Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy. Case 43509 Ref. 41 et sqq. 
916 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, “Die Rechtmäßigkeit der neueren Geldbußenpraxis der EU-Kommission wegen Ver-
stoß gegen Verfahrenspflichten nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Verordnung Nr. 1/2003”, WuW Vol. 62, no. 12 (2012), 
1166. Refer also to Brei, "Due Process in EU antitrust proceedings - causa finita after Menarini?," ZWeR Vol. 
13, no. 1 (2015), 36. 
917 Georg-Klaus de Bronett, “Die Rechtmäßigkeit der neueren Geldbußenpraxis der EU-Kommission wegen Ver-
stoß gegen Verfahrenspflichten nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Verordnung Nr. 1/2003”, WuW Vol. 62, no. 12 (2012), 
1165. With reference to Jussila v Finland. Case 73053/01 Ref. 38. 
918 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. 
919 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal from September 1, 2006. N° C 210, 2. 
920 Settled case-law since ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission. Case 41/69. European Court Reports 1970, 
661 Ref. 172, 176. 
921 Koen Lenaerts, “Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 175-176. 
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Another indicative effect pointing to a classification as criminal law results from the re-
quirements of Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003. Fining requires an antitrust infringe-
ment committed with intent or negligently. These are typical categories of criminal law.922 
In summary, the examination of the sanctioning provisions leaves room for only one con-
clusion: The procedural guarantees for criminal proceedings, foremost the requirement of 
legal clarity, apply to Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003.923 In its latest verdict, the CFI 
does not seem to question the applicability of these standards.924 
 
(c) The necessary level of legal certainty 
From the above listed requirements for sanctioning provisions, the necessary level 
of legal certainty may be deducted. It depends mainly on the intensity of the government 
intervention.925 According to the ECJ, “the requirement of legal clarity is indeed imperative 
in a sector in which any uncertainty may well lead to incidents and the application of 
particularly serious sanctions”.926 Hence, the European Council needs to define precisely 
contents, purpose and scope of an impending sanction in a way such that the prerequi-
sites, type and amount may be foreseen by potential parties concerned from the regulation 
itself. Furthermore, a maximum amount for sanctions needs to be defined. The fines may 
not achieve the character of a criminal law sanction through excessive amounts.927 Notably 
in the case of antitrust fines, the precise definition of the sanctions is necessary to balance 
the concentrated power of the European Commission in antitrust and competition law.928 
Its task to act as investigating authority, prosecutor and judge in one person carries risk 
for the principle of fair trial.929 Therefore, the European Commission needs to be provided 
with clear and nonambiguous guidelines in Regulation N° 1/2003 on how to execute its 
                                                 
922 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. 
923 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 22. 
924 Ecka Granulate GmbH & Co. KG v Commission. Case T-400/09 Ref. 25. 
925 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. 
926 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case 
32/79. European Court Reports 1980, 2403 Ref. 46. 
927 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 206. 
928 Koen Lenaerts, “Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 175. 
929 See e.g. Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43, 2377. 
The author even comes to the conclusion that the cumulation of tasks for the Commission violates the principle 
of separation of powers and the procedural guarantees of Art. 6 ECHR. Refer also to Brei, "Due Process in EU 
antitrust proceedings - causa finita after Menarini?," ZWeR Vol. 13, no. 1 (2015), 40, 44. 
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power. Codified rules for the determination of the sentence are a necessary condition for 
the implementation of the requirement of legal certainty.930 
 
(d) Incompatibility of the current legal basis for antitrust fines with the necessary level 
of legal certainty 
A comparative examination of Regulation N° 1/2003 with the necessary level of legal 
certainty derived in the preceding sections yields the incompatibility of the current legal 
basis of antitrust fines. Three main points of criticism lead to this conclusion:931 
1. The lack of legal certainty with regard to whether a fine is imposed, 
2. the lack of an absolute maximum fine, and 
3. the lack of precise criteria for the determination of an individual fine. 
At first, Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 does not contain a binding requirement for the 
European Commission to impose a fine. The text of the norm says that it “may” impose a 
fine, without limiting the authority´s discretion whether to sanction or not in any way. In 
practice, there is no judicial review with regard to the Commission´s compliance with the 
principle of equal treatment and proportionality.932 
Secondly, there is no absolute maximum fine in the regulation. The yearly revenue of any 
firm concerned limits the fine, where 10 percent of last year´s revenue constitute the 
maximum of the fine.933 In numbers, however, the fine is unlimited and does only become 
clear in the moment of application of the law.934 It may be doubted whether the legisla-
                                                 
930 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 207. 
931 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
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932 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 207. See 
also Brei, "Due Process in EU antitrust proceedings - causa finita after Menarini?," ZWeR Vol. 13, no. 1 (2015), 
47-48. 
933 The CFI considered this limit to be in accordance with the requirement of legal certainty: Ecka Granulate 
GmbH & Co. KG v Commission. Case T-400/09 Ref. 28. See also earlier decisions on this question: Degussa v 
Commission. Case T-279/02. European Court Reports 2006, II-879 Ref. 74-76; Schunk GmbH and Schunk 
Kohlenstoff-Technik GmbH v Commission. Case T-69/04. European Court Reports 2008, II-2567 Ref. 35-36. 
Taking the opposing opinion Philipp Voet van Vormizeele, "Kartellrecht und Verfassungsrecht," NZKart Vol. 1, 
no. 10 (2013), 391. 
934 Fines may, in fact, reach from 1000 € to billions of Euros. See e.g. Hans-Joachim Hellmann, “Vereinbarkeit 
der Leitlinien der Kommission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit höherrangigem Gemeinschaftsrecht”, WuW 
Vol. 52, no. 10 (2002), 952. 
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tor´s decision for an individual penalty range does fulfill the requirement of legal cer-
tainty.935 In fact, it is not the law that determines the amount of the fine, but the authority, 
which carries the risk of arbitrary decisions936 that may neither be foreseen, nor reviewed 
by the firms concerned.937 
Thirdly, Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 lacks precise criteria for the determination of 
the amount of the fine. The norm contains only two criteria (Art. 23(3) of Regulation N° 
1/2003) that shall guide the discretion of the Commission: The gravity of the infringe-
ment and its duration. Yet, particularly these two criteria are badly qualified to limit the 
Commission´s discretion: According to the jurisdiction, there is no coercive list of criteria, 
which do necessarily have to be considered for the determination of the gravity of an 
antitrust infringement.938 Therefore, this criterion is not well suited for the guidance of the 
Commission´s discretion. In practice, the amount of a fine is determined with reference 
to a number of other factors that aggravate or soften the fine.939 Hence, the Commission 
bases its decisions on a number of factors that are not part of the statutory authorization 
and can therefore not be foreseen by aggrieved parties.940 Eventually, Ref. 37 of the guide-
lines contains a general allowance to depart from the method in order to ensure sufficient 
deterrence in an individual case. This provision takes the CFI arguments941 with regard to 
a foreseeable self-limitation of the Commission through its guidelines to the absurd.942 
In summary, the lack of a general maximum fine in combination with lacking criteria for 
the precise and reviewable determination of fines leads to a violation of the requirement 
of legal certainty through Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003. 
                                                 
935 In its draft for the preceding Regulation N° 17/62, the DG Competition had considered a percentage maxi-
mum fine an inappropriate criterion for the determination of fines. See Volker Soyez, “Die 10%-Bußgeldober-
grenze und der more economic approach”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 2 (2013), 103. 
936 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1117. 
937 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 207. 
938 SPO and others v Commission. Case T-29/92. European Court Reports 1996, I-1611 Ref. 54; Ferriere Nord 
SpA v Commission. Case C-219/95 P. European Court Reports 1997, I-4411 Ref. 33; LR af 1998 A/S v Com-
mission. Case T-23/99. European Court Reports 2002, II-1705 Ref. 236. 
939 Please refer to section B. II.1. a) aa) of this chapter, where the EC guideline´s approach to the calculation 
of fines is introduced. 
940 The CFI has nonetheless denied a violation of the requirement of legal certainty, pointing to the guidelines 
as a self-imposed limit to the Commission´s  discretion. Ecka Granulate GmbH & Co. KG v Commission. Case 
T-400/09 Ref. 30. See also earlier decisions on this question: Degussa v Commission. Case T-279/02. Euro-
pean Court Reports 2006, II-879 Ref. 74-76; Schunk GmbH and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik GmbH v Commis-
sion. Case T-69/04. European Court Reports 2008, II-2567 Ref. 35-36. 
941 Ecka Granulate GmbH & Co. KG v Commission. Case T-400/09 Ref. 30. See also earlier decisions on this 
question: Degussa v Commission. Case T-279/02. European Court Reports 2006, II-879 Ref. 74-76; Schunk 
GmbH and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik GmbH v Commission. Case T-69/04. European Court Reports 2008, II-
2567 Ref. 35-36. 
942 Felix Engelsing, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 481. 
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(e) Lacking justification of the infringement of the principle of legal certainty 
The lack of legal certainty is not justified by any economic considerations or com-
pensation through judicial revision. The European Commission has repeatedly expressed 
its conviction that a foreseeable fine practice might not have a deterrent effect.943 Yet, 
with regard to the above conducted economic analysis of antitrust fines, this view is not 
economically justifiable. The opposite is true: Firms need to be able to calculate the dam-
age from the prosecution of infringements in order to compare it to the potential gains 
from infringements and – in case of optimally adjusted fines – refrain from the antitrust 
violation.944 From a legal point of view, the requirement of legal certainty is not for the 
Commission´s disposal, since it is a minimum requirement under the rule of law.945 
Furthermore, a lack of legal certainty may not be compensated through the competence 
of Community Courts to review Commission decisions with regard to the amount of the 
fine.946 First, the requirement of legal certainty is addressed to the legislator and may not 
be passed on to the courts. The judges lack a sufficiently precise standard based on which 
they may control the exercise of the Commission´s discretion.947 In practice, the European 
Courts do therefore rely on the Commission´s findings on the facts of the case, which 
provides the basis for the decision on a fine.948 Judicial review is limited to compliance with 
procedural rules, a sufficient justification of the fine, correct findings on the facts of the 
case and the lack of manifest errors of appraisal or a misuse of powers.949 
 
(f) Consequence: Restrictive interpretation of Art. 23(2) of REG N° 1/2003 
As a consequence of the violation of the requirement of legal certainty, Art. 23(2) of 
Regulation N° 1/2003 is subject to restrictive interpretation.950 The norm itself con-
cedes almost unlimited discretion to the Commission. The resulting lack of clarity and 
                                                 
943 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 208-210. 
944 Please refer to the economic analysis in section B. of this chapter. 
945 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 208. 
946 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 26. 
947 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 208. 
948 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 27 and 57. 
949 Koen Lenaerts, “Due process in competition cases”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 176-177. See also the Eu-
ropean jurisdiction John Deere Ltd v Commission. Case C-7/95. European Court Reports 1998, I-3111 Ref. 34. 
See also Bolloré SA v Commission. Joined Cases T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-
128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02. European Court Reports 2007, II-947 Ref. 664. 
950 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 80. 
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foreseeability does however not lead to nullity of the provision. According to the case law 
of the European courts, secondary EU law has rather to be interpreted in conformance 
with primary law.951 Hence, also a vague enabling provision may be enforceable if it is 
interpreted in the light of the requirement of legal certainty.952 For the case of fines for 
manipulative practices in the energy market, this means that de lege lata only fines 
below the threshold of criminal law are in accordance with EU law.953 
 
(3) The current EC guideline´s criteria violate the principle of the reservation 
of the law 
Also, the basic principle of the reservation of the law is violated by the EU Commis-
sion guidelines on antitrust fines.954 According to this principle, any administrative action 
requires an enabling provision in primary or secondary Community law, Art. 2 TEU.955 With 
regard to the guidelines on fining, two problems arise: 
1. First, it may be doubted whether Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 contains an 
enabling provision that includes the right for the Commission to establish ab-
stract, quasi-legal rules for the calculation of fines (a). 
2. Second, the compliance of the Commission´s guidelines with a potential ena-
bling provision in Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 appears doubtful (b).956 
 
(a) The legal nature of the guidances on fining 
(aa) In a first step, the legal nature of the guidances on fining needs to be deter-
mined. Both, Art. 288 TFEU and Art. 290 TFEU might apply to the Commission guidances, 
                                                 
951 Matthias Ruffert, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 288 AEUV Ref. 9. 
952 Ulrich Soltész, Christian Steinle and Holger Bielesz, “Rekordgeldbußen versus Bestimmtheitsgebot, Die Kar-
tellverordnung auf dem Prüfstein höherrangigen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, EuZW Vol. 14, no. 7 (2003), 210. 
953 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 80. 
954 Deviating Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 
2015, 25 Ref. 99. 
955 Christian Calliess, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 2 EUV Ref. 25. 
956 With regard to the legal situation before the introduction of Regulation N° 1/2003 see Hans-Joachim Hell-
mann, “Vereinbarkeit der Leitlinien der Kommission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit höherrangigem Ge-
meinschaftsrecht”, WuW Vol. 52, no. 10 (2002), 947. 
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yet only Art. 290 TFEU requires an enabling provision for the Commission to adopt its 
guidelines.957 
Art. 288 TFEU, formerly Art. 249 TEU, contains rules for all legal acts of the EU. This 
includes European administrative provisions, such as Commission Communications, Com-
mission´s Guidelines and other legally non-binding soft law.958 These administrative pro-
visions are supposed to ensure uniform administrative decisions, improve information and 
transparency and thereby contribute to legal certainty. A legal effect exceeding the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations is not envisioned by administrative provisions.959 The 
European Commission and jurisdiction consider Commission´s Guidelines like the guide-
lines on fining antitrust violations to be in the scope of application of Art. 288 TFEU. There-
fore, the need for an authorization of the Commission is negated and the reservation of 
the law not violated. 
Other than Art. 288 TFEU, Art. 290 TFEU requires an authorization of the European Com-
mission to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend cer-
tain non-essential elements of the legislative act.960 The applicability of Art. 290 TFEU to 
the guidelines on fining results from Art. 103, 289(3) TFEU. According to Art. 103 TFEU, 
the European Council is the designated legislator for antitrust and the realization of the 
principles laid down in Art. 101 and 102 TFEU.961 In particular, the Council decides about 
the introduction of fines and penalty payments, Art. 103(2) lit. a TFEU. Since legislation 
under Art. 103 TFEU refers to substantive questions in the field of antitrust, these legisla-
tive acts need to be adopted by legislative procedure (e.g. be a regulation or directive) 
according to Art. 289(3) TFEU.962 For such acts, Art. 290 TFEU applies with regard to the 
delegation of power to the Commission.963 Since Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003, which 
is the legal foundation of antitrust sanctioning, is based upon Art. 103(2) TFEU, the Com-
mission needs to be authorized to the determination of quasi-legislative legal 
acts according to the requirements of Art. 290 TFEU.964 
                                                 
957 Matthias Ruffert, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 290 AEUV Ref. 8. 
958 Ibid, Art. 288 AEUV Ref. 102. 
959 Ibid, Art. 288 AEUV Ref. 103. 
960 Ibid, Art. 290 AEUV Ref. 2. 
961 Ingo Brinker, EU-Kommentar, 3rd ed., ed. Jürgen Schwarze (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2012), 1204 
Ref. 1. 
962 Matthias Ruffert, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
Art. 289 AEUV Ref. 8. 
963 Johann Schoo, EU-Kommentar, 3rd ed., ed. Jürgen Schwarze (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2012), 2336 
Ref. 11. 
964 Wolfgang Weiß, “Das Leitlinien(un)wesen der Kommission verletzt den Vertrag von Lissabon”, EWS Vol. 17, 
no. 7 (2010), 260. 
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(bb) In a second step, the lacking compliance of the guidelines with the legal man-
date of the EC in Art. 23(2) and (3) of Regulation N° 1/2003 will be proved. Art. 23(2) 
of Regulation N° 1/2003 confers on the Commission a discretion whether and to which 
extent to fine. The third paragraph of the norm concretizes, naming the gravity and the 
duration of the infringement as a benchmark for the determination of fines.965 Settled 
case-law of the ECJ further established that the Commission needs to consider all individ-
ual circumstances, especially the total turnover and the specific turnover from the sale of 
the product concerned by the antitrust infringement.966 With the introduction of the guide-
lines, however, the Commission established abstract rules for fining instead of exercising 
its discretion in every individual case. These general criteria have the typical characteris-
tics of a quasi-legal act of secondary Community law.967 As a result, the Commission needs 
to be authorized by the Council to adopt these rules (aa). 
The enabling provision needs to lay down specifically objectives, content, scope and du-
ration of the delegation of power to the Commission and may not refer to essential ele-
ments of an area, which are, according to the materiality principle, reserved for the legis-
lative act itself, Art. 290 (1) second and third sentence TFEU.968 
With regard to the imprecise criteria for fining contained in Art. 23 of Regulation 
N° 1/2003, it may already be doubted whether the Council actually complied with its ob-
ligation to decide about all essential elements of the legislative act on its own, Art. 290(1) 
TFEU.969 Since Art. 103(2) lit. a TFEU explicitly empowers the European Council to intro-
duce sanctioning provisions, this decision must be considered essential. Hence, the Euro-
pean Council needs to specify the criteria laid down in Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003, 
resulting from its obligation to decide about essential elements of the legal act on its own, 
Art. 290(1) TFEU. 
Furthermore, even if Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 is not considered to require specifi-
cation, the basic legal act (Regulation N° 1/2003) needs to define objectives, content, 
scope and duration of the delegation of power.970 Yet, Art. 33 of Regulation N° 1/2003, 
                                                 
965 Hans-Joachim Hellmann, “Vereinbarkeit der Leitlinien der Kommission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit 
höherrangigem Gemeinschaftsrecht”, WuW Vol. 52, no. 10 (2002), 948. 
966 S.A. Musique Diffusion Francaise (Pioneer) v Commission. Joined Cases 100/80 – 103/80. European Court 
Reports 1983, 1825 Ref. 121. 
967 Hans-Joachim Hellmann, “Vereinbarkeit der Leitlinien der Kommission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit 
höherrangigem Gemeinschaftsrecht”, WuW Vol. 52, no. 10 (2002), 948. 
968 Matthias Ruffert, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
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no. 7 (2010), 260. See also Helmut Lecheler, “Ungereimtheiten bei den Handlungsformen des Gemeinschafts-
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which concerns the adoption of implementing rules, does not refer to sanctioning provi-
sions. 
(cc) Therefore, the Commission is acting without effective enabling provision ac-
cording to Art. 290 TFEU when it adopts guidelines on fining.971 The guidelines on fining 
violate the principle of the reservation of the law and are therefore unlawful. 
 
(b) The compliance of the guidelines with the enabling provision 
Assuming that Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003 is based upon an effective enabling 
provision, the compliance of the Commission´s guidelines with this provision may be 
doubted. In its guidelines, the Commission does no more refer to the turnover of the 
undertakings that Art. 23(2) of Regulation N° 1/2003 lays down related to the maximum 
fine, but rather defines a number of aggravating and mitigating criteria that are supposed 
to adapt the amount of the fine to the level of deterrence intended by the Commission. It 
appears doubtful whether the Commission´s discretion includes this interpretation.972 
The current EC guidelines aim at a restructuring of markets, particularly the energy mar-
ket, through prohibitive fines: The forced sale of production capacity in the German power 
market, as well as the separation of the highest voltage grids from the huge power pro-
ducers are prominent examples.973 This is however not included in the Commission´s man-
date for fining violations of EU competition law and its discretion with regard to the sanc-
tion. 
Some of the criteria established by the Commission do violate basic procedural rights. In 
reference 28, second indent, the Commission names the “refusal to cooperate with or 
obstruction of the Commission in carrying out its investigations” as an aggravating cir-
cumstance. Yet, the right to a fair hearing recognized in Art. 6(1) ECHR and Art. 47 Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the protection from undue force 
and self-incrimination.974 The de-facto obligation to cooperate with the European Commis-
sion in its examination even beyond the punishable cases laid down in Art. 23(1) of Reg-
ulation N° 1/2003 violates the procedural rights of the firms accused of a violation of 
                                                 
971 Ibid. 
972 With regard to the 1998 guidelines, refer to Hans-Joachim Hellmann, “Vereinbarkeit der Leitlinien der Kom-
mission zur Berechnung von Bußgeldern mit höherrangigem Gemeinschaftsrecht”, WuW Vol. 52, no. 10 
(2002), 948. 
973 Wernhard Möschel, “Geldbußen im europäischen Kartellrecht”, Der Betrieb Vol. 63, no. 43 (2010), 2377. 
974 Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community Competition 
Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 35. 
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competition law. The EC, in applying this provision, does no more sanction antitrust in-
fringements, but non-cooperation of suspects.975 This violation of the suspects´ procedural 
rights may therefore not be a permitted interpretation of the legally binding criterion of 
gravity. 
 
(4) The current EC guideline´s criteria violate the principles of proportionality 
and equal treatment 
European law, with reference to the rule of law976, does also know the principle of 
proportionality of penalties, Art. 49(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.977 It reads: 
“The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.” 
 
(a)  The principle of proportionality of penalties 
This principle relates to both, the penalty laid down in the law and its application in 
individual cases. It guarantees that penalty and scale of punishment take into account the 
purpose of the punishment and are necessary for and proportionate to the gravity of the 
infringement.978 The ECJ affirmed this principle, stating that fines imposed by the EC for 
infringements of competition law “have as their object to punish illegal conduct as well as 
to prevent it being repeated”.979 Especially with regard to the perception of punishments 
by the antitrust violators, a just, which is a proportionate punishment, may not be reached 
by ever-increasing fines.980 Rather, excessive penalties unnecessary to achieve the goals 
of punishment must be avoided.981 Hence, also from the point of view of proportionality, 
                                                 
975 Volker Soyez, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Kommission – mehr Fragen als Antworten”, EuZW Vol. 18, no. 19 
(2007), 599. 
976 Bernhard Wegener, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
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Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 20. 
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the current guidelines are no permitted interpretation of the criteria laid down in Art. 23(3) 
of Regulation N° 1/2003.982 
 
(b) The principle of equal treatment 
Furthermore, the application of the guidelines on fining violates the principle of equal 
treatment. European law recognizes this basic principle as a product of fundamental 
rights´ influence on administrative procedures.983 The Commission´s guidelines do, how-
ever, cause an unequal treatment of firms involved in competition law infringements. A 
differentiation between firms according to size, economic strength and market position is 
not provided for. Ref. 30 of the guidelines allows an increase of a fine exceeding the turn-
over in the cartelized division in cases where besides the sale of the cartelized product 
substantial other turnover has been generated.984 This provision leads to an unequal treat-
ment of small and medium sized enterprises and group companies even in cases where 
participation, intensity and duration of the infringement are the same.985 A violation of the 
principle of equal treatment may also not be considered a valid interpretation of binding 
EU law by the Commission. 
 
(5) Summary of the legal analysis and result 
The above legal analysis has shown the incompatibility of the EC guidelines on fining 
for antitrust infringements with primary EU law.986 This finding results in a mandatory 
interpretation of the EC guidelines in conformance with primary Community 
law.987 Legally binding criteria for the determination of fines for antitrust infringements 
                                                 
982 This conclusion is also reached by Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher 
und europäischer Sicht," in Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus 
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rens”, NJW Vol. 42, no. 29 (1989), 1779. 
984 Volker Soyez, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Kommission – mehr Fragen als Antworten”, EuZW Vol. 18, no. 19 
(2007), 596. 
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987 Matthias Ruffert, EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grund-
rechtecharta. Kommentar, 4th ed., ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 
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are therefore solely the gravity and the duration of the infringement, Art. 23(3) of Regu-
lation N° 1/2003.988 The subsequent section will elaborate a valid interpretation of both 
criteria that ensures efficient deterrence of market manipulations. 
 
(6) Determination of government fines DG in accordance with Art. 23(3) of 
Regulation N° 1/2003 and primary Community law 
The CFI and ECJ jurisdiction dating from the time before the introduction of the EC 
guidelines contains valuable hints on the interpretation of the fining provision in Art. 23(2) 
and (3) of Regulation N° 1/2003, then Art. 15(2) of Regulation N° 17/62. The second 
sentence of this norm defined as criteria for the determination of fines the gravity and the 
duration of antitrust infringements, just as Art. 23(3) of Regulation N° 1/2003 does today. 
 
(a) The gravity of the infringement 
With regard to the gravity of the infringement, the European jurisprudence focused 
on the value of the goods that were the object of the competition law violation, as well as 
the economic power of the firm in order to determine its influence on the market con-
cerned.989 In the seminal case of Musique Diffusion v Commission, the ECJ notes990: 
“It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the 
fine, to have regard to both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which 
gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the under-
taking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover ac-
counted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, 
which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, 
it follows that it is important not to confer on one or the other of those figures 
an importance disproportionate in relation to the other factors and, conse-
quently, that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple 
calculation based on the total turnover. That is particularly the case where the 
goods concerned account for only a small part of that figure. It is appropriate 
for the court to bear in mind those considerations in its assessment, by the 
                                                 
988 Volker Soyez, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Kommission – mehr Fragen als Antworten”, EuZW Vol. 18, no. 19 
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virtue of its powers of unlimited jurisdiction, of the gravity of the infringements 
in question.” 
Hence, the ECJ bases its considerations with regard to the gravity of the infringement on 
the turnover obtained through the antitrust infringement. This approach comes 
close to the findings of the above-conducted economic analysis991, stating that the optimal 
deterrence is achieved if the following equation is satisfied: 
 = pP(e) . (DG + D̅P).
992 
In fixing the basic amount of a fine, the change in profit achieved from the antitrust in-
fringement should be the main determinant of the considerations. This interpretation of 
gravity of the infringement satisfies the purpose of the sanctioning provision without ex-
tending the scope of Art. 23(3) of Regulation N° 1/2003.993 Thus, also from a legal point 
of view, the ECJ approach is in conformance with European law. The reference to total and 
violation-specific turnover of the firm is in accordance with the principle of legal certainty 
and does not violate the infringer´s rights guaranteed by primary Community law. This 
valid interpretation of the criterion of gravity must therefore guide decisions on fining 
under EU law to ensure an efficient and lawful deterrence of manipulative market behav-
ior.994 
 
(b) The duration of the infringement 
Even though less controversial, there shall still be some remarks on the interpreta-
tion of the criterion of duration of the infringement. The EC guidelines account for the 
duration in N° 24. The turnover calculated according to numbers 20 to 23 will be multiplied 
with the number of years that the firm was involved in the infringement. This interpretation 
of the criterion is clear and transparent. Also, the Commission´s application of the criterion 
satisfies the requirements of primary EU law. 
 
 
                                                 
991 See section II.2. of this chapter. 
992 See section B. of this chapter. 
993 See also Jürgen Schwarze, Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, Deficiencies in European Community 
Competition Law. Critical analysis of current practice and proposals for change. (Stuttgart: GleissLutz, 2008), 
80 (N° 5) who supports a similar approach de lege lata. 
994 However, the introduction of detailled criteria for the determination of the amount of the fine in Regulation 
N° 1/2003 that satisfy the requirements of legal certainty would highly improve the clarity for firms concerned 
and should be pursued by the European Council. See ibid, 81. 
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(7) Conclusion: EU law requires a reduction of government fines DG 
The applicable European law requires a lowering of fines for manipulations below the 
threshold of criminal law, as well as an interpretation of the criteria for the determination 
of the amount of the fine that is in conformance with primary Community law. Every fur-
ther extension of deterrence needs to be governed through alternative punishments (DJ) 
and, even more important de lege lata, through an increase of the probability of detection 
and punishment pp. 
 
bb) Violations of higher-ranking German Law 
The German FCO developed, based on the European example995, guidelines for the 
determination of fines in antitrust administrative proceedings that have been introduced 
above.996 Just as for the European case, the economic analysis found inefficiently high 
fines while at the same time the probability of punishment pp failed to meet the efficient 
level.997 From a legal point of view, these results are confirmed. The following section will 
show that Sec. 81(4) GWB on which the FCO guidelines are based violates the principle of 
legal certainty998 and needs to be interpreted restrictively within the limits of the applicable 
law. 
 
(1) Guiding principles of German constitutional law 
German secondary law needs to be in accordance with the rule of law referred to in 
Art. 20(3) of the German constitution (GG). This includes the guarantee of legal certainty 
for all norms of national law. It requires certainty in three ways: The formulation of pre-
dictable rules that enable the addressee to direct his behavior accordingly, clear standards 
for the administration and a basis for appropriate judicial review.999 The appropriate level 
of legal certainty depends on several factors, mainly the intensity of the governmental 
intervention resulting from the rule and the material character of the subject matter. Ba-
sically, more intense interventions require a higher degree of clarity of legal norms.1000 For 
the case of criminal provisions, Art. 103(2) GG (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) 
                                                 
995 Andreas Mundt, “Die Bußgeldleitlinien des Bundeskartellamtes”, WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 458. 
996 See section II.1. a) bb) of this chapter. 
997 See section II.1. a) bb) of this chapter. 
998 Similar Vormizeele, "Kartellrecht und Verfassungsrecht," NZKart Vol. 1, no. 10 (2013), 387. 
999 Bernd Grzeszick, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2012), Art. 20 GG Ref. 58. 
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specifies the requirements of legal certainty.1001 According to the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), this guarantee does not only apply to 
criminal law, but also to administrative offenses such as Sec. 81 GWB.1002 It extends to 
both, the requirements of Sec. 81(4) GWB and its legal consequences.1003 
The BVerfG has elaborated the necessary degree of legal certainty for criminal sanctions 
in its famous decision Vermögensstrafe.1004 In its effort to balance the principles of sen-
tencing adequate to fault committed and legal certainty, the court established the priority 
of the principle of legal certainty over adequate sentencing with increasing intensity of the 
intervention.1005 The legislator meets the requirements of legal certainty, if 
“by the choice of the threat of punishment the judge as well as the individual 
concerned are oriented in a way such that his [the legislator´s] evaluation of 
the offense becomes clear, the individual involved may assess the scope of 
the threatening punishment and the judge is provided with tools to find a 
response adequate to the fault committed.”1006 
In cases where intense sanctions are imposed, the legislator needs to define a minimum 
and a maximum penalty in order to provide orientation for the judge´s consideration of 
the wrong and the degree of fault.1007 An unlimited range for sanctions bears the danger 
of erratic, thus not sufficiently predictable punishment.1008 Furthermore, the BVerfG de-
rived from the principle of legal certainty a legislative obligation to name criteria suited to 
guide the judicial decision.1009 It should be ensured that the punishment 
“is not subject to unlimited judicial discretion but will be determined within a 
structured framework”1010. 
                                                 
1001 Eberhard Schmid-Aßmann, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 103 GG Ref. 164. 
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In the case Vermögensstrafe, the law did not contain a fixed maximum fine but rather a 
flexible penalty range, which was only concretized through the facts of the individual case. 
The BVerfG raised concerns with regard to the constitutionality of the fines provision, 
pointing out the lack of guidance on the legislator´s evaluation of the infringement for 
potential addressees.1011 
 
(2) Fines above the threshold of criminal law violate the principle of legal cer-
tainty 
The above-described BVerfG criteria for the conformity of monetary fines provisions 
with the principle of legal certainty will be used to show the violation of constitutional law 
through Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB.1012 
 
(a) The intensity of the intervention in basic rights 
In a first step, the intensity of the intervention in basic rights from the fines provi-
sion will be determined. The obligation to pay a fine may not be judged on the basis of 
Art. 14 GG, which does not protect purely asset-related legal interests.1013 The relevant 
constitutional norm for the review of Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB is therefore the 
general freedom of action guaranteed in Art. 2(1) GG. Without any doubt, the fines deter-
mined according to Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB constitute an intense intervention in 
Art. 2(1) GG.1014 Even the prohibition of excessive measures codified in Sec. 17(3) OWiG, 
which prevents fines that may endanger a firm´s existence, does not contradict the appli-
cation of the strict requirements for intense interventions. Corporate assets form the basis 
for any firm´s existence in competitive markets and are therefore highly protected by the 
law.1015 
 
 
                                                 
1011 Ibid, 163 et sqq. 
1012 Hans Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 
(2013), 698. 
1013 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1110. With reference to Investitionshilfe. Cases 1 BvR 
459/52, 1 BvR 484/52, 1 BvR 548/52, 1 BvR 555/52, 1 BvR 623/52, 1 BvR 651/52, 1 BvR 748/52, 1 BvR 
783/52, 1 BvR 801/52, 1 BvR 5/53, 1 BvR 9/53, 1 BvR 96/53, 1 BvR 114/54. BVerfGE 4, 7, 17. 
1014 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1111. 
1015 Ibid. 
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(b) Violation of the principle of legal certainty (Art. 103(2) GG) 
The lack of a fixed maximum fine in Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB violates the 
principle of legal certainty, Art. 103(2) GG.1016 Just as in the case Vermögensstrafe decided 
by the BVerfG, Sec. 81(4) second sentence lacks a fixed maximum fine. Instead, a penalty 
range reaching from five to one billion Euro is codified in the GWB.1017 Other than Weit-
brecht and Mühle find, Sec. 81(4) first sentence GWB does not serve as an orientation for 
the wrongful character of antitrust infringements.1018 The first sentence of Sec. 81(4) GWB 
refers to fines for addressees that are not companies and defines a maximum fine of one 
million Euro. Yet, the second sentence of the provision does refer to the first sentence only 
in order to extend the sentencing range for companies. An orientation with regard to the 
maximum fine may not be found in the provision.1019 Incidentally, it would be hard to 
explain how the 1 Million maximum in the first sentence of Sec. 81(4) behaves to the wide 
scope of fines imposed according to the second sentence with regard to the wrongful char-
acter of the infringements. In practice: Which proportion exists between sentence one and 
two? Therefore, the second sentence of Sec. 81(4) may not be considered lex specialis to 
its first sentence.1020 
As a consequence, it remains unclear to potential addressees which wrongful character 
the legislator assigns to antitrust infringements sanctioned by the fines provision – espe-
cially since it applies to all kinds of antitrust infringements with their different degrees of 
illegality.1021 Furthermore, the yearly turnover is not an appropriate criterion for the de-
termination of the fine, because it does not refer to the economic performance of a firm, 
but is rather a mirror for its sales.1022 A management of the financial burden imposed with 
the fine is therefore not to be expected.1023 Therefore, both the differentiation between 
                                                 
1016 Also Hans Achenbach, "Die Kappungsgrenze und die Folgen - Zweifelsfragen des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB," ZWeR 
Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 24. Dissenting opinion e.g. Thomas Ackermann, "Kartellgeldbußen als Instrument der 
Wirtschaftsaufsicht," ibid Vol. 10, no. 1 (2012), 13. 
1017 Rainer Bechtold and Martin Buntscheck, “Die 7. GWB-Novelle und die Entwicklung des deutschen Kartell-
rechts 2003 bis 2005”, NJW Vol. 58, no. 41 (2005), 2969. See also Martin Buntscheck, “Der „verunglückte” 
Abschied von der Mehrerlösgeldbuße für schwere Kartellverstöße. Kritische Anmerkungen zu § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 
GWB”, in: Recht und Wettbewerb. Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ingo Brinker, Dieter 
H. Scheuing, and Kurt Stockmann (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2006), 91. 
1018 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1111. The dissenting opinion of Achenbach, "Die 
Kappungsgrenze und die Folgen - Zweifelsfragen des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB," ZWeR Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 20. 
1019 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1003. The au-
thor does even argue that the lacking demarcation between the first and second sentence of Sec. 81(4) GWB 
does add to the violation of the principle of legal certainty. Refer also to ibid, 5-6. 
1020 However, this is being held by Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Buß-
gelddrohung gegen Unternehmen nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1111. 
1021 Hauke Brettel and Stefan Thomas, "Unternehmensbußgeld, Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz und Schuldprinzip im 
novellierten deutschen Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 44. 
1022 Also Thomas Ackermann, "Kartellgeldbußen als Instrument der Wirtschaftsaufsicht," ibid Vol. 10, no. 1 
(2012), 12. 
1023 Hauke Brettel and Stefan Thomas, "Unternehmensbußgeld, Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz und Schuldprinzip im 
novellierten deutschen Kartellrecht," ibid Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 47. 
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different types of offences and the reference for the determination of the fine violate con-
stitutional law: The subsumption of Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB under the above-
described legal standards for sentencing provisions does therefore not fulfill the require-
ments formulated by the BVerfG in its Vermögensstrafe jurisdiction. A sufficient 
orientation for firms operating under the existing law is therefore not assured. 
Also, the existing FCO guidelines on fining do not suffice as constitutional orientation for 
firms subject to antitrust proceedings: From a formal point of view, the guidelines may 
only be legally binding towards the FCO – but not towards the courts. From a material 
point of view, the guidelines do not contribute to the clarification of the deficit in legal 
certainty: Neither do they contain a differentiation between different antitrust infringe-
ments, nor is the determination of a fine a sufficient orientation for firms.1024 
The Federal Court of Justice in its Grauzementkartell verdict has recently rejected this 
view.1025 The BGH considered the flexible scope of punishment to be consistent with the 
requirement of legal certainty established in Art. 103(2) GG by way of an interpretation of 
the norm in conformity with the constitution.1026 In order to establish conformity, the 
judges interpreted the 10 percent threshold as maximum fine, as opposed to the interpre-
tation under European law1027 and former practice of the German guidelines on fining from 
2006 which treat the threshold as a cap only for the final amount determined according to 
the guidelines.1028 
 
(c) The German Federal Court of Justice decision “Grauzementkartell” 
Yet, the interpretation of the German Federal Court of Justice cannot be considered 
an allowed interpretation of the law.1029 Any interpretation in conformity with constitutional 
law is limited by the wording and in cases where it would conflict with the identifiable will 
                                                 
1024 Ibid, 49-50. 
1025 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12. 
1026 Ibid Ref. 51. 
1027 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij. Case C-238/99. European Court Reports 2002, I-8618, 8787 et sqq.; 
Dansk Rørindustri v Commission. Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-208/02 P, C-213/02 P. Euro-
pean Court Reports 2005, I-5488, 5587 et sqq. And Christoph Barth and Stefanie Budde, “Die Strafe soll nicht 
größer sein als die Schuld, Zum Urteil des BGH in Sachen Grauzement und den neuen Leitlinien für die Buß-
geldzumessung”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 8 (2013), 311. 
1028 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 52. With reference to Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, 
Wettbewerbsrecht EG/Teil 2, Kommentar zum Europäischen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1252 Ref. 101. 
1029 Winfried Hassemer and Jens Dallmeyer, Gesetzliche Orientierung im deutschen Recht der Kartellgeldbußen 
und das Grundgesetz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), 39-40. The opposite opinion is hold by 
e.g. Hauke Brettel and Stefan Thomas, “Unternehmensbußgeld, Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz und Schuldprinzip im 
novellierten deutschen Kartellrecht”, ZWeR Vol. 8, no. 1 (2009), 34 et sqq. 
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of the legislator.1030 The courts may not defy the perceptible intentions of the legislator in 
their interpretation of legal norms.1031 In the case of Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB, 
the legislator did explicitly aim at the creation of a cap according to the European exam-
ple.1032 This fact is recognized by the BGH in its decision Grauzementkartell.1033 The court 
ignores though, that the interpretation in conformity with constitutional law may not over-
ride explicitly stipulated conceptional decisions of the legislator.1034 As a consequence, a 
law that is insufficiently clear and transparent may not be fixed by the courts interpretation 
beyond the wording and purpose, but is simply unconstitutional.1035 
 
(d) Violation of the BVerfG requirements on clarity and foreseeability of norms 
Furthermore, this interpretation of the German Federal Court of Justice does still not 
fulfill the BVerfG requirements with regard to clarity and foreseeability of sanctioning pro-
visions. As the court rightly asserts, the law needs to prescribe a penalty range that guides 
the judges’ decisions.1036 The determination of a minimum and maximum penalty, how-
ever, is not guaranteed by the interpretation of the 10 percent threshold as maximum 
sanction. The maximum penalty is, other than the court holds, not fix, because it depends 
on any individual firm´s turnover.1037 This value allows for an assessment of the firm´s 
power and position in the market, as well as its economic capacity.1038 The court argues 
that the reference to the firms´ turnover allows for appropriate sanctions and justice in 
each individual case.1039 Yet, there is no natural correlation between the turnover of a firm 
                                                 
1030 Christoph Barth and Stefanie Budde, “Die Strafe soll nicht größer sein als die Schuld, Zum Urteil des BGH 
in Sachen Grauzement und den neuen Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 8 (2013), 312. 
Florian Haus, “Verfassungsprinzipien im Kartellbußgeldrecht – ein Auslaufmodell? Zu den anwendbaren Maßstä-
ben bei der Bemessung umsatzbezogener Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 GWB”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 (2013), 
185. With reference to Besoldungsrecht. Case 1 BvL 149/52 Ref. 20. 
1031 Florian Haus, “Verfassungsprinzipien im Kartellbußgeldrecht – ein Auslaufmodell? Zu den anwendbaren 
Maßstäben bei der Bemessung umsatzbezogener Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 GWB”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 
(2013), 185. 
1032 Ibid, 185. With reference to Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie. Beschluss-
empfehlung und Bericht zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Drucksache 16/5847 -. BT-Drucks. 
16/7156, 11. See also the German Federal Court of Justice. Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 52. How-
ever, the BGH considered the legislative goals with regard to a transfer of the European law to remain unclear. 
See Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 53. Similar Achenbach, "Die Kappungsgrenze und die Folgen - 
Zweifelsfragen des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB," ZWeR Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 5. 
1033 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 68. 
1034 Florian Haus, “Verfassungsprinzipien im Kartellbußgeldrecht – ein Auslaufmodell? Zu den anwendbaren 
Maßstäben bei der Bemessung umsatzbezogener Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 GWB”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 5 
(2013), 186. 
1035 Ibid, 185. With reference to Eberhard Schmid-Aßmann, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor 
Maunz and Günter Dürig (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG Ref. 225. 
1036 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 54. 
1037 Hans Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 
(2013), 698. For the differing opinion, see Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 58. 
1038 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 61-62. 
1039 Ibid Ref. 61. 
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and the wrong done by an antitrust infringement.1040 The correlation actually exists be-
tween the infringement and the gain to the firm from it, as the economic analysis has 
shown.1041 A reference to the change in profit ΔΠ obtained by the firm from the infringing 
action would comply with the objective to punish appropriately much better. Also, the legal 
situation before the introduction of Sec. 81(4) GWB in its current form in 2005, which 
referred to the surplus gained by the firm from the infringement, respected this rela-
tion.1042 Eventually, the BVerfG has stressed the priority of legal certainty over adequate 
sanctions in cases where intense interventions are discussed.1043 
Incidentally, the BGH interpretation of the 10 percent threshold as a maximum fine instead 
of a cap does not eliminate the fact that it is a flexible scope of punishment, which has 
explicitly been considered a violation of the principle of legal certainty by the BVerfG.1044 
Only in the individual case may the addressee assess the scope of the punishment. Yet, 
according to the standards established by the highest constitutional court in Germany, 
foreseeability in abstract cases is required for sanctioning provisions in order to be in 
conformity with the constitutional principle of legal certainty.1045 
 
(e) Violation of the principle of legal certainty by Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB 
As a consequence, Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB violates the principle of legal 
certainty; in its current form, it is unconstitutional.1046 This results in the nullity of fines 
above the threshold of criminal law. However, the fines provision may be effective for fines 
                                                 
1040 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1003. Also Hans 
Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 (2013), 699. 
1041 Please refer to section B. of this chapter. 
1042 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2100 Ref. 
351. 
1043 Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. BVerfGE 105, 135, 155 et sqq. See also the earlier decision Verfol-
gungsverjährung. Cases 2 BvL 15/68 and 2 BvL 23/68. BVerfGE 25, 269, 285 et sqq. 
1044 Hans Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 
(2013), 698-699. Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. BVerfGE 105, 135, 163 et sqq. 
1045 Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. BVerfGE 105, 135, 155. 
1046 Hans Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 
(2013), 688. Earlier Achenbach, "Die Kappungsgrenze und die Folgen - Zweifelsfragen des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB," 
ZWeR Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 18-19. Similar Christoph Barth and Stefanie Budde, “Die Strafe soll nicht größer 
sein als die Schuld, Zum Urteil des BGH in Sachen Grauzement und den neuen Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumes-
sung”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 8 (2013), 311. See also Rainer Bechtold and Martin Buntscheck, “Die 7. GWB-Novelle 
und die Entwicklung des deutschen Kartellrechts 2003 bis 2005”, NJW Vol. 58, no. 41 (2005), 2970. Of the 
same opinion Florian Haus, “Verfassungsprinzipien im Kartellbußgeldrecht – ein Auslaufmodell? Zu den an-
wendbaren Maßstäben bei der Bemessung umsatzbezogener Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 GWB”, NZKart Vol. 1, 
no. 5 (2013), 190. Also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar 
zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2007), 2098 Ref. 345, 2103 Ref. 357. Also Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV 
GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1004. Similar Hauke Brettel, "Aktuelle Rechtsprechung zur Bebußung von 
Kartellordnungswidrigkeiten," ibid Vol. 11, no. 2 (2013), 228. 
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below the level of criminal law.1047 Art. 103(2) GG allows for an extensive interpretation 
within the limits of its wording.1048 Since the legislator´s intention was the sanctioning of 
antitrust infringements, he would have chosen to introduce a punishment below the 
threshold of criminal law and the scope of application of Art. 103(2) GG instead of no 
punishment due to lacking conformity of the rules with constitutional principles. Dannecker 
and Biermann go even further and propose the application of the scope of punishment laid 
down in Sec. 81(4) first sentence GWB also for sanctions of firms according to Sec. 30 
OWiG, ergo a maximum fine of one million Euro.1049 
This interpretation, other than the one proposed by the BGH, does also not contradict the 
wording of Sec. 81(4) second sentence GWB. The legislator did aim at an alignment of the 
German rules with the European example.1050 As shown above, European law does de lege 
lata only allow for fines under the level of criminal law.1051 Doubts with regard to a violation 
of the constitutional principle of legal certainty due to the 10 percent threshold do not 
arise in case of less intense interventions with fines below the level of criminal law, since 
the requirements of Art. 103(2) GG are less severe with decreasing intensity.1052 
Hence, de lege lata Sec. 81 (4) second sentence GWB does only allow for fines 
below the threshold of criminal law. 
 
(3) The current FCO guideline´s criteria violate the principle of legal certainty 
The criteria for the determination of the fine laid down in Sec. 81(4) second sentence 
and the FCO guidelines on fining do also cast doubt on their constitutionality. Just as for 
the scope of fines, the German Federal Constitutional Court has established minimum re-
quirements for the legislative guidance of judicial decisions in the field of criminal law.1053 
According to the BVerfG in its verdict Vermögensstrafe, the legislator needs to provide a 
                                                 
1047 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2103 Ref. 
357. 
1048 Eberhard Schmid-Aßmann, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG Ref. 230. 
1049 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2103 Ref. 
357. 
1050 Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht zu 
dem Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Drucksache 16/5847 -. BT-Drucks. 16/7156, 11. 
1051 Please refer back to section IV.1.a) aa) (2) (f) of this chapter. 
1052 Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. BVerfGE 105, 135, 155 et sqq. See also the earlier decision Verfol-
gungsverjährung. Cases 2 BvL 15/68 and 2 BvL 23/68. BVerfGE 25, 269, 285 et sqq. 
1053 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1109. See also Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. 
BVerfGE 105, 135, 156 et sqq. 
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structured framework of criteria in order to limit judicial discretion.1054 Just as in the Eu-
ropean directive, Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB does only contain two criteria for the 
determination of the fine: The gravity and the duration of the infringement.1055 How-
ever, both the literature1056 and the Federal Court of Justice1057 consider these criteria to 
be unqualified to give orientation to the applicants of the law in the process of sanctioning. 
The FCO has published guidelines on the method and setting of fines similar to the EC 
ones, aiming at a concretization of the statutory requirement.1058 However, as the BGH 
rightly assesses,1059 the legislative obligation to define precise criteria for fining may not 
be replaced by administrative guidelines by the FCO1060 or the European Commission1061. 
Therefore, the criteria named in the FCO guidelines may not be legally binding concretiza-
tions of Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB. Instead, the gravity and duration of the infringe-
ment need to be interpreted in order to provide the orientation required by the BVerfG 
and be in conformity with the constitutional principle of legal certainty.  
 
(4) The current FCO guideline´s criteria violate the principle of the reservation 
of the law and the principles of proportionality and equal treatment 
Further doubts with regard to the constitutionality of Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB 
and the guidelines on fining published by the FCO arise in view of the principle of the 
reservation of the law. The legislator has referred the practitioners to the administrative 
guidelines of the European Commission and FCO, Sec. 81(7) GWB.1062 Yet, having regard 
to the principle of the reservation of the law, concerns relating to the constitutionality of 
this reference arise. The legislator needs to provide the framework for sanctions in the 
field of administrative offenses and may not pass the task on to the administration. Espe-
cially in the case of harsh sanctions, the administration and judges need to be carefully 
                                                 
1054 Vermögensstrafe. Case 2 BvR 794/95. BVerfGE 105, 135, 156 et sqq. 
1055 Rainer Bechtold and Martin Buntscheck, “Die 7. GWB-Novelle und die Entwicklung des deutschen Kartell-
rechts 2003 bis 2005”, NJW Vol. 58, no. 41 (2005), 2970. 
1056 See e.g. ibid. Also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar 
zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2007), 2105 Ref. 361. Also Winfried Hassemer and Jens Dallmeyer, Gesetzliche Orientierung im deut-
schen Recht der Kartellgeldbußen und das Grundgesetz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), 48. 
1057 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 57. 
1058 Federal Cartel Office, “Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren”. 
Promulgation from June 25, 2013. 
1059 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 57. 
1060 Andreas Weitbrecht and Jan Mühle, “Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bußgelddrohung gegen Unternehmen 
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 11 (2006), 1116. 
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Arbeit zu 
dem Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Drucksache 15/3640 –. BT-Drucks. 15/5049, 50. 
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oriented by legal requirements for the determination of a sanction.1063 Administrative 
guidelines like the FCO guidelines on fining antitrust infringements are therefore per se 
not qualified to concretize an imprecise wording of a legal norm in conformity with the 
constitution.1064 Therefore, the lacking precision of Sec. 81(4) GWB in terms of the criteria 
for the determination of fines does, in addition to the violation of the principle of legal 
certainty, violate the principle of the reservation of the law.1065 
Furthermore, the norm violates the principle of proportionality1066, guaranteed as part 
of the rule of law in Art. 20(3) GG and Art. 1(1) in connection with Art. 2(2) GG.1067 The 
principle of proportionality requires sanctions to be proportional to the wrong done by the 
infringer.1068 It does not only apply to criminal law, but also to sanctions imposed by the 
administration.1069 As outlined above, Sec. 81(4) GWB does refer to the total turnover of 
a firm for the determination of the fine. There is, however, no compelling link between the 
total turnover of a firm and the wrong from an antitrust infringement and its effect on the 
market.1070 A penalty for hardcore infringements reaching the maximum fine derived from 
the firm´s turnover would therefore be without reference to the actual delinquency and 
thus violate the constitutional principle of proportionality.1071 The additional criteria of 
gravity and duration of the infringement are themselves too imprecise to make a contri-
bution to proportional sanctions.1072 
The Federal Court of Justice decided in 1991 under the previous system that sanctions in 
antitrust need to be in a fair proportion to the effect the infringing act had on competi-
tion.1073 This link between fault committed and punishment is, also required under the 
                                                 
1063 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2098 Ref. 
345. 
1064 Ibid, 2101 Ref. 352. 
1065 Martin Buntscheck, “Der „verunglückte“ Abschied von der Mehrerlösgeldbuße für schwere Kartellverstöße. 
Kritische Anmerkungen zu § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 GWB”, in: Recht und Wettbewerb. Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold 
zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ingo Brinker, Dieter H. Scheuing, and Kurt Stockmann (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 
2006), 94 et sqq. See also Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 
(2006), 1003 et sqq. 
1066 Christoph Barth and Stefanie Budde, “Die Strafe soll nicht größer sein als die Schuld, Zum Urteil des BGH 
in Sachen Grauzement und den neuen Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung”, NZKart Vol. 1, no. 8 (2013), 314. 
1067 Bernd Grzeszick, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 20 GG Ref. 108, 124. 
1068 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1005. 
1069 Bernd Grzeszick, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 67th ed., ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 20 GG Ref. 124. 
1070 Hans Achenbach, “Grauzement, Bewertungseinheit und Bußgeldobergrenze”, WuW Vol. 63, no. 7-8 
(2013), 699. Also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum 
Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 
2007), 2100 Ref. 351. 
1071 Ibid. With reference to Wolfgang Deselaers, “Uferlose Geldbußen bei Kartellverstößen nach der neuen 
10 percent Umsatzregel des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB?”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 2 (2006), 121. 
1072 Winfried Hassemer and Jens Dallmeyer, Gesetzliche Orientierung im deutschen Recht der Kartellgeldbußen 
und das Grundgesetz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), 48. 
1073 Federal Court of Justice. Case KRB 5/90. WuW/E BGH 2718-2720. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
196 
 
current system.1074 The total turnover is of no relevance for this question, though.1075 
Sec. 81(4) GWB in its current form does also violate the constitutional principle of propor-
tionality.1076 
Eventually, concerns referring to a violation of the principle of equal treatment, Art. 3 
GG, through Sec. 81(4) GWB have been expressed, mainly by Gürtler.1077 The criticism is 
based on the fact that any firm under Sec. 81(4) GWB is treated differently from other 
addressees of Sec. 81 GWB and firms in fields of law other than antitrust.1078 Yet, there is 
an objective justification for this differentiation: The legislator considers firms and persons 
acting in commercial interest to be more likely to participate in competition violations with 
considerable effects in the markets. It can therefore not be argued convincingly that there 
is no plausible reason for the differentiation at all.1079 
In conclusion, the criteria for the determination of fines laid down in Sec. 81(4) GWB vio-
late the constitutional principles of the reservation of the law and the principle of propor-
tionality; besides the above-proved violation of the principle of legal certainty. The follow-
ing section will propose an interpretation of these criteria different from the FCO approach 
in its guidelines, but in conformity with the German constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1074 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2102 Ref. 
355. 
1075 Wolfgang Deselaers, “Uferlose Geldbußen bei Kartellverstößen nach der neuen 10percent Umsatzregel des 
§ 81 Abs. 4 GWB?”, WuW Vol. 56, no. 2 (2006), 121. 
1076 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2103 Ref. 
356. 
1077 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 
17 Ref. 48c.  
1078 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2102 Ref. 
354. 
1079 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1005. The same 
opinion is held by ibid. 
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(5) Determination of government fines DG in accordance with Sec. 81(7) GWB 
and constitutional law 
The interpretation of Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB in conformity with constitutional 
law needs to balance both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of an infringe-
ment. The basic rule in German law for the determination of fines in cases of administrative 
offenses is Sec. 17(3) OWiG.1080 This paragraph reads1081: 
“The significance of the regulatory offense and the charge faced by the per-
petrator shall form the basis for the assessment of the regulatory fine. The 
perpetrator´s financial circumstances shall also be taken into account; how-
ever, they shall, as a rule, be disregarded in cases involving negligible regu-
latory offenses.” 
 
(a) The relationship between Sec. 17(3) OWiG and Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB 
In a first step, it has to be elaborated how Sec. 17(3) OWiG behaves to Sec. 81(4) 
sixth sentence GWB. The legislator has not specified the hierarchy between the two 
norms.1082 The legal system suggests the understanding of Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB 
as a special rule for the determination of fines in antitrust offenses as opposed to the 
general rule for all administrative offenses codified in Sec. 17(3) OWiG.1083 The gravity 
and duration of the offense are criteria relevant also – besides other criteria – as aspects 
of the significance of the offense in Sec. 17(3) OWiG.1084 Therefore, the general rule in 
Sec. 17(3) OWiG has to be considered in the process of the determination of fines under 
Sec. 81(4) GWB.1085 
                                                 
1080 Grauzementkartell. Case KRB 20/12 Ref. 58. See also Martin Buntscheck, “Der „verunglückte“ Abschied 
von der Mehrerlösgeldbuße für schwere Kartellverstöße. Kritische Anmerkungen zu § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 GWB”, 
in: Recht und Wettbewerb. Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ingo Brinker, Dieter H. 
Scheuing, and Kurt Stockmann (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2006), 93. 
1081 The translation from German into English is taken from the German Federal Ministry of Justice internet 
page, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_owig/englisch_owig.html#p0068 and was provided by Neil 
Mussett. 
1082 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2104 Ref. 
358. 
1083 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1004. See also 
ibid, 2104 Ref. 360. 
1084 Martin Buntscheck, “Der „verunglückte“ Abschied von der Mehrerlösgeldbuße für schwere Kartellverstöße. 
Kritische Anmerkungen zu § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 GWB”, in: Recht und Wettbewerb. Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold 
zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ingo Brinker, Dieter H. Scheuing, and Kurt Stockmann (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 
2006), 93. 
1085 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2104 Ref. 
360. Also Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, 
and Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 232. 
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Yet, the criteria named in Sec. 17(3) OWiG – the significance of the offense and the finan-
cial circumstances of the offender – are as imprecise as the ones specified in Sec. 81(4) 
GWB. Other than in the case of Sec. 81(4) GWB, however, there is substantial jurisdiction 
concretizing the criteria Sec. 17(3) OWiG names.1086 
 
(b) The gravity of the infringement 
Having regard to the gravity of the infringement, Dannecker and Biermann propose 
the reference to the concrete effect of the offense on the market.1087 According to their 
opinion, the degree of impairment shall be assessed based on rational criteria, particularly 
the extent of the damage caused.1088 For the case of manipulations of price competition, 
they assume the necessity of an increased protection, since customers are directly and 
palpably affected.1089 In markets with a vulnerability to restraints of competition, particu-
larly oligopolistic market structures with trade in homogenous goods, violations of antitrust 
laws shall be punished more rigorously.1090 
Yet, this approach ignores the structural difference between the preceding regime before 
the 7th amendment of the GWB in 2005 and the then newly introduced Sec. 81(4) GWB: 
Whilst the regime was based on surplus revenue absorption (“Mehrerlösabschöpfung”) 
before 2005, Sec. 81(4) GWB, following the European example, refers solely to the gravity 
and duration of the infringement. In German antitrust law, there is no prototype for these 
criteria. Hence, the traditional rules on fining and the former jurisdiction relating to 
Sec. 17(3) OWiG are not applicable to Sec. 81(4) GWB.1091 
 
 
                                                 
1086 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2105 Ref. 
361. 
1087 Ibid, 2109 Ref. 371. With reference to Federal Court of Justice. Case KRB 5/90. WuW/E BGH 2718, 2720. 
1088 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2110 Ref. 
372. 
1089 Ibid, 2110 Ref. 373. With reference to Programmzeitschriften. Case Kart 6/79. WuW/E OLG 2369, 2374. 
Bitumenhaltige Bautenschutzmittel II. Case Kart 15/73. WuW/E OLG 1449, 1455. Bilder aus Gold. Case Kart 
29/72. WuW/E OLG 1407, 1409. Linoleum. Case Kart 4/72. WuW/E OLG 1339, 1348 et sqq. Aluminium-Halb-
zeug. Case Kart 2/72. WuW/E OLG 1327, 1334. Tubenhersteller II. Case Kart B 20/71. WuW/E OLG 1253, 
1264. Branche Heizung/Klima/Lüftung. Case Kart 4/91. WuW/E OLG 4885, 4894. 
1090 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2110 Ref. 
373. 
1091 Dominic Thiele, “Zur Verfassungswidrigkeit des § 81 IV GWB”, wrp Vol. 21, no. 8 (2006), 1005. 
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(c) A new approach to the interpretation of the gravity criterion 
Therefore, the interpretation of the gravity criterion requires a different approach 
that is particularly independent of the former “Mehrerlös jurisdiction” and adequate to 
ensure orientation of potential addressees. The problem of the determination of sanctions 
has been treated in German law before, yet in another context: The violation of personal 
rights. This section will elaborate how the purpose of sanctioning and the criteria for the 
determination of a proportional sanction in the Caroline jurisdiction may be compared to 
the problems in the field of antitrust fines. 
In the antitrust literature, there is largely consensus on the purpose of fining: The main 
focus is on the prevention of future infringements of competition. Other than in general 
cases of administrative offenses, where specific deterrence through the punishment of 
past wrongful behavior is intended, antitrust law aims at the future elimination of viola-
tions.1092 This purpose is precisely the same as the considerations that underlie financial 
compensations in civil law in cases of violations of personal rights: In its Soraya decision, 
the Federal Constitutional Court considered violations of the general right of personality 
(Art. 1, 2 GG) another right protected by Sec. 823(1) BGB.1093 The claim to financial com-
pensation for victims of violations does, according to settled case law, focus on the pre-
vention of future violations.1094 This means that in the process of determination of the 
compensation, the notion of prevention prevails.1095 Although the financial compensation 
in civil law is not a criminal punishment in the meaning of Art. 103(2) GG,1096 the purpose 
of sanctioning is quite the same. It is therefore reasonable to consult the considera-
tions underlying financial compensations for personality rights violations for the determi-
nation of fines for antitrust violations according to Sec. 81(4) GWB. 
Financial compensation for violations of personal rights is considered to fulfill the purpose 
of prevention if its amount mirrors the gain to the offender from the violation of the right. 
This does not intend the absorption of profits, but the consideration of the profit from 
the violation of personal rights as a criterion for the determination of the com-
pensation. As a result, the compensation determined needs to trigger an inhibitory effect 
                                                 
1092 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2105 Ref. 
362. With reference to Aluminium Halbzeug. Case B1 – 280000 – A – 10/59. WuW/E BKartA 1369, 1371. 
1093 Soraya. Case 1 BvR 112/65. NJW 1973, 1221. 
1094 Hans-Peter Schwintowski, Cordula Schah Sedi, and Michel Schah Sedi, Handbuch Schmerzensgeld (Köln: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 2013), 125 Ref. 69. With reference to Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung. Case VI ZR 
56/94. NJW 1995, 861, 864. 
1095 Prävention. Case VI ZR 332/94. NJW 1996, 984 Ref. 14. See also Unnamed Decision. Case VI ZR 255/03. 
NJW 2005, 215 Ref. 13. 
1096 Soraya. Case 1 BvR 112/65. NJW 1973, 1221 Ref. 46. See also Unnamed Decision. Case VI ZR 255/03. 
NJW 2005, 215 Ref. 13. 
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on the infringer.1097 This method approaches the findings of the precedent economic anal-
ysis on optimal fines for manipulative behavior in the market. The expected cost to the 
infringer should equal his gain from the violation of the law:1098 
 = pP(e) . CD. 
Applied to Sec. 81(4) GWB, this approach introduces a new interpretation of the grav-
ity criterion. Gravity of the antitrust infringement in the understanding of the underlying 
notion of prevention refers to the financial equivalent necessary to refrain from it. This 
interpretation offers the classification of various kinds of antitrust infringements on a fi-
nancial scale according to a multiple of the profit expectation1099 the infringer sets into 
them. This expectation will regularly be correlated to the harm done to the other side of 
the market: Farther-reaching interventions in the price mechanism result in higher gains 
to the firm practicing them. 
This interpretation of the gravity criterion does also not violate the constitutional principles 
of legal certainty and proportionality. The profit expectation from any action in the market 
is part of the business considerations of firms´ decision makers. This criterion is therefore 
transparent and well foreseeable to them. It contains a clear assessment of the degree of 
the wrong for any individual action by the legislator. Beyond that, the proposed interpre-
tation does not violate the principle of proportionality. It assigns a proportional sanction 
to any infringement a firm might commit that equals precisely the wrong done by the firm.  
Also, the European law, if taken into account alternatively according to the German legis-
lator´s proposal,1100 suggests the change in profit achieved from the infringement to be 
the main determinant of the gravity of the infringement.1101 
In conclusion, the understanding of the gravity criterion as the equivalent to the 
firm´s gain from the antitrust infringement represents an allowed interpretation 
of Sec. 81(4) sixth sentence GWB. De lege lata, fines for market manipulations do 
                                                 
1097 Hans-Peter Schwintowski, Cordula Schah Sedi, and Michel Schah Sedi, Handbuch Schmerzensgeld (Köln: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 2013), 126 Ref. 70. With reference to Prävention. Case VI ZR 332/94. NJW 1996, 984 
Ref. 16. 
1098 Please refer to Section B. of this chapter. 
1099 The multiple is due to the fact that the infringer calculates with a probability of detection smaller than 1. 
See section B of this chapter and section B.II.1. with further reference to  Emmanuel Combe, Constance Mon-
nier and Renaud Legal, “Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union”, Working paper 
(2008). Also John M. Connor and C. Gustav Helmers, “Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-
2005”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01, 38. 
1100 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2105 Ref. 
361. 
1101 S.A. Musique Diffusion Francaise (Pioneer) v Commission. Joined Cases 100/80 – 103/80. European Court 
Reports 1983, 1825 Ref. 121. For a detailled analysis oft he interpretation of the European rules, please refer 
to section B.IV.1.a) aa) (4) (a) of this chapter. 
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therefore have to be determined dependent on the individual firm´s profit expectations 
from the antitrust offense. 
 
(d) The duration of the infringement 
With regard to the duration of the infringement, the debate has been much less 
controversial. Other than the gravity criterion, the reference to the duration of an abusive 
market behavior is clear and transparent, thus in conformity with the constitutional re-
quirement of legal certainty. Its interpretation is therefore straightforward. 
 
(6) Conclusion: German applicable law requires a reduction of government 
fines DG de lege lata 
The preceding sections have presented detailed proof for the initially formulated the-
sis: De lege lata, government fines for market manipulations may not reach the level of 
criminal law. The applicable German constitutional law requires therefore a lowering of the 
fines below this threshold. While some authors refer to Sec. 81(4) first sentence GWB (one 
million Euro)1102, this work proposes a more complex approach. The unconstitutional in-
terpretation of the gravity criterion needs to be replaced by the profit-oriented approach 
introduced above that is in conformity with the constitution. 
 
cc) Conclusion 
For both, European and German law, the violation of higher-ranking law through the 
scope and criteria of the fines provisions in Art. 23(3) of Regulation N° 1/2003 respectively 
Sec. 81(4) GWB has been proved. The preceding sections have shown the legal conse-
quences from the violation of higher-ranking law: The lowering of fines below the level of 
criminal law de lege lata and an interpretation of the criteria for the determination which 
fulfills the requirements of the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. These find-
ings are in accordance with the results of the economic analysis on optimal deterrence of 
market manipulations, which found far too high values for government fines DG under the 
current European Commission and FCO practice. 
                                                 
1102 Brettel and Thomas, "Unternehmensbußgeld, Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz und Schuldprinzip im novellierten 
deutschen Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), 63. 
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Yet, the legal analysis identified constitutional principles in both the European and German 
legal system, which limit antitrust fines in scope de lege lata. As a result, the optimal level 
of government fines DG is enforceable under the applicable law through a necessary re-
duction de lege lata. This reduction does however lead to an imbalance in the deterrence 
equation: If an element of the fines variable decreases – in this case the government fine 
DG–, other elements of this variable, respectively the second factor, the probability of 
punishment, need to increase, to restore the balance of the deterrence equation. 
Therefore, a further extension of deterrence for manipulations may only be reached by 
means of alternative punishment introduced in the subsequent sections b) and c) and, 
more importantly, through an increase of the probability of detection and punishment pp 
discussed in subsection 2. 
 
b) Shift of the liability from firms to individuals: The individual 
cost of detection cD 
Since both the economic and the legal analysis revealed that an antitrust enforce-
ment system with very high corporate fines and a low probability of detection does not 
lead to socially optimal deterrence, alternative sanctions need to be used in antitrust en-
forcement. As a first tool, this section discusses the liability for criminal conduct of the 
firms´ agents as opposed to corporate fines.1103 Individual liability increases the deterrent 
effect of antitrust enforcement1104 with fines in accordance with higher-ranking law. The 
reason for the increase in deterrence lies in the change of incentives: Corporate fines are 
hardly internalized by the employees who engage in manipulative behavior.1105 The fine is 
paid by the company and its owners, in case of public corporations the shareholders,1106 
who have no influence on the employees´ decisions on whether to engage in manipulative 
practices or not.1107 Rather, their decision to hold or sell a corporation´s stock depends on 
the estimated earnings of the firm, or the market value of their shares.1108 Manipulative 
                                                 
1103 See already Klaus Tiedemann, "Die strafrechtliche Vertreter- und Unternehmenshaftung," NJW Vol. 39, 
no. 30 (1986), 1843. 
1104 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 16. See also Markus Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Heinrich 
Dörner, Dirk Ehlers, and Michael Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 20. 
1105 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 14. 
1106 See e.g. Artur Robert Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 
95. 
1107 Andreas Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Erich 
Samson and Klaus Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 
356. 
1108 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 17. 
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behavior increasing the market value of the corporation will not induce shareholders to 
sell their shares and thereby exert pressure on the firm´s agents to end it.1109 By contrast, 
fines levied upon the shareholders may only have an effect ex post and remain without 
influence on the day-to-day operations of the firm due to a lack of information.1110 Share-
holders are therefore no suitable supervisors with regard to the antitrust conformity of 
corporate decisions. 
Corporate agents, however, possess information that may be used for unfair commercial 
practices.1111 Moreover, corporate directors, officers and employees might gain from ma-
nipulative behavior through incentive bonuses paid for increased profits of the company 
in the short run, regardless of the legal compliance of their decisions.1112 In the long run, 
they have moved to another company or retired from their jobs – the damage remains to 
be paid by the shareholders and does not present a risk to the acting agents. Hence, 
individuals with direct influence on the day-to-day operations of the firm do lack a suffi-
cient incentive to respect the antitrust laws under the current system. 
In this conventional view of antitrust enforcement, public authorities remain to monitor 
the corporation. Yet, also they do often lack the information and influence firm insiders 
possess, which makes their task a difficult one.1113 Hence, antitrust compliance and mon-
itoring is in a deadlock situation with directors and employees lacking an incentive to 
comply with the antitrust laws and company outsiders – e.g. shareholders and authorities 
– lacking the information to insist on compliance. The following image illustrates the in-
centive problem in an overview: 
                                                 
1109 Indicated in Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 101. 
1110 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010) 17. 
1111 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 2. 
1112 Jörg Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 16. See also Florian Wagner-von Papp, "Kriminalisierung von 
Kartellen," WuW Vol. 60, no. 3 (2010), 272. Equally Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust 
Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 17. 
1113 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 17. See also Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, 
Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 2, 338. 
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Figure 17: The incentive problem in antitrust deterrence 
From this model, it may easily be derived why a shift from increasing corporate fines 
towards sanctioning of individual employees might present a more cost-effective way to 
increase deterrence.1114 Targeting the sanction to the person actually making the decision 
to manipulate solves the incentive problem. Agents face an individual expected damage 
dE from detection of manipulations that equals the probability of prosecution times the 
individual cost of detection, e.g. the fine (cD): 
dE = pp(e) . cD.1115 
More precisely, a corporate agent does weigh the individual gain from the antitrust offense 
(Δπi) against the cost, the individual expected damage dE to be paid in case of detection: 
Δπi = dE or 
Δπi = pP (e) . cD. 
This approach allows for more precisely directed (and therefore more effective) deterrence 
and lower fines: The threat of direct personal financial losses increases the appeal to re-
spect the laws.1116 The following subsections will examine whether and for which groups 
                                                 
1114 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 17. 
1115 William M. Landes, “Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 50, no. 2 (1983), 657. See also Wouter P.J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Pratice”, World 
Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 12. Precisely for the case of individual fines Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für 
Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 102. 
1116 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given 
the Existence of Corporate Liability?," International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 13, no. 3 (1993), 240. 
Also Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Fine
Influence
Monitoring
Influence
Shareholders 
 
 
No interest in legal 
compliance in case of 
increasing value of 
shares 
 
No influence on daily 
operations 
 
Corporate Directors, 
Officers, Employees 
 
Influence on daily op-
erations 
 
Incentive to reap gains 
from manipulative 
practices 
Antitrust authorities 
 
 
Lacking information on 
the firm´s operations 
 
Lacking direct influ-
ence over employee 
behavior 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
205 
 
of agents individual sanctions for manipulations are allowed under the existing European 
and German law. Just as for corporate fines, the analysis differentiates between publicly 
imposed fines dG and privately imposed fines dP (e.g. through recourse of the firm accord-
ing to corporate law or private damages actions). Hence, the total individual cost cD adds 
up to: 
cD = dG + dP, 
with dP= dP̅̅ ̅. 
Publicly imposed sanctions on individuals dG may be further differentiated in public fines 
(dGF), imprisonment (dGJ), and debarment (dGD): 
dG = dGF + dGJ + dGD. 
Subsection aa) focuses on publicly imposed fines on individuals dGF through the authorities. 
The following subsection bb) then discusses imprisonment dGJ as a means of deter-
rence.1117 Alternative individual sanctions, such as debarment from the employment mar-
ket, are discussed in subsection cc). Section dd) concludes. 
Privately imposed individual sanctions, usually imposed through recourse damage claims 
or private damages actions, are treated in the chapter on private market surveillance 
(section D. of this work). 
aa) Publicly imposed fines for corporate agents dGF (de lege lata) 
Public fines for corporate employees have a number of advantages, compared to 
private claims for damages treated in section D. of this work. First, corporate law as the 
basis of private lawsuits only provides liability rules for corporate managers or company 
directors. Members of the corporate management might therefore be held liable for the 
participation in antitrust infringements or any action, which orders, inspires, tolerates or 
approves such behavior in the company.1118 
The existing corporate law does however, not cover infringements committed by employ-
ees on lower organizational levels of the company. Yet, it might be advantageous to target 
the actual employee who is manipulating the market for the following two reasons: First, 
                                                 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 17. See also Tiedemann, "Die strafrechtliche Vertreter- und 
Unternehmenshaftung," NJW Vol. 39, no. 30 (1986), 1843. 
1117 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 9. 
1118 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 15. 
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that employee is directly responsible for the manipulation and may well be deterred by 
the threat of a sanction, whereas a director or officer may only be efficiently deterred if 
he is able to monitor and, if necessary, stop the employee engaging in illegal market 
manipulations.1119 Second, an employee has less to gain from manipulations1120 than has 
a corporate manager or company director, which allows for smaller fines to reach an effi-
cient level of deterrence.1121 
Furthermore, in practice companies buy insurance for their directors and officers, so-called 
D&O insurance contracts.1122 Even though Sec. 93(2) third sentence AktG requires a de-
ductible of ten per cent of the damage done to the company reaching up to a maximum 
of one and a half times the fixed annual remuneration,1123 insurance still lowers the deter-
rent effect of fining. An exemption is the exclusion of insurance coverage in cases of in-
tentional or even just knowing violations of the law.1124 
Third, the private liability of corporate agents is based upon the shareholders´ action 
against current or former corporate managers. Yet, the incentive scheme pictured in figure 
17 has already shown the weak influence of shareholders on corporate decisions and their 
low interest in costly monitoring and enforcement of corporate compliance with antitrust 
laws. 
As a result, publicly imposed fines for antitrust infringements of corporate agents promise 
what previous actions failed to provide: The link of profit opportunities and responsibility 
for the risks taken. The following section will examine whether German law allows for 
fining of company agents directly, respectively which changes to the current legal system 
are necessary to enhance individual deterrence. 
 
                                                 
1119 Polinsky and Shavell, "Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability?," International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 13, no. 3 (1993), 240. See also OECD, 
"Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," (2003), 7. 
1120 Advantages from market manipulations might be financial advantages or a promotion. See Biermann, 
"Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: Reformüberlegungen, 
Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, 
no. 1 (2007), 16. 
1121 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 18. 
1122 Andreas Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 169. See also Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für 
Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - 
Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 209. 
1123 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 116. Refer also to 
Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische 
Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 189. 
1124 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 116. See also Lotze, 
"Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte Kartellbußgelder," NZKart 
Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 169. 
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(1) Fines for corporate agents in antitrust law 
The treatment of individual sanctions differs between European and German antitrust 
law. The following sections will discuss the opportunity of targeted individual sanctions in 
both European (a) and German (b) antitrust law. 
 
(a) Fines for corporate agents in European antitrust law 
European antitrust law, namely Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as the administrative 
offenses codified in Art. 23 of Regulation N° 1/2003, is addressed to companies exclu-
sively, thus entrepreneurs and associations of undertakings.1125 Punishment of individuals 
is only possible where a natural person is the proprietor of the firm, however, sanctions 
have only been addressed to the firms in the past.1126 
Fines may not be levied upon corporate agents, e.g. managing directors or members of 
the executive board.1127 The question of individual liability needs thus to be addressed 
de lege ferenda. Since the emphasis of this work is on the situation de lege lata, only 
subsection (3) will shortly consider whether changes in European law towards individual 
sanctions are a useful enhancement of deterrence.1128 De lege lata, dGF in European law 
equals zero: 
dGF = 0. 
                                                 
1125 Christian Müller-Gugenberger, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht. Handbuch des Wirtschaftsstraf- und –ordnungswid-
rigkeitenrechts, 4th ed., ed. Christian Müller-Gugenberger and Klaus Bieneck (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 
2006), 1769 Ref. 50. See also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht EG/Teil 2, Kommen-
tar zum Europäischen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2007), 1931 Ref. 71 and Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellsanktionenrechts: Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von 
Verstößen gegen das Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 11. 
1126 Ibid. See also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, Kommentar zum Deut-
schen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 
1913 Ref. 71. With reference to Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel. Case IV/35.691/E-4. EU Official Journal N° L 24/1 
Ref. 157 et sqq. and HFB and Others v Commission. Case T-9/99. European Court reports 2002, II-1530 
(2002) Ref. 105. In favor of this approach Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, 
Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 327. Also Tiedemann, "Die strafrechtliche Vertreter- und 
Unternehmenshaftung," NJW Vol. 39, no. 30 (1986), 1843. 
1127 Christian Müller-Gugenberger, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht. Handbuch des Wirtschaftsstraf- und –ordnungswid-
rigkeitenrechts, 4th ed., ed. Christian Müller-Gugenberger and Klaus Bieneck (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 
2006), 1769 Ref. 51. See also Bernd A. Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende 
Untersuchung zur Frage der Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 70, 73. Also Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und 
Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 229. Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit 
der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in Bausteine des europäischen 
Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and Gonzáles(Köln: Carl 
Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 294. 
1128 Critical Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. 
Samson and Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 333 
et sqq. 
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(b) Fines for corporate agents in German antitrust law 
In German antitrust law, individuals may be fined by the authorities for infringements 
of the law.1129 Sec. 81(1)-(3) GWB contain rules on administrative offenses. The wording 
of this norm does not limit the pool of potential offenders.1130 Offenses in antitrust may 
hence be both: Offenses of entrepreneurs or general offenses not requiring a specific type 
of offender. For any individual offense, the required specific type of offender needs to be 
determined individually. In this process, the German Code on Administrative Offenses 
(OWiG), needs to be consulted.1131 Offenses requiring a specific type of offender refer to 
Sec. 9 OWiG with regard to the pool of potential offenders.1132 
Sec. 81(2) N° 1 GWB, that sanctions the abuse of a dominant position (offense against 
Sec. 19 GWB), is addressed to firms exclusively. Therefore, the offense may only be com-
mitted by a firm holding a dominant position in the market1133 or an individual under the 
additional requirements of Sec. 9 OWiG.1134 
Sec. 9 OWiG allows for the attribution of personal properties from the addressee of the 
offense to the acting representative:1135 If the addressee of the offense, who possesses 
the personal properties required by the law, arranges to be represented e.g. by one of his 
employees, the representative may be liable through attribution of the personal property 
of the addressee.1136 However, Sec. 9 OWiG limits the pool of potential persons to whom 
specific personal properties may be attributed: They must either be representatives of the 
firm subject to an antitrust offense (corporate directors´ and officers´ liability according 
                                                 
1129 Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 230. 
1130 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 49. See also Gerhard 
Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. 
Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1911 Ref. 62. 
1131 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 
4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1894 Ref. 11. Also 
Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 231. 
1132 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 50. See also Gerhard 
Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. 
Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1911 Ref. 64. 
1133 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 87. 
1134 See also Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Kartellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 2022 
Ref. 94. 
1135 In detail Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. 
Samson and Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 89. 
1136 Hans W. Többens, “Die Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität durch die Troika der §§ 9, 130 und 30 des 
Gesetzes über Ordnungswidrigkeiten”, NStZ Vol. 18, no. 1, (1999), 2. 
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to Sec. 9(1) OWiG) or authorized agents of the firm (substitute liability according to 
Sec. 9(2) OWiG).1137 
 
(aa) Corporate directors´ and officers´ liability (Sec. 9 OWiG) 
The corporate directors´ and officers´ liability according to Sec. 9(1) N° 1 OWiG 
allows for the attribution of the property “firm” to representatives of legal persons, such 
as the managing director of a GmbH (liable representative according to Sec. 13(1) and 35 
GmbHG) or the member of the executive board of a corporation (AG) (liable according to 
Sec. 1(1), 76(2) and 78 AktG).1138 Since the four oligopoly firms are organized either as 
stock corporations (RWE AG, EnBW AG, E.ON SE) or as GmbH (Vattenfall GmbH), their 
board members respectively directors are potential addressees of the fines provision in 
Sec. 81(2) N° 1 GWB in connection with Sec. 9(1) N° 1 OWiG. 
Their liability requires that they act in their role as legal representatives of the firm and 
not only incidental with it. All acts driven by the representative´s self-interest and to the 
firm´s detriment are not covered by the scope of Sec. 9(2) N° 1 OWiG.1139 The question 
whether the employee is acting in his own interest is answered with regard to the economic 
implications of his behavior.1140 The liability is irrespective of the motivation that drives 
the infringer or the utilization of organ-specific instruments.1141 With regard to market 
manipulations, employees intend to increase their employer´s profit according to the 
considerations presented in the second chapter of this work1142, probably speculating on 
higher bonuses or gratifications paid by the employer for their work.1143 Therefore, the 
firm´s and the employee´s interests are aligned here and the employee´s behavior may 
not be considered an act of pure self-interest.  
                                                 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 53. 
1139 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 91. 
1140 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 9 
Ref. 15a. 
1141 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 92. 
1142 Refer to section B.I. of the second chapter of this work. 
1143 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 16. 
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Also, the firm´s representative needs to be aware of the circumstances that his perpetra-
tion of the offense according to Sec. 9 OWiG is based upon. Otherwise he lacks inten-
tion.1144 Corporate directors and board members are aware of their role as representatives 
of the firm and therefore acting intentionally if they decide to manipulate the market. 
As a result, corporate directors and board members may be held liable for engaging 
in manipulative practices in the energy market directly according to Sec. 81(2) N° 1 GWB 
in connection with Sec. 9(1) N° 1 OWiG de lege lata. Currently, fines imposed on individ-
uals only account for a small percentage of the total fine volume.1145 Only about one per-
cent of antitrust fines were targeted to individuals in 2009 and 2010,1146 with slightly 
higher values for 2011 (three percent) and 2012 (four percent).1147 The fine amounts to 
one year´s gross salary.1148 It is limited to one million Euro, Sec. 81(4) first sentence 
GWB. This threshold is however not in accordance with the deterrence approach introduced 
above: Any infringement that promises an expected gain for the manager exceeding one 
million Euro will still be more attractive to him than compliance with the antitrust laws.1149 
Furthermore, the German Federal Court of Justice found in a 1990 verdict that firms may 
compensate their employees for fines paid due to illegal behavior in the interest of the 
firm.1150 Such compensation further reduces the incentive to legal compliance for the man-
agement. 
 
(bb) Individual liability of subordinate employees according to Sec. 9 OWiG 
With regard to the individual liability of a firm´s employees, the legal status is more 
complicated. Sec. 9(2) N° 1 OWiG extends the attribution of the property “firm” also to 
                                                 
1144 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 9 
Ref. 7. 
1145 Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in 
Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 289. See also Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: 
Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 94. 
1146 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 92. With reference to 
Federal Cartel Office, Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 2009/2010 sowie über 
die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, 2011, BT-Drucks. 17/6640, 37. 
1147 Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 2011/2012 sowie über die Lage und 
Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, 2013, BT-Drucks. 17/13675, 28. 
1148 Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 119. Also Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 96. 
1149 However arguing in favor of the cap Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, 
no. 1 (2013), 111. 
1150 Unnamed Decision, Case 2 StR 439/90, BGHSt 37, 226 Ref. 27 (German Federal Court of Justice 1990). 
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persons who have been authorized by the firm owner or the management to run the busi-
ness or at least a part of it.1151 This subsection applies to managers of sub-companies, as 
well as managers of divisions of a company1152 or functionally separate parts of the un-
dertaking1153. Its application needs to be restrictive in order to comply with the constitu-
tional guarantee in Art. 103(2) GG and Sec. 3 OWiG. Therefore, the employee´s position 
must contain a degree of responsibility that involves handling the owner´s duties self-
evidently.1154 
By all means, the individuals named in Sec. 30(1) N° 4 OWiG (general managers and 
comparable positions) are covered by the scope of Sec. 9(2) N° 1 as they belong to the 
management representatives of the firm, as well as some of the representatives named 
in Sec. 30(1) N° 5 OWiG (leading positions).1155 However, not only company agents in 
leading positions are subject to the attribution of properties according to Sec. 9(2) N° 1 
OWiG, but also employees with an own functional responsibility who take a managerial 
role on behalf of the owner of the firm. Only subordinate positions are not covered by the 
norm.1156 
The decisive criterion is the employee´s power to make decisions. In case this power 
remains reserved to a higher level in the firm organization, also the liability remains on 
this level. Only employees working in a position similar to the one of their employer may 
be obliged to fulfill the employer´s duties.1157 However, the employee is obliged to point 
out the illegality towards his superior. Furthermore, he may be hold liable for crossing the 
borders of his power to make decisions or participating intentionally in his superior´s illegal 
activities (Sec. 14 OWiG).1158 
With regard to the four oligopoly firms having an incentive to manipulate the energy mar-
ket, huge enterprises are addressed. Sec. 9(2) N° 1 OWiG surely applies to the manage-
ment board respectively corporate directors of E.ON SE, RWE AG, EnBW AG and Vattenfall 
                                                 
1151 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 57. 
1152 For the case of a branch see Bitumenhaltige Bautenschutzmittel II. Case Kart 15/73. WuW/E OLG 1449, 
1453. 
1153 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 9 
Ref. 21. 
1154 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 57. In great detail 
Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 97. 
1155 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 9 
Ref. 17. 
1156 Ibid, Sec. 9 Ref. 21. 
1157 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 98. 
1158 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 9 
Ref. 18. 
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GmbH. Also, the managing staff of the trading departments is covered by the norm.1159 
The individual employee in the trading department is, however, bound by the instructions 
of the management. It must therefore be doubted whether an energy trader acting ma-
nipulative in the market possesses the autonomy of action1160 required for liability accord-
ing to Sec. 9(2) N° 1 OWiG. Since the value choices in Art. 103(2) GG necessitate a re-
strictive interpretation of the norm,1161 liability of subordinate corporate employees 
who actively engage in market manipulations needs to be negated de lege lata. 
In exceptional cases where employees intentionally participate in their superior´s manip-
ulations, liability for complicity (Sec. 14 OWiG) may fill the gap.1162 However, this requires 
intention by both, the addressee of the norm according to Sec. 9 OWiG and the accom-
plice.1163 
In conclusion, also in German antitrust law dGF is close to zero: 
dGF ≈ 0.1164 
 
(2) Fines for corporate agents in capital market law (Sec. 39 WpHG) 
Section B.II.1.b) of the third chapter has shown that in German capital market law, 
fines are directed to both the infringer and the firm.1165 This section will elaborate the 
scope of the individual fines and their relationship to the antitrust fines presented above 
in order to obtain the overall amount of individual fines charged for market manipulations. 
All manipulation alternatives of the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence WpHG, now Art. 12, 
15 MAR, are classified as administrative offenses, Sec. 39(3d) N° 2 WpHG. Sec. 39(4a) 
WpHG imposes an individual penalty of up to 5 million Euro for any of these manipu-
lations.1166 There is no additional profit-related element to this penalty. Just as described 
                                                 
1159 Ibid, Sec. 9 Ref. 1. 
1160 Ibid, Sec. 9 Ref. 31. 
1161 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 57. 
1162 Franz Gürtler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, 16th ed., ed. Erich Göhler (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Sec. 
14 Ref. 10. 
1163 Rudolf Rengier, in Karlsruher Kommentar zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten: OWiG, ed. Lothar 
Senger, 4 ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), 277 Ref. 68, 69. 
1164 The minor importance of individual fines is apparently also recognized by the Monopoly Commission: 
Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 2015, 44 Ref. 
184. 
1165 Please refer to the third chapter, section B.II.1.b) of this work. 
1166 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), § 39 Ref. 6. 
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for the case of antitrust fines above, subordinate employees may only be fined if the re-
quirements of Sec. 9 OWiG are fulfilled.1167 Hence, individual fines are directed to corpo-
rate directors and board members, but not to the single subordinate employee 
actually engaging in the manipulative behavior. 
Hence, in German capital market law, individual employees engaging in capacity retention 
face a potential fine of 
dGF ≈ 0. 
 
(3) Conclusion 
The above examination on individual liability of employees engaging in manipulations 
for the benefit of their firms under European and German law has shown that this approach 
plays only a minor role in deterring manipulations of the energy market. European law 
does per se solely address the firm. In Germany, the code on administrative offenses 
allows for the attribution of the property “firm” to individuals in managing positions. How-
ever, the (subordinate) energy trader actually realizing the manipulation strategy is also 
not covered by the rules. 
Individual liability for subordinate employees is therefore a question de lege 
ferenda. Its advantages with regard to deterrence of market manipulations have been 
explained in the introduction to this section.1168 Yet, practical problems like the imputation 
of knowledge and the proof of intent arise with the implementation of employee liability in 
huge enterprises. These might drive the cost of detection and prosecution to a level that 
exceeds the gain from decreased antitrust infringements. These questions remain for the 
legislator to decide. A combined sanctioning system taking account of both corporate and 
individual sanctioning promises the best results.1169 
 
 
                                                 
1167 Zimmer and Cloppenburg, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Schwark and Zimmer, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2010), § 39 Ref. 3. 
1168 Please refer to section IV.1.b) in this chapter. 
1169 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 16. Refer also to OECD, "Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," 
(2003), 7. 
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bb) The introduction of a new nonmonetary damage variable dGJ: Impris-
onment of corporate agents (de lege ferenda) 
“Price fixing is nothing less than theft by well-dressed thieves”.1170 This statement 
by Scott D. Hammond introduces another deterrent of antitrust infringements, probably 
the strongest one: The introduction of imprisonment for natural persons engaging in mar-
ket manipulations.1171 It increases the individual cost cD to the infringer, independently of 
his income (which is, together with his assets, the limit for fines).1172 Furthermore, criminal 
sanctioning comprises a social stigma, which deters illegal behavior more intensely than 
purely financial sanctions can.1173 Eventually, reimbursement of fines paid by the infringer 
through the corporation1174 is not possible, which enhances deterrence compared to finan-
cial sanctions.1175 For the above named reasons, the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) has advocated the introduction of criminal sanctions for 
hard-core cartels repeatedly in the studies and reports following its 1998 recommenda-
tion.1176 However, it is the strongest possible interference in individual rights by the legis-
lator and therefore needs to be considered with great care.1177 In particular, the suitability 
of criminal sanctions as a means of problem solving in corporate structures needs to be 
examined carefully.1178 The following sections will examine the legal situation in both Eu-
rope (1) and Germany (2) and draw a conclusion on the introduction of prison sentences 
for market manipulations (3). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1170 Scott D. Hammond, "The Fly On The Wall Has Been Bugged - Catching An International Cartel In The Act," 
International Law Congress 2001 Vol. (2001). 
1171 Also proposed by the Monopoly Commission in one of its latest expert opinions: Monopoly Commission, 
Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 2015, 46 Ref. 191 et sqq. 
1172 Polinsky and Shavell, "Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability?," International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 13, no. 3 (1993), 241. 
1173 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 17. 
1174 Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 219, 231. 
1175 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 17. OECD, "Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," (2003), 8. 
1176 OECD, "Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels," 
(1998). Also OECD, "Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," (2003). 
1177 Hans Achenbach, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. Sec. 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 24. 
1178 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 4. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
215 
 
(1) Criminal sanctions for market manipulations in European law 
The European Union lacks a mandate to introduce directly applicable criminal law.1179 
Also, there is no specific competence for the introduction of criminal law in antitrust in 
Art. 83 TFEU.1180 Furthermore, Art. 23(5) of Regulation N° 1/2003 explicitly qualifies sanc-
tions according to this regulation as “non-criminal”.1181 Yet, a general competence to ob-
ligate Member States to the introduction of criminal norms through directives or regula-
tions is widely accepted.1182 Directives are addressed to Member States and the resulting 
criminal law has democratic legitimacy from the national legislator.1183 Therefore, the com-
petence to order the introduction of criminal sanctions for antitrust infringements remains 
the only option. Yet, with regard to the intensity of criminal sanctions, the democratic 
legitimation of the European legislator to define stipulations for Member States appears 
questionable.1184 Having regard to the complex political problems arising from European 
efforts to criminalize antitrust, it seems more sensible to seek a solution in the individual 
Member States.1185 The question is therefore limited to German national law. 
 
(2) Criminal sanctions for market manipulations in German antitrust law 
The German legislator has initially decided against the utilization of criminal law in 
antitrust.1186 In 1997, however, the law on the fight against corruption1187 extended the 
scope of application of criminal law to the protection of supra-individual interests and in-
troduced Sec. 298 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB), which criminalized bid 
                                                 
1179 Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der 
Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 228-229, 249. See 
also Ulrich Sieber, "Entwicklungsstand und Perspektiven des europäischen Wirtschaftsstrafrechts," in Bausteine 
des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Bernd Schünemann and 
Carlos Suarez Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 356. 
1180 Oliver Suhr, in EUV/AEUV: Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer 
Grundrechtecharta. Kommentar, ed. Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 
2011), Art. 83 EG Ref. 19. Also Martin Böse, in EU-Kommentar, ed. Jürgen Schwarze, 3rd ed. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2012), Artikel 83 AEUV Ref. 28-29. 
1181 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 3, 11. 
1182 Ibid, 36. Also Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, European Court Reports 2005, I-07879 (European 
Court of Justice 2005). Ref. 48. 
1183 Sieber, "Entwicklungsstand und Perspektiven des europäischen Wirtschaftsstrafrechts," in Bausteine des 
europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 360. 
1184 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 41. 
1185 Ibid. 
1186 In detail Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage 
der Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 108 et sqq. 
Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartell-
recht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1889 Ref. 1. 
1187 Law from August 13, 1997. Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2038. 
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rigging.1188 Hence, free competition was recognized as a legal asset deserving the protec-
tion of criminal law by the legislator.1189 Further attempts to criminalize antitrust infringe-
ments were not launched since 1997, even though this approach is strongly supported by 
the criminal law literature.1190 According to today´s evaluation of antitrust infringements, 
the attribution to the field of administrative orders seems mistaken.1191 Purely financial 
sanctions are insufficiently qualified to deter antitrust infringements.1192 However, the ma-
jority of antitrust and commercial law literature rejects the introduction of criminal of-
fenses for antitrust infringements.1193 
 
(a) Sec. 263 StGB (Fraud) 
In principle, Sec. 81 OWiG requires courts to check administrative offences for a 
potential relevance under criminal law.1194 De lege lata, the abuse of market power 
through price manipulations might only be subsumed under Sec. 263 StGB (fraud). The 
German Federal Court of Justice has discussed the classification of restrictive agreements 
according to Sec. 1 GWB as fraud in the case Vergabeverfahren.1195 If at all, this jurisdic-
tion may be applicable to other hardcore cartels according to Sec. 1 GWB.1196 With regard 
to market manipulations, however, the classification as fraud towards and harmful to the 
                                                 
1188 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1892 Ref. 
6. Before, the jurisdiction had qualified bid rigging as fraud (Sec. 263 StGB). See Rheinausbau, Case 2 StR 
102/91, BGHSt 38, 186 (German Federal Court of Justice 1992). Also Rheinausbau II, Case 2 StR 256/94, 
WuW/E BGH 2945 (German Federal Court of Justice 1994). 
1189 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 9. Having claimed this recognition already in the 1970s Jürgen 
Baumann and Gunter Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 29, 33. 
1190 Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der 
Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 113. In detail 
Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Kartellrecht, ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 
81 Ref. 17 and footnote 50 with further references. 
1191 Gerhard Dannecker and Jörg Biermann, Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kar-
tellrecht, 4th ed., ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 1895 Ref. 
17. Already in the 1970s Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 
29. 
1192 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 12. 
1193 Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der 
Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 113. See also 
Dannecker and Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, ed. 
Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81 Ref. 17 and footnote 51 with further 
references in the literature. 
1194 Erich Göhler, "Zum Bußgeld- und Strafverfahren wegen verbotswidrigen Kartellabsprachen," wistra Vol. 
15, no. 4 (1996), 133. 
1195 Vergabeverfahren, 1 StR 576/00, BGHSt 47, 83 (German Federal Court of Justice 2001). 
1196 Thomas Lampert and Susanne Götting, "Startschuss für eine Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts?: 
Anmerkung zu dem Urteil des BGH vom 11.7.2001 "Flughafen München"," WuW Vol. 52, no. 11 (2002), 1069 
et sqq. Doubtfully Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur 
Frage der Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 134. 
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other market side fails due to the absence of deception: The powerful market position of 
the suppliers is, other than in cartel agreements1197, known to the demand side and may 
hence not be subject to an (implied) deception.1198 
De lege lata, fraud may only be claimed if the demand side facing market power on the 
other side of the market includes a clause in its general terms and conditions that market 
power is not being abused. The conclusion of the contract by the seller (possessing full 
knowledge of the buyers terms and conditions) would contain the statement that no abuse 
of market power against the provisions of the GWB influences the contract. Hence, the 
seller has a contractual duty to inform that he violates if he engages in manipulative ac-
tions in the market with relevance for the contract in question. Fraud (by omission) could 
be claimed.1199 Yet, in practice contracts at the power exchange are being concluded with 
the exchange clearing house rather than the seller of the power products, Sec. 42 (1) EEX 
Exchange Rules. They underlie the standardized conditions of exchange trades and do 
hence not contain a no-abuse-clause. 
 
(b) Sec. 240 StGB (Coercion), Sec. 253 StGB (Blackmail) and Sec. 291 StGB (Usury) 
Another approach to criminal sanctions is discussed by Baumann and Arzt: The ap-
plication of Sec. 240 StGB (coercion), Sec. 253 StGB (blackmail) or Sec. 291 StGB (usury) 
on cases of abuse of market power.1200 However, the conditions for the application of these 
provisions may only be met in cases of delivery blocks or incitement to boycott, Sec. 21 
GWB.1201 There is no room for the application of these provisions to market manipulations, 
since the edge of coercion is not yet crossed due to the lack of an illegal threat.1202 
Sec. 291 StGB, as well as Sec. 4 Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz (WiStG) (excessive pricing), do 
only play a minor role in competition law.1203 Sec. 291 StGB on the one hand requires 
financial straits or a lack of experience or weak will in the person being affected by the 
                                                 
1197 For the existence of a deception in cartel constellations see Dannecker and Biermann, in 
Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th 
ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81 Ref. 137. See also Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines 
Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 35 et. sqq. 
1198 Federmann, Kriminalstrafen im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Frage der 
Kriminalisierung von Hardcore-Kartellen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 135. 
1199 Similar for the case of cartel agreements Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," 
ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 35, 37. 
1200 Ibid, 43 et. sqq. 
1201 Dannecker and Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 
ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81 Ref. 162 et sqq. See also Twele, 
Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische 
Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 221. 
1202 Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 45-46. 
1203 Dannecker and Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 
ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81 Ref. 167. 
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manipulation1204, which does not fit the scenario of whole markets being manipulated by 
powerful firms. Sec. 4 WiStG on the other hand is closer to the case of price manipula-
tions.1205 It requires restraints of competition or any other economic power as causal factor 
for excessive prices.1206 The norm is, however, classified as administrative offense 
(Sec. 4(2) WiStG) and may therefore not serve as a basis for prison sentences. 
 
(c) Conclusion 
In conclusion, German antitrust and criminal law do not allow for prison sentences 
for market manipulations de lege lata. The introduction of prison sentences in antitrust 
therefore remains a question de lege ferenda.1207 
 
(3) Criminal sanctions for market manipulations in German capital market law 
In capital market law, other than in antitrust, criminal sanctions for market manip-
ulation do exist. This section will introduce the relevant norms in the WpHG and EnWG, 
but also show that their abstract and imprecise nature makes them a rather ineffective 
tool for deterrence in practice. 
 
(a) Sec. 38(1) N° 2 WpHG (Formerly Sec. 38(2) WpHG (Market manipulation)) 
Criminal sanctions for market manipulations could be imposed during the period of 
examination, if in addition to the requirements of the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence 
N° 1, 2, or 3 WpHG an actual influence on the market price was caused by the offender.1208 
Also the influence on the price of commodities according to Sec. 20a(4) WpHG was cov-
ered by the criminal sanction, since the legislator mentioned these explicitly in Sec. 38(2) 
N° 1 WpHG.1209 After the implementation of the MAR, Sec. 38(1) N° 2 WpHG contains the 
respective criminal sanction. The norm threatens offenses with prison sentences of up to 
five years or fines, depending on the motivation of the offender, the scope of the breach 
                                                 
1204 Kristian Kühl, in Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar, ed. Karl Lackner and Kristian Kühl, 27th ed. (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2011), § 291 Ref. 8. 
1205 Dannecker and Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 
ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81 Ref. 168. 
1206 Ibid. 
1207 A proposal may be found in Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei 
Kartellverstößen, 2015, 48 Ref. 204 et sqq. 
1208 Sorgenfrei, in Kapitalmarktstrafrecht: Handkommentar, ed. Park, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 
363 Ref. 219. 
1209 Dissenting opinion, however with regard to the former legal norms ibid, 364 Ref. 220. 
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of duty, the way the infringement was executed and the consequences of the offense for 
investors and the capital market, Sec. 46(2) second sentence StGB.1210 
However, in practice, criminal sanctions play only a minor role in the deterrence of market 
manipulations. One of the reasons is probably the lack of legal certainty in the WpHG 
offenses. The norms are organized as a chain of references throughout the WpHG and the 
– similarly vague norms in the MaKonV –, which violates the principle of legal certainty 
(Art. 103(2) GG).1211 An investigation started at the public prosecution in Leipzig ended 
without a result due to lacking indications for criminal behavior.1212 
 
(b) Sec. 95a EnWG (Infringements of REMIT) 
Also Sec. 95a(1) EnWG contains criminal sanctions for market manipulations. Any 
infringement of Sec. 95(1b) or (1c) N° 6 EnWG is threatened with a prison sentence of up 
to five years or a fine.1213 The criminal punishment requires the proof of an actual influence 
on the market price through the offense and intent by the offender.1214 Both requirements 
are difficult to show in practice, especially with regard to the standards that need to be 
respected in the field of criminal law.1215 This results in a high number of criminal proceed-
ings being terminated without sanctions. In 2010, there were only 7 convictions based on 
market manipulation in capital market law.1216 With regard to manipulations of the energy 
exchange, there has never been a conviction at all.1217 
 
(c) Conclusion 
Hence, in capital market law, the existing criminal sanctions turn out to be rather 
ineffective in practice. The legislator will have to improve and clarify the offenses in case 
effective deterrence of manipulations is targeted and the principle of legal certainty shall 
                                                 
1210 Ibid, 375 Ref. 243. 
1211 Ibid, 363 Ref. 218. 
1212 Request for information at the public prosecution Leipzig, N° 206 AR 3564/14 from January 8, 2016. 
1213 Bachert, "Befugnisse der Bundesnetzagentur zur Durchsetzung der REMIT-Verordnung," RdE Vol. 24, no. 
9 (2014), 365. 
1214 Theobald and Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Danner and Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Sec. 95a EnWG Ref. 26 et sqq. 
1215 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 175. 
1216 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), 2055 Ref. 14. 
1217 Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den 
deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 198. 
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be respected. However, this would not eliminate the more basic problem to prove a crim-
inal offense in capital market law in accordance with the standards criminal law requires. 
The next section will therefore shortly discuss the fundamental adequacy of criminal sanc-
tions in antitrust and capital market law as a means of deterrence. 
 
(4) The introduction of effective criminal sanctions de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda 
The legislator has considerable discretionary power with regard to the choice of tools 
for the deterrence of market manipulations, which includes the decision about criminalizing 
the behavior in question.1218 The preceding sections have shown that currently, the deci-
sion has been in favor of criminalization in capital market law and against it in antitrust. 
For both sides, there are good reasons that will be discussed subsequently. 
From an economic point of view, the criminalization of antitrust infringements may take 
huge preventive effect, in case there is a significant probability of detection.1219 From a 
legal point of view, the introduction of criminal sanctions for antitrust infringements other 
than bid rigging would help to restore the balance between administrative offences and 
criminal acts in German law1220 and further abolish the different treatment of bid rigging 
and other serious antitrust infringements.1221 Since criminal law is the ultima ratio of the 
legislator, the criminalization of offenses may only be considered under German law if it 
is inevitable.1222 In legal categories, this standard requires a punishable nature of the 
behavior in question, as well as the requirement for a criminal punishment.1223 
                                                 
1218 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 322. 
1219 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 18. With reference to Robert M. Feinberg, "The Enforcement and 
Effects of European Competition Policy: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion," Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol. 23, no. 4 (1985), 375. See also OECD, "Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," (2003). 
1220 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 19-20. See also Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für 
Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - 
Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 225. 
1221 Hans Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Wolfgang Jaeger, Petra Pohlmann, and 
Dirk Schroeder(Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 25. Also Twele, Die 
Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge 
zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 225. 
1222 Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 99 Ref. 162. 
1223 Jürgen Baumann, Ulrich Weber, and Wolfgang Mitsch, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Lehrbuch, 11th ed. 
(Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking, 2003), Sec. 3 Ref. 19. 
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Both requirements need to be discussed with regard to the legally protected asset.1224 
European law requires proportionality between the criminal offense and the sanction im-
posed (Art. 49(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). More precisely, 
appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the legal instrument with regard to the 
purpose pursued must be met.1225  The instrument chosen may also be a sanction “stricto 
sensu” with an intensity oriented on the value of the legally protected asset offended by 
the infringer and the social condemnation of the behavior in question.1226 With regard to 
antitrust infringements, considerable evidence suggests the punishable nature of in-
fringements targeted against free competition according to the above criteria. 
First, there is an observable trend to criminalize antitrust infringements over the past 
decades.1227 This development reveals an increased social condemnation of antitrust of-
fenses,1228 also supported by the findings of modern economics pointing to the serious 
harm of competition restraints to the economy. Second, the remarkably high level of fines 
both in European and German antitrust law suggests the classification of antitrust infringe-
ments as greatly condemned behavior by the legislator. Hence, the fundamental im-
portance of free competition for the economic order leads to the conclusion that un-
distorted competition constitutes an important legal asset. This evaluation justifies the 
enforcement of competition with the help of criminal law both in German and European 
law.1229 
Notwithstanding the general finding of a punishable nature of antitrust infringements, the 
appropriateness of criminal sanctions needs to be discussed for the diverse types of 
infringements with special regard to their anti-social character. For the group of hard-core 
cartels, the benefits of criminal sanctions are widely accepted due to their general dan-
gerousness and the low probability of detection due to their clandestine nature.1230 
                                                 
1224 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 25. 
1225 Georg Freund, in Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach, 2nd ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2011), Vor §§ 13ff. Ref. 62. 
1226 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 27. 
1227 Ibid, 28. 
1228 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 225. 
1229 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 28-30. 
1230 OECD, "Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals," (2003). Also Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen 
und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer 
Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 32. 
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The criminalization of one-sided infringements, as market manipulations are, is yet 
much more difficult to justify.1231 Problems arise with regard to the many legal terms and 
definitions requiring extensive interpretation, such as the existence of a powerful market 
position. The definition of behavior that is without any doubt dangerous and condemnable, 
such as hard-core cartels, seems hardly achievable in a way that satisfies the criteria for 
criminal sanctions.1232 Furthermore, one-sided infringements like boycott and discrimina-
tion are more obvious in their nature and may therefore more easily be handled using the 
instruments of civil law (e.g. order to bring the infringement to an end).1233 
Also, less obvious one-sided infringements like market manipulations are widely consid-
ered inappropriate for the introduction of criminal sanctions.1234 This view is true especially 
with regard to the requirements of legal certainty in European and German law (Art. 2 
TFEU and Art. 20(3), 103(2) GG)1235, which may not be met having regard to the open 
wording of the offenses in Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB requiring extensive interpretation. The 
necessarily general and abstract definition of criminal offences in this field might even 
enfold counterproductive effects if it deters market participants from legitimate actions as 
a consequence of legal uncertainty (so-called “chilling effect”). Hence, competition might 
rather be weakened than boosted by the introduction of criminal sanctions for manipula-
tive behavior.1236 In addition, the experience with the criminalization of bid rigging in 1997 
has shown the complex problems arising from criminal cases with economic back-
ground.1237 Headmost, this is the shift of the power of prosecution from the antitrust au-
thorities to the public prosecutor´s office as a practical consequence of criminal sanc-
tions.1238 The expertise and focus of public prosecution departments are necessarily dif-
ferent from the antitrust authorities´.1239  Further disadvantages brought forward are a 
                                                 
1231 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 229. 
1232 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 33. 
1233 Ibid. 
1234 Wagner-von Papp, "Kriminalisierung von Kartellen," WuW Vol. 60, no. 3 (2010), 277. The opposite opinion 
is hold by Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 33. 
1235 Baumann and Arzt, "Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht," ZHR Vol. 134(1970), 25. For details on the 
constitutional requirement of legal certainty please refer to section B.IV.1.a)bb)(1) of this chapter. 
1236 Wagner-von Papp, "Kriminalisierung von Kartellen," WuW Vol. 60, no. 3 (2010), 277. 
1237 Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and Schroeder(Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 22. Also Dannecker and Biermann, in 
Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th 
ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor § 81, Ref. 24-25. 
1238 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 226. 
1239 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 42. Also Wagner-von Papp, "Kriminalisierung von Kartellen," WuW 
Vol. 60, no. 3 (2010), 278. 
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negative impact on existing leniency programs,1240 inefficient efforts to conceal criminal 
offences, and a deteriorated relationship between cartel authorities and firms,1241 which 
interferes with the consulting function of the authorities.1242 Eventually, the efficiency of 
criminal proceedings in manipulation cases is highly questionable due to the huge work-
load for the public prosecutors, opposed to a limited capacity of the departments. Such 
state of affairs might result to terminations of antitrust proceedings according to Sec. 153a 
StPO.1243 Efficiency is further reduced by the huge cost resulting from the high demands 
of the prosecutors´ capacity, the acquisition of solid evidence,1244 and of course the cost 
from imprisonment itself to society1245, which does not outweigh the benefit from increased 
deterrence. 
 
(5) Conclusion 
The experience in the field of capital market law, especially having regard to the low 
probability of punishment, indicates that the criminal law approach might not be the best-
qualified tool in the fight of market manipulations. The emphasis on individual guilt in 
criminal law fails to solve structural problems of complex systems.1246 Also, the above 
section showed that criminal sanctions come at a cost, both monetary and in the practical 
implementation.1247 An argument of better suitability to protect competition may hence 
not be built on these findings.1248 
As a consequence, the fines approach is preferable to criminal sanctions for market ma-
nipulations from both an economic and a legal viewpoint. This holds true for at least until 
all less costly administrative mechanisms have been tried to deter manipulations.1249 The 
                                                 
1240 With regard to the experience in bid rigging cases refer to Alfred Dierlamm, "Die Verfolgung von 
Submissionsabsprachen nach GWB/OWiG und Strafrecht (§ 298 StGB)," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 2 (2013). 
1241 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 227. 
1242 Wagner-von Papp, "Kriminalisierung von Kartellen," WuW Vol. 60, no. 3 (2010), 279-281. 
1243 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 42. 
1244 Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and Schroeder(Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 25 and 27. 
1245 Polinsky and Shavell, "Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability?," International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 13, no. 3 (1993), 241. 
1246 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 323. 
1247 Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and Schroeder(Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 27. 
1248 Coming to a similar conclusion Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, 
Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2013), 229. 
1249 Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo, "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers 
Still Go To Prison?," Lear Research Paper No. 05-01 Vol. (2005), 16. 
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next subsection will shortly examine another nonmonetary damage variable possibly in-
troduced to deter manipulative behavior that is non-criminal. Thereafter, necessary 
amendments to the existing fines system will be discussed (section 2).1250 
 
cc) Another nonmonetary damage variable dGD: Debarment from the em-
ployment market (de lege ferenda) 
“Criminal law is not the last available instrument to enforce otherwise ineffective 
rules.” Due to the emphasis of individual guilt, it might even be too poorly qualified to 
offer sufficient protection against manipulations of a complex system, as has been shown 
by the past section.1251 Therefore, deterrence might be reached more effectively using 
non-criminal sanctions. 
Disqualification of company directors as a punishment for competition infringements might 
be an alternative sanction to criminal sentences that still influences the individuals´ be-
havior directly,1252 but does not suffer from the drawbacks shown for criminal sanc-
tions.1253 The UK law contains a disqualification of company directors for competition in-
fringements, Sec. 9A Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by Art. 204 
of the Enterprise Act 2002.1254 According to this norm, a director may be disqualified if two 
conditions are satisfied: A company of which the person is a director breaches competition 
law, and the court considers the director´s conduct to make him unfit to manage a com-
pany, Sec. 9A(1)-(3) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by Art. 204 
of the Enterprise Act 2002. The director may be disqualified for a maximum of 15 years, 
Sec. 9A(9) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by Art. 204 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002.1255 
                                                 
1250 Similar Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and 
Schroeder(Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 27. 
1251 Ransiek, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Strafrecht, Verfassungsrecht, Regelungsalternativen, ed. Samson and 
Tiedemann, Schriften zum gesamten Wirtschaftsstrafrecht  (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1996), 323. 
1252 Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 107 Ref. 193. 
1253 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 233. 
1254 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 17. 
1255 Holger Fleischer, "Kartellrechtsverstöße und Vorstandsrecht," BB Vol. 63, no. 21 (2008), 1074-1075. 
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In German law, de lege lata, Sec. 70 et sqq. StGB contains provisions that allow the 
imposition of a (criminal) suspension or even disbarment.1256 The norm requires a convic-
tion on account of market manipulation and the danger of re-offending. For first offenders, 
suspension is therefore practically out of question due to the principle of proportionality. 
In practice, the norm has been almost of no relevance.1257 
Twele examines a prohibition of management activities based on the general clause in 
Sec. 35 GWB for firm executives having engaged in antitrust infringements.1258 The norm 
requires unreliability from the part of the executive, as well as a need to protect the gen-
eral public and the firm´s employees from further damage. However, the disqualification 
from running a business may only be the ultima ratio for cartel authorities after all other 
approaches have failed to keep the company from infringing the antitrust laws repeat-
edly.1259 Furthermore, the disqualification is only lawful in the form of an order to the 
company requiring the dismissal of the unreliable board member.1260 In conclusion, the 
requirements of the general clause are too high to provide for effective punishment of 
antitrust offenders and increase deterrence. 
Schünemann proposes a temporary supervision of offending firms by a government 
agency comparable to the Treuhandanstalt that was reliable for the privatization of the 
formerly nationally owned enterprises of the German Democratic Republic. His argument 
is based upon the deterrent effect of this measure, especially through the related harm 
done to the reputation of the top management.1261 This approach may, if at all, only be a 
solution de lege ferenda. 
From an economic point of view, the approach is generally questionable, since the dis-
qualification of top managers necessary results in the loss of highly qualified human capital 
to the employment market.1262 The social cost from the measure might exceed the benefits 
it creates in antitrust deterrence. 
  
                                                 
1256 Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der European Energy Exchange 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 181. Refer also to Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 72 - 
Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 2015, 49 Ref. 208. 
1257 Vogel, in Wertpapierhandelsgesetz Kommentar, ed. Assmann and Schneider, 6th ed. (Köln: O. Schmidt, 
2012), § 38 Ref. 96. 
1258 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 234. 
1259 Ibid, 244. 
1260 Ibid, 246. 
1261 Schünemann, "Die Strafbarkeit der juristischen Person aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht," in 
Bausteine des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Madrid-Symposium für Klaus Tiedemann, ed. Schünemann and 
Gonzáles(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1994), 290-291. 
1262 Holger Fleischer, "Bestellungshindernisse und Tätigkeitsverbote von Geschäftsleitern im Aktien-, Bank- 
und Kapitalmarktrecht," WM Vol. 54, no. 4 (2004), 164. 
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dd) Conclusion 
The preceding sections on different legal approaches to introduce individual liability 
for market manipulations lead to one definite conclusion: From an economic point of view, 
a system relying exclusively on corporate liability is less efficient than one that combines 
corporate and individual sanctions to deter manipulations on competitive markets.1263 
From a legal perspective, renouncing sanctions addressed to individuals who commit an-
titrust infringements falls short of the objective of punishment.1264 A combined system of 
company and individual sanctions is therefore required. The legal consequences of this 
finding will be discussed in the fifth chapter of this work.1265 
With regard to the character of the individual sanctions, the analysis revealed the inap-
propriateness of criminal sanctions for the field of market manipulations. The fines ap-
proach, both towards companies and individuals, is the preferable instrument for efficient 
deterrence of manipulative market behavior.1266 It needs however to be revised in some 
core questions, the most important thereof will be introduced in the following section 2. 
 
c) Conclusion on changes with regard to government fines DG 
The preceding sections have shown various ways to change the current system of 
governmental fining for antitrust infringements. Most importantly, it has been shown that 
a new reference for the calculation of fines is needed (section a)) for two reasons. From a 
legal point of view, the current system of fining is in contrary to European and German 
constitutional law. From an economic point of view, today´s fines create inefficiently high 
incentives for antitrust compliance and leave no room for other effective tools of antitrust 
deterrence, e.g. private damages claims. 
Also, the shift of the liability from firms to individuals has been discussed under various 
aspects, e.g. fining of corporate agents or criminal sanctions. It could be shown that a 
system of deterrence that applies both, company and individual fining, works more effi-
ciently in the deterrence of market manipulations. 
                                                 
1263 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 16. 
1264 Tiedemann, "Die strafrechtliche Vertreter- und Unternehmenshaftung," NJW Vol. 39, no. 30 (1986), 1843. 
1265 See section D. of the fifth chapter of this work. 
1266 Also Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and Schroeder(Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), Vorbem. § 81 GWB 2005 Ref. 27. 
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With the proposals for the optimization of the damage variable DG at hand, the following 
section 2 now turns to necessary changes with regard to the probability of punishment pp. 
 
2. Changes with regard to the probability of 
punishment pP 
The above analysis has shown that approaches solely based on the cost of detection 
CD do not succeed in deterring market manipulations – they do neither optimize deterrence 
from an economic point of view, nor are they feasible from the legal standpoint.1267 Acting 
on the target function for optimal deterrence, 
 = pP(e) . CD, 
measures influencing the probability of punishment pp remain hence to be discussed. 
Clearly, the increase of efforts for the punishment of manipulators results – ceteris paribus 
(especially the level of fines) – in a higher level of deterrence, as has been shown in the 
economic analysis at the beginning of this chapter:1268 
∂p
p
∂e
 > 0 and therefore 
∂∆π
∂e
 > 0. 
This chapter will answer the question, which efforts e should preferably be increased to 
influence the probability of punishment. Since the probability of punishment depends on 
the detection rate of manipulations rD and the rate of conviction rC, which may both be 
increased by higher effort e,1269 
pp(e) = rD . rC, 
where rD(e), rC(e), 
the following examination distinguishes between measures that target a higher rate of 
detection rD of manipulations (e.g. leniency programs) and legal tools that focus on the 
rate of conviction rC (e.g. the facilitation of proof for antitrust authorities). 
                                                 
1267 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 232. 
1268 Please refer to Sec. B.III of this chapter. See also Ulrich Schwalbe and Jan Höft, "Ausgestaltung von 
Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 602. 
1269 Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 
76, no. 2 (1968), 174. 
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Having regard to the rate of detection rD, the following two measures will be discussed: 
▪ The introduction of leniency programs for the case of market manipulations (a),1270 
▪ combined with a system that rewards whistleblowers (b). 
In sections c and d, approaches focusing on the rate of conviction rC will be examined: 
▪ An alternative approach to prove manipulations based on the firms´ profits (c), 
▪ the shift of the burden of proof from the antitrust authorities to the suspected firms 
(d). 
 
a) Leniency programs for the case of market manipulations  
In order to sanction market manipulations, antitrust authorities need to find out 
about them in a first step. Since the infringers do self-evidently not communicate the 
manipulations openly,1271 authorities may only rely on unusual market data as well as 
competitors´ or consumers complaints. These may however not create a sufficiently high 
rate of detection.1272 
In cartel prosecution, the probability of detection could be raised considerably with the 
introduction of so-called leniency programs:1273 The European Commission1274 and national 
                                                 
1270 Even though these programs also increase the rate of conviction rC, they are discussed in section a. See 
e.g. Buccirossi and Spagnolo, "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go To 
Prison?," Lear Research Paper No. 05-01 Vol. (2005), 16. 
1271 Mario Mathias Ohle and Stephan Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in 
Kartellsachen," wrp Vol. 21, no. 7 (2006), 866. 
1272 See the examination with regard to the probability of punishment in section B.III.1. of this chapter. With 
reference to Peter G. Bryant and E. Woodrow Eckard, "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught," The 
Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 73, no. 3 (1991), 531. Also Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier, 
and Renaud Legal, "Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union," BEER Research Paper 
N° 12 Vol. (2008), 17. John M. Connor and C. Gustav Helmers, "Statistics on Modern Private International 
Cartels, 1990-2005," American Antitrust Institute Working Paper N° 07-01 Vol. (2007), 38. 
1273 Felix Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 
(2007), 474. With reference to Wouter P.J. Wils, "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice," World 
Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 23. Refer also to Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was 
Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 219. Refer also to 
the European Commission´s Notice on the leniency program: European Commission, Notice on Immunity from 
fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006 Ref. 3. See also Andreas Klees, "Zu viel Rechtssicherheit für 
Unternehmen durch die neue Kronzeugenmitteilung in europäischen Kartellverfahren?," WuW Vol. 52, no. 11 
(2002), 1057. 
1274 European Commission, Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006. 
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antitrust authorities1275 offer discounts on fines or even a reduction of fines to zero in 
exchange for a firm blowing the whistle on a cartel not yet known to the prosecutors.1276 
So far, the leniency program does only apply to cartel agreements. The abuse of a domi-
nant market position e.g. through manipulations is not covered by the existing rules.1277 
This section will examine the suitability of this concept for the case of market manipula-
tions, introducing the legal framework in subsection (aa) and discussing the transferability 
of the leniency concept to cases of abuse in subsection (bb). Section cc) concludes. 
 
aa) The legal framework of leniency programs 
Both the European and German leniency programs were inspired by the US depart-
ment of justice antitrust division´s leniency policy, which is based upon insights from game 
theory.1278 The situation for cartel infringers is comparable to the Prisoner´s Dilemma 
Game: The optimal choice (e.g. Nash equilibrium) for any player is to report the antitrust 
offense in order to avoid a sanction (e.g. fine). This setup destabilizes cartel agreements 
and increases the number of reported infringements, if the following requirements are 
met: 
▪ The sanction firms face is considerably high, 
▪ the program and the procedures are transparent in order to allow firms a precise 
assessment of their risks when filing their leniency application, and 
▪ an atmosphere of suspicion is created between cartel members through the auto-
matic granting of leniency to the first applicant.1279 
The legal tool the European Commission´s leniency program employs is the creation of 
trust for firms by way of the publication of its notice on immunity: The Commission is 
binding itself with regard to its leniency offer, thereby having to respect the prohibition of 
                                                 
1275 In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office published its leniency notice in 2006: Federal Cartel Office, Notice 
N° 9/2006 of the Bundeskartellamt on the immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel cases - Leniency 
Programme -, 2006, 9/2006. 
1276 Hans-Joachim Hellmann, "Die Bonusregelung des BKartA im Lichte der Kommissionspraxis zur 
Kronzeugenmitteilung," EuZW Vol. 11, no. 24 (2000), 741. 
1277 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. 
1278 Till Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," ibid Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 606-
607. 
1279 Felix Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 
184. See also Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 
(2005), 607. 
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arbitrary action and the protection of legitimate expectations.1280  The Commission´s com-
petence to issue the notice on immunity is based upon its comprehensive administrative 
authority in the field of competition law. Especially in cases that leave room for discretion, 
legal certainty increases with the publication of internal rules and standards for the prac-
tical application of the norm. The Commission´s leniency notice touches the question of 
fining for antitrust infringements, which is in the authority´s discretion (Art. 23(2) of Reg-
ulation N° 1/2003). Therefore, European law covers the publication of the leniency no-
tice.1281 
The Commission notice differentiates between the immunity from fines and the reduction 
of the fine, depending on the applicant´s rank and the quality of proof he is offering.1282 
An applicant qualifies for immunity from the fine if he fulfills the following requirements 
(Section II. of the Commission notice): 
▪ The undertaking disclosing its participation in an alleged cartel is the first to report 
the cartel agreement and submit evidence on it. 
▪ The evidence enables the Commission to either carry out a targeted inspection in 
connection with the alleged cartel, (8)(a), or find an infringement of Article 81 EC 
(now Art. 101 TFEU) in connection with the alleged cartel, (8)(b). 
▪ The Commission did not already have sufficient evidence to carry out an inspection 
or find an infringement of Art. 81 EC by the time of the submission, (10) and (11). 
▪ The undertaking is genuinely, fully, continuously and expeditiously cooperating 
throughout the Commission´s procedure (12)(a). 
▪ The undertaking ended its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately after sub-
mitting its application (12)(b). 
▪ The undertaking has not destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence nor disclosed 
the fact or the content of the application except to other competition authorities 
(12)(c). 
The core criterion for immunity is therefore the disclosure of proof for a cartel so far un-
known to the Commission (alternative 1) or evidence allowing the proof of a cartel that 
                                                 
1280 Andreas Klees, "Zu viel Rechtssicherheit für Unternehmen durch die neue Kronzeugenmitteilung in 
europäischen Kartellverfahren?," ibid Vol. 52, no. 11 (2002), 1057. 
1281 Philipp Hetzel, Kronzeugenregelungen im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 
160 et sqq. See also Birgit Häberle, Die Kronzeugenmitteilung der Europäischen Kommission im EG-
Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005), 99 and 118. 
1282 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 607. 
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was known to the Commission before the application but could not be proved so far (al-
ternative 2).1283  In case the requirements are met, the fine has to be reduced to zero, the 
Commission has no more discretionary power.1284 Furthermore, firms are granted confi-
dentiality with regard to parallel proceedings of other competition authorities, as well as 
private damages claims.1285 
Besides immunity, the reduction of the fine may be granted (23) if the following re-
quirements are met (Section III. of the Commission notice): 
▪ The undertaking provides the Commission with evidence representing significant 
added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission´s possession 
(24). 
▪ The undertaking is genuinely, fully, continuously and expeditiously cooperating 
throughout the Commission´s procedure (12)(a). 
▪ The undertaking ended its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately after sub-
mitting its application (12)(b). 
▪ The undertaking has not destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence nor disclosed 
the fact or the content of the application except to other competition authorities 
(12)(c). 
If the criteria are met, the firm is eligible for a reduction of 30-50 percent of the fine (first 
undertaking to provide significant added value), 20-30 percent of the fine (second under-
taking to provide significant added value) or up to 20 percent (any subsequent undertaking 
to provide significant added value), (26). The exact amount of the reduction is determined 
depending on its quality and the time of submission.1286 
The German FCO is following a similar approach: Its leniency notice differentiates be-
tween immunity (Section B) and the reduction of the fine (Section C).1287  Its legal nature 
resembles the Commission´s notice as a way to disclose its administrative practice to 
firms and bind itself to certain administrative standards in order to provide reliability for 
                                                 
1283 Andreas Klees, "Zu viel Rechtssicherheit für Unternehmen durch die neue Kronzeugenmitteilung in 
europäischen Kartellverfahren?," ibid Vol. 52, no. 11 (2002), 1058. 
1284 Ibid, 1062. 
1285 Ibid, 1063. 
1286 Ibid, 1064. 
1287 Ohle and Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in Kartellsachen," wrp Vol. 21, no. 7 
(2006), 867. See also Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 
6 (2005), 607. 
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cartel members willing to return to legality.1288 The requirement of a legal basis was con-
troversial in the past,1289 but has been resolved with the introduction of Sec. 81(7) GWB. 
This paragraph empowers the FCO to the introduction of general administrative principles 
on the exercise of its discretion with regard to the imposition of fines,1290 which has been 
realized with the 2006 FCO notice on the immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel 
cases (leniency program). 
The requirements for immunity from the fine follow the European example: Firms need 
to disclose proof for a cartel so far unknown to the authority (Ref. 3) or evidence allowing 
the proof of a cartel that was known to the authority before the application but could not 
be proved so far (Ref. 4).1291 In addition to the European requirements, a firm is not 
eligible for immunity under German law if it was the sole leader of the cartel or has forced 
other firms into the agreement (Ref. 3/4, N° 3).1292 
In case the requirements are met, the first applicant´s fine is zero. Other cartel members 
may receive reductions of their fines of up to 50 percent according to section C of the 
FCO notice for the submission of evidence that allows the proof of the infringement and 
continuous cooperation with the authority.1293 
 
bb) Transferability of the leniency approach to abuse cases 
The leniency programs of the European Commission1294 and the German FCO de-
scribed above only cover hard-core cartels to date.1295 There is no comparable incentive 
scheme for abuse cases in any of the two legal systems. However, under European law 
                                                 
1288 Martin Klusmann, in Handbuch des Kartellrechts, ed. Gerhard Wiedemann, 2nd ed. (München: Beck, 
2008), Sec. 57 Ref. 93d. See also Ohle and Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in 
Kartellsachen," wrp Vol. 21, no. 7 (2006), 868. 
1289 For a comprehensive presentation of the argument see Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer 
"Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 607 et sqq. 
1290 Ohle and Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in Kartellsachen," wrp Vol. 21, no. 7 
(2006), 870. Refer also to Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 
5, no. 2 (2006), 181. 
1291 Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 185, 
186. Also Ohle and Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in Kartellsachen," wrp Vol. 21, 
no. 7 (2006), 870. See also Edgar Panizza, "Ausgewählte Probleme der Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes 
vom 7. März 2006," ZWeR Vol. 8, no. 1 (2008), 64, 65. 
1292 Felix Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ibid Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 
186. 
1293 Ibid, 187. See also Ohle and Albrecht, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes in Kartellsachen," 
wrp Vol. 21, no. 7 (2006), 871. 
1294 Häberle, Die Kronzeugenmitteilung der Europäischen Kommission im EG-Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005), 60. See also Hetzel, Kronzeugenregelungen im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 58. 
1295 Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 184. 
See also Edgar Panizza, "Ausgewählte Probleme der Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamtes vom 7. März 
2006," ibid Vol. 8, no. 1 (2008), 63. 
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firms may be granted reductions of fines for antitrust infringements not covered by the 
leniency program for active cooperation with the Commission.1296 Other than under the 
leniency notice, firms have no legal right to these reductions1297 – one of the core criteria 
for a successful leniency policy, transparency and foreseeability, is therefore not ful-
filled.1298 
With regard to the increase of both – the rate of detection (rD) and the rate of conviction 
(rC) – by a successful leniency policy1299 it remains to be discussed whether the scope of 
application of the above describes leniency programs should be extended in order to cover 
cases of abuse of a dominant market position as well. Especially since studies show that 
rewarding whistleblowers lowers the minimum fines CD with deterrent effects fall to ex-
tremely low levels (e.g. 10 percent of the optimal Beckerian fine).1300 Hence, the problem 
of excessive and therefore unlawful fines would be solved, while the balance of the deter-
rence equation is kept. Furthermore, leniency brings about further deterrence effects like 
an “improved prosecution effect” and an increase in “the risk of being undercut and de-
nounced by other firms”,1301 which makes it a highly effective tool in antitrust enforcement 
and even more attractive for the deterrence of manipulation cases. 
However, the problem that market manipulations, other than cartels, are no collaborative 
offense, needs to be handled, because the classical leniency approach based on the pris-
oner´s dilemma game only works for those collaborative infringements of antitrust.1302 
This question will be handled in section b) following this part. 
 
 
                                                 
1296 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. With reference to Damien Geradin and David Henry, "The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition 
Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts' Judgments," GCLC 
Working Paper No. 2/05 Vol. (2005), 40. 
1297 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. With reference to HFB Holding für Fernwärmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Others 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-9/99, European Court Reports 2002, II-1530  Ref. 608 et 
sqq. (European Court of First Instance 2002). 
1298 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 607. 
1299 Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: 
Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das 
Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), 45-46. See also Buccirossi and Spagnolo, "Optimal Fines in the Era of 
Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go To Prison?," Lear Research Paper No. 05-01 Vol. (2005), 16. 
1300 Buccirossi and Spagnolo, "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go To 
Prison?," Lear Research Paper No. 05-01 Vol. (2005), 17. 
1301 Ibid, 22. 
1302 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 603. 
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(1) The requirement of a crisis of investigation 
In the antitrust literature, a crisis of investigation has been required for the jus-
tification of leniency programs.1303 Thus, there must be a deficit in detection with regard 
to the offense in question – and the introduction of a leniency program must be qualified 
to resolve it.1304 Having regard to antitrust offenses in the field of abuse of a dominant 
market position, Engelsing denies the existence of a crisis of investigation due to the lack 
of secrecy as compared to cartel agreements.1305 His argument is yet self-contradictory: 
In the case of a cartel already known to the FCO, but not yet proved sufficiently to issue 
administrative orders imposing fines to the wrongdoers (Section B, Ref. 4 of the FCO le-
niency notice), he sees a persistent crisis of investigation.1306 
The differentiation between cartel agreements known to the FCO (and therefore no longer 
operating secretly), but not proved due to a lack of evidence and manipulation cases not 
happening secretly and hard to prove due to a lack of evidence does not become clear. 
This is because the situation for investigators is the same in both cases: They possess 
information about an infringement that is however not sufficient to result in a conviction 
of the infringers. Also, the desired “greyhound race” by cartel members to the FCO is not 
likely in any of the two constellations just named,1307 which does make the differentiation 
even more coincidental. 
Both, detection and investigation of a cartel require information from the infringers.1308 In 
the case of manipulations, this remains true at least for the investigation part. With regard 
to the detection part, this is a question of the individual case. 
However, today´s market manipulations are not committed in any obvious way. The ex-
ample of market manipulations at the energy exchange illustrates the problem paradig-
matically: Both the European Commission and the FCO have launched huge investigations 
running complex simulations in order to detect the manipulation strategies – without yield-
ing any evidence that would have been sufficient to lead to a conviction of the manipulators 
in the end.1309 The same is true for the European case: The Commission sector inquiry 
                                                 
1303 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 608. 
See also Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 
180. 
1304 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 608. 
1305 Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 185. 
1306 Ibid, 186. 
1307 With regard to the cartel case see Edgar Panizza, "Ausgewählte Probleme der Bonusregelung des 
Bundeskartellamtes vom 7. März 2006," ibid Vol. 8, no. 1 (2008), 69. 
1308 Hetzel, Kronzeugenregelungen im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 31. 
1309 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 157-158. 
See also Dörte Fouquet, Angela Seidenspinner, and Thomas Füller, "Kurzgutachten Wettbewerbs- und 
energiepolitische Lücken der Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung, Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes 
vom Januar 2011,"(2011), 6. Also Peter Becker, "Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel 
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from 2007 found substantial scope for excessive pricing at EEX,1310 but did not succeed in 
providing substantial evidence for actual manipulations that could have stood up in 
court.1311 
As a result, a crisis of investigation may not be negated. Even if, due to the lack of secrecy 
of abuse of market dominance, automatic and full immunity is not considered the appro-
priate offer to infringers, a leniency policy might provide for immunity as a general rule 
(intended discretion)1312 or offer reductions of fines in exchange for the delivery of evi-
dence and cooperation with the authority. 
 
(2) Comparable regulations in tax law 
It needs yet a slightly different design because the Prisoner´s Dilemma situation that 
destabilizes cartel agreements and speeds up the rush to the authority may not be found 
in abuse cases. Still, a comparable tool has been adopted in a similar constellation in the 
recent past: In German tax law, tax dodgers may benefit from a tax amnesty for voluntary 
declarations and avoid fining if they fulfill the requirements of Sec. 371 German Fiscal 
Code (Abgabenordnung, AO).1313 Sec. 371(1) German Fiscal Code reads1314: 
“Whoever, in relation to all tax crimes for a type of tax that have not become 
time-barred, fully corrects the incorrect particulars held by the revenue author-
ity, supplements the incomplete particulars held by the revenue authority or 
furnishes the revenue authority with the previously omitted particulars shall 
not be punished pursuant to section 370 on account of these tax crimes.” 
                                                 
des Bundeskartellamtes: Ausgezeichnete Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen," ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 
118. 
1310 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 2006, COM(2006) 851 final, 146 Ref. 436 
and p. 150. 
1311 Ibid, 147 Ref. 443, 311 Ref. 998 and 149 Ref. 445. 
1312 Engelsing refers to the FCO leniency policy for cartels already known to the authority, but not yet proved 
(Section B Ref. 4 Leniency Notice): Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," 
ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 186. 
1313 Markus Jäger, in Abgabenordnung: Kommentar, ed. Franz Klein, 12th ed. (München: C.H.Beck, 2014), 
Sec. 371 Ref. 1. 
1314 The translation was provided by the Language Service of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
236 
 
The norm serves two purposes: It shall find sources for taxation hidden so far1315 and 
incentivize tax dodgers to return to legality.1316 Therefore, the legislator may have an 
interest to offer a favorable treatment in exchange for cooperation. 
Also in the field of antitrust, this interest has already been named: With regard to hard-
core cartels, the Commission reasons that the interest of consumers and citizens in the 
detection and punishment of cartels might outweigh the interest in fining the infringers 
who cooperate with the authorities.1317 The transfer of the tax authorities approach to 
manipulation cases is therefore a promising step forward in the process of detecting and 
proving market manipulations in the interest of society as a whole. 
 
(3) Conclusion: Leniency for abuse cases is feasible de lege lata 
Hence, the establishment of a leniency policy that also covers abuse cases is a well-
suited tool to uncover and punish manipulations of the energy exchange. In addition to 
the advantages in deterrence, the introduction of leniency has several upsides from a legal 
point of view: First, the intransparent reward policy of the Commission so far decided on 
a case by case basis1318 would be replaced by a reliable and transparent set of rules that 
is in line with the rule of law.1319 Furthermore, the approach has considerable advantages 
with regard to the practical implementation: A formal enabling provision is not required 
since the leniency policy is an administrative procedure intended to guide the authorities 
discretion with regard to the prosecution of infringements according to Sec. 47(1) 
OWiG.1320 Besides, the general wording of the enabling provision for the current leniency 
policy in Sec. 81(7) GWB leaves room for the introduction of general administrative pro-
cedures not only for hard-core cartel cases but also any other offense subject to fining – 
including the administrative offenses targeting the abuse of market power according to 
Sec. 81(2) GWB. 
                                                 
1315 See for example Unnamed Decision, Case 3 StR 10/87, BGHSt 35, 36 (German Federal Court of Justice 
1987). 
1316 Jäger, in Abgabenordnung: Kommentar, ed. Klein, 12th ed. (München: C.H.Beck, 2014), Sec. 371 Ref. 2. 
With reference to Unnamed Decision, Case 1 StR 577/09, BGHSt 55, 180 (German Federal Court of Justice 
2010). 
1317 European Commission, Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006, Recital 
3. 
1318 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. With reference to Geradin and Henry, "The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An 
Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts' Judgments," GCLC Working 
Paper No. 2/05 Vol. (2005), 40. 
1319 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 609. 
1320 Ibid. See also Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 
(2006), 181. The lawfulness of a leniency policy to guide discretion has also been approved by the Higher Re-
gional Court Düsseldorf: Papiergroßhandel, Case VI-Kart 3/05 (OWi) , Kart 3/05 (OWi), WuW/E DE-R, 1733 
Ref. 166 et sqq. (Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf 2006). 
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Having regard to the immense costs e.g. the sector inquiry caused and the fact that the 
authority´s resources were bound for years,1321 the interest in detection and actual inter-
diction of manipulations with the help of leniency might outweigh the interest in cashing 
(the full amount of) the fine.1322 
 
cc) Design of a leniency policy for abuse cases 
The concrete design of the leniency program under German law follows the example 
of the existing program for hard-core cartels: 
▪ The requirements with regard to the delivery of proof and cooperation need to be 
described transparently and 
▪ the obligations of the principal witness before immunity is granted need to be as 
limited as possible in order to guarantee fairness of the procedures.1323 
Immunity from a fine for the abuse of a dominant market position in German law could 
e.g. be granted following the example of Section B Ref. 4 of the FCO leniency notice: 
The Federal Cartel Office will as a general rule grant immunity from a fine for 
the abuse of a dominant market position, if 
1. the infringer is the first to cooperate with the authority before it has suf-
ficient evidence to prove the infringement and 
2. the infringer enables the Federal Cartel Office by way of oral and written 
information and – if available – pieces of evidence to prove the infringe-
ment and 
3. the infringer is cooperating with the authority absolutely and continuously. 
In addition, the reduction of a fine for abuse cases may be granted following the example 
of the current Section C of the FCO leniency notice: 
                                                 
1321 Hetzel, Kronzeugenregelungen im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 59. 
1322 The European Commission names this fact in the recitals for the introduction of leniency for hard-core car-
tels. Refer to European Commission, Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 
2006, Recital 3. 
1323 Wiesner, "Zur Rechtmäßigkeit einer "Bonusregelung" im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 55, no. 6 (2005), 609. 
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In favor of an infringer who does not fulfill the requirements for immunity from 
the fine according to the previous section, the Federal Cartel Office may reduce 
the fine by up to 50 percent, if 
1. the infringer enables the Federal Cartel Office by way of oral and written 
information and – if available – pieces of evidence to prove the infringe-
ment and 
2. the infringer is cooperating with the authority fully and continuously. 
The detailed obligations for cooperation (Section D of the current FCO leniency notice) and 
all other rules on the application process (Section E), confidentiality (Section F) and others 
would have to be the same for abuse cases. 
Today´s European Commission leniency program also differentiates between the dis-
closure of evidence on cartels so far unknown to the Commission (alternative 1) and evi-
dence allowing the proof of a cartel that was known to the Commission before the appli-
cation but could not be proved so far (alternative 2).1324  Therefore, a future leniency 
policy for abuse cases could be based on the qualification requirements of the latter alter-
native: 
▪ The undertaking disclosing abuse of a dominant market position enables 
the Commission to find an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. 
▪ The Commission did not already have sufficient evidence to find an in-
fringement of Art. 102 TFEU by the time of the submission. 
▪ The undertaking is genuinely, fully, continuously and expeditiously co-
operating throughout the Commission´s procedure. 
▪ The undertaking ended its abusive practice immediately after submitting 
its application. 
▪ The undertaking has not destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence nor 
disclosed the fact or the content of the application except to other com-
petition authorizes. 
 
                                                 
1324 Andreas Klees, "Zu viel Rechtssicherheit für Unternehmen durch die neue Kronzeugenmitteilung in 
europäischen Kartellverfahren?," ibid Vol. 52, no. 11 (2002), 1058. 
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dd) Conclusion 
The extension of the scope of today´s leniency programs in European and German 
national law to cases of abuse of a dominant market position is a legal tool well suited to 
increase the probability of punishment pp, because it influences both the rate of detection 
rD of forbidden abusive market behavior and the rate of conviction rC that today suffers 
from a considerable lack of proof on the side of the antitrust authorities. By the use of 
leniency, the equation for optimal deterrence of market manipulations introduced at the 
beginning, 
 = pP(e) . CD, 
is balanced with much lower values for the cost of detection (which is economically pref-
erable and from a legal point of view compulsory)1325. 
Besides its efficiency and the accordance with the rule of law, the leniency approach has 
the practical advantage of immediate effectiveness: Antitrust authorities may adopt new 
administrative guidelines on their leniency policy independently and without going through 
the complete legislative process that may take years for a change.  
Thus, a leniency policy for cases of abuse of market power can and should be adopted de 
lege lata to increase deterrence of market manipulations. The sole implementation of 
leniency in manipulation cases does however entail a problem: Due to the nature of ma-
nipulations being individual behavior of a firm as compared to coordinative acts by several 
firms in cartel cases, leniency for manipulations lacks the urge to disclose the infringement 
to the antitrust authorities. While firms have to fear the disclosure of the infringement by 
a competitor in cartel cases, they do not face the same threat in manipulation cases where 
they are committing the infringement individually. This “prisoner´s dilemma” situation 
may however be created by the use of a complementary legal tool introduced in the fol-
lowing section b: The reward of whistleblowers. 
 
b) The reward of whistleblowers 
Closely connected to the idea of leniency is the concept of the whistleblower: People 
having inside information about an antitrust infringement, but are not or only marginally 
involved in it shall be rewarded for information about the infringement or proof delivered 
                                                 
1325 Please refer to sections B.II. and B.IV.1. of this chapter. 
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to the antitrust authorities.1326 Such approaches increase the probability of detection and 
prosecution in antitrust cases.1327 Furthermore, the approach solves a problem that a le-
niency policy for abuse cases faces: Since abuse of a dominant market position is not a 
collaborative offense, other than e.g. cartels are, the leniency approach may not work 
effectively due to the absence of a prisoner´s dilemma situation for the infringers.1328 If, 
however, leniency is combined with a reward for whistleblowers, this prisoner´s dilemma 
situation is simulated and makes hence leniency work in abuse cases. 
Several alternatives for the design of whistleblower programs are possible, the most im-
portant ones are: 
▪ The extension of existing leniency programs by adding a financial premium for in-
formation about a cartel by cartel insiders, or 
▪ a separate reward system for information about antitrust infringements by cartel 
outsiders.1329 
This section will show advantages and disadvantages of the two reward systems named 
from an economic point of view and subsequently discuss options for the implementation 
in the legal system. 
 
aa) The extension of leniency: Financial premiums for cartel insiders 
In addition to the existing leniency programs by the antitrust authorities, some au-
thors have proposed to reward principal witnesses in antitrust cases not only with immun-
ity from fines common in most modern leniency programs, but also offer them a financial 
incentive for their information (negative fine).1330 Spagnolo argues that a reward equaling 
the sum of all fines paid by his former cartel members for the first party that reports the 
cartel to the authorities would lead to the first best solution: Complete and costless deter-
rence of cartels. The reason is straightforward: No cartel agreement would be sustainable 
in this model.1331 
                                                 
1326 Eckart Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 310. 
1327 Ibid, 326. 
1328 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 603. 
1329 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 314-315. 
1330 Giancarlo Spagnolo, "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs," Working Paper Vol. (2005), 5, 18. 
1331 Ibid, 5. 
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However, this argument is only valuable for collusive agreements that may be destabilized 
through outside incentives. In manipulation cases, there is no collusion between the ma-
nipulators. Rather, a single company decides to exploit a manipulative scope. Besides, a 
financial reward for the report about own illegal practices causes ethical concerns and 
political opposition because it appears as a reward of illegal behavior.1332 
With regard to the deterrence of market manipulations at the energy exchange, additional 
financial premiums for insider reporters are therefore no promising approach. 
 
bb) A separate reward system for information by cartel outsiders 
A more promising approach for the increase of the probability of punishment in ma-
nipulation cases might be the reward of informants not themselves involved in the in-
fringement, but possessing information about the case due to their position in the firm or 
its environment.1333 Those may namely be employees confronted with antitrust infringe-
ments in the firm who have denied their participation in the illegal practices, employees 
in the administrative departments (e.g. controlling, accounting), network administrators, 
employees of security companies or even cleaning staff.1334 
This group of employees may possess valuable insider information about antitrust infringe-
ments including manipulations committed by their employer. However, it will often not 
report this information to the authorities from pure intrinsic motivation1335 due to serious 
personal disadvantages from whistleblowing like the loss of their job and the destruction 
of career opportunities in their sector, as well as the need for expensive legal advice.1336 
A financial reward that compensates them for the disadvantages suffered and 
leaves them with a bonus for their efforts will incentivize a number of these insiders to 
blow the whistle and help detect antitrust infringements. 
                                                 
1332 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 314. 
1333 For similar problems in the field of capital market law empirical data on whistleblowing may be found in 
Holger Fleischer and Ulrich Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 365. With regard to cartels refer to Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine 
Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 108 Ref. 199. 
1334 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 315. 
1335 Controversial. With regard to negative effects of financial rewards due to the so-called crowding-out effect 
see ibid, Ref. 93. 
1336 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 361. See also Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine 
rechtsökonomische und rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 340. 
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(1) Economic theory of whistleblowing 
This effect is due to the following economic considerations: Firm officials involved in 
antitrust infringements, namely manipulations of the energy market in the focus of this 
work, may never be sure who of the firm´s employees is aware of the illegal behavior. 
Due to the external (financial) incentive for employees to report the infringement to the 
authorities, the infringers need to bribe the employees in order to buy their silence. In 
fact, every single employee suspicious of knowledge about the infringement needs to be 
paid by the firm, even if the governmental whistleblower program only rewards the first 
reporter. Since the infringers neither know who in the firm is aware of the illegal practice 
nor whether the employees bribed won´t still report to the authority, the illegal practice 
does not appear attractive in the long run. Either will it be detected due to whistle-
blowing in the short run or the payments to buy silence will become costlier than the 
benefits from the infringement in the long run, since they need to be repeated in every 
new period.1337 
Furthermore, whistleblower programs have an intensifying side effect on the existing 
leniency programs: Firm officials learning about an antitrust infringement in their com-
pany will feel an urge to report it to the authorities in order to be accepted as a leniency 
applicant before a whistleblower may report it.1338 Hence, the addition of leniency pro-
grams that also cover abuse cases1339 by rewards for non-involved whistleblowers creates 
a situation comparable to the Prisoner´s Dilemma game also in non-cartel cases: While in 
a cartel, all participants are incentivized to report to the authorities first in order to receive 
immunity from the fine while everybody else pays, infringers engaging in market manip-
ulations are incentivized to report first because they have to fear that otherwise firm in-
siders will report using the whistleblower reward system. This makes whistleblower sys-
tems for outsiders in combination with specific leniency programs an optimal tool for 
detection and deterrence of manipulations of the market according to Sec. 19(2) 
N° 2 GWB. 
Economic theory suggests that whistleblowing is the most cost-effective way to gather 
information about infringements of the law and hence increase the probability of detec-
tion.1340 While it seems costly to reward a single whistleblower with up to one million Euro, 
                                                 
1337 For the case of cartels see "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische 
und rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 316-317. 
1338 Ibid, 317. 
1339 Refer to the proposal in section B.IV.2.a)cc) in this chapter. 
1340 Jennifer Arlen, "The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability," The Journal of Legal 
Studies Vol. 2, no. 2 (1994), 835. Refer also to Robert Howse and Ronald J Daniels, "Rewarding 
Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy," in Corporate Decision-
Making in Canada, ed. Ronald J. Daniels and Randall Morck(Calgary: Calgary University Press, 1995), 529. 
With reference to the European Commission´s argument Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize 
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the reward may be financed from the additional fines paid by the infringers. In cases where 
this cost-benefit balance is doubtful, the authority may prioritize cases and only engage 
in further examinations where the expected benefit at least equals the cost that is caused 
due to the examination of the case (e.g. opportunity cost for the capacity of the staff).1341 
 
(2) Disadvantages of the whistleblower approach 
However, there are also a number of potential disadvantages to the whistle-
blower approach that need to be weighed against the above-named benefits. First, there 
is a danger of over deterrence that may lead to the elimination of pro-competitive practices 
on the side of the firms due to the danger of a wrong evaluation of the behavior with all 
of its consequences. Also, inefficiently prohibitive cost might result from efforts to hide 
antitrust infringements in the firm from potential whistleblowers. Finally, there is also a 
danger that managers of firms involved are misusing the whistleblowing program.1342 
These problems may however be managed with an appropriate design of the whistleblower 
system1343 that will be discussed in the following section cc). Remaining moral concerns 
referring to the creation of a culture of denunciation1344 or infringements of confidentiality 
obligations (e.g. Sec. 17(1) UWG)1345  may not overcome the fact that the whistleblower 
reports criminal behavior with far-reaching damage caused to the economy. 
 
(3) Conclusion 
From an economic point of view, the introduction of a reward system for whistle-
blowers is hence an effective tool to increase the probability of detection also in manipu-
lation cases and reach an efficient level of deterrence. 
 
 
                                                 
für Whistleblower im Europäischen Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des 
Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, no. 10 (2012), 363. 
1341 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 319-320. 
1342 Ibid, 320-326. 
1343 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 364. Also Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische 
und rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 326. 
1344 Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 109 Ref. 203. 
1345 Ibid, 110 Ref. 206. 
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cc) Implementation in the legal system 
The German FCO has set up a standardized whistleblower system in June 2012.1346 
However, informants are not offered payment for their information today – which will not 
result in a high number of tips, as the above pictured analysis of risks for informants 
suggests.1347 A legislative proposal from 2012 did also not contain financial incentives for 
whistleblowers – and did not pass in German Bundestag.1348 In the field of capital market 
law, the European Commission has proposed the introduction of a whistleblower system 
with financial incentives in conformity with national law of the Member States in Art. 32(4) 
of its 2014 Market Abuse Regulation (MAR).1349 The MAR does however not cover com-
modities traded in spot markets like the EEX power contracts (except from Art. 12 and 15 
MAR, see Art. 2(2) MAR). By now, the Commission does not further pursue a Union-wide 
harmonized protection of whistleblowers.1350 It has, however, in March 2017 introduced a 
whistleblower system for cartel cases. Yet, this system does – as the German FCO one – 
not offer a reward to informants.1351 This section will therefore discuss, whether a whis-
tleblowing program may be implemented de lege lata (subsection (1)) or needs to be 
installed de lege ferenda. 
 
(1) Implementation de lege lata 
De lege lata, a legal basis for the implementation of a whistleblower program may 
not be found. In particular, it may not be based on Sec. 81(7) GWB and Sec. 47(1) OWiG 
that only empower the antitrust authority to reductions of fines for infringers, but not for 
third parties offering information.1352 
However, there might be an approach to establish whistleblowing de lege lata: Individual 
negotiations between informants and the FCO about the “price” of the information offered. 
                                                 
1346 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 312. Also refer to the FCO information on 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/DE/Kartellverbot/Anonyme_Hinweise/anonymehinweise_artikel.html. 
1347 See also Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 361. 
1348 Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 109 Ref. 202. 
1349 European Parliament and Council. Regulation N° 596/2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) 
and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 
2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. EU Official Journal N° L 173, p. 1-61. Before Art. 29(2) of 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2011, COM(2011) 651 final. 
1350 Monopoly Commission, Hauptgutachten XX 2012/2013: Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 109 Ref. 202. 
1351 Holzwarth, „Ein gut gefüllter Werkzeugkasten – Verfolgung von Kartellrechtsverstößen durch die EU-Kom-
mission nach Einführung des Instruments für Whistleblowing“, WuW Vol. 67, no. 7-8 (2017), 353. 
1352 Engelsing, "Die neue Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts von 2006," ZWeR Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), 181. 
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In Germany, a comparable situation arose when informants offered discs with data on tax 
evaders to the German tax authorities against payment of a individually negotiated re-
ward. Both in the fields of tax and antitrust law, administrative action requires a legal 
basis due to the principle of legality of the administration. Yet, neither in antitrust, nor in 
the StPO or the OWiG there is a section allowing the acquisition of information or proof.1353 
Yet, already a statutory assignment of a task may contain the entitlement to act, because 
without the possibility to act, the authority may not complete its tasks. If it is hence the 
FCO´s task to survey the compliance of market actors with the rules of the GWB and – if 
necessary – punish infringements according to Sec. 32 et sqq., Sec. 81 GWB, the FCO is 
necessarily entitled to acquire the required information.1354 Sec. 81 GWB may hence serve 
as a legal basis for negotiations with potential whistleblowers. 
The acquisition of information from a whistleblower might however be a violation of the 
fundamental constitutional right to informational self-determination, Art. 1(1) and 
2(1) GG.1355 This right is applicable not only to natural persons, but also to companies, 
Art. 19(3) GG.1356 However, both the process of acquisition and the analysis and utilization 
of the information are covered by the powers of intervention granted to the FCO according 
to Sec. 56 et sqq. GWB.1357 Therefore, the violation of the right to informational self-de-
termination is denied. Also concerns with regard to budgetary law and to abetting to the 
disclosure of trade and industrial secrets (Sec. 17 UWG), prove unfounded.1358 
For the comparable case in tax law, the German Federal Constitutional Court has decided 
that the acquisition and utilization of the data – even if it comes from a tortious act, which 
is not necessarily the case with whistleblowing in antitrust – is legal.1359 Therefore, the 
negotiation about a reward for information with a potential whistleblower is legal de lege 
lata. 
Yet, a whistleblower program purely based on individual negotiation between the inform-
ants and the FCO does not promise to be an overwhelming success, because it contains 
too much legal uncertainty and a high risk for the informant. The implementation of a 
                                                 
1353 Similar for the field of tax law Ingo Kaiser, "Zulässigkeit des Ankaufs deliktisch erlangter Steuerdaten," 
NStZ Vol. 31, no. 7 (2011), 385. 
1354 Ibid. 
1355 Ibid. 
1356 Barbara Remmert, in Grundgesetz: Kommentar, ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig(München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Art. 19(3) GG Ref. 1. 
1357 Similar for the field of tax law Kaiser, "Zulässigkeit des Ankaufs deliktisch erlangter Steuerdaten," NStZ 
Vol. 31, no. 7 (2011), 386. 
1358 Ibid, 387-388. 
1359 Steuer-CD, Case 2 BvR 2101/09, WM 2010, 2376 (German Federal Constitutional Court 2010). 
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codified whistleblower program in the current legal system, no matter if in the field of 
capital or antitrust law, requires a legal basis de lege ferenda. 
 
(2) Implementation de lege ferenda 
Since the preceding analysis showed that the opportunities for the implementation 
of a whistleblower program de lege lata are strictly limited to an inefficient negotiation 
approach, this section will propose necessary changes in German antitrust law that pave 
the way for transparent and reliable rules on whistleblowing. 
From the experience in other countries that have already implemented whistleblower sys-
tems in the field of antitrust, a number of important structural requirements for the pro-
gram can be named. Overall, an effective whistleblowing program requires clear and trans-
parent rules with regard to the reward and the protection from repression. By contrast, 
extensive discretion of the authority minders the attractiveness.1360 In particular, the fol-
lowing requirements need to be respected: 
▪ The kind of antitrust infringement eligible for a reward, e.g. only certain kinds of 
cartel agreements and manipulations.1361 
▪ The requirements with regard to the quality of the information, e.g. what is con-
sidered a new information of high importance that results in a sanction.1362 
▪ The allocation of the reward in case of several whistleblowers, especially whether 
strict priority applies or also additional information by a second or third whistle-
blower may result in a reward.1363 
▪ The groups of beneficiaries need to be defined carefully, excluding persons who 
shall not receive a reward (e.g. officials of the antitrust authorities, professional 
consultants with a duty to confidentiality, compliance representatives of the firm 
or employees who have been infringing internal surveillance duties with regard to 
                                                 
1360 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 335-336. 
1361 Ibid, 336. 
1362 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 366. 
1363 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 339-340. 
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the infringement).1364 Some authors propose to limit the beneficiaries further and 
only reward true company insiders.1365 
▪ The program needs to ensure reliable protection of the informant´s identity. 
▪ The reward needs to be significant. Due to the risk of high disadvantages for whis-
tleblowers, the required amounts start with more than 100.000 €.1366 
▪ Punishments need to result for abuse of the whistleblower program.1367 
The infringements eligible for a reward should include manipulations of the market by 
dominant firms according to Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB. As proved above, the combination of 
a leniency program and a corresponding whistleblower program creates a Prisoner´s Di-
lemma situation between the infringers and potential confidants that increases the incen-
tive to blow the whistle for both infringers and third parties and thereby increases deter-
rence. In the interest of effective deterrence of manipulations in the energy market, whis-
tleblowing on infringements of Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB should absolutely be eligible for a 
reward by the authority. 
The requirements with regard to the quality of the information need to be defined pre-
cisely. In the European Commission´s proposal in Art. 32(2) of the MAR, four requirements 
are named: 
(1) The information is new. 
(2) It is of high importance. 
(3) It refers to one of the infringements eligible for a reward, and 
(4) a governmental sanction for the infringer results.1368 
Those criteria seem suited also for the field of antitrust. The criterion new shall be dis-
cussed under the topic of the allocation of the reward. The eligibility criterion (3) has 
                                                 
1364 Ibid, 342. 
1365 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 366. 
1366 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 336. 
1367 Ibid, 344. 
1368 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 366. 
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already been discussed above. The criteria “importance” (2) and “resulting sanction” (4) 
shall avoid rewards for bagatelles, and erroneous complaints and abuse of the program. 
With regard to the allocation of the reward, it needs to be decided whether the system 
only refers to information on cases not yet known to the authorities or also additional 
information (e.g. proof) on cases already known.1369 Existing systems show a wide range 
of designs reaching from a reward only of the first whistleblower (e.g. in South Korea) to 
a full reward for any whistleblower (e.g. in Hungary).1370 While Bueren considers only 
priority allocation to be effective,1371 there is also a good argument for a reward of addi-
tional information, especially in cases where proof is hard to acquire. This does in particular 
refer to complex cases where market power is abused, e.g. the manipulations of prices at 
the EEX. In constellations like the one discussed in this work, where the authorities already 
have a justified suspicion that an infringement of the antitrust and capital market laws 
may have occurred, but do not succeed in proving it, insider informants might deliver the 
proof needed to actually sanction the infringement. The probability of punishment and 
thereby overall deterrence of this kind of infringements would increase considerably. The 
danger of collusion between whistleblowers and retarded whistleblowing1372 may be han-
dled using a phased payment scheme that provides the highest reward for the first whis-
tleblower. 
The reward consists of a guarantee to protect the whistleblower´s identity if necessary 
and a financial incentive. In order to balance the need for anonymity and the danger of 
abuse, the authority may ask for the deposit of an affirmation in lieu of an oath at a lawyer 
who knows the whistleblower´s identity.1373 Besides the guarantee of protection, there is 
a need for a substantial financial reward for the reasons discussed above. In the existing 
whistleblower programs, the approaches differ between a fixed scope for the reward (UK), 
a percentage share of the fine charged from the infringer (USA) and negotiated settle-
ments.1374 Advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches shall not be dis-
cussed in depth in this work. An effective whistleblower program should however consider 
that extensive discretion of the authority with regard to the individual reward creates legal 
                                                 
1369 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 340-341. 
1370 Ibid, 339. 
1371 Ibid, 340. 
1372 Ibid. 
1373 Holger Fleischer and Schmolke, "Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen 
Kapitalmarktrecht?: Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Reform des Marktmissbrauchsregimes," NZG Vol. 15, 
no. 10 (2012), 367. 
1374 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 338. 
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uncertainty – which comes at the cost of information not offered to the antitrust authori-
ties.1375 
Finally, the design of the whistleblower program needs to respect internal compliance 
programs of the firms. The incentive to report an infringement to the authorities instead 
of the internal compliance management needs hence to be controlled. With rules ensuring 
that the whistleblower keeps his position with regard to priority and novelty of his infor-
mation and an obligation to contact the internal compliance management before the au-
thorities, this conflict may be handled.1376 
 
(3) Conclusion 
As a result, the implementation of a whistleblower program is a feasible instrument 
to increase the detection and prosecution of market manipulation also from a legal point 
of view. De lege lata, the negotiation approach should be realized immediately in the 
framework of the existing whistleblower system of the FCO to set financial incentives for 
informants. De lege ferenda, the legislator should create a legal basis for the implemen-
tation of an FCO notice on whistleblowing that sets transparent and reliable standards for 
the information required, the level of protection and the reward offered. A proposal will be 
introduced in the following subsection dd). 
 
dd) Design of a whistleblowing program for abuse cases 
Following the requirements for whistleblower systems introduced in the previous 
section, a proposal for the design of a German program will be presented subsequently. 
It uses the existing whistleblower programs in the United Kingdom – the informant re-
ward program introduced in 2008 by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)1377 – and the Re-
ward Payment to Informants Scheme of the Competition Commission of Pakistan 
(CCP) from 20071378 as an example. 
 
                                                 
1375 Ibid, 339. 
1376 Ibid, 345. 
1377 Ibid, 328. 
1378 Ibid, 331. 
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German Federal Cartel Office 
Notice on the whistleblower system 
The German Federal Cartel Office has extended its whistleblower system. The 
objective of the system is to detect and prosecute antitrust infringements pro-
hibited in the GWB. These guidelines are being issued pursuant to the legal 
basis in the GWB. 
 
Sec. 1 Eligible persons 
(1) As a general rule, everybody possessing information about an infringement 
of the GWB is eligible for a reward. 
(2) By derogation from paragraph (1), the following groups of persons are not 
eligible for a reward under the whistleblower program: 
1. Officials of the Federal Cartel Office or other antitrust authorities, 
2. Professional consultants with a duty to confidentiality towards their clients, 
3. Compliance managers and comparable employees with regard to infringe-
ments of their employers, 
4. Employees who have been infringing firm internal surveillance duties with 
regard to the infringement.1379 
 
Sec. 2 Eligible information 
(1) The Federal Cartel Office will as a general rule pay a reward reaching from 
10 to 30 percent of the fine charged from the infringer to an informant, if 
2. the informant is the first to report a cartel according to Sec. 1 GWB or an 
abuse of a dominant market position according to Sec. 19 GWB to the au-
thority before it has knowledge about the infringement and 
                                                 
1379 Inspired by ibid, 342. 
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3. the informant enables the Federal Cartel Office by way of oral and written 
information and – if available – pieces of evidence to prove the infringe-
ment and issue a fine against the infringer and 
4. the informant has reported the infringement to the internal compliance 
management of his employer before, but no more than 90 days before his 
report to the FCO. 
(2) In favor of an infringer who does not fulfill the requirements for a reward 
according to paragraph (1), the Federal Cartel Office will pay a reward reaching 
up to 20 percent of the fine charged from the infringer to the informant, if 
1. the informant enables the Federal Cartel Office by way of oral and written 
information and – if available – pieces of evidence to prove the infringe-
ment and issue a fine against the infringer and 
2. the informant has reported the infringement to the internal compliance 
management of his employer before, but no more than 90 days before his 
report to the FCO. 
(3) It shall be in the discretion of the Federal Cartel Office not to accept the intended 
information provided by the informant. 
 
Sec. 3 Reward payment 
(1) The reward shall be paid subject to the condition that the information pro-
vided by the informant is accurate, verifiable and useful in the Federal Car-
tel Office´s work. 
(2) The reward paid shall be calculated by reference to the usefulness of the 
information provided, seriousness of the antitrust infringement, efforts and 
expenses made by the informant, and level and nature of the informant´s 
contribution and cooperation with the authority. 
(3) The reward shall be paid in three installments: 
a. An initial payment upon receipt of the information and after a general 
assessment of the value and authenticity of the information within a 
period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the complete information, 
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b. A second payment upon issuance of the Federal Cartel Office´s order 
to the infringer within a period of six months from the date of passing 
the order, 
c. The substantial portion of the reward upon recovery of the fine from 
the infringer within a period of six months from the date of receipt.1380 
 
Sec. 4 Protection of the informant 
(1) The informant´s identity shall be kept secret, unless he agrees to give ev-
idence. 
(2) The authority may ask for the deposit of an affirmation in lieu of an oath at 
a lawyer who is aware of the whistleblower´s identity. The document may 
only be accessed by the authority in case of abuse of the whistleblower 
program. 
 
Sec. 5 Punishment for abuse 
Any abuse of the whistleblower program will be prosecuted as an administrative 
offense and may be punished with a fine of up to 50,000 euros. 
 
ee) Conclusion 
The analysis of whistleblowing as a tool to increase the probability of punishment in 
cases of market manipulation has shown, that both, from an economic and a legal per-
spective, whistleblowing is effective and cost-efficient. De lege lata, individual negotia-
tions may already today allow informants to receive a reward for their information from 
the FCO. In order to establish whistleblowing in antitrust deterrence on a larger scale, a 
codified set of rules is necessary de lege ferenda. 
Also, the idea of whistleblowing might be extended to other fields of economic law with 
complex crimes that regularly are hard to prove. In the context of manipulations of the 
energy market, this thought refers to capital market law in particular. The legislator might 
                                                 
1380 The reward section was largely taken from the Pakistani example. Refer to Competition Commission of 
Pakistan, Revised Guidelines on “Reward Payment to Informants Scheme”, 2007, 2-3. 
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hence consider the installation of a central office for whistleblowing on matters that con-
cern the compliance of energy market participants with the law that refers to both capital 
market and antitrust law. The concept will be brought up again in the fifth chapter of this 
work treating an integrated system for the prosecution of violations of the law in the ex-
change environment. 
 
c) Proof on the basis of profits: “Gewinnbegrenzung” 
Besides the legal tools focusing on the collection of evidence discussed so far, this 
section will treat the legal framework with regard to the proof of infringements. The more 
options the authority has to prove infringements, the higher the rate of conviction rC. The 
law does not prescribe the application of marginal cost calculations for the proof of over-
charged prices (subsection aa). This chapter will raise the question whether the marginal 
cost approach is the best-suited method to find and prove pricing strategies that build 
upon a dominant market position (subsection bb). It will be asked whether – due to a 
permanent lack of reliable data on the marginal cost of production – this approach appears 
to be unsuitable to prove infringements of Art. 102 TFEU and Sec. 19 GWB. Yet, the law 
also allows for alternative techniques to prove an abuse of market power (subsection 
cc).1381 As a consequence, the insistence on the marginal cost approach in the antitrust 
authorities’ examinations violates the concept of effectiveness (effet utile), if other tech-
niques promise to be more successful, Art. 4(3) TFEU (subsection dd). 
 
aa) Legal rules on the proof of price overcharges 
In German antitrust law, price overcharges according to Sec. 19 GWB need to be 
proved by the antitrust authority. However, the law does not bind the authority to a spe-
cific method of proof, Sec. 19(2) N° 2 second sentence GWB.1382 Therefore, both marginal 
cost-based approaches and profit-based approaches to the proof of a price overcharge are 
legitimate de lege lata.1383 Especially, the FCO is not bound to an examination based on 
                                                 
1381 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 19. 
1382 Ibid. 
1383 Christoph Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der 
Energieversorgung," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 62. See also Monopoly Commission, 
Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur Novellierung des GWB, 2007, 14 
Ref. 19. With reference to Netznutzungsentgelt, VI-Kart 2/02 (V), WuW/E DE-R 914  916 et sqq. (Higher 
Regional Court (OLG) Düsseldorf 2002). 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
254 
 
comparable markets before employing a profit-based approach.1384 In case one of the 
approaches promises better results, it should therefore be preferred in the authority´s 
practice. 
Also, European law does not prescribe which data the Commission needs to consult in 
order to find price overcharges by dominant firms.1385 In the past, both a marginal cost-
based approach and profit-based proof (European Court of Justice in United Brands)1386 
have been used to examine pricing in markets.1387 
The following sections will discuss in more detail strengths and weaknesses of the two 
approaches named in order to find the superior strategy to the proof of manipulations. 
 
bb) Marginal cost-based approaches (Comparable market concept) 
Today, antitrust authorities both in Europe1388 and Germany1389 rely on the compa-
rable market concept when trying to prove abuse of a dominant position by a firm. This 
means that the abuse is found based on a comparison with prices that would be observed 
in the event of effective competition.1390 As has been shown in the introductory section, 
pricing in competitive markets is based on the marginal cost of the producers.1391 Hence, 
the antitrust authorities need to prove that power producers offer electricity at a price 
above the marginal cost of production at the energy exchange. In order to produce that 
evidence, the authorities need data on the marginal cost of production of any power seller 
suspicious of pricing above its marginal cost. This data is, however, only available to the 
producer itself and will not be revealed to the antitrust authorities. As a consequence, the 
FCO has made huge effort to calculate the marginal cost for any of the various sources of 
                                                 
1384 Kurt Markert, in Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht 
(Kartellrecht), ed. Günter Hirsch, Frank Montag, and Franz Jürgen Säcker(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), Sec. 29 
Ref. 42. 
1385 Horst-Peter Götting, in Kartellrecht: Kommentar, ed. Ulrich Loewenheim, Karl M. Meessen, and Alexander 
Riesenkampff, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), Sec. 19 Ref. 80. 
1386 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission, Case 27/76, European Court 
Reports 1978, 207 (European Court of Justice 1978). 
1387 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, 14 Ref. 18. 
1388 Andreas Fuchs and Wernhard Möschel, in EU-Wettbewerbsrecht, ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim 
Mestmäcker, 5th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 102 AEUV Sec. 181. 
1389 Götting, in Kartellrecht: Kommentar, ed. Loewenheim, Meessen, and Riesenkampff, 2nd ed. (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2009), Sec. 19 Ref. 74. 
1390 Ibid. 
1391 Refer to the first chapter, section D.I.2. 
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electricity (e.g. nuclear energy, hard and brown coal, gas) offered at the EEX in the 
past.1392 
However, this approach has not proved to lead to robust results: The FCO request for data 
on marginal cost, connected with plausibility controls for some types of power plants has 
revealed that firms might have reported excessive marginal cost to the authority.1393 The 
FCO then calculated marginal cost for the power producers based on four cost factors: 
▪ Fuel costs, 
▪ operating costs, 
▪ carbon emission costs, 
▪ start-up and shutdown costs.1394 
It could be shown that some plants were being offered at the exchange, even though their 
marginal cost exceeded the price paid in the market. However, the FCO was not able to 
prove excessive prices based on this data. A number of alternative explanations for the 
seemingly uneconomic use of the power plants, e.g. a lacking flexibility of the plant, the 
use in the balancing market or data errors were making a definite conclusion on manipu-
lative behavior impossible.1395 When applying the comparable market approach, the au-
thority is forced to make surcharges and reductions in the process of finding the com-
petitive price because of uncertainty about the actual data.1396 Also charging a price ex-
ceeding the competitive price (thus marginal cost) is not yet sufficient to prove an abuse: 
Rather, the authority needs to find a considerable exceedance.1397 Therefore, the proof of 
price abuse requires that the deviation between marginal cost and price demanded be 
substantial. Again, the authority makes a surcharge on the calculated competitive price to 
fulfill the requirement.1398 
                                                 
1392 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 161 et 
sqq. 
1393 Ibid, 166 Ref. 206. 
1394 Ibid, 162. 
1395 Ibid, 198-199. 
1396 Götting, in Kartellrecht: Kommentar, ed. Loewenheim, Meessen, and Riesenkampff, 2nd ed. (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2009), Sec. 19 Ref. 76. 
1397 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Gesa Marisa Gosse, and Maik Wolf, in Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und 
Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), ed. Günter Hirsch, Frank Montag, and Franz Jürgen 
Säcker(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), Sec. 19 Ref. 63. 
1398 Götting, in Kartellrecht: Kommentar, ed. Loewenheim, Meessen, and Riesenkampff, 2nd ed. (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2009), Sec. 19 Ref. 77. 
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As a result, the authority is often not able to prove excessive pricing based on this concept: 
A comparable competitive price mainly calculated on the basis of surcharges and reduc-
tions may not be a robust basis for a ruling on abuse practices.1399 
 
cc) Profit-based approaches (“Gewinnbegrenzungskonzept”) 
Some authors do therefore propose the proof of price overcharges based on the 
profits of firms.1400 This approach does not require information about the marginal cost of 
the firms under suspicion of excessive pricing. Instead, the inappropriate ratio of cost and 
price (limitation of profits) is used for the determination of abuse.1401 Supporters of this 
approach argue that the data needed for the proof of excessive pricing is more easily 
available than is data needed under the comparable market concept. Information on the 
firms´ profits and costs is available from the company balance sheets, information on 
prices charged is available in the market. The regulator is only required to define a thresh-
old for the accepted equity yield rate and compare it to the actual rates realized by the 
firms under suspicion of price manipulation.1402 In theory, the detection of price manipu-
lations should therefore be much more easily than under the comparable market concept. 
 
(1) A profit-based approach in practice: Sec. 29 first sentence N° 2 GWB 
The German legislator has, apparently following this logic, introduced a profit-based 
regulatory approach explicitly in Sec. 29 first sentence N° 2 GWB. In an effort to 
strengthen abuse control in the energy sector, the norm was introduced in December 2007 
as part of the 7th amendment of the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB).1403  It 
shall serve as an example for the utility of profit-based proof in abuse cases. 
                                                 
1399 Ibid, Sec. 19 Ref. 76. With reference to Stadtwerke Mainz, Case KVR 17/04, WuW/E DE-R, 1513 (German 
Federal Court of Justice 2005). 
1400 For the economic idea behind this rate of return regulation approach see e.g. Arnold C. Harberger, 
"Monopoly and Resource Allocation," The American Economic Review Vol. 44, no. 2 (1954), 78. 
1401 Markert, in Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), ed. 
Hirsch, Montag, and Säcker(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), Sec. 29 Ref. 1 and 40-42. See also Götting, in 
Kartellrecht: Kommentar, ed. Loewenheim, Meessen, and Riesenkampff, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), 
Sec. 19 Ref. 80. 
1402 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 23. 
1403 Harald Kahlenberg and Christian Haellmigk, "Aktuelle Änderungen des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen," BB Vol. 63, no. 5 (2008), 174. 
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The norm allows abuse control based on both, the comparable market concept (Sec. 29 
first sentence N° 1 GWB) and profit-based (Sec. 29 first sentence N° 2 GWB – “Gewinnbe-
grenzungskonzept”).1404 With regard to the profit-based approach, the paragraph 
reads:1405 
“§ 29 Energy Sector 
An undertaking, which is a supplier of electricity or pipeline gas (public utility 
company) on a market in which it, either alone or together with other public 
utility companies, has a dominant position, is prohibited from abusing such 
position by 
1. [...] 
2. demanding fees which unreasonably exceed the costs. 
Costs that would not arise to the same extent if competition existed must not 
be taken into consideration in determining whether an abuse within the mean-
ing of sentence 1 exists. [...]” 
Hence, the proof of an abuse requires the legal definition of several terms: 
▪ The firm´s cost, 
▪ the threshold for an unreasonable exceedance of costs, and 
▪ costs that would not arise under competitive circumstances. 
Furthermore, the price the firm demands needs to be identified, which raises a number of 
questions as well.1406 
 
(a) The definition of costs under Sec. 29 GWB 
Sec. 29 GWB itself does not refer to a specific cost concept.1407 Also the explanatory 
memorandum to the act does not define whether the term cost refers to marginal cost of 
                                                 
1404 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 9 with graphical illustration. 
1405 Translation provided by the FCO (Bundeskartellamt). 
1406 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy : Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 186. 
1407 Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," 
Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 62. Also Axel Beckmerhagen and Christoph Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 
121. 
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production or any other cost definition, e.g. including overhead costs.1408 It is hence left 
to the applicants of the law – which is the antitrust authorities – to define guidelines for 
the practical abuse control. The government draft refers the authorities to recognized eco-
nomic theories like the price equals marginal cost paradigm for competitive markets.1409 
It is, however, left open how marginal cost is to be determined in markets with imperfect 
competition.1410 
Also with regard to “costs that would not arise to the same extent if competition existed”, 
Sec. 29 GWB lacks a definition. It seems hard to imagine how antitrust authorities and 
private claimants shall uncover inefficiencies in firms with a dominant market position, 
since there is neither competition nor transparent information on cost structures that 
might help to identify the efficient level of costs.1411 
 
(b) Unreasonable exceedance of costs 
For the case of price manipulation in the energy market, the legislator has defined 
adequacy of profits based on “common price formation mechanisms in competitive mar-
kets” and “the goal of inexpensive power supply defined in Sec. 1 EnWG”.1412 Yet, based 
on these general statements on pricing, the determination of a threshold for unreasonably 
high costs is not possible. Rather, the identification of a price that is “too high” – which is 
it unreasonably exceeds the costs of production – raises many practical questions.1413 
Ritter and Lücke recommend the reference to the adequacy criterion applied with regard 
to network access.1414 However, the field of network access is a regulated market with 
                                                 
1408 Axel Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 466. 
1409 German Federal Government, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels, 2007, 
Drucksache 16/5847,, 11. 
1410 Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 467 Ref. 41. Refer also to Kurt Markert, "Die Preishöhenkontrolle 
der Strom- und Gaspreise nach dem neuen § 29 GWB," ZNER Vol. 11, no. 4 (2007), 368. 
1411 Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 467. 
1412 Markert, in Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), ed. 
Hirsch, Montag, and Säcker(München: C.H. Beck, 2008), Sec. 29 Ref. 51. With reference to German Federal 
Government, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von 
Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels, 2007, Drucksache 16/5847,, 
17. 
1413 Motta, Competition Policy : Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 186. 
1414 Jan-Stephan Ritter and Alexander Lücke, "Die Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der 
Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels - geplante Änderungen des GWB," WuW Vol. 57, no. 7/8 
(2007), 703. 
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risk-free interest rates,1415 other than the market in the focus of Sec. 29 GWB is. There-
fore, authorities have to define the adequacy of costs and prove any divergence in every 
individual case.1416 This approach would result in a regime of price regulation that disables 
the marginal cost based price formation mechanism at EEX.1417 
 
(c) Conclusion 
In consequence, the analysis shows that neither the term cost nor the exceedance 
of a reasonable level of cost is defined in Sec. 29 GWB. This situation leaves authorities 
and firms subject to the regulation with numerous practical problems that will be discussed 
in the following subsection. 
 
(2) Practical problems with profit-based regulation 
Even if a profit-based regulatory approach looks promising in theory, it is much less 
in practice. The apparent advantage that no information on the marginal cost of the ma-
nipulator and its competitors is needed is largely negated by the need for precise defini-
tions of cost, prices and equity yield rate,1418 as well as data on these variables. 
These problems make the profit-based approach at least as difficult to handle as the com-
parable market approach is. Furthermore, it results in high legal uncertainty for market 
participants.1419 
 
 
                                                 
1415 Jörg Wiese and Peter Gampenrieder, "Der risikolose Zins in der Energiewirtschaft aus 
betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht," VW Vol. 59, no. 8 (2007), 185. Refer also to Gernot Müller, "Berücksichtigung 
der Kapitalverzinsung bei der Entgeltregulierung von Netzsektoren," N&R Vol. 5, no. 2 (2008), 56-57. 
1416 Markert, "Die Preishöhenkontrolle der Strom- und Gaspreise nach dem neuen § 29 GWB," ZNER Vol. 11, 
no. 4 (2007), 369. 
1417 Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," 
Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 62. See also Andreas Lotze and Hans-Christoph Thomale, "Neues zur 
Kontrolle von Energiepreisen: Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und Anreizregulierung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 
263. A different opinion is hold by Jan-Stephan Ritter and Alexander Lücke, "Die Bekämpfung von 
Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels - geplante Änderungen des 
GWB," ibid Vol. 57, no. 7/8 (2007), 702. 
1418 Andreas Lotze and Hans-Christoph Thomale, "Neues zur Kontrolle von Energiepreisen: 
Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und Anreizregulierung," ibid Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 263. 
1419 Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 467. See also Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von 
Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 62. 
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dd) Conclusion 
As a result, it may therefore not be stated that the profit-based approach to the 
proof of manipulations is superior to the marginal-cost based strategy predominant in 
practice today. A violation of the concept of effectiveness (effet utile, Art. 4(3) TEU) due 
to the antitrust authorities’ preference for the comparable market concept in abuse control 
may hence not be found. 
 
d) Shift of the burden of proof  
The legal instrument presented in this section starts the search for evidence from 
where it is to be found: The infringers. Today, the burden of proof for the abuse of a 
dominant position according to Art. 102 TFEU respectively Sec. 19 GWB lies with the an-
titrust authorities.1420 An increase of the probability of punishment might hence be reached 
through a shift of the burden of proof to the infringers who possess all the necessary 
information to build a case.1421 The potential infringers would hence have to rebut the 
presumption that prices higher than the ones of comparable firms are excessive and there-
fore an abuse of their dominant market position. 
However, the shift of the burden of proof is a serious interference with the procedural 
rights of the infringers.1422 This section will examine the potential effects of the shift of the 
burden of proof on the probability of prosecution (subsection aa), discuss its legality (sub-
section bb), examine experience with comparable rules, especially Sec. 29 GWB (subsec-
tion cc) and conclude in subsection dd. 
 
aa) Effects of a shift of the burden of proof on the probability of punish-
ment 
Today, antitrust authorities need to meet comprehensive burden of proof obligations 
in order to establish with sufficient certainty that a company dominates a market and uses 
this power to manipulate the market outcome. In detail, the authorities need to comply 
                                                 
1420 Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich 
der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 123. 
1421 The European Commission develops a similar thought in its proposal for a directive on cartel damages ac-
tions. Refer to European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 2013, COM(2013) 404 final, 13. 
1422 Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich 
der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 123, 124. See also Achim-Rüdiger Börner, "Die 
Missbrauchsaufsicht über Strom- und Gaspreise und ihre Verschärfung," VW Vol. 60, no. 4 (2008), 83. 
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with the principle of ex officio investigation: All facts relevant to clarify the matter need to 
be investigated.1423 With regard to Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB, the FCO needs not only to de-
termine the dominant position of the firm under investigation, but also the relevant com-
parison price within the framework of the comparable market concept1424 and a lacking 
justification for the firm´s deviation from this price.1425 The proof is, however, hard to 
establish in practice.1426 The Commission´s and the FCO´s sector inquiries illustrate this 
problem explicitly.1427 Thus, the lack of price and cost data on the authority´s side, com-
bined with its burden of proof obligations, keeps the probability of punishment in manip-
ulation cases considerably low. 
A shift of the burden of proof to the party who possesses all the necessary data might 
therefore be a promising approach to increase the number of cases detected and fined. 
The German legislator had similar reasons when introducing Sec. 29 GWB in 2007:1428 
The norm was supposed to intensify the supervision of energy markets and specifically the 
control of pricing in this market.1429 For this purpose, it contains a shift of the substantial 
burden of proof to the dominant energy producers1430 that shall motivate the firms to work 
more cooperatively on the clarification of the matter.1431 It may therefore serve as a model 
for the following considerations on a shift of the burden of proof in abuse cases. 
The obligations for firms from the burden of proof according to Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 
GWB refer to the factual justification of prices differing from the ones the comparable firm 
                                                 
1423 Ritter and Lücke, "Die Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des 
Lebensmittelhandels - geplante Änderungen des GWB," WuW Vol. 57, no. 7/8 (2007), 703. 
1424 For details on the comparable market concept relevant for the determination of the market price refer to 
the first chapter section E.II.2.b) of this work. Also refer to Volker Emmerich, Kartellrecht : Ein Studienbuch, 
11th ed. (München: Beck, 2008), 368-369. 
1425 Börner, "Die Missbrauchsaufsicht über Strom- und Gaspreise und ihre Verschärfung," VW Vol. 60, no. 4 
(2008), 84. 
1426 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 7. See also Motta, Competition Policy : Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 69-70. 
1427 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 157-158. 
See also Fouquet, Seidenspinner, and Füller, "Kurzgutachten Wettbewerbs- und energiepolitische Lücken der 
Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung, Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes vom Januar 2011," 6. Also 
Becker, "Die Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel des Bundeskartellamtes: Ausgezeichnete 
Analyse, unzureichende Konsequenzen," ZNER Vol. 15, no. 2 (2011), 118. With regard to the Commission´s 
inquiry refer to European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 2006, COM(2006) 851 final, 146 
Ref. 436 and p. 150. 
1428 German Federal Government, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels, 2007, 
Drucksache 16/5847,, 9. Also Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, 
Kartell- und Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 464. 
1429 Jan-Stephan Ritter, "Regierungsentwurf zum Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der 
Energieversorgung und des Lebensmittelhandels," WuW Vol. 58, no. 2 (2008), 142. Also Metzger, 
"Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 
172, no. 4 (2008), 458 and 464. 
1430 Lotze and Thomale, "Neues zur Kontrolle von Energiepreisen: Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und 
Anreizregulierung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 259. 
1431 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
340. With reference to Heitzer, "Schwerpunkte der deutschen Wettbewerbspolitik," WuW Vol. 57, no. 9 (2007), 
858. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
B. Public Market Surveillance 
262 
 
determined by the antitrust authority is charging.1432 Hence, other than with 
Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB, where the antitrust authority is obliged to prove the comparability 
of the firms under the comparable markets concept, the firm suspicious of abusing its 
market power needs to prove that no comparability exists according to Sec. 29 first sen-
tence N° 1 GWB. Furthermore, the burden of proof with regard to the deviation of prices 
from the ones the comparable firm charges lies with the potential infringer.1433 This alter-
native distribution of the burden of proof between antitrust authority and potential in-
fringer reflects in the outcome of the investigations: While a ruling on abusive practices 
fails under Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB if the antitrust authority may not prove the comparability 
of firms and a considerable price deviation, it may succeed under Sec. 29 first sentence 
N° 1 GWB if the potential infringer is not able to prove the lack of comparability or justify 
the price deviation.1434 Remaining doubts about the matter (non liquet) are on the firms´ 
account.1435 
A rule of the type of Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB may hence change the probability 
of conviction in abuse cases. However, this result comes at a cost – both with regard to 
economic incentives and legal concerns with regard to its legitimacy. The next section will 
examine these concerns and show whether a shift of the burden of proof is still a suitable 
measure to increase the probability of punishment. 
 
bb) Legitimacy of the shift of the burden of proof 
The shift of the burden of proof on the potential infringers shifts the problem of 
information procurement about market prices and production cost towards the firms. What 
might sound like an ideal solution to the information deficit of antitrust authorities creates, 
however, new problems on the side of the firms. Furthermore, questions with regard to 
the legitimacy under German law arise. This section will discuss whether the shift of the 
burden of proof is allowed under the German constitution. 
 
                                                 
1432 Kahlenberg and Haellmigk, "Aktuelle Änderungen des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen," BB 
Vol. 63, no. 5 (2008), 177. Also Lotze and Thomale, "Neues zur Kontrolle von Energiepreisen: 
Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und Anreizregulierung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 261. And Metzger, 
"Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 
172, no. 4 (2008), 465. 
1433 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
341. 
1434 Ibid. 
1435 Lotze and Thomale, "Neues zur Kontrolle von Energiepreisen: Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und 
Anreizregulierung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 261. 
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(1) Legitimacy under German law: The principle of ex officio investigations 
Under the application of the comparable market concept, authorities do not possess 
all the information needed for the clarification of the matter. Rather, the firm under sus-
picion needs to present data on cost structures and pricing of the firm used as a compar-
ator, thus another firm, in order to prove the factual justification of a price deviation.1436 
The information procurement by the firm therefore faces two problems: First, a firm does 
neither have investigation powers comparable to the ones an antitrust authority has, nor 
are there rights to information that could be used to gather the data that is needed.1437 
Furthermore, the firm used as a comparator will often be a competitor of the firm under 
suspicion. Data needed for the justification of the potential infringer´s position – e.g. dif-
ferent purchasing or distribution costs, profit margins and so on – will normally not be 
available because it has the character of trade secrets and – under competitors – must 
not be shared according to the ban of cartels in Sec. 1 GWB.1438 
The conflict is solved referring to the principle of ex officio investigation, which is laid 
down in Sec. 57(1) and 70(1) GWB for the field of antitrust. Hence, the authority needs 
to investigate the matter of the case by itself. This duty does not only cover incriminating 
facts, but also mitigating circumstances. Especially the investigation of facts that are be-
yond the reach of the firm under suspicion – e.g. the data of competitors named above – 
is part of the obligation to collect proof of the authority.1439 The shift of the burden of proof 
to the firm according to Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB does oblige the potential infringer 
to cooperate by presenting all the relevant information from its spheres of knowledge and 
business, which is mainly facts that justify higher costs of production than the comparator 
firm.1440 
Only after the antitrust authority has conclusively determined the facts of the case, un-
certainties with regard to the structural comparability with another firm and the price 
overcharge remain for the potential infringer to prove.1441 Any other interpretation of the 
                                                 
1436 Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 465. Also Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von 
Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 63. 
1437 Metzger, "Energiepreise auf dem Prüfstand: Zur Entgeltkontrolle nach Energie-, Kartell- und 
Vertragsrecht," ZHR Vol. 172, no. 4 (2008), 466. See also Lotze and Thomale, "Neues zur Kontrolle von 
Energiepreisen: Preismissbrauchsaufsicht und Anreizregulierung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 3 (2008), 262. 
1438 Kahlenberg and Haellmigk, "Aktuelle Änderungen des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen," BB 
Vol. 63, no. 5 (2008), 177. See also Heitzer, "Schwerpunkte der deutschen Wettbewerbspolitik," WuW Vol. 57, 
no. 9 (2007), 858. 
1439 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
349. 
1440 Ibid. 
1441 Ulrich Scholz, in Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), § 34 Ref. 146. 
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shift of the burden of proof in Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB violates the inquisitorial 
principle, the constitutionality of the administration and the rule of law.1442 
As a result, the shift of the substantive burden of proof from the antitrust authority to the 
firms does not release the authority from its duty to a comprehensive clarification of all 
facts of the case, especially to find comparability and the price difference with the com-
parator firm.1443 The antitrust authorities do hence not have fewer duties to collect evi-
dence than under Sec. 19(2) N° 2 and 3 GWB. The shift of burden of proof as codified in 
Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB does rather underline the duty of firms to cooperate in 
the process.1444 
 
(2) Constitutional limitations in German fine proceedings 
Moreover, the shift of the burden of proof is only in accordance with the German 
constitutional requirements in cartel administrative proceedings: In proceedings for fines 
imposed under cartel law, the presumption of innocence, deducted from the rule of law in 
Art. 20(3) GG, applies.1445  Presumption rules or a shift of the burden of proof are therefore 
not applicable in administrative proceedings like fines for antitrust infringements.1446 In 
fine proceedings, the authority bears the full burden of proof for the accusation 
against the potential infringer. Therefore, the antitrust authority needs to prove all matters 
of the case including the lack of a factual justification of price deviations, because a shift 
of the burden of proof may not apply for reasons of conflicting constitutional law.1447 
Therefore, the shift of the burden of proof only brings changes for cartel damages pro-
ceedings at civil courts, where the principle of production of evidence applies: Parties need 
to adduce evidence of the facts of the case, in the manner and to the extent which is in 
their interest. With the introduction of a shift of the burden of proof, the probability of 
successful proceedings might increase if claimants only need to proof the dominant market 
position of the power producer and the fact that the price charged exceeds the price of 
                                                 
1442 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
355-356. With reference to Bodo Heinrich, Die verfassungswidrige Beweislastnorm - zugleich ein Beitrag zu 
den Vermutungen des § 22 Abs. 3 GWB (Münster 1985), 245-246. 
1443 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 14. 
1444 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
354, 356. 
1445 Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich 
der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 123. Also Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung 
von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 63 Ref. 20. 
1446 Dannecker and Biermann, in Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 
ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), Vor Sec. 81 Ref. 257. 
1447 Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich 
der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 124. 
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another producer. The burden of proof for the factual justification of the price deviation 
would be with the power producer.1448 The related questions of private damages actions 
will be treated in section C of this work. 
 
(3) Conclusion 
In conclusion, the shift of the burden of proof to the potential infringers is in accord-
ance with German constitutional law: 
▪ In fine proceedings, the authority continues to bear the full burden of proof for the 
infringement including the matters of the case, the comparability of firms under 
the comparable market concept and the lack of justification for price deviations.1449 
▪ In administrative proceedings, the principle of ex officio investigation remains in 
force – the authority needs hence to investigate all circumstances including those 
that relieve the potential infringer. Firms are hence rather subject to increased 
duties of cooperation for all facts that are on their behalf than to a comprehensive 
burden of proof.1450 
From a legal point of view, a (limited) shift of the burden of proof is therefore feasible and 
has been introduced with Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB. The next section will discuss 
the practical relevance of the norm since its introduction in 2007. 
 
cc) Experience with the distribution of the burden of proof in Sec. 29 GWB 
The last sections have shown that the primary goal of the introduction of Sec. 29 
GWB was to enhance the possibilities of intervention for the antitrust authorities.1451 How-
ever, in practice, the norm had almost no relevance. Kahlenberg already pointed this out 
by the time of the introduction of the paragraph in 2007.1452 The Federal Cartel Office only 
                                                 
1448 Ritter and Lücke, "Die Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des 
Lebensmittelhandels - geplante Änderungen des GWB," WuW Vol. 57, no. 7/8 (2007), 704. Refer also to 
Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der 
Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 124. 
1449 "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung," et 
Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 124. Also Stadler, "Der Gesetzentwurf zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im 
Bereich der Energieversorgung," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 62, no. 2 (2007), 63 Ref. 20. 
1450 Koleva, Die Preismissbrauchskontrolle nach § 29 GWB (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), 
356. 
1451 Ritter and Lücke, "Die Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich der Energieversorgung und des 
Lebensmittelhandels - geplante Änderungen des GWB," WuW Vol. 57, no. 7/8 (2007), 698. 
1452 Kahlenberg and Haellmigk, "Aktuelle Änderungen des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen," 
Betriebs-Berater Vol. 63, no. 5 (2008), 177. 
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mentioned Sec. 29 GWB in passing in its 2011 Sector inquiry on abusive pricing in the 
wholesale market for power, without building its argument on the norm.1453 Furthermore, 
there has not been one case where antitrust authorities have applied Sec. 29 GWB to the 
energy wholesale markets.1454 
Already before the introduction of the shift of the burden of proof in Sec. 29 first sentence 
N° 1 GWB, it has been subject to severe criticism.1455 The Monopoly Commission pointed 
out that the proof of comparability of firms – now shifted to the firms suspicious of market 
manipulations – could not be provided by the firms due to a lack of structural data. In this 
situation, the authority remains in charge of the evidence for the constitutional reasons 
discussed above, which equals the situation under the existing Sec. 19 GWB.1456 An in-
crease of the number of convictions in manipulation cases may therefore not be expected 
from the shift of the burden of proof. 
Still, the legislator has prolonged the intensified abuse control in Sec. 29 GWB for another 
five years with the 8th amendment of the GWB.1457 With reference to the markets for power 
production and wholesale, it is argued that the transformation from monopolistic to com-
petitive markets is not yet complete, which requires intensified abuse control in the shape 
of Sec. 29 GWB.1458 The legal and economic facts have however not changed since the 
introduction of the norm. A reduction of the practical problems abuse control poses for 
antitrust authorities may therefore not be expected.1459 The temporal forfeiture clause 
limits the applicability of the norm to December 31, 2017.1460 A further prolongation is not 
expected. 
 
  
                                                 
1453 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 26 and 
191. 
1454 Peter Gussone, "Die 8. GWB-Novelle und ihre Bedeutung für die Energie- und Versorgungswirtschaft," 
EnWZ Vol. 1, no. 1 (2012), 18. 
1455 Ibid, 17. 
1456 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 14. 
1457 Gussone, "Die 8. GWB-Novelle und ihre Bedeutung für die Energie- und Versorgungswirtschaft," EnWZ 
Vol. 1, no. 1 (2012), 17. 
1458 German Federal Government, Entwurf eines Achten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (8. GWB-ÄndG), 2012, Drucksache 17/9852, 35 et sqq. 
1459 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 8. 
1460 Christian Alexander, "Die Neuordnung der kartellrechtlichen Missbrauchsaufsicht," WuW Vol. 62, no. 11 
(2012), 1034. See also Wolfgang Bosch and Alexander Fritzsche, "Die 8. GWB-Novelle - Konvergenz und 
eigene wettbewerbspolitische Akzente," NJW Vol. 66, no. 31 (2013), 2229. 
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dd) Conclusion 
The above examinations of economic and legal implications of a shift of the burden 
of proof on the potential infringer have shown that, if applied within the limits of constitu-
tional law, the practical problems with regard to the proof of abusive behavior by dominant 
firms are not diminished. Rather, the administrative proceedings suffer from as much in-
formation deficits as they did under the exclusive application of Sec. 19 GWB – at the cost 
of legal uncertainty and wrong incentives for market participants.1461 The practical expe-
rience with the introduction of Sec. 29 first sentence N° 1 GWB confirms this result. 
With regard to fine proceedings, it has been shown that a shift of the burden of proof to 
the potential infringers is against constitutional law1462 and therefore no feasible tool to 
increase the probability of punishment. Yet, also with regard to administrative proceedings 
of the antitrust authorities and private damages claims, the disadvantages of this approach 
outweigh the marginal improvements in non-liquet situations by far. 
The shift of the burden of proof to the potential infringers is therefore not suited to increase 
the probability of punishment and increase deterrence of market manipulations at the 
energy exchange. 
 
V. Results for the public prosecution of manipulations 
The comprehensive analysis of today´s public market surveillance scheme for mar-
ket manipulations in complex scenarios has revealed one core weakness of the system: It 
concentrates almost exclusively on huge – and steadily increasing – amounts of fines to 
deter manipulations of the market. 
This single-sided approach does however not lead to effective deterrence from an eco-
nomic point of view: today´s fines create inefficiently high incentives for antitrust compli-
ance and leave no room for other effective tools of antitrust deterrence, e.g. private dam-
ages claims. From a legal point of view, the current system of fining is in contrary to 
European and German constitutional law. Therefore, a new reference for the calculation of 
government fines was introduced, which is based on the expected profit of the firm from 
the infringement. 
                                                 
1461 Monopoly Commission, Sondergutachten 47 - Preiskontrollen in Energiewirtschaft und Handel: Zur 
Novellierung des GWB, 2007, Ref. 16. 
1462 Beckmerhagen and Stadler, "Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Preismissbrauch im Bereich 
der Energieversorgung," et Vol. 57, no. 1/2 (2007), 123. 
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With the optimal amount of government fines DG decreasing, the probability of punishment 
pp needs to increase to keep the balance of the deterrence equation: 
 = pP(e) . CD. 
Consequently, legal instruments to increase the probability of detection and punishment 
were analyzed, finding that neither a change of the method of proof from the comparable 
market approach towards a profit-based approach, nor a shift of the burden of proof to 
the infringers promises improvements in deterrence. Rather, a combined introduction of 
leniency for abuse cases together with financial rewards for whistleblowers is the prefera-
ble instrument to considerably increase the probability of punishment at the lowest cost. 
This system should therefore be implemented de lege lata based on the existing rules of 
the FCO and individual negotiations with whistleblowers. In addition and to fully support 
this approach, a legal basis for the financial compensation of whistleblowers should be 
introduced de lege ferenda. 
Third Chapter: Improved Public Market Surveillance 
C. Summary 
269 
 
C. Summary of the Third Chapter 
The third chapter of this work started the examination of market surveillance instru-
ments available to influence the market participants´ behavior prior to manipulations hap-
pening by a deterrent threat of sanctions. Those measures have the biggest potential to 
fight market manipulations in the short run because they do not require reforms of the 
market structure or the entrance of new competitors that both take effect only in the long 
run. Reforms in surveillance rules, by contrast, may take effect almost immediately. 
However, the analysis revealed serious impediments to an efficient surveillance system: 
Most notably this is the sole focus on ever-increasing fines in the deterrence of market 
manipulations. In the field of public market surveillance, authorities concentrate almost 
exclusively on the amount of the fine in order to reach the necessary level of deterrence 
. This leads to inefficient deterrence from an economic point of view and infringes the 
principle of legal certainty laid down in EU and German constitutional law. Furthermore, it 
leaves almost no room for private market surveillance efforts in the shape of damages 
claims, whose potential to contribute to deterrence will be examined in the following fourth 
chapter. 
Yet, there is an alternative to this economically inefficient and illegal approach to deter-
rence: Since the necessary level of deterrence  may not only be reached with an in-
crease of the cost of detection CD, but also a rise in the probability of punishment pp, 
 = pP(e) . CD, 
a number of further legal tools are worth considering. 
Those are namely a change of the method of proof from the comparable market approach 
towards a profit-based approach and a shift of the burden of proof to the infringers. Both 
approaches did however not yield convincing results in the legal analysis. 
However, a combined introduction of leniency for abuse cases together with financial re-
wards for whistleblowers did. This instrument promises to considerably increase the prob-
ability of punishment at the lowest cost due to the implementation of a prisoner´s dilemma 
situation for market manipulators. This system should therefore be implemented de lege 
lata based on the existing rules of the FCO and individual negotiations with whistleblowers. 
In addition and to fully support this approach, a legal basis for the financial compensation 
of whistleblowers should be introduced de lege ferenda. 
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The following fourth chapter will concentrate on private market surveillance instruments 
that may – if combined effectively with the public surveillance instruments – result in a 
sufficient and cost-efficient level of deterrence to result in behavioral effects on the market 
participants taking effect before the offense is committed. 
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FOURTH CHAPTER: 
IMPROVED PRIVATE MARKET SURVEILLANCE 
 
A. Introduction 
“However, it is our aim that companies and individuals should increasingly feel en-
couraged to make use of private action before national courts in order to defend the sub-
jective rights conferred on them by the EC competition rules.”1463 
Following up on the analysis of legal remedies to improve public market surveillance in the 
preceding chapter 3, this chapter focuses on the field of private market surveillance as 
a necessary complement to deter market manipulations1464 using behavior control to over-
come the shortcomings in enforcement. Other than with public market surveillance, it is 
not the authorities that take action against market participants being suspicious of manip-
ulating the energy exchange, but private actors – e.g. competitors or firms from a down-
stream market. Since the effort put into the investigations of a suspected abuse directly 
pays off to the claimant in case of success, parties harmed have a strong incentive to 
invest in private market surveillance.1465 Furthermore, it could be shown that private mar-
ket participants do – in some respects – have better information on antitrust infringements 
that antitrust authorities do due to their market insight. This might hence be a driver for 
the detection of infringements that the authorities do not have knowledge of.1466 
Diverse types of private damages claims will be examined for their suitability to deter 
market manipulations with regard to economic and legal criteria. Just as for the field of 
public market surveillance, it will be shown that there is a necessity for a coordination of 
capital market law and antitrust enforcement on the one hand and public and private 
activities on the other hand. The resulting claim for an integrated legal system of pub-
lic and private enforcement will be introduced in the fifth chapter. 
                                                 
1463 Mario Monti, former European Commissioner for Competition Policy in a speech on Effective Private En-
forcement of EC Antitrust Law, 2001. Available on http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=SPEECH/01/258&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed January 29, 2013). 
1464 Hans-Wilhelm Krüger, Öffentliche und private Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots von Art. 81 EG: Eine 
rechtsökonomische Analyse, ed. Peter Behrens, et al., Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts  (Wiesbaden: 
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2007), 319 et sqq. 
1465 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," 
WuW Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1241. See also Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen 
und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag 
von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011). 
1466 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 621. 
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B. Private Market Surveillance 
Private market surveillance is driven by the private interest of actors. With regard to firms, 
this interest is mostly of a monetary nature. In consequence, private actors often pursue 
their interests using damages claims against actors who infringed laws that are supposed 
to protect other partys´ interests. The diverse types of damages claims examined in this 
chapter are the following: 
▪ Private damages claims of actors harmed by market manipulations against the 
manipulators according to Sec. 33 GWB and EU law in the field of antitrust, as well 
as capital market law (section I.); 
▪ damages claims of firms against their directors for violations of the antitrust and 
capital market laws (section II). 
 
I. Damages claims against the manipulators 
Private claims for damages in case of infringements of the rules on market behavior 
may well accompany public enforcement efforts to effectively deter manipulations at the 
EEX.1467 Since the authorities concentrate their efforts on a relatively small number of 
cases with paramount importance for the functioning of the European and/or German 
market,1468 there is room for private efforts both to support the authorities interventions 
and to uncover cases not subject to an authority´s investigation. In fact, private damages 
claims may affect both variables of the deterrence equation – the cost of detection CD and 
the probability of punishment pp(e) – introduced at the beginning of this chapter: 
 = DE or 
 = pP(e) . CD.1469 
                                                 
1467 Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, “Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadenersatz”, 
WuW Vol. 61 (2011), N° 12, 1235. See also Andreas Mundt, "Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert," in Recht, 
Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, 
Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 438. Earlier Feinberg, "The 
Enforcement and Effects of European Competition Policy: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion," Journal of 
Common Market Studies Vol. 23, no. 4 (1985), 376. 
1468 Wernhard Möschel, "Behördliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?," WuW Vol. 57, no. 
5 (2007), 489. 
1469 Please refer to sections B. and B.II. of this chapter for the derivation of the formulas. 
Fourth Chapter: Improved Private Market Surveillance 
B. Private Market Surveillance 
274 
 
Firstly, damages claims increase the total cost of detection firms face in case of a 
punishment,1470 since this cost adds up from both criminal and civil sanctions the govern-
ment imposes (DG) and damages paid by the convicted firm to private claimants (DP):1471 
CD = DG + DP. 
In the following considerations, the focus lies on the private sanctions DP. Criminal and 
civil sanctions imposed by the government DG have been treated separately in subsection 
B of this chapter.1472 Therefore, DG is held constant in the following analysis: 
DG = D̅G. 
Secondly, the private efforts to recover damages also increase the probability of punish-
ment pp(e), which results in higher deterrence: 
∂p
p
∂e
 > 0 and therefore 
∂∆π
∂e
 > 0.1473 
The increase in pp may however mainly be observed in cases of stand-alone damages 
actions. Those are claims where no public proceedings by the antitrust authority (FCO) or 
the capital market supervisor (BaFin) preceded.1474 Most of today´s claims for antitrust 
damages are, by contrast, so-called follow-on damages claims that build on a preceding 
decision of the European Commission or the FCO.1475 But even in follow-on damages 
claims, the fact that additional (private) agents invest resources in the detection and proof 
of infringements increases the probability of detection.1476 
Moreover, the increase of the two decisive variables in the deterrence equation comes at 
a cost: As the next subsections will show, the collection of damages entails huge efforts 
from the part of the claimants.1477 It needs therefore to be discussed from an efficiency 
                                                 
1470 Möschel, "Behördliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
488. 
1471 Weller, "Die Anrechnung pönaler Schadensersatzleistungen gemäß § 33 GWB auf Kartellbußen," ZWeR 
Vol. 6, no. 2 (2008), 171. 
1472 See the third chapter of this work, section B. 
1473 For the derivation of this formula please refer to section B.IV.2. of this chapter. 
1474 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
257. 
1475 Roman Inderst and Stefan Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt 
Fachmedien, 2015), 104. Refer also to Sebastian Dworschak and Lars Maritzen, "Einsicht - der erste Schritt zur 
Besserung? Zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 
63, no. 9 (2013), 831. 
1476 Krüger, Öffentliche und private Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots von Art. 81 EG: Eine rechtsökonomische 
Analyse, ed. Behrens, et al., Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 
2007), 323. 
1477 Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," WuW Vol. 61, 
no. 12 (2011), 1246. 
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perspective whether the advantages of private law enforcement outweigh this cost or legal 
respectively political reasons justify the application.1478 
The examination starts with the definition of the relevant baseline scenario under the ex-
isting legal rules in both the EU and Germany and then turns to a critical review of the 
success of the existing legal framework. 
 
1. Private damages claims: The baseline scenario 
The law offers various statutory bases for claims both in antitrust and capital market 
law. This section will present the different approaches with their requirements and contri-
butions to the surveillance of the energy market in an overview to judge whether private 
market surveillance is a successful complement to public enforcement or needs revision 
to work efficiently. 
 
a) Damages claims in antitrust law 
Damages claims in antitrust have recently taken a rapid development,1479 mainly 
driven by EU efforts to establish a common set of rules on the subject for all member 
states in the directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the Eu-
ropean Union.1480  The directive codifies the right for anybody who has suffered harm 
caused by an infringement of competition law by an undertaking [...] to claim full com-
pensation for that harm, Art. 1(1) Directive 2014/104/EU. The detailed requirements for 
damages claims both in European and German law will be treated in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
1478 Similar Justus Haucap and Torben Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: 
Antworten aus Sicht der Wirtschaftstheorie," ibid Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 419. Critical Wernhard Möschel, 
"Behördliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?," ibid Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007). 
1479 Back in 2007, private damages claims in Europe and Germany were almost of no relevance. Refer to 
"Behördliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 485. Today, 
the number of claims is increasing rapidly: Matteo Fornasier and Julian Alexander Sanner, "Die Entthronung 
des Kronzeugen?: Akteneinsicht im Spannungsfeld zwischen behördlicher und privater 
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung nach Pfleiderer," ibid Vol. 61, no. 11 (2011), 1068. 
1480 European Parliament and European Council. Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union. N° 2014/104/EU, EU Official Journal L 349, p. 1-19. Earlier, the European Commission had 
already published a green paper (2005) and a white paper (2008) on the subject: European Commission, 
Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2005, COM(2005) 672 final. White Paper 
on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2008, COM(2008) 165 final. 
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aa) Damages claims in European antitrust law 
Already in 2001, the European Court of Justice had derived the basis for damages 
claims in the field of antitrust from the European contract directly in its famous decisions 
Courage1481 and Manfredi1482. Several other decisions1483 – also on separate questions con-
nected with damages, e.g. on the access to files (“Pfleiderer” and “Donau Chemie”)1484 or 
the liability for umbrella pricing of non-cartel firms (“Kone AG”)1485 – followed. 
In an effort to increase the number and success of private damages claims, the European 
Parliament and Council issued a directive on antitrust damages actions in 2014.1486 This 
directive shall create a harmonized framework for damages claims in Europe – the legal 
basis is, however, found in the individual national legal systems.1487 The directive contains 
a comprehensive set of rules that provides the framework for private damages suits in 
detail. These are: 
▪ The pool of potential claimants (Artt. 1(1), Art. 12(1) DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ the scope of compensation (Art. 3 and 12 DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ disclosure of evidence (Artt. 5-7 DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ the relationship between public enforcement and private damages claims (namely 
the protection of the EU leniency program, Art. 6-7 DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ proof of the violation of competition law (Artt. 9, 17(2) DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ limitation periods (Art. 10 DIR 2014/104/EU), 
                                                 
1481 Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, European Court Reports 2001, I-6297 Ref. 26 et sqq. 
(European Court of Justice 2001). 
1482 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, European Court 
Reports 2006, I-6619 (European Court of Justice 2006). 
1483 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis and Others, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (European Court of 
Justice 2012). Also Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, Case C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366 
(European Court of Justice 2013). 
1484 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Case C-360/09, European Court Reports 2011, I-5161 (European Court 
of Justice 2011). Also Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, Case C-536/11, 
EU:C:2013:366 (European Court of Justice 2013). 
1485 Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, Case C-557/12, European Court Reports 2014, I general 
(European Court of Justice 2014). 
1486 Daniele Calisti, Luke Haasbeek, and Filip Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a 
stronger competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of 
the EU competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 467. See also Tilman Makatsch and Arif Sascha Mir, 
"Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen "Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, 
no. 1 (2015), 7. Also Christian Kersting, "Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," 
WuW Vol. 64, no. 6 (2014), 564. 
1487 Christian Vollrath, "Das Maßnahmenpaket der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen 
Schadensersatzrecht," NZKart Vol. 1, no. 11 (2013), 437. 
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▪ joint liability (Art. 11 DIR 2014/104/EU), 
▪ passing-on defense (Art. 12-13 DIR 2014/104/EU), and 
▪ the quantification of harm (Art. 17 DIR 2014/104/EU). 
The rules relevant to the considerations of this work are the pool of claimants and the 
scope of compensation, disclosure of evidence and the connected questions with regard 
to the leniency program practiced in public enforcement, the proof of violations and the 
quantification of harm. 
 
(1) The pool of potential claimants 
The pool of potential claimants has been defined wide by EU competition law: Ac-
cording to Art. 1(1) and 3(1) DIR 2014/104/EU, anybody who has suffered harm from an 
infringement of competition law is entitled to a damages action.1488 Hence, market partic-
ipants harmed by the abuse of a dominant position by way of manipulation of the energy 
exchange are entitled to damages suits in European law. In fact, not only the direct pur-
chasers (Art. 2(23) DIR 2014/104/EU) of power products offered at artificially inflated 
prices may claim damages for their losses. Both European primary law (cases 
“Manfredi”1489, “Otis”1490 and “Kone AG”1491) and European secondary law (Artt. 12(1), 
2(24) DIR 2014/104/EU) also entitle indirect purchasers to damages suits. The term 
refers to customers who have acquired the product that is the object of the infringement 
from a direct or subsequent purchaser, Art. 2(24) DIR 2014/104/EU. In the case of ma-
nipulations of the energy exchange this would refer to all customers who have bought 
power from one of the firms buying in the energy market while the price level is manipu-
lated. 
In fact, any customer who has bought electricity during a period when the energy 
exchange was manipulated, irrelevant of its size or purpose (households/industry) is en-
titled to damages claims according to European law. Since the exchange price serves as a 
                                                 
1488 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 7. 
1489 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, European Court 
Reports 2006, I-6619 Ref. 61 (European Court of Justice 2006). 
1490 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis and Others, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 Ref. 43 (European Court 
of Justice 2012). 
1491 Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, Case C-557/12, European Court Reports 2014, I general 
Ref. 22 (European Court of Justice 2014). 
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reference price for the main part of power products1492, the manipulation of it causes harm 
not only to the direct customers at the exchange, but also to anybody who has made a 
contract using the EEX price as a reference, e.g. in the OTC market. 
This wide interpretation of the pool of claimants is backed up by the directive, that address 
the right to full compensation to anyone who has suffered harm from an infringement of 
competition law, Art. 2(6) DIR 2014/104/EU. It also covers products or services that were 
derived from the object of the infringement or contain it, Art. 2(24) DIR 2014/104/EU. 
This definition includes manipulations of the market by firms possessing market power 
according to Art. 102 TFEU, Art. 2(1) DIR 2014/104/EU. Also, the European Court of Jus-
tice judgments strengthen this view: The court repeatedly emphasized the entitlement of 
claimants to damages in any constellation where a causal link between a cartel and the 
damage done could be proved. In the case Kone AG it even affirmed a causal link between 
an existing cartel and damage done due to umbrella pricing by non-cartel members.1493 
Therefore, the pool of potential claimants for antitrust damages due to energy exchange 
price manipulations covers all customers of power and power products. 
 
(2) The scope of compensation 
The scope of compensation is defined in Art. 3 DIR 2014/104/EU. The directive aims 
at full compensation of the injured parties, granting damages that 
“[...] place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that person 
would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed”, 
Art. 3(2) first sentence DIR 2014/104/EU. Full compensation shall therefore cover the ac-
tual loss of the injured party, its loss of profits and interest, Art. 3(2) second sentence DIR 
2014/104/EU. Punitive, multiple or other types of damages are not in scope of the di-
rective, Art. 3(3) DIR 2014/104/EU. 
Even if this approach to the scope of compensation looks efficient from the perspective of 
the individual claimant, it does not necessarily from a macroeconomic perspective. A con-
sequent realization of the principle of full compensation for all parties harmed by an in-
                                                 
1492 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 88. See also Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der 
European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 90-91. 
1493 Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, Case C-557/12, European Court Reports 2014, I general 
Ref. 30 (European Court of Justice 2014). 
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fringement of competition law might in fact lead to overcompensation in the macroeco-
nomic perspective and create inefficiently high levels of deterrence for firms.1494 The 
reason is a potential gap between the sum of the individual damage a competition law 
infringement causes and the macroeconomic damage: While the latter equals the 
deadweight loss (DWL) caused to the economy by price overcharges1495 plus dynamic 
and productive efficiency losses and rent-seeking costs that are hardly quantifiable,1496 
the sum of private losses (Σ PL) adds up from the aggregated price overcharge paid by 
all purchasers per unit of the product and the aggregated losses that result from the de-
crease in the quantity sold in downstream markets due to the higher price (quantity ef-
fect). 
Hence, the consequence might lead to a situation where the aggregated private losses 
exceed the losses to the economy as a whole from price overcharges:1497 
Σ PL > DWL, 
with Σ PL = DP. 
In this scenario, the deterrent effect from private damages suits equals 
pP(e) . Σ PL, 
which results in an expected damage for infringers higher than the change in profits from 
the infringement, thus higher than the economically efficient level: 
 < pP(e) . (DP + D̅G). 
While this inefficiency does not harm the effectivity of antitrust deterrence, it does cause 
unnecessarily high costs to the economy that stem from too high investments in antitrust 
deterrence on the side of the authorities and claimants and too high compliance costs on 
the side of the firms.1498 
                                                 
1494 Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der 
Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 414, 419. 
1495 Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 5th ed. (Mason, Ohio: South-Western, 2008), 367. Refer also to the in-
troductory first chapter, section D.I.3.a) of this work. 
1496 Gordon Tullock, "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," Western Economic Journal Vol. 5, 
no. 3 (1967), 224. Refer also to Motta, Competition Policy : Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2004), 45 et sqq., 55 et sqq. 
1497 Roman Inderst, Frank Maier-Rigaud, and Ulrich Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch 
Wettbewerbsverstöße," in Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Andreas Fuchs and Andreas 
Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 8 (not yet published). 
1498 Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der 
Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 419. Similar Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung 
des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," ibid Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1246. 
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The directive targets this problem in Art. 3(3) DIR 2014/104/EU that clarifies that full 
compensation shall not lead to overcompensation of the injured parties.1499 Yet, this may 
only be guaranteed for the compensation of the damage done to an individual business. 
The rule does not solve the problem of the aggregated damages done to individual busi-
nesses exceeding the damage done to the economy as a whole. 
However, this problem is rather a theoretical one: In practice, damage from market ma-
nipulation is spread over a vast number of buyers who have suffered dispersed and rela-
tively low-value damage. The incentive to invest in the recovery of the damage in corre-
spondingly low for these parties.1500 Hence, one can assume that in practice not all of the 
damage caused by a manipulative act will be claimed.1501 
With regard to the exemplary case of excessive pricing at the energy exchange, dam-
age is done to the wholesale buyers who bought at the higher prices in the first place. This 
damage is the difference in price (Δp) between the overcharged price pO and the compet-
itive price (p*) times the quantity bought.1502 
Δp . xi = (pO – p*) . xi. 
However, since those buyers mainly resell their power in smaller quantities to local retail-
ers or end-customers – thereby passing the overcharged price (at least partly) on to them 
– the damage is spread on this level. Furthermore, the quantities of power resold by the 
wholesale buyers might sink in the event of overcharged prices (quantity effect) – leaving 
them with lower revenues (RO) than would have been realized in a competitive market 
environment:1503 
ΔRO = (
∆xi
∆p
 ∙ p
O
)  - (xi ∙ p
*). 
                                                 
1499 Christian Kersting, "Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ibid Vol. 64, no. 
6 (2014), 564. 
1500 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
256. 
1501 Florian Becker, "Die Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzansprüchen: Rahmenbedingungen 
und Reformansätze," EuZW Vol. 22, no. 13 (2011), 508. See also Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten 
Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 260. 
1502 Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 250. Also Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle 
verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 420. See also 
Alexander Morell, "Kartellschadensersatz nach "ORWI"," ibid Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 960. For the application to 
abuse cases see Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch 
Wettbewerbsverstöße," in Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and 
Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 24 (not yet published). 
1503 Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der 
Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 420-421. Also Alexander Morell, "Kartellschadensersatz nach 
"ORWI"," ibid Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 960. 
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The extent of this effect depends on several factors, namely the intensity of competition 
without disturbances, the size of the market and the elasticity of demand.1504 At the energy 
exchange, competition used to be of low intensity during the time of the powerful oligop-
oly. This situation is, however, about to change, due to the priority feed-in of renewable 
energy that is changing the course of the merit order1505. 
As experience shows, the elasticity of demand is rather low in the power market in the 
short term, especially in the group of the private end customers – which mirrors in the 
wholesale market.1506 Therefore, price overcharges may cause considerable individual 
damage in the power market, which results in a high incentive for the injured parties to 
sue the manipulators.1507 However, the damage is spread over a huge number of custom-
ers in the power market, many of them private households with small losses that will not 
be worth claiming in court due to the high risk and cost involved.1508 The risk of private 
damages claims causing an inefficiently high level of deterrence seems therefore rather 
theoretical in the example chosen, but surely also with regard to other manipulation cases, 
even if full compensation according to the directive is granted. 
 
(3) The disclosure of evidence and the proof of violations 
One of the main requirements for claimants is the access to evidence in order to 
prove violations of competition law and the emergence of damage to the claimant in court. 
Therefore, the rules on the disclosure of evidence are one of the key elements in the 
antitrust damages directive. Their design is decisive for the success of private market 
surveillance in antitrust.1509 
Basically, the directive distinguishes between three distinct categories of evidence with 
various levels of protection: 
                                                 
1504 Justus Haucap and Torben Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus 
Sicht der Wirtschaftstheorie," ibid Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 417. 
1505 Fürsch, Malischek, and Lindenberger, "Der Merit-Order-Effekt der erneuerbaren Energien - Analyse der 
kurzen und langen Frist," EWI Working Paper Vol., no. 12/14 (2014), 3, 22. Refer also to Kopp, Eßer-Frey, and 
Engelhorn, "Können sich erneuerbare Energien langfristig auf wettbewerblich organisierten Strommärkten 
finanzieren?," Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft Vol. 36, no. 2 (2012), 245. 
1506 Elberg et al., "Untersuchungen zu einem zukunftsfähigen Strommarktdesign," (2012), 7. See also Erdal 
Atukeren and Banu Simmons-Süer, "Elektrizitätsnachfrage nur wenig elastisch," Ökonomenstimme (2011). 
1507 Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der 
Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 419. Also Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, 
"Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in Handbuch der privaten 
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 9 (not yet publsished). 
1508 In general on low-value damage Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu 
Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen "Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 12. 
1509 Vollrath, "Das Maßnahmenpaket der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen Schadensersatzrecht," 
NZKart Vol. 1, no. 11 (2013), 443-444. 
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▪ No disclosure is possible for leniency statements and settlement submissions in-
cluded in the file of a competition authority, Art. 6(6)(a) and (b) DIR 
2014/104/EU.1510 
▪ Limited disclosure is granted for other pieces of evidence included in the file of 
a competition authority: In case no third party is reasonably able to provide the 
evidence, and the disclosure is proportionate, the authority will grant access, 
Art. 6(1), (10) and (4) DIR 2014/104/EU.1511 
▪ Disclosure of other specified items of evidence is ordered by the national courts 
on the claimants’ request. The evidence or category of evidence needs to be “cir-
cumscribed as precisely and narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably avail-
able facts”. Disclosure is only limited by the principle of proportionality with regard 
to scope and cost of disclosure, confidentiality of the information, amongst other 
things,1512 Art. 5(2) and (3) DIR 2014/104/EU. 
In summary, the access to evidence according to the directive is rather restrictive. Artt. 5 
to 7 DIR 2014/104/EU significantly impair the proof of damages claims in antitrust, espe-
cially in cases where parties subject to the leniency program are involved.1513 Therefore, 
there are doubts on whether the directive is in accordance with primary EU law: The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, in its famous decision Pfleiderer, has ruled that the interest in 
disclosure by the injured parties has to be weighed against the interest in the protection 
of the leniency documents in any individual case by the national courts.1514 The ECJ deci-
sion in the case Donau Chemie has confirmed the need to weigh the individual case.1515 A 
categorical exclusion of disclosure is therefore not acceptable in the light of Art. 101 TFEU 
and the corresponding jurisdiction in primary EU law.1516 
                                                 
1510 Peter Gussone and Tilmann M. Schreiber, "Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: Rückenwind aus Europa? 
Zum Richtlinienentwurf der Kommission für kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen," WuW Vol. 63, no. 11 
(2013), 1045. Also Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der 
eigenen "Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 9. 
1511 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 467. 
1512 Ibid. 
1513 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 9. 
1514 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Case C-360/09, European Court Reports 2011, I-5161 Ref. 30 et sqq. 
(European Court of Justice 2011). Refer also to Thorsten Mäger, Daniel J. Zimmer, and Sarah Milde, "Chance 
vertan? - Zur Akteneinsicht in Kartellakten nach dem Pfleiderer-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 61, no. 10 (2011), 
936. 
1515 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, Case C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366 Ref. 31 and 
42-49 (European Court of Justice 2013). 
1516 Fornasier and Sanner, "Die Entthronung des Kronzeugen?: Akteneinsicht im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
behördlicher und privater Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung nach Pfleiderer," WuW Vol. 61, no. 11 (2011), 1072. See 
also Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 9. 
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Hence, the regime for the disclosure of evidence is a limiting factor when it comes to the 
efficiency of private damages claims in European antitrust law. Especially in the energy 
market manipulation, only the manipulator himself is holding the crucial data on plant 
utilization and cost of production that will be needed to assess the scope of the price 
deviation and the damage suffered by the injured parties. Therefore, the existing rules on 
the disclosure of evidence need revision in order to work efficiently. Proposals in this re-
gard will be discussed subsequently in the fifth chapter of this work. 
 
(4) The quantification of the harm 
Another topic closely connected to the collection of evidence is the quantification of 
the damage done to the individual injured party through the energy market manipulation. 
While the directive contains a rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements cause 
damage in Art. 17(2) DIR 2014/104/EU, it remains a task of the claimants to show the 
scope of the damage.1517 For the case of market manipulations, there is no such presump-
tion. Hence, the burden of proof for both the emergence of damage and the scope of the 
damage done lies with the injured party.1518 
Art. 17(1) DIR 2014/104/EU empowers national courts to the estimation of the amount 
of harm in cases “where it is practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to 
quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available”.1519 Also, the directive 
provides for the right of a national court to request the assistance of a national competition 
authority with regard to the determination of damages, Art. 17(3) DIR 2014/104/EU.1520 
In practice, the courts require substantiated estimates of the scope of damage: Claimants 
need to offer data on the hypothetical competitive price in the manipulated market.1521 
Since the claimants do often not know this price, they will have to rely on formal models 
on competition in this market. This may be the same geographical and product market, 
                                                 
1517 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 469. See also Christian Vollrath, "Das Maßnahmenpaket der 
Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen Schadensersatzrecht," ibid Vol. 1, no. 11 (2013), 440. 
1518 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
138. Refer also to René Galle, "Der Anscheinsbeweis in Schadensersatzfolgeklagen - Stand und Perspektiven," 
NZKart Vol. 4, no. 5 (2016), 214. 
1519 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 8. 
1520 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 469. 
1521 Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in 
Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 35 
(not yet published). 
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yet at another point in time when no manipulations took place. Alternatively, comparable 
geographical or (similar) product markets may provide data on the competitive price.1522 
In order to offer some guidance for judges and plaintiffs, the European Commission pub-
lished a Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in Actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU1523 in 2013.1524 It contains an overview of the 
different types of harm caused by competition infringements, information on methods and 
techniques to quantify the harm, including their strengths and weaknesses and also prac-
tical examples to illustrate typical effects of competition law infringements.1525 The guide 
is, however, not binding to national courts and parties, but purely informative.1526  It re-
mains the task of the claimants to decide which approach to the quantification of harm is 
appropriate in every individual case – depending on the available data,1527 the cost and 
time involved, as well as the proportionality with regard to the value of the damages 
claim.1528 
Having regard to the example of manipulations of the energy exchange, the counter-
factual scenario would have to estimate the non-infringement price of power and the loss 
in profits due to the volume effect.1529 Methodically, claimants may use data from a period 
before or after the manipulations took place (comparison over time on the same market), 
if available.1530 Since it is, however, not clear, when exactly the manipulations started and 
ended, the estimation of the counterfactual price based on this approach might carry too 
many uncertainties and outside factors.1531 Comparisons with other products seem unsuit-
able for the power market, since there is hardly any comparable product with the same 
                                                 
1522 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
139. Refer also to Reinhard Ellger, "Kartellschaden und Verletzergewinn," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2011), 202. 
1523 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in 
Actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2013, SWD(2013) 205. 
1524 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2013, C(2013) 3440 Ref. 11. 
1525 Ibid, Ref. 11, 15. 
1526 Ibid, Ref. 12. 
1527 Anna Maria Doose, "Methods for Calculating Cartel Damages: A Survey," ZWeR Vol. 12, no. 3 (2014), 
283, 285. 
1528 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2013, 
C(2013) 3440 Ref. 14. See also Doose, "Methods for Calculating Cartel Damages: A Survey," ZWeR Vol. 12, 
no. 3 (2014), 297. 
1529 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in 
Actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2013, SWD(2013) 205 Ref. 128. 
1530 Ibid, Ref. 21, 38. 
1531 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
145. 
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characteristics1532 (e.g. lacking storability of the product) in a comparable market envi-
ronment (e.g. number of competitors or market structure).1533 Also with regard to geo-
graphical comparisons, the power market does not seem suited: Even though the whole-
sale market for power is national in scope,1534 there are huge differences between the 
German power market and neighboring markets in e.g. France or Poland, that differ con-
siderably in the structure of production – the comparison loses validity.1535 
In case none of the techniques named above is successful in quantifying the harm from 
the manipulations, claimants will have to rely on empirical comparisons that abstract from 
a concrete comparable market and calculate the counterfactual price based on the data 
available.1536 Those techniques include simple methods like the comparison of averages, 
interpolation and extrapolation, cost-based methods, profitability analyses, as well as 
highly complex techniques like multivariate regression or the use of models from the field 
of industrial organization. There will be no further analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the techniques named in this work1537, also because the use of an individual 
technique depends on the special characteristics of the individual manipulation case. It 
needs yet to be said that the quality of the results all of them deliver depends on the data 
that is available for the analysis: The less data is available, the more the estimation needs 
to rely on surcharges and reductions. The result becomes rather vague and will not be 
accepted as substantiated proof in court.1538 
Hence, claimants require lots of information on the market, pricing and cost of the manip-
ulators in order to successfully proof the harm done to them by the competition law in-
fringement. Under the current regime for the disclosure of proof introduced above, claim-
ants face difficulties with the proof of the harm done by a competition law infringement. 
The effectiveness of private market surveillance is therefore rather low. This problem will 
be discussed in more depth in the following section on the interplay of public and private 
antitrust prosecution. 
                                                 
1532 Ibid, 152. 
1533 Ibid. 
1534 For the comparability of geographical markets refer to European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document – Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in Actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2013, SWD(2013) 205 Ref. 51. 
1535 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
148. 
1536 Ibid, 155 et sqq. 
1537 For further information on the methods named refer to ibid. See also Peter Davis and Eliana Garcés, 
Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 
347 et sqq. Also refer to Doose, "Methods for Calculating Cartel Damages: A Survey," ZWeR Vol. 12, no. 3 
(2014), 282 et sqq. 
1538 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
201. See also Vollrath, "Das Maßnahmenpaket der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen 
Schadensersatzrecht," NZKart Vol. 1, no. 11 (2013), 441. Refer also to Doose, "Methods for Calculating Cartel 
Damages: A Survey," ZWeR Vol. 12, no. 3 (2014). 
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(5) The interplay between public enforcement and private damages claims 
The second main objective of the European Commission with the introduction of the 
directive on antitrust damages actions in 2013 was the improvement of the interplay be-
tween public and private antitrust prosecution.1539 The urgency of the harmonization of 
the two instruments of market surveillance has already been indicated in the preceding 
sections on the disclosure of proof and the estimation of the damage done with the com-
petition law infringement.1540 
The directive addresses the problem of conflicting incentives between public and private 
enforcement in several ways: 
(1) With regard to the detection and proof of competition law infringements: 
▪ On the one hand, restrictive rules on the disclosure of evidence against firms that 
cooperated in the leniency program (Art. 6(6) and Art. 7 DIR 2014/104/EU) that 
shall secure the incentives for firms to apply for leniency without having to fear 
damages claims that exceed the gains from the leniency application with regard to 
the fine1541, and 
▪ the significant evidentiary value of Commission and national decisions in subse-
quent civil actions for damages that are binding for the national courts on the other 
hand, Art. 16(1) of Regulation N° 1/2003 and Art. 9 DIR 2014/104/EU.1542 
(2) Also with regard to the limitation periods for follow-on damages actions: Limi-
tation is suspended or interrupted in case of ongoing public investigations, Art. 10(4) DIR 
2014/104/EU.1543 
                                                 
1539 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 469. See also European Parliament and European Council. 
Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. N° 2014/104/EU, EU Official 
Journal L 349, 1-19. 
1540 With regard to the general conflict between public and private enforcement see also Thomas Kapp, "Das 
Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," WuW Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 
485. 
1541 Argument of advocate general Mazáks in the case Pfleiderer. See Thorsten Mäger, Daniel J. Zimmer, and 
Sarah Milde, "Chance vertan? - Zur Akteneinsicht in Kartellakten nach dem Pfleiderer-Urteil des EuGH," ibid 
Vol. 61, no. 10 (2011), 938. 
1542 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 469. 
1543 Ibid, 470. 
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(3) Finally, the directive sets limitations to joint and several liability for immunity 
recipients under the leniency program, Art. 11(4) to 11(6) DIR 2014/104/EU.1544 
While the directive was supposed to improve the conditions for damages claims of injured 
parties, a look on the above-named rules may cast doubt on the effectiveness of the pro-
visions. Namely with regard to the disclosure of evidence in cases where immunity recip-
ients are involved, claimants will categorically be excluded from access to documents in 
the file of the competition authority. The private enforcement of competition law becomes 
practically impossible in cases where claimants require these documents to prove their 
claim.1545 As has been indicated before in the section on the disclosure of evidence, it 
remains however to be seen whether the absolute protection of leniency statements in the 
file of the competition authority is in line with European primary law, namely with regard 
to the ECJ decisions in the cases Pfleiderer1546 and Donau Chemie1547 that require the 
individual weighing of the conflicting interests in each case explicitly.1548 
 
(6) Summary of the results 
The analysis of the legal framework for damages claims in Europe has shown, that 
in spite of the considerable effect on antitrust deterrence there remains much to be done 
in order to make private market surveillance work efficiently.1549 Namely, the balance be-
tween the public interest in the protection of the leniency program and the interest of 
private claimants in disclosure of evidence needs to be improved.1550 Even if this problem 
is much less severe in manipulation cases, where the leniency programs of both EU and 
                                                 
1544 Ibid, 472. 
1545 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 9. 
1546 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Case C-360/09, European Court Reports 2011, I-5161 (European Court 
of Justice 2011). 
1547 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, Case C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366 (European 
Court of Justice 2013). 
1548 Vollrath, "Das Maßnahmenpaket der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen Schadensersatzrecht," 
NZKart Vol. 1, no. 11 (2013), 446. Refer also to Gussone and Schreiber, "Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: 
Rückenwind aus Europa? Zum Richtlinienentwurf der Kommission für kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen," 
WuW Vol. 63, no. 11 (2013), 1048. Also Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu 
Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen "Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 9. 
1549 Florian Becker, "Die Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzansprüchen: Rahmenbedingungen 
und Reformansätze," ibid Vol. 22, no. 13 (2011), 509. Refer also to Ellger, "Kartellschaden und 
Verletzergewinn," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, 
ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2011), 199. 
1550 Gussone and Schreiber, "Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: Rückenwind aus Europa? Zum 
Richtlinienentwurf der Kommission für kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen," WuW Vol. 63, no. 11 (2013), 
1057. Also Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 13. 
Fourth Chapter: Improved Private Market Surveillance 
B. Private Market Surveillance 
288 
 
FCO do not apply to date,1551 the imbalance between public and private interests in anti-
trust deterrence needs to be resolved. Corresponding proposals for changes in the legal 
framework are presented in the following fifth chapter. 
bb) Damages claims in German antitrust law 
This section treats damages claims in German antitrust law. Since the German leg-
islator needed to transpose DIR 2014/104/EU into national law,1552 there was, however, 
not much room for deviations from the legal requirements just presented in the section 
on European law. 
 
(1) The pool of potential claimants 
Sec. 33a(1) GWB contains the basis for damages claims in German national law.1553 
Anybody who suffered harm from a competition law infringement may claim the damage 
he suffered – German law is in line with the European Courage decision.1554 The German 
Federal Court of Justice found in its famous ORWI decision that this wide range of potential 
claimants includes indirect buyers on downstream markets, e.g. end customers.1555 There-
fore, the pool of potential claimants in German law mirrors the wide interpretation of 
claimants in European law: Anybody who suffered a deterioration of his legitimate chances 
in the market is considered to be affected by the infringement of competition law.1556 For 
the example of the European Energy Exchange, just as in European law, any customer 
who has bought electricity at a time when the EEX prices were potentially manipulated is 
entitled to damages claims in German law. Also, buyers of OTC products, where the ex-
change price serves as a reference,1557 are potential claimants. 
 
                                                 
1551 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. Refer also to section B. IV. 2. a) of this chapter. 
1552 Calisti, Haasbeek, and Kubik, "The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Towards a stronger 
competition culture in Europe, founded on the combined powers of public and private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), 472. 
1553 For the legal situation before the transformation of the antitrust damages directive Inderst and Thomas, 
Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 19. 
1554 Volker Emmerich, "Wettbewerbsrecht," ed. Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, 5th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 33 GWB Ref. 14, 18. 
1555 ORWI, Case KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145 Ref. 16, 151, 23 et sqq. (German Federal Court of Justice 2011). 
See also Martin Buntscheck, ""Private Enforcement" in Deutschland: Einen Schritt vor und zwei Schritte 
zurück," WuW Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 950. 
1556 Emmerich, "Wettbewerbsrecht," ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 5th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 
33 Ref. 15. 
1557 Jörg Spicker, Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd ed., ed. Hans-Peter Schwintowski (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-
lag, 2010), 88. See also Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der 
European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 90-91. 
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(2) The scope of compensation 
The scope of compensation is determined according to Sec. 249 to 252 BGB.1558 
Accordingly, the injured party may claim any damage that emerged from the competition 
law infringement adequately causally.1559 The specific extent of damage is determined by 
means of the so-called balancing method (Differenzmethode).1560 Hence, the injured party 
receives compensation that equals the presumable situation without the competition law 
infringement. Therefore, the hypothetical market situation in a competitive environment 
is the benchmark for the determination of damages. This result meets the ECJ standards 
in the case Manfredi1561, where the court found that not only the pecuniary loss from the 
increase in prices (damnum emergens), but also the loss in profit (lucrum cessans) – 
Sec. 252 BGB – and interest – Sec. 33a(4) first sentence GWB with reference to Sec. 288, 
289 first sentence BGB – need to be paid by the injurer.1562 
 
(3) Proving the claim: The access to evidence 
As has been shown for the European case, the success of private antitrust enforce-
ment depends on the rules on the disclosure of evidence and the requirements that the 
legislator sets for the quantification of the harm done. Basically, claimants need to prove 
the prerequisites of the legal basis of their claim, here Sec. 33a(1) in connection with 
Sec. 33(1) GWB.1563 Having regard to the proof of a cartel damages claim, Sec. 33b GWB 
contains a rule on the binding effect of decisions of the antitrust authorities in antitrust 
cases.1564 However, this rule only refers to the existence of an antitrust infringement and 
does not cover the causality of the damage and its scope,1565 which are both subject to 
                                                 
1558 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
83. See also Melanie Meyer and Regina Zorn, "Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche in Bezug auf 
Netznutzungsentgelte - Beweislast und Durchsetzbarkeit," N&R Vol. 7, no. 3 (2010), 129. 
1559 Emmerich, "Wettbewerbsrecht," ed. Immenga and Mestmäcker, 5th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 
33 Ref. 50. 
1560 Ellger, "Kartellschaden und Verletzergewinn," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. 
Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2011), 200. 
1561 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, European Court 
Reports 2006, I-6619 Ref. 92, 95, 97 et sqq. (European Court of Justice 2006). 
1562 With reference to the legal situation before the transformation of the antitrust damages directive into Ger-
man law Ibid, Sec. 33 Ref. 50. Refer also to Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen 
(Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 83 et sqq. 
1563 Meyer and Zorn, "Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche in Bezug auf Netznutzungsentgelte - 
Beweislast und Durchsetzbarkeit," N&R Vol. 7, no. 3 (2010), 127. 
1564 For the comparable rule before the transformation of the directive into German law see Peter Gussone, 
"OLG Hamm: Recht der Zivilgerichte auf Einsicht in Akten über Kartellordnungswidrigkeiten," Betriebs-Berater 
Vol. 69, no. 10 (2014), 533. 
1565 Fornasier and Sanner, "Die Entthronung des Kronzeugen?: Akteneinsicht im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
behördlicher und privater Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung nach Pfleiderer," WuW Vol. 61, no. 11 (2011), 1077. See 
also Martin Buntscheck, ""Private Enforcement" in Deutschland: Einen Schritt vor und zwei Schritte zurück," 
ibid Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 951. 
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the free appraisal of evidence by the civil courts.1566 Therefore, claimants for damages 
depend on the law to get access to the evidence they need to prove their claim. 
With regard to the disclosure of evidence, German law needs to comply with the re-
quirements of primary and secondary (Directive 2014/104/EU) EU law. Before the trans-
formation of the antitrust damages directive into German law, access to files was granted 
according to Sec. 406e German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO) 
and Sec. 46 OWiG. Claimants needed to show a legitimate interest, e.g. the preparation 
of a private damages claim.1567 However, access to the files could be denied in case of 
prevailing interests of the affected parties – Sec. 406e(2) first and second sentence StPO 
–,1568 e.g. in cases where immunity recipients were involved, as the district court Bonn 
found in the case Pfleiderer II.1569 The Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf ruled similarly in 
its Kaffeeröster decision.1570 Also, the FCO explicitly grants protection of leniency state-
ments against third parties to immunity recipients in its leniency notice (Ref. 22). Any 
other decision would hence violate the legitimate expectations of immunity recipients.1571 
However, the Higher Regional Court Hamm decided differently and ruled that the public 
prosecutor´s office needed to grant access to the files to the civil court that needed to 
decide on a damages claim due to an infringement of competition law, even if the file 
contains leniency applications.1572 The judgment was confirmed by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG).1573 Yet, the facts of the case at Higher Regional Court Hamm 
were different: Other than in the cases Pfleiderer II and Kaffeeröster, not a plaintiff was 
                                                 
1566 Rüdiger Harms and Alex Petrasincu, "Die Beiziehung von Ermittlungsakten im Kartellzivilprozess - 
Möglichkeit zur Umgehung des Schutzes von Kronzeugenanträgen?," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 8 (2014), 304. Also 
Jens Steger, "Zugang durch die Hintertüre? - zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugenanträge von Kartellanten," 
Betriebs-Berater Vol. 69, no. 17 (2014), 963. 
1567 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
370. 
1568 Harms and Petrasincu, "Die Beiziehung von Ermittlungsakten im Kartellzivilprozess - Möglichkeit zur 
Umgehung des Schutzes von Kronzeugenanträgen?," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 8 (2014), 304. 
1569 Pfleiderer II, Case 51 GS 53/09, WuW/E DE-R, 3499 (District Court Bonn 2012). See also Kapp, "Das 
Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," WuW Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 
477. Negating the subsumtion of leniency cases under Sec. 406e(2) StPO: Matteo Fornasier and Julian 
Alexander Sanner, "Die Entthronung des Kronzeugen?: Akteneinsicht im Spannungsfeld zwischen behördlicher 
und privater Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung nach Pfleiderer," ibid Vol. 61, no. 11 (2011), 1075. 
1570 Kaffeeröster, Cases V-4 Kart 5/11 (OWi), V-4 Kart 6/11 (OWi), 4 Kart 5/11 (OWi), 4 Kart 6/11 (OWi), 
WuW/E DE-R, 3662 Ref. 44 et sqq. (Higer Regional Court Düsseldorf 2012). 
1571 Mäger, Zimmer, and Milde, "Chance vertan? - Zur Akteneinsicht in Kartellakten nach dem Pfleiderer-Urteil 
des EuGH," WuW Vol. 61, no. 10 (2011), 941. Critical Thomas Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht 
kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," ibid Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 480. 
1572 Unnamed Decision, Cases III-1 VAs 116 - 120/13, III-1 VAs 116/13, III-1 VAs 117/13, III-1 VAs 118/13, 
III-1 VAs 119/13, III-1 VAs 120/13, III-1 VAs 122/13, 1 VAs 116 - 120/13, 1 VAs 116/13, 1 VAs 117/13, 1 
VAs 118/13, 1 VAs 119/13, 1 VAs 120/13, 1 VAs 122/13, WuW/E DE-R, 4101 Ref. 36 et sqq. (Higher Regional 
Court Hamm 2013). 
1573 Unnamed Decision, Cases 1 BvR 3541/13, 1 BvR 3543/13, 1 BvR 3600/13, WuW/E DE-R, 4213 Ref. 31 
(German Federal Constitutional Court 2014). Also Steger, "Zugang durch die Hintertüre? - zur Akteneinsicht in 
Kronzeugenanträge von Kartellanten," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 69, no. 17 (2014), 964. 
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demanding access to the files, but the court itself according to Sec. 474 et sqq. StPO.1574 
Furthermore, the court´s access to the files did not yet decide about their actual utilization 
in the case, which was up to the receiving civil court (so-called “Doppeltürmodell”). This 
decision is to be taken for every individual case, balancing the interest in effective judicial 
protection and the protection of secrets.1575 In consequence, the Hamm decision did there-
fore not fully contradict the earlier decisions of Bonn (Pfleiderer II) and Düsseldorf (Kaf-
feeröster). 
After the transformation of the European antitrust damages directive into German law, 
Sec. 33g GWB contains comprehensive rules on the access to evidence.1576 
 
(4) The quantification of the damage 
Claimants need to put a number on the harm done to them by the competition law 
infringement, Sec. 286 ZPO (necessity of full proof).1577 Just as described above for the 
European requirements, the injured parties face problems to precisely number the damage 
done by the infringer.1578 This situation is worsened by the restrictive practice of the FCO 
and the courts with regard to the access to files containing leniency statements described 
in the preceding section. In German law, Sec. 33a(2) first sentence GWB contains a re-
buttable presumption that a cartel causes damage. Yet, this presumption alone does not 
assist claimants in quantifying their damage. Furthermore, it only refers to cartel agree-
ments and not to manipulation cases that are treated in this work. Rather, Sec. 33a(3) 
GWB in connection with Sec. 287 ZPO requires at least the estimation of the harm done 
by the court in cases where the exact quantification of the harm suffered is practically 
impossible or excessively difficult.1579 
                                                 
1574 "Zugang durch die Hintertüre? - zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugenanträge von Kartellanten," Betriebs-
Berater Vol. 69, no. 17 (2014), 964. 
1575 Ibid, 967. 
1576 Andreas Rosenfeld and Peter-Andreas Brand, “Die neuen Offenlegungsregeln für Kartellschadensersatzan-
sprüche nach der 9. GWB-Novelle,” WuW Vol. 67, no. 5 (2017), 248. 
1577 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
138. 
1578 Ibid, 210. See also Kapp, Kartellrecht in der Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen 
müssen, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013), 250. 
1579 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 8. Refer also to Galle, "Der Anscheinsbeweis in 
Schadensersatzfolgeklagen - Stand und Perspektiven," NZKart Vol. 4, no. 5 (2016), 219. Refer also to 
LOTTOBLOCK II, Case KZR 25/14, NSW GWB § 33, Ref. 41 et sqq. (German Federal Court of Justice 2016). 
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The estimation of the damage needs to be based on actual reference points1580 (e.g. ver-
ifiable facts like the price actually paid1581 as compared to a hypothetical competitive price 
found with econometric methods1582, or the profit of the infringer (Sec. 33a(3) second 
sentence GWB)1583). The estimation according to Sec. 287 ZPO needs to refer to the min-
imal damage, which corresponds to the difference between the actual and the hypothetical 
price that would have to be paid with reasonable certainty in case the manipulation did 
not happen.1584 In practice, this requires comprehensive economic expertise on the side 
of both the claimants (e.g. supported by expert opinions) and on the side of the judges.1585 
Expert witnesses will have to present a comparison between the actual market with the 
manipulation and a hypothetical, counterfactual market based on a temporal or geograph-
ical confrontation with a comparable market or even an econometric model.1586 
The requirements for the quantification of the harm, combined with a lack of information 
on the side of the claimants, make damages claims risky and expensive.1587 In practice, 
many claimants do not succeed at proving the damage suffered – and fail with their 
claim.1588 This is, however, not due to insufficient rules concerning the burden of proof,1589 
but rather a problem of the access to information for claimants discussed in the preceding 
section. 
 
                                                 
1580 Jens Ole Rauh, "Vom Kartellantengewinn zum ersatzfähigen Schaden - Neue Lösungsansätze für die 
private Rechtsdurchsetzung," NZKart Vol. 1, no. 6 (2013), 225. Also Kapp, Kartellrecht in der 
Unternehmenspraxis: Was Unternehmer und Manager wissen müssen, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 
2013), 251. Recently confirmed by Unnamed Decision, Case N° 11 U 73/11 (Kart), WuW 2016, 312, 313 
(Higher Regional Court Frankfurt am Main 2015). 
1581 ORWI, Case KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145 Ref. 83 (German Federal Court of Justice 2011). 
1582 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
215. With reference to Selbstdurchschreibepapier, Case 6 U 118/05, juris Ref. 61 (Higher Regional Court 
Karlsruhe 2010). Also ORWI, Case KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145 Ref. 83 (German Federal Court of Justice 2011). 
1583 Controversial, in the affirmative Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: 
Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 216. Likewise Rauh, "Vom Kartellantengewinn zum ersatzfähigen Schaden - 
Neue Lösungsansätze für die private Rechtsdurchsetzung," NZKart Vol. 1, no. 6 (2013), 222. See also Joachim 
Bornkamm and Mirko Becker, "Die privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots nach der Modernisierung 
des EG-Kartellrechts," ZWeR Vol. 4, no. 3 (2005), 216. Negating Global One, Case U (Kart) 15/97, juris Ref. 98 
(Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf 1998). 
1584 Berliner Transportbeton, Case 2 U 10/03 Kart, WuW/E DE-R, 2773, 2777 Ref. 31 (Higher Regional Court 
Berlin 2009). 
1585 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
227. With reference to Papiergroßhandel, Case KRB 12/07, WuW/E DE-R, 2225, 2228 (German Federal Court 
of Justice 2007). 
1586 Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in 
Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 35-
36 (not yet published). 
1587 Morell, "Kartellschadensersatz nach "ORWI"," WuW Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 969. 
1588 Martin Buntscheck, ""Private Enforcement" in Deutschland: Einen Schritt vor und zwei Schritte zurück," 
ibid, 948. 
1589 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
240. 
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(5) Application to the manipulations at the EEX 
Having regard to claims referring to market manipulations at the energy exchange, 
so far, no damages claim was filed. Injured parties may base their claims on Sec. 33a(1) 
GWB. They would be entitled to full compensation of their harm according to Sec. 249 to 
252 BGB. Applying the findings above to the wholesale market for power this means: 
(a) Price effect (damnum emergens) 
▪ The difference between the manipulated price of power and the hypothetical com-
petitive price at the EEX times the quantity of power units bought;1590 
▪ in case the seller shows that the injured party succeeded at passing on the higher 
prices to end customers (so-called passing-on defense, Sec. 33c(1) second sen-
tence GWB), end customers are entitled to claim the price difference from the in-
jurer, Sec. 33c(2) GWB.1591 
(b) Quantity effect (lucrum cessans) 
▪ The number of additional power units that would have been sold by the injured 
party to end customers in case of working competition.1592 
(c) Interest 
The damage claimed needs to be based on substantive proof: Injured parties hence require 
information about the manipulative scope of power producers in order to estimate the 
price and the quantity effect. Since demand tends to be inelastic in the power market,1593 
and the oligopoly firms accused of manipulations were pivotal suppliers in the clear ma-
jority of the hours,1594 the scope for manipulations might be substantial. In court, however, 
Sec. 287 ZPO requires much more detailed information on pricing and the market envi-
ronment for every hour that is assumed to have been subject to excessive pricing. Claim-
ants face the problem to acquire this information from the manipulators, since the data 
publicly available only shows the EEX prices for the individual hours, yet not the price that 
                                                 
1590 Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in 
Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 8, 
23-24 (not yet published). 
1591 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
242 et sqq. 
1592 Meyer and Zorn, "Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche in Bezug auf Netznutzungsentgelte - 
Beweislast und Durchsetzbarkeit," N&R Vol. 7, no. 3 (2010), 129. 
1593 Elberg et al., "Untersuchungen zu einem zukunftsfähigen Strommarktdesign," (2012), 7. See also 
Atukeren and Simmons-Süer, "Elektrizitätsnachfrage nur wenig elastisch," Ökonomenstimme (2011). 
1594 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09, 104-105. 
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would have formed in case of working competition. Also, there is no information on pro-
duction cost publicly available – studies like the FCO sector inquiry only simulate cost 
functions for the different plant types on the basis of economic models.1595 
The access to information is, however, difficult in practice, as the above sections have 
shown. Although the problem of exclusion from leniency statements does not apply to 
manipulations at the energy market – the scope of application of the leniency program 
does not cover abuse cases1596 – claimants still face high barriers and costs for the access 
to the files. 
 
(6) Conclusion on the German legal framework 
Claimants for damages under German antitrust law face many of the same problems 
that have been pointed out for the European legal framework before. Namely, the re-
strictions on the access to information complicate the collection of evidence for injured 
parties. 
 
cc) Conclusion on private antitrust damages claims 
The preceding sections have described both the European legal framework and the 
German implementation of rules for antitrust damages claims. It could be shown that the 
problems lie not with the existing rules on damages claims and the requirements for sub-
stantial proof of the claims,1597 but rather with the restrictions on access to evidence that 
hinder injured parties – for practical and financial reasons – to substantiate their claim. 
From an economic point of view, the incentives to sue a manipulator are rather low. The 
danger of an inefficiently high number of damages claims pointed out initially1598 will there-
fore not realize in practice under the current legal framework. 
                                                 
1595 Ibid, 161. 
1596 Engelsing, "Die Bußgeldleitlinien der Europäischen Kommission von 2006," WuW Vol. 57, no. 5 (2007), 
479. Refer also to section B. IV. 2. a) of this chapter. 
1597 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
240. 
1598 Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in 
Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht(München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 8 
(noz yet published). See also Haucap and Stühmeier, "Wie hoch sind durch Kartelle verursachte Schäden: 
Antworten aus Sicht der Wirtschaftstheorie," WuW Vol. 58, no. 4 (2008), 419. Similar Hans Jürgen Meyer-
Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," ibid Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 
1246. 
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Furthermore, most of the antitrust damages claims are follow-on claims, which build upon 
the examinations of an antitrust authority.1599 While those claims increase the level of 
deterrence by adding to the damage variable DP, they remain without influence on the 
probability of punishment pp. Only stand-alone damages claims have potential to increase 
pp, they are however rare nowadays. 
It remains hence much to be done in order to increase the incentives for private parties in 
the fight against market manipulations. Foremost, the interaction between public and pri-
vate prosecution needs further revision. Section 2. will present necessary changes in the 
legal framework to reach this goal. Beforehand, damages claims based on capital market 
law will be examined with regard to their suitability to strengthen private enforcement. 
 
b) Damages claims in capital market law 
Also in the field of capital market law, injured parties have legal remedies to claim 
the harm done to them by market manipulators. This section presents the legal framework 
for damages claims under capital market law and discusses, whether the rules lead to 
more successful claims in today´s antitrust framework. 
Sec. 37b and 37c WpHG contain rules on the civil liability of parties having injured their 
WpHG duties. However, both paragraphs target injuries of the duty to the disclosure of 
inside information according to the former Sec. 12 et sqq. WpHG.1600 A civil liability for 
infringements of the ban on market manipulation (formerly Sec. 20a WpHG) that covers 
the price manipulations at the EEX is not part of the law. 
However, civil liability has been derived from the German Civil Code: According to 
Sec. 823(2) BGB, the infringer of a protective law is liable for any harm done to the injured 
party.1601 Hence, civil liability might result from Sec. 823(2) BGB in connection with 
Sec. 20a WpHG. This liability requires the quality of a protective law of the former Sec. 20a 
WpHG. However, this quality has been denied by the German Federal Court of Justice, 
most recently with its 2011 IKB decision.1602 According to the court and the biggest part 
                                                 
1599 Inderst and Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen (Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien, 2015), 
104. 
1600 Holger Fleischer, in Handbuch des Kapitalanlagerechts, ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Rolf A. Schütze, 4th 
ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), § 6 Ref. 5. 
1601 Gerhard Wagner, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. Franz Jürgen Säcker and 
Roland Rixecker, 6th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 823 Ref. 384 et sqq., 405. 
1602 Fleischer and Bueren, "Cornering zwischen Kapitalmarkt- und Kartellrecht," ZIP Vol. 33, no. 27 (2013), 
2564. With reference to IKB, Case XI ZR 51/10, BGHZ 192, 90 Ref. 20 (German Federal Court of Justice 
2011). 
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of the literature, the focus of Sec. 20a WpHG is on the protection of the functionality of 
the securities markets, rather than the protection of individual investors´ rights.1603 
Therefore, civil liability may only be derived from Sec. 826 BGB.1604 The norm explicitly 
protects the assets and requires the intentional cause of an immoral damage by the in-
fringer. Hence, not only needs the infringer have caused a pecuniary loss for the injured 
party. Also, an increased reprehensibility of the infringer´s actions needs to be proved. 
The infringement of a law itself is not sufficient, however. Rather, the increased reprehen-
sibility emerges from the objective pursued, the measures used, the attitude shown or the 
consequences from the actions.1605 The hurdles to be granted damages according to 
Sec. 826 BGB are hence considerable, especially with regard to the immorality of the ac-
tion and the intent of the infringer: The legislator wanted to avoid liability for pure pecu-
niary losses getting out of hand.1606 Sec. 826 BGB is therefore not suited to foster 
private enforcement of capital market law and increase deterrence of market manip-
ulations. 
 
2. Required changes in the legal framework 
The above examination of the current system of private enforcement against the 
infringer has shown that only in the field of antitrust, there is a system of civil liability for 
parties injured due to market manipulations. However, the regime for private damages 
claims in antitrust suffers from a number of weaknesses that minder the effectiveness of 
private market surveillance.1607 Those are namely the restricted access to proof for claim-
ants, the problems to weigh the public interest in the protection of leniency applicants 
against the private interest in access to information. Also, the European Commission di-
rective on cartel damages claims issued in autumn 2014 could not solve these problems 
convincingly.1608 
                                                 
1603 IKB, Case XI ZR 51/10, BGHZ 192, 90 Ref. 22 et sqq. (German Federal Court of Justice 2011). For the 
prevailing opinion in the literature see e.g. Schwark, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Schwark and 
Zimmer, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2010), Sec. 20a Ref. 7. Also Alexander Worms, in Handbuch des 
Kapitalanlagerechts, ed. Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Rolf A. Schütze, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), § 10 
Ref. 77. For the opposite opinion refer to Stefan Grundmann, in Handelsgesetzbuch, ed. Karlheinz Boujong, et 
al., 3rd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 20a Ref. VI 156. 
1604 Holger Fleischer and Eckart Bueren, "Die Libor-Manipulation zwischen Kapitalmarkt- und Kartellrecht," Der 
Betrieb Vol. 65, no. 45 (2012), 2564. 
1605 IKB, Case XI ZR 51/10, BGHZ 192, 90 Ref. 28 (German Federal Court of Justice 2011). 
1606 Wagner, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. Säcker and Rixecker, 6th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 826 Ref. 12 et sqq. 
1607 Dworschak and Maritzen, "Einsicht - der erste Schritt zur Besserung? Zur Akteneinsicht in 
Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 63, no. 9 (2013), 830. 
1608 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 7. 
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The lacking effectiveness of private enforcement is however an infringement of European 
law. National procedural rules must not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult 
the exercise of rights accorded by Community law.1609 Hence, German national law needs 
to grant better access to proof and solve the problems between immunity recipients and 
private claimants. 
What is needed to solve the conflict is a system that balances the different interests. 
Several proposals will be discussed: 
▪ The release from the liability for leniency applicants only in the internal relationship 
with other manipulators (section a),1610 
▪ the introduction of a monistic system of antitrust deterrence that combines public 
fining and private damages claims in only one hand (fifth chapter).1611 
 
a) Full liability of leniency applicants in the external relationship 
Today, leniency applicants are neither fully liable in the internal relationship (towards 
other cartel participants/manipulators) nor in the external relationship (towards the in-
jured parties), Art. 11(4), (5) DIR 2014/104/EU. In both cases, their liability is restricted 
to the damage done to their direct or indirect purchasers and does not cover liability for 
damage done to other injured parties. 
It has therefore been proposed to change the legal framework in order to establish full 
liability in the external relationship and grant the privilege of limited liability only in the 
internal relationship with the other infringers.1612 In German civil law, all antitrust infring-
ers are liable as joint and several debtors according to Sec. 840 BGB (external relation-
ship), since their behavior has become causal for the damage of the injured parties.1613 In 
the internal relationship, Sec. 426(1) first sentence BGB applies: The joint and several 
                                                 
1609 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
255. With reference to Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, European Court Reports 2001, I-6297 
Ref. 26 et sqq. (European Court of Justice 2001). 
1610 "Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," WuW Vol. 64, no. 6 (2014), 569. 
1611 See e.g. Thomas Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa 
finita?," ibid Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 485 et sqq. 
1612 Christian Kersting, "Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ibid Vol. 64, no. 
6 (2014). See also "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
266. Refer also to Dworschak and Maritzen, "Einsicht - der erste Schritt zur Besserung? Zur Akteneinsicht in 
Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 63, no. 9 (2013), 841. Of the 
same opinion Raphael Koch, "Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht: Public vs. private enforcement," JZ Vol. 69, 
no. 8 (2013), 393. 
1613 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
265. See also Koch, "Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht: Public vs. private enforcement," JZ Vol. 69, no. 8 
(2013), 391. 
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debtors need to grant each other compensation in equal parts, unless a different rule 
applies.1614 In order to align the public interest in the protection of the immunity recipient 
and the private interest of claimants, the liability in the external relationship towards the 
injured parties should not be denied to any group of claimants.1615 In the internal relation-
ship between the antitrust infringers, however, the immunity recipient would only be liable 
for the percentage of damage that correlates with the reduction of the fine granted by the 
antitrust authority according to its leniency policy. The remainder of the damage would 
have to be split between the remaining infringers that did not apply for leniency.1616 
The advantages of this policy are straightforward: It would allow claimants to sue the 
infringer they prefer based on its liquidity, the applicable law or the availability of evidence, 
without hurting the immunity recipients who are entitled to recourse against the other 
infringers. The divergence from the basic rule in Sec. 426(1) first sentence BGB on the 
internal relationship between the infringers may well be justified de lege lata: As Kersting 
argues, the leniency applicant has made a contribution to the minimization of the damage 
by way of disclosure of the antitrust infringement. This contribution may well be inter-
preted as a prevention of even higher damage in the meaning of Sec. 254(2) BGB.1617 
 
b) Conclusion 
However, full liability of successful leniency applicants in the external relationship 
would now be conflicting with the provisions in Art. 11(4), (5) DIR 2014/104/EU and is 
therefore no legal option. Furthermore, the increased financial burden on the infringers 
that are not immunity recipients may hardly be justified only on the grounds of the pre-
vention of future damage.1618 The situation becomes even more difficult in the cases of 
abuse of market power through manipulations of the market that are treated in this work: 
Since the firms do not necessarily act as a group like cartel members do, Sec. 840, 426 
                                                 
1614 Peter Bydlinski, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. Franz Jürgen Säcker and 
Roland Rixecker, 6th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 426 Ref. 1. 
1615 Different Lilly Fiedler, "Der aktuelle Richtlinienvorschlag der Kommission - der große Wurf für den 
kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatz?," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 68, no. 37 (2013), 2184. 
1616 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
266. 
1617 Ibid, 267. See also Carsten Krüger, "Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten 
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," WuW Vol. 62, no. 1 (2012), 13. 
1618 Florian Bien, "Überlegungen zu einer haftungsrechtlichen Privilegierung des Kartellkronzeugen," EuZW Vol. 
22, no. 23 (2011), 890. Different with regard to the nature of joint and several debtors: Dworschak and 
Maritzen, "Einsicht - der erste Schritt zur Besserung? Zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugendokumente nach dem 
Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 63, no. 9 (2013), 842. 
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BGB will not apply.1619 The solution discussed here is hence not suited to help private 
enforcement in manipulation cases. 
Apart from that, this concept does not solve the problems with regard to the access to 
evidence. In so far, a further reaching approach to the system of private damages claims 
is required.1620 A corresponding proposal will be introduced in the following fifth chapter 
of this work. 
Nonetheless, one alternative concept for private damages claims is considered in this sec-
tion. Other than so far, those claims are not targeted against the firm infringing the anti-
trust laws, but against the responsible firm directors according to Sec. 93(2) AktG and 
Sec. 43(2) GmbHG (section III.). 
 
II. Damages claims against firm directors 
Direct fining of corporate directors, officers and employees by the antitrust authori-
ties plays only a minor role in today´s antitrust enforcement.1621 On the EU level, antitrust 
laws do currently not allow for direct fining of corporate directors, officers or employees 
by the antitrust authorities.1622 In Germany, Sec. 81(4) first sentence GWB allows for di-
rect fining, however only to a very small extent.1623 This gap may however be closed 
through private damages claims: The named groups of agents may be liable indirectly 
through recourse claims of their firms or third parties. 
This section will therefore discuss the economic effects of private damages claims (section 
1.) and the legal tools available de lege lata (section 2.). Section 3. concludes. 
 
                                                 
1619 Even in cartel cases, the liability is shared according to criteria like responsibility, market share, profit and 
so on instead of the general rule of equal shares in Sec. 426(1) first sentence BGB. See e.g. Carsten Krüger, 
"Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," ibid Vol. 62, no. 1 (2012), 
9. Confirmed by Calciumcarbid-Kartell II, Case KZR 15/12, BGHZ 203, 193 Ref. 32 et sqq. (German Federal 
Court of Justice 2014). Now for manipulation cases where any firm may act without consultations with its com-
petitors, there is no common responsibility that would justify the application of Sec. 426 BGB. 
1620 Koch, "Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht: Public vs. private enforcement," JZ Vol. 69, no. 8 (2013), 398. 
1621 With regard to individual fining refer to the examination in section B.IV.1.b) of this chapter. 
1622 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 23-24. 
1623 Achenbach, in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, ed. Jaeger, Pohlmann, and Schroeder(Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2011), 33 et sqq. 
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1. The economic effects of damages claims against firm offi-
cials 
Today, the number of claims against firm officials is negligibly small.1624 Yet, an ef-
fective regime of corporate liability could change the incentive scheme for firm officials 
towards stricter compliance with the rules of antitrust and capital market law. The equation 
on individual expected damage (dE) of corporate agents applies: 
dE = pp(e) . dP, 
with dG= dG̅̅ ̅̅
1625, 
which equals the change of the individual profits received from the infringement of the 
laws ΔΠi (e.g. bonuses paid for increased profits of the firm) in the optimum: 
ΔΠi = dE or 
ΔΠi = pp(e) . dP. 
Hence, changes of either the probability of punishment pp or the sum of private damages 
to be paid to injured parties dP influence the behavior of firm officials when deciding about 
compliance with the rules of the energy market. 
Targeting damages claims to the individual actors might be a more cost-effective way to 
increase deterrence of infringements than today´s focus on the firms.1626 First, because it 
allows more precisely directed and therefore more effective deterrence: The punishment 
hits the person in the firm that is actually making the decision about compliance or non-
compliance with the legal framework. Second, because an individual approach allows for 
lower fines that are in accordance with the rule of law: The threat of personal financial 
losses has a much bigger effect on individual decision making than may have the threat 
of a sanction against the firm.1627 Limits to this approach may however be created by 
                                                 
1624 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 93. 
1625 See already section B. b) of this work. Refer also to William M. Landes, "Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust 
Violations," The University of Chicage Law Review Vol. 50, no. 2 (1983), 657. Also Wils, "Optimal Antitrust 
Fines: Theory and Practice," World Competition Vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), 12. 
1626 Ginsburg and Wright, "Antitrust Sanctions," Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 17. 
1627 Polinsky and Shavell, "Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability?," International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 13, no. 3 (1993), 240. See also 
Biermann, "Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: Reformüberlegungen, 
Determinanten und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 5, 
no. 1 (2007), 17. 
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institutions like D&O (Directors and Officers) insurance contracts that fully or in part adjust 
the damage.1628 
From a legal point of view, it remains hence to be shown which bases for private damages 
claims against firm directors and officers are available and how they influence the crucial 
variables probability of punishment and damage in the decision makers’ equation. 
 
2. Legal remedies of injured parties against firm officials 
From a legal point of view, two kinds of claims need to be distinguished: 
▪ Damages claims of the owners of the firms having manipulated the market 
against their (former) responsible employees (section a), and 
▪ damages claims of third parties having suffered damages from manipulations 
of the power prices (section b). 
 
a) Damages claims by the owners of the firms against their re-
sponsible employees 
National law regulates the liability of company agents towards the owners of the 
firm. In Germany, liability depends on the legal form of the company: Members of the 
management board of a corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) are liable according to Sec. 
93(2) of the German Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG), directors of a GmbH are liable 
according to Sec. 43(2) GmbH-Gesetz (GmbHG).1629 Both rules require a neglect of the 
duty to legality by the reliable agent.1630 Members of the management board have to act 
according to the due care of a reasonable and careful businessman.1631 This includes the 
compliance with general rules like antitrust and capital market laws. In fact, any unlawful 
behavior in the external relationship between company and the market is mirrored as a 
neglect of duty in the internal relationship between the company and its owners. Managers 
are hence obliged to obey the law themselves and prevent infringements of the law by the 
                                                 
1628 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 188. 
1629 Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 162. 
1630 Oliver Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 
71. 
1631 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 110-111. 
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firm and its employees.1632 The following sections will therefore analyze whether liability 
of the management for market manipulations, using the example of Sec. 93(2) AktG on 
the energy market. 
 
aa) Liability according to Sec. 93(2) AktG 
Liability according to Sec. 93(2) AktG requires a breach of duty by the management, 
a damage for the firm, causality and fault. This section will discuss whether these require-
ments are fulfilled for the boards of management of the firms having manipulated the 
energy exchange. 
 
(1) Breach of duty towards the company 
The fact that manipulations of the energy market by way of physical or financial 
capacity retention are infringements of the antitrust, energy and capital market laws, has 
been proved thoroughly in the preceding sections.1633 With regard to the director´s and 
officer´s liability it needs however to be clarified, whether any infringement of the law 
results in damages claims of the firm.1634  Specifically, it needs to be discussed, whether 
the breach of duty in the external relationship is to be considered a corresponding breach 
of duty towards the company.1635 
Director´s and officer´s liability has long been oriented on the 1997 decision of the Ger-
man Federal Court of Justice in the case ARAG/Garmenbeck1636.1637 In their ruling, the 
judges established a duty for the supervisory board of a firm to examine, whether the 
management has made itself liable for damages and conduct a risk analysis in order to 
assess whether a judicial enforcement is promising. In case this question was answered 
in the affirmative, the supervisory board is obliged to pursue potential enforceable claims, 
                                                 
1632 Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 163. 
1633 Refer to the second chapter of this work. 
1634 Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 163. Critical Gerald Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz, ed. Wulf Goette, Mathias Habersack, and Susanne Kalss, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), 
Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 147. 
1635 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 113. 
1636 ARAG/Garmenbeck, Case II ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 (German Federal Court of Justicde 1997). 
1637 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 70. See 
also Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 162. 
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unless important considerations of the corporate well-being outweigh or are at least equiv-
alent to those in favor of a claim.1638 
According to this jurisdiction, the supervisory boards of the four oligopoly firms being 
suspect of price manipulation would be obliged to check, whether their management board 
complies with its duties to legality according to Sec. 93(1) AktG and, more recently, the 
ruling of the Regional Court Munich I in the Siemens/Neubürger case1639.1640 The reproach 
is not an infringement of the rules by the management itself, but rather a failure to or-
ganize and supervise the company such that infringements of the law are avoided.1641 The 
standard for the ex-post evaluation of management decisions and installed control mech-
anisms is set by the so-called Business Judgment Rule, which served as a model for 
the codification of Sec. 93(1) second sentence AktG.1642 
The Business Judgment Rule is supposed to respect the need for entrepreneurial discretion 
of the management when acting according to its assignment in Sec. 76 AktG. Therefore, 
a decision of the management board is not subject to judicial review according to the duty-
of-care standards, if the following criteria are met: 
▪ Disinterested judgment: The responsible manager does not have an own relevant 
interest in the decision. 
▪ Informed judgment: The responsible manager has acquired sufficient information 
in preparation of the decision. 
▪ Rational belief and good faith: The responsible manager has acted comprehensibly 
and, according to his own conviction, in the best interest of the firm.1643 
Liability is not per se affirmed if the requirements of the business judgment rule are not 
met, however, the lack of one of the criteria indicates a breach of duty by the responsible 
management. Still, this breach of duty needs to be positively determined and proved in 
court.1644 
                                                 
1638 ARAG/Garmenbeck, Case II ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 Ref. 25 (German Federal Court of Justicde 1997). 
1639 Neubürger, Cases 5 HKO 1387/10, 5HK O 1387/10, 5 HK O 1387/10, WM 2014, 947 (Regional Court 
Munich I 2013). 
1640 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 71. See 
also Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 74. 
1641 Neubürger, Cases 5 HKO 1387/10, 5HK O 1387/10, 5 HK O 1387/10, WM 2014, 947 Ref. 89 (Regional 
Court Munich I 2013). 
1642 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 36. 
1643 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 37. 
1644 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 40. 
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With regard to the energy market manipulations, the managers might either be liable for 
a breach of duty due to active behavior, e.g. the internal order to optimize plant utiliza-
tion using capacity retention, or breach of duty due to failure to act1645 and e.g. install 
an effective Compliance Management System in order to supervise lower managerial 
levels of the company (Sec. 130 OWiG).1646 The responsible managers have hence violated 
the Business Judgment Rule due to a lack of rational belief and no action in the best 
interest of the firm. 
However, from a subjective point of view, managers may, according to their own convic-
tion, consider manipulations of the energy market in the best interest of the firm. It 
must be in a capitalistic firm´s interest to maximize profit and therefore – through the 
management´s decisions – adjust their behavior to the liability equation introduced above: 
ΔΠ = pp(e) . CD.1647 
If a firm operates in an environment, where the right side of the equation, thus the prob-
ability of detection and/or the cost of detection are sufficiently low, such that 
ΔΠ > pp(e) . CD, and 
ΔΠ –[pp(e) . CD] > 0, 
the profit from infringing the law exceeds the expected cost, hence the firm´s profits 
increase.1648 The management might argue that non-compliance with the rules was in the 
very interest of the firm and could therefore not be considered a breach of duty of the 
management. This argument has become known under the term of “beneficial breaches 
of duty”: While there is clearly a breach of duty in the external relationship, the judgment 
in the internal relationship might differ. Some authors do therefore propose a limitation of 
liability for beneficial breaches of duty.1649 
                                                 
1645 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 147. 
1646 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 71-72. 
With regard to antitrust refer also to Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, 
Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2013), 136. 
1647 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 102. 
1648 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 143. Refer also to 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, "Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers," Michigan Law Review 
Vol. 80(1982), 1168 Ref. 36. Also Fleischer, "Kartellrechtsverstöße und Vorstandsrecht," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 
63, no. 21 (2008), 1071. 
1649 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 144. With reference 
to Easterbrook and Fischel, "Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers," Michigan Law Review Vol. 80(1982), 
1168, 1177. 
Fourth Chapter: Improved Private Market Surveillance 
B. Private Market Surveillance 
305 
 
Such view would however stand in stark contrast to the duty to legality in Sec. 92(1) AktG 
that is supposed to also have preventive effect on manager´s behavior and ensure legal 
compliance of their decisions. The category of “beneficial breaches of duty” is hence to be 
denied.1650 
As a result, market manipulation at the Energy Exchange is a breach of duty by the man-
agement of the firms concerned. 
 
(2) Damage 
Managers must have caused damage to the firm. According to Sec. 249 BGB, they 
must restore the position that would exist if the circumstance obliging him to pay damages 
had not occurred, including the lost profits.1651 Basically, the damage may also be a fine 
that has been imposed on the firm and shall be borne by the reliable management in the 
internal relationship.1652 However, this view causes problems with regard to the scope of 
the fine: While public fines, namely in antitrust, are determined depending on the situation 
of the company (e.g. its profits), the pure pass-on of the fine to the management does 
not consider their situation. 
It has therefore been requested to fully deny recourse claims against the management for 
several reasons: 
▪ The rules on fines are exhaustive and do not allow for exemptions.1653 
▪ Also, the purposes of general and specific deterrence would be defeated if the fine 
could be passed on to the management.1654 
▪ The fact that in EU antitrust law, individual fining of the management is not possi-
ble, has been used to justify the full exclusion of recourse claims.1655 
A recent decision of the State Labor Court Düsseldorf has confirmed this view: The judges 
found that reimbursement of a fine for the company (in the case a GmbH) according to 
                                                 
1650 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 146-148. Refer also 
to Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 102. 
1651 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 171. 
1652 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 172. 
1653 Fleischer, "Kartellrechtsverstöße und Vorstandsrecht," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 63, no. 21 (2008), 1073. 
1654 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 161-162. Refer also 
to Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 102. 
1655 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 104. 
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Sec. 81 GWB may not be claimed from an employee according to Sec. 43(2) GmbHG.1656 
The judges argue that the strict separation between administrative law on the one hand 
and civil law on the other hand may not be overcome by damages claims. Hence, the 
company remains the addressee of the fine – also from a civil law point of view.1657 
Other authors1658 propose to limit the scope of recourse claims and consider the circum-
stances of the individual case, e.g. the individual contribution to the breach of duty, as 
well as the individual financial capacity of the management.1659 This approach seems bet-
ter suited to reach a deterrent effect. It is also no violation of the unity of the legal system: 
Damages payments of former directors do not cause a situation contrary to the law on the 
antitrust level (e.g. an infringement without a sanction). Rather, it corresponds to the 
situation that would have existed if the reliable director had duly taken care of his duties. 
In fact, solely the liability law in stock companies is concerned, yet not the fines level.1660 
Also, the Düsseldorf ruling causes the following problem: While antitrust requires compli-
ance by the firm as a legal entity, the firm itself is not able to act. Rather, people (e.g. the 
management) act in the name of the company. Hence, the requirements for compliance 
have to be realized by the management.1661 While the management is supervised by an-
other legal body of the company (in the AG the supervisory board), there remains an 
information asymmetry between the management and its supervisors.1662 This gap may 
only be closed by an effective legal framework that disciplines the persons who make 
decisions about legal compliance of the firm. This does necessarily include effective deter-
rence of illegal behavior. 
A different interpretation would cause a lack of damages claims exactly for the kind of 
infringements that are considered serious violations of the law and hence punishable by a 
fine.1663 The precise scope of recourse liability and its dogmatic construction would go far 
beyond the purpose of this work and will therefore not be discussed. A comprehensive 
                                                 
1656 Schienenkartell, Case 16 Sa 459/14, WuW/E DE-R, 4668 Ref. 151 (State Labor Court Düsseldorf 2015). 
1657 Ibid, Ref. 161 et sqq. Confirming this view Stefan Thomas, "Bußgeldregress, Übelszufügung und D&O-
Versicherung," NZG Vol. 18, no. 36 (2015), 1412. 
1658 For an overview of the views on recourse claims against the management in antitrust cases refer to 
Markus J. Friedl and Laura A. Titze, "Der Sanktionszweck heiligt den Regressausschluss - Zur Haftung von 
Vorstandsmitgliedern für Verbandsgeldbußen," ZWeR Vol. 13, no. 3 (2015), 319 et sqq. 
1659 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 172. See also Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für 
Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 109. Also Walter Bayer, "Legalitätspflicht der 
Unternehmensleitung, nützliche Gesetzesverstöße und Regress bei verhängten Sanktionen - dargestellt am 
Beispiel von Kartellverstößen -," in Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Georg Bittner, et 
al.(Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2009), 97. 
1660 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 100. 
1661 Ulrich Rust, "Innenregress und Haftung der Unternehmensleistung bei Kartellverstößen," ibid Vol. 13, no. 
3 (2015), 305-306. 
1662 Ginsburg and Wright, "Antitrust Sanctions," Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 17. 
1663 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 100. 
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description of the topic may be found in Twele´s 2013 work on Manager´s liability for 
antitrust infringements.1664 
Authors agree, however, with regard to damages recourse claims against the management 
referring to private damages claims according to Sec. 33(3) GWB. This amount will regu-
larly already meet the threshold for liability of firm officials.1665 
Furthermore, the management may require the consideration of additional profits that 
resulted for the company precisely due to the (antitrust) infringement (so-called adjust-
ment of profits – Vorteilsausgleichung).1666 In consequence, damage needs to be de-
nied in the scope of the profits received by the company.1667 
Having regard to market manipulations, the companies are potentially subject to anti-
trust and capital market fines from the public sector, as well as damages claims based on 
Sec. 33 GWB by private parties. These are payments that would not have to be incurred 
if the breach of duty (thus the antitrust and capital market laws) had not occurred. Dam-
age has hence occurred to the firm, that has however to be reduced by the amount of 
profits from the infringement and adapted to the individual situation of the managers. 
 
(3) Causality 
Furthermore, the law requires causality between the breach of duty and the damage 
to the company. Problems may occur if decisions are made based on the majority on the 
management board: Any individual manager might argue that the same decision would 
have been made without his vote, given the relevant majority.1668 In civil and stock cor-
poration law, Sec. 830(1) second sentence BGB solves the problem of not identifiable cau-
sality, but common causation.1669 
Managers manipulating the prices in a market are undoubtedly causing damage to their 
employers causally. 
 
                                                 
1664 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 165-168. 
1665 Thomas, "Bußgeldregress, Übelszufügung und D&O-Versicherung," NZG Vol. 18, no. 36 (2015), 1414. 
1666 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 106 et sqq. 
1667 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 168-173. 
1668 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 174-175. 
1669 Ibid, Sec. 830 BGB Ref. 16 et sqq. 
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(4) Fault 
Eventually, the claim for damages requires a faulty breach of duty by the manage-
ment, thus intention or negligence, Sec. 276(1) second sentence BGB. The manager 
must have disregarded the due care of a reasonable and careful businessman.1670 In prac-
tice, the subjective breach of duty will regularly mirror the objective breach of duty dis-
cussed above: A board member that has objectively broken his duties will also have been 
able to act like a reasonable and careful businessman on the subjective level.1671 In the 
event of controversial legal questions, the manager is obliged to seek expert advice and 
check it critically: According to the ECJ verdict in the case Schenker & Co. AG,1672 a mistake 
of law (Sec. 17 StGB) that would exclude guilt, may not be claimed based on qualified 
legal advice solely, if the infringement of competition law must have been obvious to the 
firm.1673 
In the example used, managers of power sellers acting at the EEX must have known that 
the retention of production capacity was an infringement of the antitrust laws if their firms 
were holding a dominant market position, Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB. In case of doubts about 
the applicability of the norm due to e.g. the relevant market share justifying market dom-
inance or the behavior covered by N° 2, managers are obliged to seek qualified legal ad-
vice. The same is true for the infringement of capital market law. As a result, the respon-
sible management has committed the manipulations of the energy exchange that may be 
objectively proved intentionally. 
 
(5) Conclusion 
In conclusion, a firm whose management board has manipulated prices in the energy 
market may claim damages from its managers if the breach of duty, thus the infringement 
of the law, may be proved. In so far, the law supports the claimants as it contains a 
rebuttable presumption for a breach of duty by the management. The directors do have 
to prove that they acted like reasonable and careful businessmen.1674 
                                                 
1670 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 96. Refer also to 
Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 176. 
1671 Holger Fleischer, in Aktiengesetz, ed. Gerald Spindler and Eberhard Stilz, 3rd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 
2015), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 205. Refer also to Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 
11, no. 1 (2013), 97. 
1672 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Schenker & Co. AG, Case C‑681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:404 (European Court 
of Justice 2013). 
1673 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 177. 
1674 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 181 et sqq. 
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However, this recourse liability has shortcomings with regard to its deterrent effect: 
▪ It only provides liability rules for corporate managers or company directors. The 
individual employee who is making the decision to manipulate is not addressed by 
the rules. It would, however, be advantageous to target the actual employee who 
is manipulating the market. First, that employee is directly responsible for the ma-
nipulation and may well be deterred by the threat of a sanction, whereas a director 
or officer may only be effectively deterred if he is able to monitor and, if necessary, 
stop the employee engaging in illegal market manipulations. Second, an employee 
has less to gain from manipulations than has a corporate manager or company 
director, which allows for smaller fines to reach an efficient level of deterrence.1675 
The following section bb) will therefore treat additional liability according to labor 
law that also targets subordinate employees. 
▪ It requires a public fine and/or private damages claims in the first place – recourse 
claims are hence not suited to increase the rate of detection of manipulations, be-
cause they only refer to manipulation cases that have already been uncovered by 
the authorities or private interest groups. 
▪ Companies buy insurance contracts for their directors and officers (so-called D&O 
insurance) that compensate managers under certain circumstances for dam-
ages.1676 This instrument might minder the deterrent effect of recourse claims and 
will therefore be discussed in section cc). 
 
bb) Liability based on labor law 
In case an employee on the level below the management engages in market manip-
ulations that result in a public fine against the corporation, the question whether also this 
group of actors may be liable personally comes up.1677 In these cases, the specific rules 
on pecuniary responsibility for entrusted property (so-called “Arbeitnehmerhaf-
tung”) apply: While originally developed for the damage of working tools, it also refers 
to the indirect damage due to infringements of antitrust and capital market laws. The basis 
for damages claims are Sec. 241(2), 280(1) BGB due to a breach of duty in the employ-
ment contract.1678 With regard to the burden of proof, Sec. 619a BGB specifies the general 
                                                 
1675 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Sanctions”, Competition Policy International Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2010), 18. 
1676 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 115. 
1677 Ibid, 117. 
1678 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 109. 
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rule in Sec. 280(1) second sentence BGB, stating that fault and liability of the employee 
must be reduced due to the operational risk borne by the employer. Employees are hence 
only liable for intent and gross negligence.1679 
An employee engaging in manipulations of the energy market as a trader at the EEX or in 
any other position in the company will regularly act intentionally. He may hence be held 
liable for the damage done to the firm according to the legal concept of “Arbeitnehmer-
haftung”. The scope of liability depends on several factors including the degree of fault, 
damage caused so far in the employment contract, personal circumstances and the oper-
ational risk of the employer in the individual case.1680 
 
cc) Shortcomings of the corporate liability 
Yet, the above-introduced liability regime of German company law has several seri-
ous disadvantages. First, it requires a public fine or a successful damages claim of a third 
party against the firm in order to lead to a recourse claim. Deterrence is hence only 
reached in cases where there has already been a sanction before, even if not as precisely 
directed as the individual sanction of corporate liability. The liability regime may hence 
increase the cost of detection to the infringer, an increase of the probability of pun-
ishment may not be reached. 
Furthermore, in practice companies buy insurance for their directors and officers, so-called 
D&O insurance contracts.1681 Even though Sec. 93(2) third sentence AktG requires a 
deductible of ten percent of the damage done to the company reaching up to a maximum 
of one and a half times the fixed annual remuneration,1682 insurance still lowers the deter-
rent effect of fining.1683 Especially since the deductible is not compulsory if the D&O insur-
ance contracts that have been bought by the management itself (where Sec. 93(2) third 
sentence AktG does not apply) instead of the company.1684 
                                                 
1679 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 72. 
1680 Ibid. 
1681 Lotze, "Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte 
Kartellbußgelder," NZKart Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 169. See also Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für 
Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - 
Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 209. With regard to the dispute about the insurability of antitrust 
fines refer to Thomas, "Bußgeldregress, Übelszufügung und D&O-Versicherung," NZG Vol. 18, no. 36 (2015), 
1416. 
1682 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 116. Refer also to 
Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, Münsterische 
Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 189. 
1683 Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 193. 
1684 Ibid, Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 198. 
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An exemption is the limitation of insurance coverage in cases of intentional or even 
just knowing violations of the law.1685 In case of market manipulations, managers must 
be aware that they work for a firm with a dominant position in the market and need to 
comply with the rules of conduct codified in Sec. 19 GWB. If there is insecurity with regard 
to the market position or the legality of the concrete behavior, intent may not be denied; 
rather, managers need to search for expert advice. In practice, managers culpable of 
market manipulations will have to face a limited coverage of their damage from the D&O 
insurance. This limitation might not fully balance the loss of deterrence from D&O insur-
ance, but it still improves the preventive effect to comply with the law by some degree.1686 
Third, the German approach of indirect liability of corporate agents relies on the supervi-
sory board´s action against current or former corporate managers. Yet, the incentive 
scheme pictured in figure 17 has already shown the weak incentives for supervisors and 
shareholders to effective control of corporate decisions and their low interest in costly 
monitoring and enforcement of corporate compliance with antitrust laws.1687 Even though 
the supervisory board is obliged to check whether the management is liable for damages 
according to the ARAG/Garmenbeck decision,1688 in practice, strong reasons from the rule 
are found that outweigh the need for juridical prosecution.1689 
 
dd) Conclusion 
As a result, recourse claims as a means of indirect liability of the management may 
help to target damages to the decision maker and have a preventive effect with regard to 
legal compliance in energy trade. Due to the shortcomings named above, the deterrent 
effect is, however, rather small. 
An approach based on direct liability of corporate agents for infringements of the law 
promises what previous actions failed to provide: The link of profit opportunities and re-
sponsibility for the risks taken. The following section will examine whether German law 
allows for damages claims against company agents directly, respectively which changes 
to the current legal system are necessary to enhance individual deterrence.  
                                                 
1685 Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 116. See also Lotze, 
"Haftung von Vorständen und Geschäftsführern für gegen Unternehmen verhängte Kartellbußgelder," NZKart 
Vol. 2, no. 5 (2014), 169. 
1686 Indicated in Spindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, ed. Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, 4th 
ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), Sec. 93 AktG Ref. 193. 
1687 Refer to section B.IV.1.b) of this chapter. 
1688 ARAG/Garmenbeck, Case II ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 Ref. 25 (German Federal Court of Justicde 1997). 
1689 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 71 Ref. 
31. 
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b) Damages claims of injured third parties against firm officials 
Besides indirect sanctions from recourse claims, firm directors might face damages 
claims from third parties injured by market manipulations, e.g. wholesale buyers at the 
EEX or even end customers. This section will discuss both the advantages of the approach 
from an economic point of view (subsection aa)) and the legal opportunities (section bb)). 
Section cc) concludes. 
 
aa) Economic effects from direct liability 
From an economic point of view, such claims may drive both the cost of detection 
and the probability of punishment up. Since they do not require prior fine proceedings, 
the cost of detection is not just distributed between the firm and the management, but an 
additional cost position is created. Furthermore, traders in the energy market being 
suspicious of paying excessive prices for power do not have to rely on governmental ad-
ministrative procedures, but may, based on their own experience in the market and in-
vestigations file claims that might uncover illegal behavior. This aspect is particularly 
interesting for cases that do not meet the Commission´s or FCO criteria for the initiation 
of an investigation, e.g. because they are not of extensive relevance. 
Eventually, this approach (re-)establishes the connection between risk and liability. 
 
bb) Legal opportunities in German civil law 
A legal basis for claims by third parties against the management may not be found 
in Sec. 93(2) AktG respectively Sec. 43(2) GmbHG discussed above. These rules only refer 
to the internal relationship between the corporation and its management.1690 A basis for 
such damages claims against the management may however be found in German torts 
law, Sec. 823(2) BGB in connection with Sec. 263 StGB. Sec. 823(2) BGB expands the 
liability of the management to third parties.1691 The rule requires the infringement of a 
statute that is intended to protect another person. With regard to market manipulations, 
this protective statute may be Sec. 263 StGB (fraud). 
                                                 
1690 Michael Nietsch, "Die Garantenstellung von Geschäftsleitern im Außenverhältnis," CCZ Vol. 6, no. 5 
(2013), 194. 
1691 Wagner, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. Säcker and Rixecker, 6th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 823 BGB Ref. 387. 
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If the manager himself has committed manipulations in a market or has instructed his 
employees to do so, he may be held liable by third parties who suffered damage from the 
infringement according to Sec. 823(2) BGB, Sec. 263 StGB.1692 
In the more common scenario where a subordinate management level (e.g. the trading 
department) engages in manipulations, it is highly controversial whether the infringement 
may be attributed to the company´s directors. In the absence of a director´s active be-
havior, he may only be liable for omission contrary to his duty. In the literature, omission 
has been based on the infringement of the director´s duty to legality. This duty does not 
only cover the director´s own compliance with the law, but also the duty to work towards 
compliance of the company´s employees.1693 Hence, if a subordinate employee has com-
mitted manipulations in e.g. the energy market, the management of the company might, 
according to this view, be liable for the omission to install an effective compliance man-
agement system or a lack of supervision, Sec. 13 StGB.1694 
While this view is widely accepted in the criminal law literature, it is still a topic of contro-
versial discussion in civil law. In the past, the German Federal Court of Justice has however 
repeatedly denied liability of firm directors towards third parties for the infringement of 
the duty to legality due to a lack of guarantor status.1695 In its 2012 verdict it argued that 
the duty to legality according to Sec. 93(1) first sentence AktG and Sec. 43(1) GmbHG 
only applies towards the corporation and does not serve the protection of creditors from 
negligent management.1696 
In the civil law literature, liability is not denied as categorically as in the jurisdiction. Ra-
ther, a guarantor status shall be admitted in cases where supervision lacks completely or 
the infringement is accompanied by another breach of duty. Furthermore, some authors 
propose the limitation of liability to high-ranking individual legal assets, e.g. the exclusion 
of offences against financial assets.1697 Hence, also from the point of view of the literature, 
liability of the firm directors in the external relationship is restricted to exceptional cases. 
Eventually, also direct liability of subordinate employees engaging in manipulations is 
a possible legal approach for third parties to claim damages. Liability for intentional and 
                                                 
1692 Generally Unnamed Decision, Case VI ZR 341/10, BGHZ 194, 26 Ref. 24 (German Federal Court of Justice 
2012). 
1693 Nietsch, "Die Garantenstellung von Geschäftsleitern im Außenverhältnis," CCZ Vol. 6, no. 5 (2013), 196. 
1694 Ibid, 192. 
1695 Hein, "Compliance - Haftungsrisiken für die Unternehmensleitung," EWeRK Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015), 74. 
1696 Unnamed Decision, Case VI ZR 341/10, BGHZ 194, 26 Ref. 22, 23 (German Federal Court of Justice 
2012). 
1697 Nietsch, "Die Garantenstellung von Geschäftsleitern im Außenverhältnis," CCZ Vol. 6, no. 5 (2013), 197. 
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direct infringements of the law is uncontroversial.1698 In cases of indirect infringements, 
liability of the employees is either denied or accompanied by an exemption from liability 
in the relationship between employer and employee.1699 For the market manipulations 
discussed here, there will be no difference in the results, because the exemption from 
liability towards the employer shall only be granted in cases of simple negligence. The 
decision to retain capacity in order to influence the market price for power is, however, a 
conscious decision that is made intentionally. Hence, also a subordinate employee is liable 
in the external relationship. In practice, creditors who are firm outsiders will however face 
problems to identify the individual employee reliable for their damage, which hinders ef-
fective enforcement of the law. 
 
cc) Conclusion 
The above analysis of economic effects and legal opportunities from direct individual 
liability of firm directors and subordinate employees engaging in market manipulations 
has shown that the link between risk and liability is important in order to deter infringe-
ment of the law. German torts law offers a basis for damages claims for infringements 
that also fulfill the requirements of a statute that is intended to protect another person, 
Sec. 823(2) BGB. 
Intentional and direct infringements of a protective statute, e.g. Sec. 263 StGB give rise 
to liability also in the external relationship to third parties. In practice, claimants who are 
firm outsiders will however often face problems to identify the reliable person in the firm 
and prove their claim. 
 
IV. Results for the private prosecution of manipulations 
Private market surveillance is a necessary complement of public surveillance efforts 
in the fight against market manipulations. This chapter has given an overview of the cur-
rent legal framework in the EU and Germany. Namely in the field of antitrust damages, 
private surveillance efforts have taken a rapid development due to efforts at the EU level 
to implement rules that incentivize private damages claims. 
                                                 
1698 Wagner, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. Säcker and Rixecker, 6th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 823 BGB Ref. 115. 
1699 Ibid. 
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However, the economic and legal analysis showed that even with the recently introduced 
directive on private damages claims, a number of drawbacks remain that make the proof 
of the claim an uncertain and risky decision for claimants. A huge deterrent effect may 
therefore not be expected from this legal instrument. The same is true for the field of 
capital market law that does not contain specific legal bases for damages claims against 
infringements of Sec. 20a WpHG – which leaves claimants with the legal bases in the 
German Civil Code (BGB) that do however not yield promising results. 
Finally, damages claims against firm individuals, e.g. on the management and subordinate 
levels were examined as a means of deterrence. It was shown that individual liability 
through damages claims has a number of shortcomings especially with reference to sub-
ordinate employees. It is not suited to efficiently deter market manipulations at low cost. 
In conclusion, the analysis has revealed a number of conflicts between public and private 
market surveillance that minder the effectiveness of both approaches from an economic 
point of view. In legal categories, an infringement of European primary law was found due 
to the restrictive rules on access to leniency files that are required for the proof of damage 
by private claimants. 
The following chapter five will therefore develop a system of integrated enforcement of 
fair market rules that ensures an optimal balance between public and private market sur-
veillance. 
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C. Summary of the Fourth Chapter 
The fourth chapter of this work has covered the field of private market surveillance. 
This area has immense potential to support the efforts of the antitrust authorities in the 
fight against market manipulations by increasing the level of deterrence. 
However, the analysis revealed serious impediments to an efficient private surveillance 
system: Since public market surveillance efforts concentrate almost exclusively on the 
amount of the fine in order to reach the necessary level of deterrence , there is almost 
no room for private market surveillance efforts in the shape of damages claims that further 
increase the amount infringers have to pay in case of detection. 
Further impediments to private market surveillance efforts, namely damages claims of 
victims of manipulations, arise from the unresolved conflict between public and private 
surveillance efforts: Authorities have incentives to handle requests for information from 
injured parties restrictively in order to protect their leniency applicants and thereby keep 
the leniency program an attractive option for manipulators in the future. This restrictive 
policy makes it however complicated and costly, sometimes even impossible for claimants 
to pursue their damages claim successfully – and hence results in too low incentives for 
private market surveillance. 
This work therefore proposes an integrated system of market surveillance in the following 
fifth chapter that balances the conflicting incentives to considerably improve both public 
and private market surveillance in manipulation cases. 
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FIFTH CHAPTER: 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED LEGAL SYSTEM 
OF MARKET SURVEILLANCE 
 
A. Introduction 
“A policeman sees a drunk man searching for something under a streetlight and asks 
what the drunk has lost. He says he lost his keys and they both look under the streetlight 
together. After a few minutes the policeman asks if he is sure he lost them here, and the 
drunk replies, no, and that he lost them in the park. The policeman asks why he is search-
ing here, and the drunk replies, “this is where the light is”.”1700 
The streetlight effect is a common observational bias in the social sciences. It refers to 
people only looking for the easiest solution to their problem and thereby limiting their 
possibilities for insight and understanding to a limited number of solutions –which does 
not necessarily contain the optimal one. Also with regard to the market manipulations in 
the energy wholesale market, research has taken a one-sided view on the problem. Either 
has only the field of public antitrust enforcement been considered in the case of the FCO 
sector inquiry (by legal assignment in Sec. 32e(2) GWB),1701 or an approach purely based 
on capital market law has been followed.1702 Also, the relationship between public and 
private enforcement, especially in antitrust, is not sufficiently clear: As the preceding chap-
ter has shown, the regime for private damages claims in antitrust suffers from a number 
of weaknesses that minder the effectiveness of private market surveillance.1703 Moreover, 
also the public market surveillance is weakened by the conflict with private interests.1704 
Also, this work has so far focused on isolated solutions for the different fields of law, as 
well as the relationship of public and private prosecution of infringements of the market 
integrity. However, since a comprehensive economic analysis of the problem is the task, 
this chapter will shift the focus to the requirements for an effective system of enforcement 
                                                 
1700 The streetlight effect refers to an observational bias and was first introduced by Abraham Kaplan, The 
Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Transaction Publishers, 1964), 11. 
1701 Federal Cartel Office, Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung/Stromgroßhandel, 2011, B10-9/09. 
1702 Refer e.g. to the works of Brunke, Die Strafbarkeit marktmissbräuchlichen Verhaltens am Spotmarkt der 
European Energy Exchange (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011). And Wiesner, Der Stromgroßhandel in 
Deutschland: Die Anwendung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes auf den deutschen Stromgroßhandel zur 
Stärkung der Marktintegrität, Europäische Hochschulschriften  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010). 
1703 Dworschak and Maritzen, "Einsicht - der erste Schritt zur Besserung? Zur Akteneinsicht in 
Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH," WuW Vol. 63, no. 9 (2013), 830. 
1704 Ibid, 836. Also refer to Thomas Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in 
Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Stefan Bechtold, 
Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 323. 
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of market rules that takes into consideration the reciprocal interference and conflicts of 
objectives of the different legal tools. 
First, a complete overview of the different approaches discussed so far will be presented. 
From this scheme, interrelations between the different approaches and the potential for 
conflicts will be derived (section B.). 
The following section C. will present the requirements for an effective and efficient inte-
grated legal system of enforcement for fair market behavior in complex market environ-
ments like the EEX. Section D. points to the constitutional requirement of the changes 
proposed and the final section E. concludes. 
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B. Interrelations Between the Different 
Legal Tools 
So far, the analysis was limited to partial considerations: Only one variable has been 
varied while all other variables influencing the level of deterrence have been kept constant. 
This approach led to a number of different proposals to approach the optimal level of 
deterrence for market manipulations. Those are pictured in the following figure 18 in an 
overview. 
Yet, in order to reach the optimal level of deterrence, a combination of the different ap-
proaches is required. Otherwise, a further increase of the level of deterrence may not be 
reached based on just one legal instrument or the cost of the individual approaches is too 
high compared to a combination of different approaches. However, the combination of 
different approaches involves the risk of conflicts between the solutions that minder the 
effectiveness of deterrence. 
In the course of this work, it has already been made reference to conflicts between the 
different solutions, namely with regard to the governmental fining policy (DG) that conflicts 
with private damages claims efforts (DP) in various ways.1705 A solution to ensure effectiv-
ity of both legal tools is required. Also within the scope of governmental fining DG, con-
flicting rules may be found if an offence violates rules from different legal fields, e.g. an-
titrust and capital market law. It needs hence to be decided which rule applies or whether 
there is parallelism in applicability. The same is true for the field of antitrust where a 
number of corporate and individual sanctions need to be coordinated.1706 
The challenge for the legal system is hence to optimally balance the different tools of 
deterrence.1707 This section will show which conflicts arise between the means of deter-
rence for market manipulations in the energy market discussed in this work. The following 
section C. will take this up and propose solutions to the conflicts detected. Section D. 
shows the necessity of the proposed changes from a legal point of view while section E. 
summarizes and concludes. 
  
                                                 
1705 Refer to the fourth chapter of this work, section B.I.1. a) aa) (5) of this work. 
1706 Ginsburg and Wright, "Antitrust Sanctions," Competition Policy International Vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), 5. 
1707 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 601. 
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Figure 18: Overview of the legal tools to reach the optimal level of deterrence 
Fifth Chapter: An Integrated System of Market Surveillance 
B. Interrelations between the different legal tools 
321 
 
I. Overview of the conflicting fields of law 
From the overview of legal tools to increase the level of deterrence for market ma-
nipulations at the energy exchange, conflicting fields may be derived. The most important 
ones are: 
▪ Conflicts between public and private prosecution of infringements, namely in the 
field of antitrust, 
▪ conflicts between different fields of law with regard to the applicability, e.g. be-
tween antitrust and capital market law, and 
▪ conflicts between corporate and individual sanctioning for infringements of the law. 
The following sections will demonstrate the potential for conflict in the three named fields 
in depth. 
 
II. Conflicts between public and private prosecution of in-
fringements 
One of the main conflicts arises between public and private prosecution of infringe-
ments of market rules, namely in the field of antitrust.1708 First, private prosecution 
through damages claims against the manipulators influences the fines level (D): It in-
creases the financial burden the manipulator has to bear: 
D = DG + DP.1709 
The fine resulting from the individual maximization of public fines (DG) and private dam-
ages (DP) might infringe the economic liability condition: 
CD ≤ Πi + Ai.1710 
                                                 
1708 Cornelis Canenbley and Till Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und 
Schadensersatz - Liegt die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: 
Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010), 144. 
1709 Ibid, 151. 
1710 Refer to the third chapter of this work, section B.II.1. a) cc). 
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As has been shown before, fines exceeding this threshold have no further deterrent effect 
for the parties involved and are hence inefficient from an economic point of view.1711 The 
solution of this conflict is hence a necessary step to effective deterrence.1712 
Second, private prosecution of manipulations also influences the probability of prosecution 
(pp) of the public prosecutor: The manipulators´ incentive to participate in the antitrust 
authority´s leniency program decreases if he faces additional damages claims besides the 
(reduced) governmental fine.1713 
On the other hand, the incentives for private claimants to sue manipulators and participate 
in the prosecution of infringements decrease with high efforts of the authorities to protect 
the infringers from damages claims in order to preserve the attractiveness of their leniency 
programs.1714 As has been shown, this happens through high hurdles from both the Com-
mission and the FCO for the access to evidence that is required to win a case.1715 
Hence, also private prosecution efforts and the governmental leniency policy require a 
balanced solution in order to avoid conflicting incentives for market participants.1716 
 
                                                 
1711 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 634. Refer also to Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des 
Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," WuW Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1238. 
1712 Focussing on the economic optimum Krüger, Öffentliche und private Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots von 
Art. 81 EG: Eine rechtsökonomische Analyse, ed. Behrens, et al., Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts  
(Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2007), 327 et sqq. 
1713 Mäger, Zimmer, and Milde, "Chance vertan? - Zur Akteneinsicht in Kartellakten nach dem Pfleiderer-Urteil 
des EuGH," WuW Vol. 61, no. 10 (2011), 938. Refer also to Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von 
Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 624, 630 et sqq. Refer also to Kurt Stockmann, "Zur neueren Bußgeldpraxis bei Kartellverstößen," 
ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 1 (2012), 30-31. 
1714 Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 321. 
1715 Sebastian Jungermann, "Obtaining US-Discovery for Use in German Private Antitrust Actions," WuW Vol. 
64, no. 1 (2014), 4. See also Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, 
Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and 
Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 322. Also Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, 
Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem 
einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 
bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010), 153. 
1716 Mundt, "Kartellverfolgung im 21. Jahrhundert," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. 
Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2011), 439. 
Refer also to Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," 
WuW Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 485. Also Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und 
private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von 
Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 611, 623 et sqq. Refer also 
to Christian Alexander, Schadensersatz und Abschöpfung im Lauterkeits- und Kartellrecht (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2010), 303. 
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III. Conflicts between different fields of law 
A second important potential conflict arises between the different fields of law appli-
cable on the market manipulations at the EEX presented in this work. Those are namely: 
▪ Antitrust (DA): In antitrust, infringements of Sec. 19(2) N° 2 GWB, as well as 
Art. 102 TFEU are possible in case of market manipulations.1717 The infringement 
is punishable by a fine under Sec. 81(1) respectively (2) GWB. 
▪ Capital Market Law (DM): In capital market law, manipulations of the EEX were 
qualified as infringements of the former Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 2 WpHG in 
conjunction with Sec. 3(2) N° 1 MaKonV, as well as Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 
1 WpHG (information based manipulations) and Sec. 20a(1) first sentence N° 3 
(other manipulations). They are now infringements of Art. 12, 15 MAR. According 
to Sec. 39(3d) N° 2, 39(4a) WpHG, a fine may be imposed. 
▪ Energy Law (DE): In energy law, Sec. 95(1b) and (1c) EnWG contain fines provi-
sions for infringements of REMIT that are fulfilled in case of market manipulations 
at the energy exchange. 
Hence, in case all of the fines provisions apply in parallel, the infringer would face a public 
fine of 
DG = DA + DM + DE, which is 
DG = 0,1 . (p . x)        +      0,15 . (p . x)      +        1 mio. + δ . [(p** . x) - (p . x)].1718 
          Antitrust fines         Capital market fines                Energy law fines 
In case all of the above fines provisions do in principle apply to the market manipulations 
at the EEX, the question needs to be answered whether there is parallelism in application 
or whether one of the fields of law rules out the application of the others.1719 Otherwise, 
the infringement of the economic liability condition 
CD ≤ Πi + Ai 
is inevitable. Also, the more formal question which public authority shall be competent for 
the EEX manipulations needs to be answered: 
                                                 
1717 Refer to the second chapter of this work, section B.II. 
1718 For details on the scope of the fines refer to the discussion in the third chapter of this work in section 
B.II.1. 
1719 Daniel Zimmer, "Kartellrecht und Marktmanipulation," WuW Vol. 63, no. 10 (2013), 811. 
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▪ The FCO with its expertise in antitrust, 
▪ the BaFin supervising financial markets, and/or 
▪ the BNetzA with regulatory competence for the energy sector. 
An integrated solution will have to decide which authority to award the (main) competence 
for energy market manipulations in order to avoid inefficiencies from an uncertain alloca-
tion of rights and duties. 
 
IV. Conflicts between corporate and individual sanctioning 
Also between corporate and individual sanctioning, there is potential for conflict. It 
may arise with regard to recourse claims of the firms. Some authors argue that allowing 
recourse claims of firms against their (former) employees minders the deterrent effect of 
the fine for the firm, because the firm no longer has to bear the full burden of the financial 
sanction.1720 
However, this conflict has already been solved in the specific section on recourse claims1721 
and shall therefore not be treated any further in this section. 
 
V. Summary and conclusion 
In summary, two important conflicts of interest arise that need to be addressed by 
an integrated system of enforcement of fair market behavior at the EEX. Those are the 
conflict between public and private market surveillance with regard to the level of the fines 
and the probability of punishment, as well as the conflict between different fields of law 
referring to the level of fines. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1720 Twele, Die Haftung des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße, ed. Dörner, Ehlers, and Heghmanns, 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft - Neue Folge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 161-162. See also 
Fabisch, "Managerhaftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße," ZWeR Vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 102. 
1721 Refer to the third chapter of this work in section B.III.2.a) aa) (2). 
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Figure 19: Central conflicts of law enforcement at the EEX 
 
The following section C. will propose a solution to the conflicting fields that enables public 
authorities and private claimants to effective enforcement of the market rules. 
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C. An Integrated System of Enforcement of 
Fair Market Behavior at the EEX 
The preceding section has shown that two main conflicts arise with regard to the 
enforcement of market rules in complex market environments like the EEX, which are 
between public and private prosecution of infringements and the different fields of appli-
cable law. This section will discuss solutions to these conflicts, starting with the conflicting 
fields of law in section I. and treating public and private prosecution in section II. Section 
III. combines both approaches to an integrated system of law enforcement for fair market 
behavior at the EEX. Section IV. summarizes and concludes. 
 
I. The balance between the conflicting fields of law 
The three fields of law involved in the case of market manipulations at the energy 
exchange – antitrust, capital market and energy law – do basically apply in parallel. The 
different offenses have individual prerequisites and, with them being fulfilled in an individ-
ual case, apply. However, the relation between their requirements needs to be clarified.1722 
Yet, the rule of law (Art. 20(3) GG), more precisely the principle of proportionality, ap-
plies, stating that no legal action shall be punished twice (principle ne bis in idem).1723 
In German law, this principle has been laid down in Art. 103(3) GG specifically for the field 
of criminal law. It needs however to be discussed whether 
▪ ne bis in idem also applies to administrative offences and 
▪ different fields of law applying already constitute a repeated punishment. 
 
                                                 
1722 Markus Ludwigs, "Die Rolle der Kartellbehörden im Recht der Regulierungsverwaltung," WuW Vol. 58, no. 
5 (2008), 534, 550. For the fields of capital market and antitrust law refer to Holger Fleischer, 
"Finanzinvestoren im ordnungspolitischen Gesamtgefüge von Aktien-, Bankaufsichts- und Kapitalmarktrecht," 
ZGR Vol. 37, no. 2-3 (2008), 223. 
1723 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Theodor Manuz and Günter Dürig, 75 ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Art. 103 GG Ref. 288. 
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1. The application of ne bis in idem to administrative 
offences 
Art. 103(3) GG, stating that no legal action shall be punished twice, explicitly only 
applies to criminal sanctions.1724 It remains hence to be shown whether sanctions based 
on administrative offences are also subject to the ne bis in idem principle. 
Even if Art. 103(3) GG does not apply directly, the constitutional guarantees (rule of law, 
Art. 20(3) GG) contain a comparable level of protection. In particular the principle for 
proportionality contains limitations for repeated or double sanctions.1725 This general rule 
is further concretized by Sec. 84 OWiG: A legal action that has already been punished with 
a fine or according to the rules of administrative offences or criminal law may not be 
pursued under the rules of the act on administrative offences again, Sec. 84(1) OWiG. 
However, the OWiG allows for the opening of a criminal examination after the fine notice 
took legal effect, Sec. 102(1) OWiG. This criminal procedure requires yet the annulment 
of the fine notice and the crediting of the fine already paid, Sec. 86(1), (2) OWiG. 
These norms do however not contain a general rule that states “that there may not be 
several adverse consequences for one legal action”.1726 Rather, it needs to be decided in 
the individual case whether a multiple punishment is proportional and in accordance with 
the constitutional guarantees.1727 Since those, as shown, also apply to administrative of-
fences, the next section will discuss the constitutionality of sanctioning market manipula-
tions according to different legal rules in antitrust, capital market and energy law. 
 
2. Constitutionality of sanctions from different fields of 
law 
The rule of law, namely the principle of proportionality, limits multiple sanctions for 
legal actions. However, it does not contain precise rules for any individual case. More 
generally, it states that multiple punishments with an identical or largely identical sanction 
are interdicted. Hence, a sanction is precluded if it is identical with an earlier sanction in 
all details.1728 
                                                 
1724 Ibid, Art. 103 GG Ref. 286. 
1725 Ibid, Art. 103 GG Ref. 289. 
1726 Ibid, Art. 103 GG Ref. 278. With reference to Unnamed Decision, Case 2 WD 42/84, BVerwGE 83, 1 Ref. 
67 (German Federal Administrative Court 1985). 
1727 Unnamed Decision, Case 2 WD 42/84, BVerwGE 83, 1 Ref. 67 (German Federal Administrative Court 
1985). 
1728 Ibid. Refer also to Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Manuz and Dürig, 75 ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Art. 103 GG Ref. 280. 
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With regard to the sanctions in antitrust, capital market and energy law, it remains hence 
to be examined whether and in how far they need to be considered as “identical punish-
ments” from a constitutional proportionality perspective. 
 
a) The relation between antitrust and capital market law 
sanctions 
As shown in the previous section, the relation between antitrust and capital market 
law sanctions depends on the question, whether those sanctions are “identical”. This is 
namely to be determined with regard to the (different) protection mandates that the gov-
ernment exercises with the application of antitrust and capital market law. Also, the puni-
tive and preventive functions of the different sanctions need to be considered.1729 Multiple 
sanctions tend to be allowed where the functions and goals of the laws involved are strictly 
different. On the other hand, they tend to be unlawful the closer they are to each other. 
However, even for sanctions whose functions are strictly different, an obligation to credit-
ing may result.1730 
 
aa) Differences in the legislative goals 
With regard to the fields of antitrust and capital market law, it needs to be differen-
tiated. Both codes aim at the regulation of free markets. While capital market law regulates 
a specific market – the capital market – antitrust is not market-specific but applies to any 
market. Still, the capital market laws (WpHG/WpÜG) may not generally be considered as 
special regulations in the relation to Art. 101 et sqq. TFEU and the German GWB.1731 
Even despite such differences, the US jurisdiction, where the rules of the Sherman Act 
(antitrust) may conflict with capital market laws like the Williams Act, the courts repeat-
edly ruled that in principle, capital market law does not preclude antitrust rules. However, 
the Supreme Court assumed an implied exclusion of the applicability of antitrust in 2007 
for actions that are also permitted under capital market laws. In its justification, the court 
                                                 
1729 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Manuz and Dürig, 75 ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Art. 103 GG Ref. 278. 
1730 Ibid, 280. 
1731 Jörn Axel Kämmerer, "Bemessung von Geldbußen im Wettbewerbs- und Kapitalmarktrecht: Eine 
komparative Betrachtung " in Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010: 
Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, ed. Stefan Grundmann, et al.(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 2050. 
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referred to a lacking expertise of the antitrust courts that might cause decisions, which 
hinder the smooth functioning of the capital markets.1732 
For Germany and Europe, this settled practice is however not binding. Rather, the two 
fields stand in material concurrence to each other. While the antitrust laws aim at the 
protection of a system of free competition,1733 capital market laws refer to the protection 
of the investors´ confidence in the functionality of the capital markets.1734 
 
bb) Differences in the sanctioning systems 
In European and German law, the differences in the sanction regimes in these fields 
are tremendous. While fines in antitrust may reach up to a billion Euros, capital market 
fines are limited to a million Euros.1735 On the other hand, capital market law contains 
criminal sanctions for hardcore infringements that are not possible in antitrust.1736 
Whether this makes up for the enormous difference in fines may not be decided clearly,1737 
but is without relevance to the question of identical sanctions discussed here. Rather, it is 
important to notice that the two different sanctioning systems are both carefully balanced 
internally with regard to the particular regulatory goals of the law. This does however not 
yet allow for a conclusion on the relation between the systems. 
Having regard to the capital market law criminal sanctions, there is clearly a qualitative 
difference to the fines in antitrust, even if they are considered to be criminal in nature due 
to their extreme scope.1738 With regard to the fines it needs to be differentiated, consid-
ering namely the goals of the legislator from fining. Basically, antitrust fines aim at 
general and specific deterrence of infringements. However, also the excess profits from 
the infringements shall be levied, Sec. 81(5) first sentence and 34, 34a GWB as well as 
Ref. 17 of the FCO Guidelines on Fining.1739 For capital market fines, the situation is slightly 
                                                 
1732 Fleischer, "Finanzinvestoren im ordnungspolitischen Gesamtgefüge von Aktien-, Bankaufsichts- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht," ZGR Vol. 37, no. 2-3 (2008), 223. With reference to Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Billing, 
127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396, 2007). 
1733 Maik Wolf, in Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht, ed. Joachim 
Bornkamm, Frank Montag, and Franz Jürgen Säcker, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 19 GWB Ref. 
1. 
1734 Schwark, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Schwark and Zimmer, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 
2010), Sec. 20a WpHG Ref. 7. 
1735 See the third chapter of this work in section B.II.1.a) and b). Refer also to Kämmerer, "Bemessung von 
Geldbußen im Wettbewerbs- und Kapitalmarktrecht: Eine komparative Betrachtung " in Festschrift für Klaus J. 
Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010: Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, ed. Grundmann, et 
al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 2044. 
1736 Ibid, 2056. 
1737 Ibid, 2059. 
1738 Refer to the third chapter in section B.IV.1.a)aa)(2). 
1739 Federal Cartel Office, Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren, 2013. 
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different. The authorities have no means to levy excess profits from an infringement. This 
is partly due to the complex strategies used for infringements of the capital market rules 
that do not always manifest themselves in an injury of a certain group of people.1740 
 
cc) Conclusion 
The regulatory objectives of antitrust and capital market law are different ones, and 
so are the sanctioning systems. There is hence much to be said for a parallelism in appli-
cation according to the constitutional principles of the rule of law introduced above. How-
ever, the principle of proportionality might require the crediting of a fine already paid as 
a sanction in one of the fields in case of the opening of a second procedure by another 
authority.1741 
 
b) The relation between antitrust and energy law sanctions 
In the relation between antitrust and energy law, the situation is comparable to the 
one between antitrust and capital market law just discussed: While antitrust regulates the 
freedom of markets in general, the field of energy law concerns a specific market – the 
energy market.1742 According to Sec. 1 EnWG, the legislative goals of the code are a reli-
able, inexpensive, consumer-friendly, efficient and sustainable grid-bound supply of the 
public with electricity and gas.1743 This includes namely the guarantee of effective and 
genuine competition with regard to the supply of electricity, Sec. 1(2) EnWG, as well as 
the implementation of European Community law in the field of grid-bound energy supply, 
Sec. 1(3) EnWG. Even though there may be manipulative strategies used that fulfill the 
requirements of both antitrust and the REMIT prohibitions, the character of the infringe-
ment is different from the exercise of market power by a dominant firm. An infringement 
                                                 
1740 Kämmerer, "Bemessung von Geldbußen im Wettbewerbs- und Kapitalmarktrecht: Eine komparative 
Betrachtung " in Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010: Unternehmen, Markt 
und Verantwortung, ed. Grundmann, et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 2053. 
1741 Schmidt-Aßmann, in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Manuz and Dürig, 75 ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 
Art. 103 GG Ref. 278. Similar with regard to the relationship between cartel damages and a government fine 
Weller, "Die Anrechnung pönaler Schadensersatzleistungen gemäß § 33 GWB auf Kartellbußen," ZWeR Vol. 6, 
no. 2 (2008), 180, 182. 
1742 More general Johanna Hartog, "Kartellrechtsaufsicht im Kontext der Regulierung," EnWZ Vol. 4, no. 12 
(2015), 536. 
1743 Christian Theobald, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Wolfgang Danner and Christian Theobald, 86th ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 1 EnWG Ref. 1 et sqq. 
Fifth Chapter: An Integrated System of Market Surveillance 
C. An Integrated Legal System of Public and Private Law Enforcement 
331 
 
of REMIT does not even require market dominance, but may be committed by any firm 
engaging in trades in the energy market.1744 
Hence, energy law focuses primarily on the functionality of the energy market with its 
particular characteristics from an ex ante perspective.1745 According to REMIT, namely the 
consumers´ and market participants´ confidence in the integrity of power and gas markets 
are protected, which includes competitive pricing on the wholesale markets without market 
manipulations.1746 On the other hand, antitrust aims at the freedom of markets in general 
and – with regard to abuse control – acts from an ex post perspective.1747 The legislative 
goals are therefore considerably different. 
Also with regard to the goals from fining there are differences between the two regulative 
systems. While, as has been shown in the previous section, antitrust sanctions aim at 
general and specific deterrence of infringements, but also contain an element of levy of 
excess profits earned, the sanctions codified in Sec. 95(1b) and (1c) N° 6 EnWG originate 
from the European REMIT regulation. This regulation was supposed to increase the integ-
rity and transparency of the energy markets1748 rather than protect the basic freedom of 
competitive markets from the exercise of market power by dominant firms.1749 The differ-
ent character of the infringements does mirror in the sanctioning regimes: Fines in energy 
law focus on deterrence of manipulations that may also have been committed by an indi-
vidual person: Other than in antitrust, criminal sanctions of up to five years of imprison-
ment are possible under Sec. 95a(1) EnWG in connection with REMIT. However, also the 
punishment of the manipulating firm is possible by a fixed fine, as well as the levy of 
excess profits up to three times the amount earned due to the infringement, Sec. 95(2) 
first sentence EnWG. 
                                                 
1744 Refer to the definition of market manipulations according to REMIT in Art. 2(2) of European Parliament 
and Council. Regulation N° 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency. EU Official Journal N° L326, p. 1-16. See also Theobald 
and Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Danner and Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 
95a EnWG Ref. 12. 
1745 Franz Jürgen Säcker, "Das Verhältnis von Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsrecht," EnWZ Vol. 4, no. 12 
(2015), 532. 
1746 Theobald and Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Danner and Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Sec. 95a EnWG Ref. 3. With reference to recital 1 of European Parliament and Council. Regulation 
N° 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency. EU Official Journal N° L326, 1-16. 
1747 Säcker, "Das Verhältnis von Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsrecht," EnWZ Vol. 4, no. 12 (2015), 534. 
1748 Norbert Huber, in Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, ed. Martin Kment(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), Sec. 95 
EnWG Ref. 1. 
1749 Such is the case for Sec. 19 GWB: Wolf, in Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches 
Wettbewerbsrecht, ed. Bornkamm, Montag, and Säcker, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 19 GWB 
Ref. 1. 
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Yet, scope and purpose of fining still remain considerably different between the two regu-
latory regimes due to the distinct structure of the infringements: While companies are in 
the focus of antitrust, energy law also comprises infringements committed by individuals. 
Sec. 111 EnWG contains an exemption from the applicability of Sec. 19 GWB in the field 
of energy law: Questions referring to the grid (namely Sec. 17, 20 et sqq. EnWG) may not 
be subject to an abuse control according to Sec. 19 GWB. Yet, with regard to the manip-
ulations of the wholesale markets for power subject to this work, the exemption does not 
apply and the parallelism of both regimes remains in force.1750 This view is de lege lata 
confirmed by Sec. 130(3) GWB, stating that except from the rule in Sec. 111 EnWG, abuse 
control according to Sec. 19 GWB is applicable to the energy markets.1751 
In conclusion, regulatory objectives of antitrust and energy law differ considerably, as well 
as the sanctioning systems applied. Therefore, both regulatory regimes apply in parallel, 
while the principle of proportionality may require the crediting of fines already paid in an 
earlier procedure.1752 
 
c) The relation between capital market and energy law sanctions 
The relation between capital market and energy law is slightly different from the 
ones discussed so far: Both codes regulate particular industries and, other than with an-
titrust, do not stand in a relation of generality versus specialty to each other. This fact 
already points to the differences of the two sector specific regulatory regimes. While capital 
market law focuses, as has been pointed out before, on the functionality of the capital 
markets in order to preserve the market participant´s confidence in the market out-
come,1753 energy law and namely the REMIT provisions specifically regulate the markets 
for power and gas to ensure fair trading of these goods in the wholesale markets.1754 Even 
though capital market law applies on these wholesale markets, REMIT brings new rules 
that shall improve the fight against market manipulations in this particular industry.1755 
                                                 
1750 Säcker, "Das Verhältnis von Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsrecht," EnWZ Vol. 4, no. 12 (2015), 531. 
1751 Wolf, in Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht, ed. Bornkamm, Montag, 
and Säcker, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), Sec. 19 GWB Ref. 19. 
1752 Schmidt-Aßmann, in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Manuz and Dürig, 75 ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 
Art. 103 GG Ref. 278. 
1753 Schwark, in Kapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar, ed. Schwark and Zimmer, 4th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 
2010), Sec. 20a WpHG Ref. 7. 
1754 Theobald and Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Danner and Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Sec. 95a EnWG Ref. 3. With reference to recital 1 of European Parliament and Council. Regulation 
N° 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency. EU Official Journal N° L326, 1-16. 
1755 Theobald and Werk, in Energierecht: Kommentar, ed. Danner and Theobald, 86th ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Sec. 95a EnWG Ref. 4. 
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For this purpose, also the quality of the sanctions is different: In energy law, precisely 
according to Sec. 95a(1) EnWG in connection with REMIT, even criminal sanctions reach-
ing up to imprisonment for a maximum of five years are possible in severe cases that 
result in an actual influence on the price in the wholesale markets.1756 Furthermore, the 
authority may levy excess profits, Sec. 95(2) first sentence EnWG. Capital market law 
sanctions infringements of Sec. 20a WpHG with criminal sanctions as well, Sec. 38, 39 
WpHG, including imprisonment of up to five years. The levy of excess profits is however 
not part of the sanctioning regime. 
In conclusion, the differences between the regulated sectors and the sanctions suggest 
the parallel application of capital market and energy law. If the summation of fines results 
in an infringement of the principle of proportionality, crediting of fines already paid may 
be required.1757 
 
d) Conclusion 
In conclusion, the parallel application of sanctions from antitrust, capital market and 
energy law is no infringement of the ne bis in idem principle. There is material concurrence 
between the fields of law named. Solely the principle of proportionality may require the 
crediting of fines paid before in another legal procedure. 
This finding requires the coordination of the authorities involved in the prosecution of 
market manipulations in order to come to a fair sanction of the infringement – at the best 
with consideration of expected damages to be paid as a result of private damages claims. 
 
3. The coordination of FCO, BNetzA and BaFin 
The parallel applicability of sanctions for market manipulations in the energy whole-
sale market from three different fields of law requires the coordination of the authorities 
involved1758 in order to come to a total fine that is in accordance with the constitutional 
principle of proportionality. 
                                                 
1756 Huber, in Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, ed. Kment(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), Sec. 95a EnWG Ref. 2. 
1757 Schmidt-Aßmann, in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, ed. Manuz and Dürig, 75 ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 
Art. 103 GG Ref. 278. 
1758 With regard to the relationship of BNetzA and FCO refer to Säcker, "Das Verhältnis von Wettbewerbs- und 
Regulierungsrecht," EnWZ Vol. 4, no. 12 (2015), 535. 
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For the three named fields of law involved, the competent authorities under German law 
are: 
▪ The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) for the field of antitrust, 
▪ the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) for the field of energy law (EnWG), 
▪ the Saxon State Ministry of Economic Affairs, Labor and Transport (SMWA), and 
▪ the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) for the field of capital market 
law.1759 
In case of severe infringements triggering criminal sanctions, the public prosecutors ra-
tione loci and ratione materiae may also be involved.1760 
So far, there is only limited coordination between the three authorities with regard to 
manipulation cases at the energy exchange. Since the introduction of REMIT and its im-
plementation in the German Act on the Establishment of a Market Transparency Unit for 
Electricity and Gas Wholesale Trading (Markttransparenzstellengesetz), FCO and BNetzA 
cooperate in the Transparency Unit at the BNetzA, Sec. 47a(1) GWB. A cooperation agree-
ment between the two authorities regulates the allocation of responsibilities and the coor-
dination of the data collection, Sec. 47a(3) GWB.1761 The unit analyzes the data collected 
for suspicious facts that suggest an infringement of Sec. 1, 19, 20, 29 GWB and the cor-
responding Art. 102, 102 TFEU, as well as infringements of WpHG, BörsG and REMIT pro-
visions, Sec. 47b(6) GWB.1762 In case there is suspicion of an infringement, the information 
is passed on to the authorities to initiate proceedings in the relevant field, Sec. 47b(7) 
GWB. 
However, the Market Transparency Unit does not coordinate the proceedings, once 
started, any more.1763 The GWB contains provisions that empower the Market Transpar-
ency Unit to close cooperation agreements with other authorities, Sec. 47i(2) GWB. This 
is yet not compulsory and may not ensure coordination with regard to the total fine that 
results for the infringer from all – independent – proceedings. The constitutionality of the 
                                                 
1759 Volker Lüdemann and Selma Konar, "Die Überwachung von Stromgroßhandelsmarkt und 
Emissionshandelsmarkt," ZNER Vol. 19, no. 2 (2015), 81. 
1760 See for example the procedures initiated by the public prosecutor´s office in Leipzig, reply to a request for 
information from January 8, 2015, case N° 206 AR 3564/14. 
1761 Lüdemann and Konar, "Die Überwachung von Stromgroßhandelsmarkt und Emissionshandelsmarkt," ZNER 
Vol. 19, no. 2 (2015), 82. 
1762 Tanja Reiner and Alexandra Rohlje, in Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches 
Wettbewerbsrecht, ed. Joachim Bornkamm, Frank Montag, and Franz Jürgen Säcker, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015), Sec. 47b GWB Ref. 20. 
1763 Ibid, Sec. 47b GWB Ref. 21. 
Fifth Chapter: An Integrated System of Market Surveillance 
C. An Integrated Legal System of Public and Private Law Enforcement 
335 
 
total fine does however depend on the compliance with the principle of proportionality. 
With regard to the doubts that excessive antitrust fines alone raise in so far, coordination 
between the different proceedings is an urgent matter. The Market Transparency Unit in 
its current form may hence only be the beginning of an integrated prosecution system. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The preceding sections have shown that there is material concurrence between the 
sanctioning systems of antitrust, capital market and energy law. Yet, currently a compre-
hensive coordination system between the authorities involved – namely FCO, BNetzA and 
BaFin, is missing. The existing Market Transparency Unit establishes coordination between 
FCO and BNetzA in data collection and analysis and examines the data for infringements 
of all three named fields of law. 
Still, a coordination mechanism for the resulting total fine that a company faces is missing. 
This is notably problematic with regard to the constitutional principle of proportionality 
that is according to this work already violated due to the excessive antitrust fines alone. 
The fact that other authorities´ fines and also potential payments to injured parties from 
private damages claims are not taken into account in the individual process of fining of 
any of the authorities involved aggravates this conclusion. 
The solution to the conflict between the different fields of law hence requires a coordination 
system that goes beyond today´s Market Transparency Unit1764 – or at least extends its 
powers to the coordination of the procedures started in the three authorities. 
The following section II. will focus on the solution to the conflict between public and private 
prosecution using the example of antitrust. Thereafter, section III. combines both ap-
proaches to an integrated system of law enforcement. 
 
II. Public and private prosecution in balance 
To balance the conflicting interests of public and private prosecution of market ma-
nipulations, three approaches are being discussed: 
▪ The elimination of barriers for private damages claims (section 1), 
                                                 
1764 Lüdemann and Konar, "Die Überwachung von Stromgroßhandelsmarkt und Emissionshandelsmarkt," ZNER 
Vol. 19, no. 2 (2015), 87. 
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▪ the exemption from liability for the leniency applicant towards damages claimants 
(section 2), or 
▪ a monistic system of law enforcement with centralized powers at the FCO (section 
3). 
This section will present and discuss the named approaches with regard to their effective-
ness in the enforcement of infringements of the market rules. 
 
1. The elimination of barriers for private damages 
claims 
As has been shown, claimants pursuing damages claims against antitrust infringers 
suffer from problems to prove their claim in court due to the restrictive practice of the FCO 
with regard to the disclosure of information contained in the leniency application.1765 Re-
ducing difficulty to provide proof, mainly with regard to the extent of the damage in court, 
would hence eliminate a key barrier for private damages claims. This needs however to 
be realized in a way that does not minder the effectiveness of the FCO leniency program. 
Some authors do therefore propose the lowering of the legal requirements on the 
quantification of the damage. Inderst et al. propose to move away from „seemingly 
precise“ econometric modeling of the damage. Rather, the specification of lower and upper 
limits of the damage, preferably in connection with the probability that the actual damage 
is within these limits (confidence intervals), is recommended. The lower and upper bounds 
of the damage are determined using different empirical methods and assumptions in the 
process of quantification.1766 
Today, Sec. 33(3) GWB in connection with Sec. 287 ZPO only allow for the estimation of 
the harm by the court in German law.1767 The estimation requires the specification of the 
minimal damage that would have been paid in case the manipulation did not occur.1768 
This ruling is hence close to the Inderst solution. However, it remains debatable whether 
                                                 
1765 Jungermann, "Obtaining US-Discovery for Use in German Private Antitrust Actions," WuW Vol. 64, no. 1 
(2014), 4. Also Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und 
Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2011), 322. 
1766 Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe, "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," in 
Handbuch der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, ed. Fuchs and Weitbrecht (München: C.H. Beck, 2016), 46 
(not yet published). 
1767 Makatsch and Mir, "Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen - Angst vor der eigenen 
"Courage"?," EuZW Vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), 8. 
1768 Berliner Transportbeton, Case 2 U 10/03 Kart, WuW/E DE-R, 2773 Ref. 31 (Higher Regional Court Berlin 
2009). 
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the specification of confidence intervals for the assessment of the damage really improves 
the situation for claimants. The underlying methodology is quite the same as for today´s 
seemingly precise determination of cartel damages – both approaches rely on statistical 
methods or econometric modeling and require comprehensive economic expertise and 
data. The effort and cost that claimants face may hence not be diminished – and so will 
not eliminate the barriers for private damages claims. 
Jungermann proposes to obtain discovery via an US District Court for use in German 
civil proceedings.1769 Discovery under title 28 of the United States Code section 1782(a) 
provides that a US district court may order a person residing or found in that court´s 
district to give testimony or produce documents for use in a proceeding in a foreign inter-
national tribunal upon the application of an interested person.1770 This procedure starts 
after initiation of the proceeding and before the trial. Any party of the proceeding is given 
the right to request surrender of all documents, digital data, written interrogatories, or 
depositions relevant to the claim from the other party. Also trade secrets need to be dis-
closed, but may be subject to confidential treatment by the court.1771 
However, discovery entails huge efforts and expenditures for the investigation of the sub-
stantive truth – a party shall not be in disadvantage only due to a an opposing party´s 
superior knowledge and evidence.1772 A demand for legal assistance in the US discovery 
procedure is hence an effective tool for the collection of evidence that has been used 
before by German claimants in the context of patent and tax disputes.1773 However, due 
to the high cost of the procedure, the barrier for private damages claims does not get 
smaller with the use of US-discovery. 
An effective system of law enforcement hence requires a more far-reaching approach than 
the simple elimination of barriers in civil procedure for private damages claims against the 
manipulators.1774 
                                                 
1769 Jungermann, "Obtaining US-Discovery for Use in German Private Antitrust Actions," WuW Vol. 64, no. 1 
(2014), 4. Refer also to Steger, "Zugang durch die Hintertüre? - zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugenanträge von 
Kartellanten," Betriebs-Berater Vol. 69, no. 17 (2014), 970. 
1770 Jungermann, "Obtaining US-Discovery for Use in German Private Antitrust Actions," WuW Vol. 64, no. 1 
(2014), 4. 
1771 Ibid, 6. 
1772 Ibid, 7. 
1773 Ibid, 17. 
1774 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 154. Similar Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung 
und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 319. 
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2. Exemption from liability of the leniency applicant 
A farther-reaching solution to the conflict between public and private prosecution of 
market manipulations is the exclusion from liability to third parties of the leniency appli-
cant. In the literature, this solution is proposed:1775 The leniency applicant is privileged in 
the internal relationship with the other infringers – while he may be sued by injured third 
parties on the basis of joint and several liability.1776 Absolute protection of the data dis-
closed in the leniency application would hence no longer be required and claimants would 
have easy access the proof they require for a successful claim.1777 
Yet, this approach raises constitutional concerns: Claims for damages are covered by the 
property guarantee in Art. 14 GG – the full exclusion of damages claims against the leni-
ency applicant would hence be an intervention in this constitutional right that is hard to 
justify.1778 In particular if the European law is also taken into perspective, which grants 
full compensation to parties injured by antitrust infringements, the justification of full ex-
clusion of damages claims against the leniency applicant seems not feasible. Some authors 
do therefore propose the introduction of a damages multiplier comparable to the US treble 
damages (triple damages payments) in German law. This approach would in consequence 
allow for a differentiation of the damages payments between the infringers, e.g. treble 
damages for cartel members except the leniency applicant whose liability might be limited 
to single damages.1779 
However, even this solution only works in the context of today´s leniency policy addressed 
solely to cartels. It would not have any effect on the approach followed in this work that 
extends the leniency policy to manipulations. In manipulation cases, only the manipulator 
discloses his infringement to the authority. In the absence of other cartel members, only 
the leniency applicant may be liable to third parties – there is no joint and several liability 
that he could be exempted from in the internal relationship. 
                                                 
1775 Ulrich Schwalbe and Jan Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private 
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," ibid, 631. 
1776 Kersting, "Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ZWeR Vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), 
266. Also "Removing the Tension Between Public and Private Enforcement: Disclosure and Privileges for 
Successful Leniency Applicants," Journal of European Competition Law & Practice Vol. 5, no. 1 (2014), 4. Refer 
also to Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," WuW 
Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 485. 
1777 With further reference to the literature Christian Kersting, "Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten 
Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht," ibid Vol. 64, no. 6 (2014), 569. 
1778 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 632. 
1779 Ibid, 634 et sqq. 
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Therefore, this approach may improve the situation of claimants in cartel cases, but is not 
suited to improve the prosecution of manipulation cases discussed in this work and will 
hence not be examined any further here. 
 
3. A monistic system of law enforcement 
Finally, a monistic system of law enforcement has been discussed in the litera-
ture.1780 This section shall discuss the approach in depth. Basically, it denies the parallel-
ism of public and private enforcement (dualistic model) and proposes to eliminate the 
separation between both systems. Rather, a monistic public procedure that connects 
fines and levy of profits procedures in one hand shall take the place of today´s two con-
flicting systems.1781 
In more detail, the monistic system works as follows: 
▪ The public fines procedure remains the same as it is today, including the application 
of the leniency programs of Commission and FCO to incentivize disclosure of in-
fringements by the firms. 
▪ In addition to pubic fining, the excess profits from the antitrust infringement are 
being levied by the authority – but not to the benefit of the treasury, but to the 
benefit of the injured parties. A further enforcement of damages claims shall be 
excluded.1782 
 
                                                 
1780 Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," WuW Vol. 
62, no. 5 (2012), 485 et sqq. Refer also to Hans Jürgen Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots 
durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," ibid Vol. 61, no. 12 (2011), 1246 et sqq. 
1781 Thomas Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," 
ibid Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 485. Refer also to "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in 
Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, 
and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 331-332. Similar Canenbley and Steinvorth, 
"Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt die Lösung des Konflikts de lege 
ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 
Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010), 143 et sqq. 
1782 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 157. Also Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," 
WuW Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 485. 
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a) Advantages of a monistic system 
Such organization of law enforcement in antitrust has a number of advantages that 
have been pointed out by the literature:1783 
▪ First and most importantly, the conflict between the leniency program in public 
enforcement and the need for access to evidence in private enforcement is being 
solved. While the leniency applicant remains exempted from the fine according to 
the rules of the applicable leniency program, his liability risk towards injured parties 
may be limited in the framework of the monistic procedure to a foreseeable and 
sensible amount.1784 
▪ The problem of third-party access to evidence is resolved – since the whole proce-
dure is one of administrative law, there is no need for an inspection of files by third 
parties.1785 
▪ The expertise of the FCO with regard to the determination of the excess profits 
subject to levy of profits ensures a precise and cost-efficient determination of dam-
ages – other than to be expected by the civil courts that are no specialized experts 
in this field. 
▪ Furthermore, the concentration of the procedures at the antitrust authorities en-
sures a consistent jurisdiction (which would be unlikely in case of several different 
civil damages claims before different courts) and safes costs.1786 
▪ Also, it saves time and cost as compared to today´s dualistic system: The addi-
tional work for the antitrust authorities is less than if a number of cases were 
treated in parallel or in succession before the authorities and the courts.1787 
▪ Eventually, the preventive deterrence of antitrust infringements increases if also 
leniency applicants face a (limited) liability towards the injured parties. At the same 
                                                 
1783 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 157. Also Kapp, "Das Akteneinsichtsrecht kartellgeschädigter Unternehmen: Bonn locuta, causa finita?," 
WuW Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012), 486-487. 
1784 Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 338. 
1785 Ibid, 339. 
1786 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 159. 
1787 Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," WuW Vol. 61, 
no. 12 (2011), 1246. 
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time, the monistic system ensures that no inefficiently high level of deterrence is 
being installed due to the weak coordination of public and private enforcement. 
However, antitrust authorities argue that it was not their task to take care of the compen-
sation of damages. Canenbley/Steinvorth reply with the protective function of antitrust 
law: It is supposed to protect both, competition and the consumers. The authors do hence 
consider the determination of the damage and the distribution among the injured consum-
ers as a consequent development of the antitrust enforcement system, rather than an 
inconsistency. Furthermore, fining shall not only refer to specific and general deterrence, 
but needs to factor into the detrimental effects of an antitrust infringement as well.1788 
Already today, the fine is calculated referring to the turnover from the sale of goods and 
services subject to the infringing practices (N° 5 of the German FCO guidelines on the 
determination of fines.1789 Following Canenbley/Steinvorth, it is hence a question of fair-
ness that the economic advantage is awarded to the group at whose expense it has been 
earned before.1790 
A monistic system of law enforcement is therefore not only advantageous to balance the 
conflicting tools of public and private enforcement. It is even an original task of the FCO. 
The following section will thus discuss a potential design of the integrated system. 
 
b) The design of the monistic system of law enforcement 
While the literature agrees about the preservation of the current public fines system 
including the leniency program also in a future monistic system of law enforcement,1791 
there is some discussion about the detailed design of the compensatory share for private 
damages. Three approaches discussed at the moment shall be presented and evaluated 
                                                 
1788 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 157. 
1789 Federal Cartel Office, Promulgation N° 38/2006 on the Determination of Fines Pursuant to Sec. 81(4) 
second sentence GWB, 2006, 38/2006. 
1790 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 158. 
1791 Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 332. See also Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und 
Schadensersatz - Liegt die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: 
Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010), 157. 
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with regard to their ability to solve the conflict between public and private prosecution in 
the following sections. Those are: 
▪ A fund that collects damages from the infringer for the distribution to the injured 
parties (section 1), 
▪ The empowerment of the FCO to participate in or even take over private damages 
claims against the infringers (section 2), or 
▪ the disgorgement of benefits from the infringers based on today´s Sec. 34, 34a 
GWB (section 3). 
 
(1) A fund to collect damages from the infringers 
Some authors propose the introduction of a fund that collects the damages payments 
of the infringers and distributes them among the injured parties during a defined period. 
Amounts that have not been claimed at due date would fall back into the treasury.1792 This 
solution does however not specify how the damages payments are determined and divided 
between the infringers. In its current form, the proposal is therefore not suited to serve 
as a model for an integrated, monistic system of law enforcement. 
 
(2) The FCO´s participation in private damages claims as “amicus curiae” 
Bueren proposes a different solution to the dilemma of conflicting public and private 
prosecution: The antitrust authority shall be enabled to participate in private damages 
claims as “amicus curiae” and even have the power to overtake the privates´ claims. This 
approach would hence also work with antitrust infringements not yet known to the FCO.1793 
However, due to the problems of private parties to collect evidence to prove their claims 
even in cases known to the FCO, it appears highly unlikely that this approach proves 
successful. The detection and proof of the infringement will remain the core task of the 
antitrust authorities.1794 
                                                 
1792 Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und Schadensersatz - Liegt 
die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2010), 157. 
1793 Bueren, "Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug: Eine rechtsökonomische und 
rechtsvergleichende Analyse," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 3 (2012), 341-342. 
1794 Schwalbe and Höft, "Ausgestaltung von Kronzeugenprogrammen und private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung," 
in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, 
Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 622. 
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(3) The disgorgement of benefits based on today´s Sec. 34, 34a GWB 
Kapp proposes a different approach for the levy of excess profits: In his model, the 
levy is based on today´s existing Sec. 34, 34a GWB that regulate the disgorge-
ment of benefits by the antitrust authority respectively associations.1795 In a first 
step, the excess profits realized due to the antitrust infringement are determined. This 
refers to the difference between the profits due to the manipulation of the market (M) 
and the (hypothetical) profits that would have been earned in a competitive market envi-
ronment (C): 
ΔΠ = ΠM - ΠC. 
Since the determination of profits requires internal information from the firm, a request 
for information may be started. If necessary, e.g. due to remaining uncertainties, the 
excess profit may be estimated according to Sec. 287 ZPO. 
In addition to the excess profits, the antitrust authority charges a procedural fee from 
the infringers to cover the cost of the procedure. Finally, the authority issues notifications 
about the amount that shall be levied to all infringers. 
Leniency applicants may be privileged by an exemption from the procedural fee and the 
exclusion of joint and several debt in this system.1796 
If in the course of this procedure a damage caused by the infringement has been found, 
all potentially injured parties are being asked publicly to register their damages claims 
until a deadline (so-called opt-in procedure). Thereafter, the authority checks the justifi-
cation of the registered claims. Finally, the overall distribution amount and the distribution 
system are determined. 
Besides, legal protection is to be granted to parties whose damages claims have been 
rejected by the authority as unjustified.1797 
 
(4) Conclusion 
In conclusion, only the proposal by Kapp may convince if extended on abuse cases. 
His system is the only approach that truly integrates the private enforcement of antitrust 
damages into the existing public enforcement system. Only with this full integration, the 
                                                 
1795 Thomas Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," ibid, 334. 
1796 Ibid, 333. 
1797 Inspired by the approach for the case of hardcore cartels by ibid, 335-336. 
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above-named advantages of a monistic system may be realized and the conflict be solved 
for all parties concerned. Also, his proposal builds upon the existing Sec. 34, 34a GWB 
and does hence not require a completely new structure in the law and in practice in the 
antitrust authorities. The hurdles for a realization of this approach are hence comparably 
low. 
 
c) The monistic system is in conformity with EU law 
Since EU primary law requires effective legal protection and the right to claim dam-
ages for everybody who suffered harm from the infringement of EU law,1798 the introduc-
tion of a monistic system of law enforcement would have to comply with this requirement. 
The design of the national enforcement system is not regulated in detail by EU law. Rather, 
it is up to the national parliaments to issue rules that guarantee effective enforcement of 
damages claims.1799 German national rules on the enforcement of damages for private 
parties hence need to comply with the effectivity requirements established in EU law. 
The integrated enforcement system presented in the preceding section ensures that in-
jured parties may not only claim damages from the infringers, but also effectively get to 
enforce the payment in court. As compared to today´s dualistic system that leaves the 
proof of the claims and evidence for the quantification of the damage to the parties, ef-
fectiveness is highly improved in the monistic approach. It does hence not conflict with 
the rules of EU law.1800 With a strict interpretation of EU law, one might even argue that 
the monistic approach is the only allowed choice for the Member States, if other ap-
proaches infringe subjective rights of the injured parties.1801 Art. 101 et sqq. TFEU require 
effective enforcement of EU antitrust law by the national legal systems.1802 A solution that 
leads to ineffective results in enforcement of antitrust sanctions like the current dualistic 
system practiced in Germany may hence not be in conformity with primary EU law. 
                                                 
1798 Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, European Court Reports 2001, I-6297 Ref. 25-26 
(European Court of Justice 2001). 
1799 Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 337. With reference to Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, European Court Reports 2001, 
I-6297 Ref. 29 (European Court of Justice 2001). 
1800 Kapp, "Abschaffung des Private Enforcement bei Hardcore-Kartellen," in Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel, ed. Bechtold, Jickeli, and Rohe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 337. Similar Canenbley and Steinvorth, "Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und 
Schadensersatz - Liegt die Lösung des Konflikts de lege ferenda in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?," in 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft. 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010. Festschrift (Köln: 
Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010), 159. 
1801 Weller, "Die Anrechnung pönaler Schadensersatzleistungen gemäß § 33 GWB auf Kartellbußen," ZWeR 
Vol. 6, no. 2 (2008), 186. 
1802 Thomas Ackermann, "Kartellgeldbußen als Instrument der Wirtschaftsaufsicht," ibid Vol. 10, no. 1 (2012), 
6. 
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Still, this solution requires the legislator on both the national and the European level. 
However, improvements may still be made de lege lata: In the process of calculation of 
the fine, compensation paid to injured parties may be considered as a factor reducing the 
fine.1803 This would be a first step to the coordination of public and private enforcement. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the integration of private enforcement of antitrust infringements in 
the public fines procedure (so-called monistic system) is a promising approach to solve 
the conflict between the two systems and achieve effective enforcement of antitrust in-
fringements.1804 Kapp has presented a model for hard core cartels that might, if extended 
to abuse cases, work as well for the manipulations at the energy exchange. It does how-
ever require changes by the legislator de lege ferenda to become effective. 
 
III. The integrated system of law enforcement 
The preceding sections have shown that supervision of the energy markets requires 
a far more integrated approach than common today. This refers to both, the coordination 
between the authorities involved in the prosecution of market manipulations and the co-
ordination between public and private prosecution efforts.1805 
Section I. showed that coordination between the FCO (antitrust), the BNetzA (energy 
law/REMIT) and the BaFin (capital market law) should happen at the existing Market 
Transparency Unit. This unit needs however extension de lege ferenda in order to suc-
cessfully coordinate the outcomes of the three authorities´ procedures and come to a 
constitutional total fine for an infringement of the market rules. 
Section II. concentrated on the balance between public and private prosecution and came 
to the conclusion that a monistic system of law enforcement that includes private damages 
claims in the public enforcement system is the most effective solution to this conflict. 
                                                 
1803 Meyer-Lindemann, "Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots durch Bußgeld und Schadensersatz," WuW Vol. 61, 
no. 12 (2011), 1247. 
1804 With regard to the effectiveness argument also refer to Stockmann, "Zur neueren Bußgeldpraxis bei 
Kartellverstößen," ZWeR Vol. 10, no. 1 (2012), 45. 
1805 With regard to the coordination of public and private prosecution efforts refer to Block, Nold, and Sidak, 
"The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy Vol. 89, no. 3 (1981), 443. 
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Bringing it all together, the solution must be an integrated system of law enforcement. 
The proposal is pictured in the following figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: An integrated system of law enforcement for the wholesale market for power 
 
The system contains the following steps: 
▪ The existing Market Transparency Unit monitors the wholesale market for power, 
Sec. 47b GWB.  
▪ In case of suspicion of an infringement, the examination is passed on to the com-
petent authorities, already effective law, Sec. 47b(7) GWB. 
Market Transparency 
Unit 
Traders in the wholesale market 
for power products 
Monitoring, Sec. 47b GWB 
BaFin 
(Capital Market 
Law) 
BNetzA 
(Energy Law) 
FCO 
(Antitrust) 
Coordination 
Suspicion Data 
Sanction FCO 
Sanction 
BNetzA 
Sanction 
BaFin 
Injured parties Infringers 
Damages Damages Damages 
Total sanction Levied profits (damages) 
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▪ Other than today, the authorities conduct not only the public fines procedure, but 
also an organized levy of the excess profits based on the existing Sec. 34, 34a 
GWB. The excess profits from the infringement are calculated and balanced with 
the government fine. 
▪ At the end of all procedures at the authorities involved, the total fine is found at 
the Market Transparency Unit in accordance with the constitution. 
▪ Finally, the excess profits levied in the official procedure are distributed between 
the injured parties who have registered their damage. 
This integrated solution ensures that the conflicts between the different prosecution ap-
proaches are solved the best possible way. Furthermore, it has several advantages: 
▪ The crucial work is left to the authorities competent in the particular field. 
▪ Still, coordination is ensured due to the continuous exchange at the Market Trans-
parency Unit. 
▪ The model builds on existing structures and does therefore not cause a fundamen-
tal change in the authorities involved or high modification expenses. 
▪ A high number of parallel complicated and costly private damages claims is 
avoided. 
▪ As a result, this integrated model of prosecution ensures that the complexity of the 
cases is well handled at a comparably low cost and that the constitutional principle 
of proportionality is respected. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the conflicts between the different approaches of law en-
forcement discussed in the first chapters of this work. It has been shown that efficient 
enforcement of the existing rules requires coordination between the authorities involved 
on the one hand and the public and private prosecution efforts on the other hand. As a 
solution, an integrated system of law enforcement has been presented. The next section 
will point out the consequences of these findings. 
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D. EU and German Constitutional Law Re-
quire the Integrated Monistic System 
The preceding section has presented a solution to the conflicts between the different 
fields of law involved as well as public and private prosecution efforts. However, it has also 
been pointed out that the introduction of a monistic system of law enforcement as well as 
the extension of the Market Transparency Unit´s competence for coordination between 
the authorities involved may only be realized de lege ferenda. 
However, there is particular urgency for the legislator to act in this case. As has been 
shown in the third and fourth chapters of this work, the current level of fines infringes 
European primary and German constitutional law.1806 As a result, only fines below the level 
of criminal law are feasible de lege lata.1807 The combined fines from procedures in dif-
ferent authorities, plus private damages claims from injured parties that are not included 
in the fines, by far pass the limit to criminal sanctions. Under the current system that 
knows almost no coordination of the activities of different authorities and private claim-
ants, an infringement of constitutional law is hence day-to-day business. The legislator´s 
action is therefore urgently required. 
Also with regard to the current system of private prosecution of antitrust damages 
claims, German law infringes European primary law. Indeed, has the European Union 
left the concrete design of the damages claims for injured parties to the Member States, 
Art. 3(1) of the antitrust damages directive.1808 However, the system needs to allow for 
the effective enforcement of the claims, Art. 4 of the directive.1809 As has been shown, this 
is not the case in German law.1810 The legislator is hence asked to provide an effective 
system for private enforcement efforts. The EU requirements with regard to effectiveness 
may best be realized with a monistic system of law enforcement as proposed in this sec-
tion.1811 
The requirements of German constitutional and EU law combined point to an integrated 
solution that ensures effective enforcement of both public and private prosecution efforts 
in the energy wholesale market. 
                                                 
1806 Refer to the third chapter of this work, section B.IV.1.a)cc). 
1807 Refer to the third chapter in section B.IV.1.a)bb)(6). 
1808 European Parliament and European Council. Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union. N° 2014/104/EU, EU Official Journal L 349, 1-19. 
1809 See already Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, European Court Reports 2001, I-6297 Ref. 
26 et sqq. (European Court of Justice 2001). 
1810 Refer to the fifth chapter of this work in section C.I.1.a)cc). 
1811 Refer to the preceding section C. of this chapter. 
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E. Summary and conclusion 
This fifth chapter has finally considered the interdependencies between all of the 
deterrence approaches based on either cost of detection CD or probability of punishment 
pp discussed in the first chapters of this work. 
It could be shown that namely the conflicts between the different fields of law concerned 
in the exemplary case of manipulations in the energy wholesale market, respectively the 
authorities involved, and between public and private prosecution of the manipulations 
drive the enforcement in Germany rather ineffective. This fact minders deterrence tre-
mendously: If manipulators do face a number of regulations that sanction manipulative 
behavior, but as well observe a lack of coordination between the authorities involved and 
no reliable perspective for private damages claims against their firms, they accurately 
deduce that a sanction is improbable – and carry on to manipulate as long as it is profita-
ble. 
A solution to the complex challenges that monitoring the energy wholesale market repre-
sents is not easy at hand. However, this chapter has shown that a practical and feasible 
solution might lie in the introduction of an integrated system of law enforcement that 
includes a combination of fines procedure and damages claims in a monistic system at the 
competent regulatory authority and extends the coordination between the authorities at 
the level of the existing Market Transparency Unit (Figure 29). 
Finally, the pressure for the legislator to act and implement the necessary changes de lege 
ferenda was emphasized with reference to the infringements of EU primary and German 
constitutional law that are caused by the current ineffective system. 
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SIXTH CHAPTER: 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS 
 
A. Introduction 
The economic and legal analysis of complex market manipulations using the example 
of the German wholesale market for energy conducted in this work has made an effort to 
cover the problem from all relevant perspectives in order to come to the most efficient 
and cost-effective solution. 
This last chapter will now summarize the findings based on the theses initially suggested 
in the introductory first chapter (section B.). Thereafter, section C. contains an overview 
of recommendations for administrative or legislative action de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda, which results from the insights of the first five chapters of this work. 
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B. Fundamental Results of the Analysis 
This work has treated the complex problem of market manipulations using the Ger-
man energy wholesale market, namely at the marketplace European Energy Exchange 
from both an economic and a legal point of view. In the course of the analysis, the following 
theses could be proved: 
(1) Data from the Federal Cartel Office´s and the European Commission´s inquiries, as 
well as the market structure in the market for power generation suggest that during 
the period of examination – the years from 2002 to 2008 – market participants, 
namely the four oligopoly firms E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall, have had incen-
tives to increase their profit through market manipulations. 
(2) A successful fight against market manipulations needs to impact the behavior of 
market participants through regulatory measures. Namely, legislative measures 
need to target the incentive system for market participants in order to change it in 
a way such that manipulations of the market are no attractive option. 
(3) The necessary impact on the market participants´ behavior is best reached by a 
change of the system of sanctions, because this causes repercussions on the offense. 
De lege lata, the FCO is required to change its approach to public market surveil-
lance, making a shift from the current focus on tremendous fines towards an in-
creased probability of punishment. Thereby, the total level of deterrence that guides 
the actors´ incentives is increased. 
(4) Besides the shift in paradigm in public market surveillance, the legislator needs to 
create better incentives for injured parties to engage in private market surveillance 
efforts de lege ferenda. Thereby, the deterrent effect stemming from public market 
surveillance efforts is further increased and information carriers from the sphere of 
potential infringers may be incentivized to disclose the information they possess to 
the regulator. 
(5) In order to achieve an effective and cost-efficient system of deterrence, better coor-
dination of public and private market surveillance efforts is required. This goal is best 
achieved by an integrated system of market surveillance that avoids potential con-
flicts between the different legal instruments.  
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C. Recommendations for Action 
Since the superior approach to the deterrence of market manipulations at the EEX 
requires legislative action – and may hence only be implemented de lege ferenda – this 
section will shortly list measures that promise improvements de lege lata and should 
therefore be realized immediately by the agents involved. 
 
I. Improvements in market surveillance 
In the field of market surveillance, in particular one instrument with a focus on the 
increase of the probability of punishment should be implemented in the short term: The 
combined introduction of leniency for abuse cases together with financial re-
wards for whistleblowers. This instrument promises to considerable increase the prob-
ability of punishment at lowest cost due to the implementation of a prisoner´s dilemma 
situation for market manipulators. This system should therefore be implemented de lege 
lata based on the existing rules of the FCO and individual negotiations with whistleblowers. 
 
II. Conclusion 
While the measure named in this section is not suited to solve the problem of market 
manipulations in complex scenarios like the energy exchange in its entirety, it proposes 
considerable improvements of deterrence in the very short term because it does not re-
quire changes of the existing laws that are necessarily accompanied by time-consuming 
legislative processes and discussions with uncertain outcome. Therefore, the proposal 
named in this section should absolutely be realized even before the numerous further 
changes to the legal system are implemented. 
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